

LUCKNOW UNIVERSITY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

BRADLEY AND BERGSON

A Comparative Study

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

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with a Foreword by

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FOREWORD

This volume constitutes the first publication of research work in Philosophy carried on at the Lucknow University. It is the work of a promising young scholar who feels that there is a method of approach and a vision of reality common to the metaphysics of Bradley and Bergson. The idea is probably too unorthodox. But Mr Loomba is not afraid of philosophical heterodoxy.

His excursions into the field of Indian Philosophy have brought certain conceptions into sharp relief. It seems that he has been largely influenced by the Hindu thought in his metaphysical outlook.

Mr Loomba has adopted a refreshingly genial attitude towards rival schools of thought, an attitude that rules out the pessimism and despair as to real advance and achievement in Philosophy which is so much in the air these days. "The point which we wish to emphasise here," he says, "is that every well-meaning and sincere attempt at a knowledge of the ultimate reality must in its own way and to a certain degree go some way towards attaining its desired object. Total failure there is none."

Many of the Neo-Hegelians believe that Bradley's

philosophy has in its making a strain of Mysticism. Bradley himself says that a metaphysical enquiry is calculated to satisfy the mystical side of our nature. Again for Bradley, the Reality must satisfy the whole nature. Hence in Bradley's metaphysics, Knowing is the same as Being. Approached from this point of view Bradley and Bergson do not seem to be so very different in their outlook. Both their epistemologic and metaphysical standpoints appear to converge to a field which is somewhere midway between idealism and mysticism. Mr. Loomba has exhibited an excellent philosophical acumen in his appreciation of this fact.

Ordinarily Mysticism and Idealism seem to be poles apart. The latter particularly is anxious to disclaim filiation with the former. Our author however has developed in the volume before us a particular logical attitude. This attitude consists in an attempt to see behind every philosophical formulation the working of a set of historical factors as well as the expression of a mystical vision of some great and fundamental truth. Both of these contribute, he argues, to each of the alternative types in Philosophy. And whenever two great rival alternatives meet and agree in their basic vision, there, he says, is achieved a permanent and final contribution to the System of Philosophy which thinking humanity is striving to build up.

Philosophical training usually breeds a degree of sophistication. This expresses itself today in the shape of a half-expressed agnosticism which is a cloak for want of boldness of conviction. Our author is certainly not guilty of this. He seizes upon a point of view and boldly says that a new theory of life and knowledge can be built upon it.

N. N. SEN GUPTA.

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No mere words can adequately express my debt to my professor Dr Narendra Nath Sen Gupta. Not only has he very kindly written the Foreword to this book the work has also had the opportunity of developing under his direct advice and guidance. Indeed it was at his suggestion that the work was originally undertaken as a thesis for the Master's Degree in Philosophy. And but for his continuous help and encouragement it would perhaps have never been written. I am also deeply grateful to Professor Hari Das Bhattacharya of Dacca University whose appreciation of the work has considerably determined its publication in the present form.

RAM MURTI LOOMBA.

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CHAPTER ONE

WAYS OF METAPHYSICAL QUEST

Four kinds of men of fair deeds all
O Arjuna look up to me —
Who suffers Pain, who yearns for the Truth
Who longs for Good and last the Wise.
—Bhagavadgita.

Alas ' the senses outward bound
Are cursed by God and so perceive
The world without and not the self
Within But some brave soul perceives
The Indweller his eyes withdrawn
And on immortality bent.
—Kathakopanishad

The average man of the world is guided in his everyday life chiefly by one idea—that of reward and punishment. This idea is based upon an unquestionable belief in a moral world-order and implies the traditional conceptions of God Spirit Soul Man, Duty and Morality. But the view does not go far in analysing their exact nature it merely

accepts them and their interrelations. The common man is not speculative in the manner of the scientific metaphysician. He is content to accept certain ultimate and basic truths behind the appearances. He does not doubt the conceptions, he merely interprets and elaborates them. For, his main concern is not knowledge as such but only knowledge of the Ultimate so far as it may in any way serve his practical endeavours. Such a man is called 'artharthi' he seeks knowledge of the Absolute or of God only to get fulfilment of certain desires, ambitions or 'kamanas' of his own. And his metaphysical quest therefore naturally takes the form of a religious pursuit—to know the Ultimate beings (one or more) and to please or to appease them. The average non-atheistic, God-fearing family of any country or nation may be taken as a typical example of such a search for the Absolutely Real.

But there are men in the world who have had no occasion to calmly seek or further worldly purposes by religious practice or otherwise. There have been men whose (shall we say unfortunate ?) lot of worldly life has been full of misery, pain and unhappiness. Their experience has shown them that there is after all nothing in this world but selfishness and wickedness, pain and sorrow, poverty and sickness, death and decay. They adopt a pessimistic view of this world,

they despair of happiness here And in order to escape the present unhappiness, they are naturally led to a question of a world beyond where there is no worry, no trouble no pain, no poverty, no misery, no unhappiness—where there shall be, in short, perfect peace Thence to the immortality of the soul, thence to the existence of God, and so forth The 'arta' or the man in distress in his attempt to reach a state of 'nirvana', must enter into the field of metaphysical speculation The origin of Buddhistic philosophy and of the minor subordinate systems that grew out of it (e g, Sarvastivada, Yogachara Shunyavada, etc.,) are relevant instances

There is a third type of seekers after Truth They also enter upon the pursuit with a troubled mind seeking for a solution But the worry that hangs over their minds is not about the sorrows and miseries of every day life They are perturbed about something more general and more objective They observe that experience offers us a world full (not of sorrow and pain) of contradictions and inconsistencies The multifarious phases in which it presents itself the differences and contrarieties between them—how are all these to be viewed by the human mind, the very nature of which is to seek unity and uniformity anywhere and everywhere A state of great perplexity and intellectual unrest is the natural consequence The only way to

solve this situation is to somehow build up a system of knowledge of the Universe which can explain all its multifariousness, variety, change and contradictions and inconsistencies with reference to simple, ultimate first principles—a purely metaphysical problem. Philosophy thus may also begin in wonder, and confusion, and doubt, though Plato was wrong in saying that it always begins in that way. Baffled by the apparent incoherences in nature and life, the 'jijnasu' yearns to know the Truth. Such an intellectual unrest as the starting point of metaphysical investigation is illustrated in the Indian system of Samkhya and in the whole trend of idealistic and realistic thought of the West.

The last type of seekers after Truth is called in the Bhagavadgita by the name of 'jnani' or the wise. A philosopher of this type pursues his inquiry with no particular object in view. His mind is not troubled either by misery and pain or by intellectual confusion. Nor does he undertake it that any of his worldly ambitions or desires be satisfied. He is a pure seeker after knowledge. He simply wants 'jnana' or wisdom, for its own and no other sake. Such is the Vedantist. With a mind clear of all despair, or confusion, or difficulties he sits down and applies himself to the procedure prescribed for him by the Holy Mimamsas, as an end in itself and with no intention other than to know.

These then, are the four ways how the metaphysical problem suggests itself to man. To further his worldly position, to escape the evil and misery of this world, to dispel the confusion of mind aroused by the apparent changes and self-contradictions in the Universe or finally, to gain pure knowledge for its own sake, he seeks to know the Absolutely Real, the Ultimate behind our external world, the Essence of Being.

And he tries to know it in either of two ways. He may pursue the path of rational investigation or the path of immediate apprehension. Rational enquiry adopts the method of reasoning, inference, and intellectual scientific speculation. Universal and necessary truths can be known only through reason, or through the intellect, or the understanding or what is in general called thought. It may be described as the faculty of forming concepts or ideas and of bringing out their relations in conformity with the inner unity peculiar to its own nature.

But the intellectualistic method of procedure in metaphysical investigation may take two different forms as the history of philosophic thought shows. It may take the form of scientific rationalism as employed by the naturalists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by the positivists and the Spencerian evolutionists of the nineteenth century and by the realists of today.

It is the method of the natural or the positive sciences applied to metaphysical problems. In fact, no such application of the purely scientific method to philosophy has as yet been carried out except to a certain extent by the New Realism of the present century. For, the naturalistic rationalists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were too busy with the readjustment of their knowledge of the special sciences in the light of the increasing new discoveries to be able to develop a rational scientific metaphysic. They had, however, laid down the problems which they felt such a metaphysic would discuss. Metaphysics had, for them, two main functions—to discover the eternal and immutable forms of bodies and to discuss purposes, ends or final causes. The positivists and the evolutionists also did but generalise the conclusions of their research in some special science to the higher and wider realm of philosophy. They carried out their investigations in the field of sociology, ethics and biology and raised the special laws thus reached to the status of metaphysical truths. The New Realists, on the other hand, though the school is yet in the stage of infancy, have sought to apply the rational principles of scientific enquiry directly to ultimate questions of metaphysics, as their writings, specially of the American school, shew. They have in fact expressly joined hands with each other, and in spite of individual differences of detail, are carrying on vigorous

cooperative studies to work up the realist programme which they have laid before themselves †

Again the method of intellectual approach may take the form of a search for the Absolute Truth or the Ultimate Reality in terms of idea or spirit. The constant supposition of such an inquiry is that a spiritual life which is a unified whole is at work in the depths of our soul. * Man is regarded as a microcosmic representation of God the Absolute his spiritual nature a revelation of the principle of Reality and his ideas or ideals the only sources whereby it can be known. The theory of knowledge is then for the idealist, the essential basis of all metaphysical investigation. Knowing is Being.

We can however look among idealists for agreement only in a common temper and a common direction of outlook rather than for agreement upon a set of hard and fast principles or formulae. Their cardinal principle changes its significance with each writer of that school. The aspect of the idealistic thesis which each thinker emphasises upon depends on the intellectual movements in the thinker's own time which he is either seeking to incorporate into his idealism or else to combat. It changes with the theory of episte-

† For an example of the results of such attempts we may refer to *The New Realism* by Holt, Marvin Montague Perry Pitkin and Spaulding.

* Euoken *Life of the Spirit*, p. 100

mology he adopts as the basis of his enquiry. Moreover it is determined by the corresponding stage which scientific research has attained in the course of its development, for, in defining the scope of science, we also thereby naturally affect the scope of idealistic metaphysic.

As an illustration we may observe the various types of idealistic theory that have sprung up since the first advent of 'ideas' in philosophy in the system of Plato. For Plato ideas are substances, eternal, transcendental archetypes of things, existing in a well-ordered world of their own beyond this world of sense, and these produce the 'things' by impressing their forms on the 'non-being' matter. In the much-discussed 'subjective idealism' of Berkeley there was a direct challenge to the materialism of Hobbes and others. For he absolutely denied the existence of matter and modified the concept of idea by lowering it to the level of human perceptions, though still retaining the eternal perceiver, God. He was the founder of modern idealism in as much as he was the first to expressly lay down the thesis "Knowing is Being" in his doctrine of *esse is percipi*. In Spinoza and Leibniz, again, we meet with a distinct type of idealism altogether; they analytically seek to resolve out of the Highest Idea ('Substance' in the case of Spinoza and 'Monad of Monads' in the case of Leibniz), by adopting the immanent view of causation,

the nature, in the one case, of modes, in the other, of 'monads'. The 'modes' are an eternal and necessary system of aspects of the Ultimate Substance each is "God in so far as God is affected in a certain manner". The monads similarly are manifestations of God graded in pre-established harmony each is a living mirror of the Universe which it represents in its own fashion.

German Transcendental Idealism, however, relifted the ideas from the level of 'perception' of the empiricists to what they called apperception and connected it with a superpersonal or impersonal logical consciousness which is called the Transcendental Synthetic Unity of Apperception. For Fichte this unity of apperception is to be identified with a divine Moral Will. Hegel followed and elaborated this transcendentalisation of ideas, but in a different way by introducing what he called the dialectical movement of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis in place of the forms and categories of the unity of apperception or of the moral will.

The Absolute Idealism of Green, the Cairds, Bradley and Bosanquet, similarly, has a unique significance of its own. It represents the spirit of protest against the current empiricism of Mill, the naturalism of Spencer and the positivism of Comte. The Neo-Idealism of Croce, Gentile and other Italians, likewise, had naturally to arise to affirm the reality and ultimacy of the spirit

against the tendency of contemporary physical realism to be little more in the scheme of things.

Let us now turn to the third method of metaphysical enquiry which man has taken recourse to as an alternative of intellectualistic rationalism: the method of immediate apprehension of the Real. The general idea behind this line of approach is that the Real can be known immediately, without the use of such complex processes as intellectual reasoning, inference, speculation or deduction. The Real presents itself to man in direct, first-hand experience.

Now, this method of direct apprehension, again, has also followed various paths even leading to quite opposed ways of thinking. Difference arises at the very outset as to what is the nature of that immediate experience which directly brings us face to face with the Ultimate Truths of Reality. The popular belief of the man on the street is naturally that the physical world we know through our senses is the real world of existence. It is obviously against such naive realism that the rationalists had raised the protesting voice of reason. Again, empiricism maintains that all knowledge is derived from perceptions. Direct experience is the sole source of knowledge and immediate experience consists in a combination of perceptions. Locke and Hume are the chief representatives of this school of thought. Berkeley carried the principle of empiricism

to its extreme in what is known as his 'subjectivism', the doctrine that *esse* is *percipi*.

But these attempts at defining an immediate experience of Reality in terms of every day sensuous (or, as in the case of Berkeley perceptual) experience did not agree with man's general vague and primitive notion expressed in the phrase Ultimate Reality. Custom and religion have since the most ancient times insisted that there are two worlds of knowledge the external world and the world beyond. Corresponding to them there are different ways of knowing. The world beyond, the world of Reality, as opposed to the external world of appearance, can not be known through any of the ordinary sources of knowledge like sensation perception reason or inference. The Ultimate, the Other the Beyond, can be attained only through a superhuman mode of knowledge. Man has in him a supernatural faculty of spiritual insight which can alone reveal to him the nature of Ultimate Truth. This faculty of intuition (and not sensation perception or reasoning) provides the mystic's method of immediate apprehension of Reality. Mysticism, in short, appeals to a special inner organ of absolute knowledge. "In this supernatural manner the soul knows God in the depths of her being and she sees Him, so to say more clearly than she sees the material light with the eyes of the body. Neither the senses nor

the imagination have the least part in this vision, all takes place in the summit of the spirit.” It is through this divine revelation that Boehme “saw and knew the whole working essence, in the evil and in the good, and the mutual origin and existence, and likewise how the fruitful bearing womb of eternity brought forth. . . a thorough view of the universe as in a chaos, wherein all things are couched and wrapped.”† Such a mystic method of direct apprehension of Reality is illustrated in the writings of Origen, of Plotinus, of Alvarez de Paz, of Angelo de Foligno, of John of the Cross, of Bernard of Clairvaux, of Hugo of St. Victor, of Bonaventura and of Eckhart in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, of Jacob Boehme in the sixteenth century, of Blaise Pascal in the seventeenth and of F. H. Jacobi in the eighteenth. Many writers would like to place Bergson in this same category, though the strictly ‘philosophical’ nature of his treatment of the problem of Reality (philosophical in the sense in which the term is used in speaking of the opposition between mysticism and philosophy, an opposition very similar to the one popularly expressed in the phrase “science versus religion”) would bid us hesitate before we make such an unwarranted assertion.

* Alvarez de Paz Works, Vol III, Bk. V, ch xiv

† Bennet A Philosophical Study of Mysticism, pp 70-71.

Now we have sketched briefly the various ways in which the problem of metaphysics arises and the various ways in which men have attempted to approach its solution. An exhaustive and accurate classification and subclassification of these ways is however a practical impossibility. There is such an infinite variety of views among individual philosophers that it is a hard task for any one to group any particular number of thinkers positively to one type of philosophical theory. In a general way of course, metaphysics has long ago been defined as an 'inquiry into first principles.' And no philosopher had has, or we hope shall ever have, anything new to say in the matter of a definitive statement of what the problem of metaphysics is. And it is due to this that an attempt at a comprehensive 'definition' of metaphysics is a rarity in the works of the greatest philosophers. Most of them have proceeded with their respective expositions without attempting an express definition of the general problem of metaphysics; the rest have merely adopted at best with a few verbal modifications, the same idea of an inquiry into first principles. But in fact even those writers who have repeated the very same words of the long past have been compelled—often involuntarily and unconsciously—to limit the field of their inquiry by taking

up only a particular phase of its wide scope from a particular point of view. Every writer is influenced by certain peculiar philosophic tendencies traceable to the spirit of the times or the land to which he belongs, or to the particular external circumstances around him, or again to particular intellectual dispositions of his own. And these determine to a large measure the point of view he is to adopt in the course of his investigation, the problems on which he lays special emphasis—rather than on the host of others also comprised within the vast scope of metaphysics—and the method of inquiry he is to follow. And this infinite individual variety of attitude, problem and method naturally must give rise to a corresponding infinite number of types of philosophic thought. In fact they would not be types but only individual ways of looking at the universe as a whole. In the words of the late Prof. William James, they are but “just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push, and seeing the whole drift of life”, forced on thinkers by their respective total character and experience, and on the whole preferred as their best working attitudes.

But from this infinite individual variety of attitudes and methods towards a solution of the metaphysical problem, are we to infer that agreement and finality is an idle dream in philosophy? Are we to think that philosophy is doomed eternally to lose itself in the

variety of system, schools and types of thinking? Such a despair it must be pointed out is quite unwarranted. There is, no doubt, a large number of philosophical schools or metaphysical alternatives each claiming a degree of probability, each appealing for recognition to some phase of human nature or the other and each trying to maintain its own claims against all the rest. Yet we have no right no basis to say "there, none of them has got at Reality, and none similarly of those that shall come in the future can get at it." For let us remember that after all they are all 'visions' of Reality which were forced upon those who maintained them by their respective experience and investigations. Each of the opponents has a sort of inner light guiding him and an inner faith as urging him that he is through his own system feeling the ultimate essence, the real push, behind this Universe. And we must admit that man has a certain prophetic side of his nature which ever keeps him in touch with the world of Reality the world beyond our senses and beyond our intellect. The most obvious evidence for the existence of this spiritual faculty or by whatever name we may choose to call it, is the joy and satisfaction we feel within us when we get at the essence of any thing, or when we have performed an act of duty which we ought to have done at a particular moment, or again in moments when we admire and wonder

The point, in short, which we wish to emphasise here, is that every well-meant and sincere attempt at a knowledge of the Ultimate Reality must in its own way and to a certain degree go some way towards attaining its desired object. Total failure there is none. And in as much as there are degrees of the extent to which any such attempt may approach success, progress and advance in philosophy is a fact. And again in as much as all attempts must to a certain degree in their own way represent to us the Real, absolute opposition of what are often called 'metaphysical alternatives' is only an appearance and not a fact. Even the most directly opposed schools must have common trends and tendencies and reach common hypotheses and conclusions

though their attitudes and methods may widely differ. The farthest extremes must meet though they be engaged in an open fight against each other. And it is when these extremes meet that we shall find the 'visionic' elements in each of them, the elements in them that really belong to Reality, the elements which we may take as to great probability a settled fact of all philosophy to come if it is to proceed to any insight into the true nature of things.

In the pages that follow it shall be our foremost aim to bring out the common visionic elements of two schools the conflict between which has to-day an importance probably next only to that great conflict between idealism and realism. The most common place book on the topic says that the two philosophic schools of Bradley and Bergson are radically opposed to each other: one is an absolute idealist, the other has been called a mystic. The one emphasises upon rational coherence as the criterion of Reality; for the other, intuitive identification of the knower with the known can be the only means of true knowledge. For the one, Reality is timeless and stable; for the other, time and change constitute the very stuff of its nature. Yet a careful study will, we hope, discover that they are not quite antagonistic to each other, and that ultimately they reach strikingly similar results. Both come to one single spiritual principle to account

for the multifariousness and change in the Universe Both offer a spiritualistic interpretation of the existence and the nature of matter. Both view Reality as a unity-in-diversity, as a many in one, though they conceive the exact nature of that relation in different ways — one, as in a collective confusion, the other, as in a continuous flow of duration. For both, again, a non-relational immediate experience offers us the greatest facilities for the complete realization of such a conception. Thought claims to attempt it, but, by virtue of its own inherent defects, only succeeds in distorting reality and dividing it against its own self in discrepancies and self-contradictions.

All these facts, of which it is the business of the following pages to treat, may be reasonably seen to point to important metaphysical conclusions. Indeed they seem to offer us clear evidence

(i) that a movement of idealistic metaphysic, if carried to its logical consequence, must ultimately end in a mystical or intuitionistic view of the Universe.

(ii) that mysticism philosophically worked out must take the shape of an absolute idealism on a firmer basis, and on a 'thicker' basis—to use James' term—,than the typical absolute idealism of to-day which we think is sufficiently instanced in Bradley's system.

(iii) that Bradley's philosophy of absolute idealism and Bergson's philosophy of intuitionism form two definite stages of the idealistic movement in metaphysics which is characterised since the middle of the nineteenth century by a reaction and a protest against the introduction of 'scientific method' in philosophical investigations made current by naturalistic, evolutionistic and positivistic thinkers.

But now, first to the respective phases in the philosophies of Bradley and Bergson which serve to suggest these conclusions

CHAPTER TWO

THE PROBLEM OF BRADLEY AND OF BERGSON

The world as experienced in our every day life seems to present us with an indefinite plurality of more or less independent and self-subsisting facts each pursuing its own course. These offer an annoying resistance to our conations and our plans and compel us to recognise their reality. This indifference towards man's aims and expectations is not confined to the inanimate world of matter and motion. Even human beings in their relations to each other appear to be a collection of actors upon the same stage brought together by chance or by fate but who have each his own part to play. Every one of them seeks to develop his own interests, to further his own purposes and to achieve his own objects. Indeed, of no two of them does one seem to penetrate and see into the schemes and intentions of the other. Besides, even the psychic life of the individual often reveals itself as at the mercy of a number of heterogeneous ends and inclinations all at once each of these ever fighting with the rest for supreme control over what is called the 'self' and its activities.

As a consequence of these overwhelming phenomena affective life is oppressed by a growing feeling of disharmony, and cognition discovers contradictions in every phase of experience.

Yet, no one can fail to notice some degree of harmony and coherence even in this chaos and multiplicity. Day by day, as our theoretical knowledge of things increases we are discovering laws of interaction and interdependence between things which we had hitherto supposed to be absolutely unconnected. Moreover the strange fact of those of man's experiences which are commonly termed spiritual and which claim to lift us from this world of care and conflict into a region of calm and unswerving self-consistent activity, afford us sufficient evidence to the effect that it is possible to achieve a large measure of inner poise and quiet and to perceive or to understand the world as the expression, manifestation or development of a single unitary principle or purpose. Hence it is natural to believe that underneath the apparent conflict and disharmony there is a plane of reality which is essentially and completely coherent and is therefore a unity.

Bradley's task is to discover the nature of such a reality. For there alone is a refuge for the man who burns to think consistently, and yet is too good to become a slave either to stupid fanaticism or

dishonest sophistry".^{*} He takes his stand on the desire to think about and comprehend reality in terms of unity and coherence as against the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions, with a view to build up a thoroughly harmonious conception of the Absolute. For, as he says, there is "no other certain way of protecting ourselves against dogmatic superstition", against "orthodox theology on the one side, and...common-place materialism on the other".[†]

Stated in this way, the problem may be said to be similar to that of the scientist. In fact, the concepts and laws of science are nothing but an attempt to make us see harmony and order in particular fields of experience, and, indeed, success in this has to a large measure been attained. But these concepts and laws do not suffice for Bradley. As he says, "The fact of illusion and error is in various ways forced early upon the mind, and the ideas by which we try to understand the universe, may be considered as attempts to set right our failure", but "they have not reached their object".[‡] To emphasise this fact is the object of his whole book on 'Appearance' where he points out, by taking up, one by one, the various basic conceptions of science and of common sense, that the world

* Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 5.

† *Ibid.*, p. 5

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

as understood through them is not a self-subsisting system, and is therefore appearance and not absolute reality. They offer us only a universe that is relative—to the needs of practice, or again to the needs and limits of the intellect in so far as it identifies itself with mere discursive or relational thought. The problem, therefore, remains unsolved in spite of the great achievements of science.

Bradley assigns this ultimate problem, which commonsense raises and which science can not completely solve to metaphysics and philosophy. The quest of the philosopher then, is for a knowledge of the ultimate nature of things, and it is actuated by a feeling of intellectual unrest aroused by the apparent chaos and incoherence of our daily experience. "The contradictory and the meaningless fail to be true because in a certain way they do not satisfy. They produce a special kind of uneasiness and unrest and that on the other hand which alters this unrest into an answering contentment, is truth."[†]

The feeling of intellectual discontent as providing the chief motive for metaphysical inquiry we may here note has been emphasised greatly by Bradley even to the extent of involving a very challenge to the supremacy he has himself assigned to reason and intellect. For, in the course of this insistence, Bradley

builds up, consciously or unconsciously, a complete theory of the 'good' by saying that all human endeavour is the outcome of a state of unrest and uneasiness and aims at a suppression of that unrest leading to a state of contentment and satisfaction. And there is no one channel within which human enquiry is confined. It directs itself into all the various phases of the universe with which the mind comes in contact and evokes wonder, curiosity and research. In all these directions man seeks the 'good' — that which gives him contentment and satisfaction. So far Bradley is quite consistent. But the point of inconsistency comes when he proceeds to say that of all of these quests, the intellect is chiefly concerned about one — the quest for harmony behind apparent contradictions. It lies in the very nature of the intellect to seek unity and uniformity, harmony and order, in all things; as long as these are not found, it remains in a state of disquiet and instability. Consistency and absence of contradiction, or, in other words, truth, is the basic end of all its activity. "It is truth, we may say, where the intellect has found its good."† On other and most occasions, Bradley, we know, would be tempted very easily to make the intellect the epitome of the whole of life and the 'absolute good' instead of only one phase of it. Similarly, while always defining philosophy

† *Ibid.*, p. 1.

as absolute knowledge or as an inquiry into the absolute Bradley has also at times put forward the view that "In philosophy we must not seek for an absolute satisfaction" †. These and similar inconsistencies in Bradley's philosophising were we may say, the few moments when he was by his inner conscience compelled to recognise, inspite of his great intellectualism the fact that the intellect is but one side of our nature and that his philosophy of the intellect is therefore at best but an understanding of its object and not an experience in which that object is wholly contained and possessed.

Science and in fact all of man's intellectual efforts, aim at the discovery of a common principle behind the apparent plurality and of a principle of harmony underlying the apparent contradictions. Science however according to Bradley has to isolate facts from the context in which they appear and to limit itself to the proximate principles of explanation. If the explanations are pushed to their ultimate consequences contradictions manifest themselves. Science, therefore, can grasp only the relative and proximate truths it can not attain the absolute. Philosophy, however goes further. It points out the relativity of the basic conceptions of science and in this way it tries to read a system into the universe of apparent plurality, in order that the

† *Ibid* p 18

satisfaction of the intellect, which is its 'good', may be achieved. It is in this context indeed that we can appreciate Bradley's view that "Philosophy aims at intellectual satisfaction . . . It seeks to gain possession of Reality . . . in an ideal form",^{*} that is, as a coherent and harmonious system which ensures contentment to the intellect. Again, as Taylor, who follows Bradley in almost every point of metaphysic, more explicitly points out, "Metaphysics deals with the ultimate problems of existence in a purely scientific spirit; its object is *intellectual* satisfaction, and its method is of the critical and systematic analysis of our conceptions".[†]

We can, thus, understand Bradley's metaphysical pursuit as grounded mainly in a desire to overcome the trials and tribulations of the intellect. He subjects to a critical analysis the concepts and principles which commonsense supplies. The object of such a method is to discover the nature of reality as distinguished from the self-contradictory world of commonsense and science. And the criterion of reality implied in this method of analysis is coherence and individuality. In short, "We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate

* *Ibid*, pp 11—12

† Taylor *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 5

truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole.' * The criteria of coherence and individuality are, for Bradley absolute. The two represent the same ultimate conception and signify a positive content. The true and the real are, for Bradley, coherent in their nature, and error and the merely apparent exhibit contradictions. But, "in thus rejecting the inconsistent as appearance, we are applying a positive knowledge of the ultimate nature of things. Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the fact that either in endeavouring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it we tacitly assume its validity" † All reality must be positive self-subsisting individuality. It must show the mark of internal harmony and the mark of expansion and all-inclusiveness. In other words, it must be a system.

Again we must note that the test of all inclusiveness implies that reality can exclude nothing, not even appearances. "For what appears is and whatever is cannot fall outside the real ‡ What Bradley means by this is that every thing which appears is, to a certain

* Bradley *Appearance and Reality* p. 1

† *Ibid*, pp. 186-187

‡ *Ibid*, p. 140

degree, real in so far as it exhibits, certainly, though not perfectly, the mark of individuality. In fact, the very task of metaphysics is, for him, "to survey the field of appearances, to measure each by the idea of perfect individuality, and to arrange them in an order and in a system of reality and merit."*

Such a system, obviously, must be timeless and changeless in the sense that it must be a static whole containing in itself all phases of existence. It can admit of no change, for there is nothing else to affect change. It is not determined by anything external to itself and is therefore self-sufficient. It is a whole to be grasped all at once, as a timeless reality. For time involves change, change relation, and relation self-contradiction. The reality exhibits the fundamental Principle of Identity which implies changelessness and timelessness as also unity and coherence.

The view that reality is timeless and changeless is accepted alike by thinkers ancient and modern. Bergson's philosophy stands as a challenge to this time-honoured doctrine.

We may best understand Bergson's problem by noting first of all that a distinction has often been drawn in contemporary philosophical circles between what are commonly known as knowledge 'about' a

* Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, 'p. 489.

thing and knowledge of it. In knowledge of or immediate knowledge the knower and the known are one. In knowledge 'about' or knowledge by description, a fact or an event is represented in terms of a number of ideas, concepts or images. Thus in knowledge of, the fact is grasped as a unit and all at once. In 'knowledge about', the fact is built up, as it were, by adding up fragments of previous knowledge. Knowledge by description, thus, is built upon the materials supplied by immediate experience.

Bergson draws a similar distinction between analytic knowledge and intuition. Analysis, according to him, gives knowledge 'about', while intuition gives knowledge 'of', any object. "The first implies that we move round the object the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view, nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the *relative* the second in those cases where it is possible, to attain the *absolute*."^{*}

Analysis says Bergson is the knowledge of the object with reference to a certain system of symbols. And such knowledge is obtained through sensation perception, reasoning, etc., in fact through all mental

* Bergson Introduction to Metaphysics, p

processes which we usually employ in our every day life. Intuition, on the other hand, is the knowledge of a thing as it is in itself, that is, apart from any context, of memory, of association, of distance, of position or of relation. And such absolute knowledge can be attained only when the knower by an effort of sympathetic imagination inserts himself in the object, in fact, when he 'becomes' the object itself. Through intuition alone can we know an object in its full perfection. No enquiry from a particular point of view or with reference to any particular system of symbols can compare with an imaginal identification with the object of the enquiry to which we apply the symbols or which we view from a particular standpoint. Nor can any compilation or collection of various relative views of an object, as, for example, attempted by Bertrand Russell, give us the absolute knowledge of the object as a whole. You may go on adding continuously one perspective to another, thinking that having collected all such possible relative views you may by some sort of logical construction be able to build up an absolute knowledge of the object as a whole. But however long you may continue this inexhaustible process, the attempt shall be useless. The object will never be attained. The object given in intuition is absolutely given; the process of analysis reveals it to be an unattainable infinite.

But the absolute is not only inexhaustible it is also simple. It is inexhaustible and infinite only when looked at from the outside. Viewed from the inside it is an indivisible simple unity or whole. Intuition is a simple act and the infinite absolute when realized by this identifying sympathy reveals itself as an indivisible apprehension. This is how Bergson attempts to reconcile the infinity and the simplicity of the absolute. And he gives a new significance to the word 'infinite' when he declares "that which lends itself at the same time both to an indivisible apprehension and to an inexhaustible enumeration is, by the very definition of the word an infinite"†

To realize the simplicity of this infinite Absolute is for Bergson the task of philosophy. Metaphysic, as an inquiry into first principles, as a discussion of the nature of the Absolute, must, then, according to him be an attempt to possess reality absolutely instead of knowing it relatively by placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view. We must that is to say, have an intuition instead of making an analysis of it, or, in other words must seize it without any expression, translation or symbolic representation. It is, in short, "*the science which claims to dispense with symbols*" ‡

‡ *Ibid*, p. 8

† *Ibid*, p. 8

The aim of metaphysics is to seek for absolute knowledge. Relative knowledge can not give us the ultimate reality, it can only give us its partial expressions or fragmental views. But whatever we can get at through intuition must be real, must be ultimate, or, in other words, must be indubitable. That is, then, the plan of our inquiry according to Bergson. We are to discard all external or relative standpoints, all particular systems of symbols, all interpretations or translations, if we are to seek for the ultimately certain. We have to place ourselves in that attitude of identifying sympathy which is in other words called intuition, and then we are to see what we can get at, for that shall be real, that shall be certain, that shall be Absolute.

Apparently, then, Bradley and Bergson seem to differ radically in their respective conceptions of metaphysical inquiry. In one case the method is of logical analysis and the criterion coherence and individuality, in the other, the method is intuition and imaginal identity with the real the criterion. In fact, the two standpoints appear to be ever challenging each other in direct opposition. We, however, intend here to notice certain features in which the two philosophers (or the two schools) agree. We wish to attach due importance (which has been often ignored) to the fact that both ultimately are the result of the same basic

tendencies and that both ultimately, must come to the same conclusion as to the nature of the knowledge which can apprehend reality

The first point to be noticed in this connection is that in the writings of Bradley as well as in those of Bergson, considerable emphasis has been laid on the idea that science from its very nature, can not solve the problem of ultimate reality. This distrust of science forms a principal tendency in both of these systems. We have seen evidence enough of this in the case of Bradley, in the beginning of this chapter. All the concepts which science employs in order to read harmony and order into the universe are Bradley thinks relative and self-contradictory, and hence they can not give absolute knowledge. The very basic notions of science for instance, substance, relation and motion, change and activity—all these when analysed carefully, are seen either to be so vague as to be of no definite significance, or else to involve self-contradictions and infinite regressions of such a nature as to render them unsuited for purposes of coherent knowledge. The ideas', he points out in his 'Essays on Truth and Reality', 'which we use within the special sciences are hardly self-consistent' and his whole book on Appearance is solely devoted to a detailed exposure and censure of these ideas of science in their metaphysical implications

Bergson introduces his critique of science in almost all his writings. His works are all written in the same general strain of anti-science-ism. Science presents reality coloured with points of view, interpretations and symbols. "The ordinary function of positive science", he says, "is analysis. Positive science works, then, above all, with symbols. Even the most concrete of the natural sciences, those concerned with life, confine themselves to the visible form of living beings, their organs and anatomical elements. They make comparisons between these forms, they reduce the more complex to the more simple, in short, they study the workings of life in what is, so to speak, only its visual symbol. If there exists any means of possessing reality absolutely instead of relatively, of placing oneself within it instead of looking at it from outside points of view, of having the intuition instead of making the analysis. in short, of seizing it without any expression, translation or symbolic representation—metaphysics is that means." The method of science, then, can not serve the problem of metaphysics. The former trains the mind to think in terms which it is the very function of the latter to throw out of court. Science treats reality as a physical, mechanical world of things. For the instrument of science is the intellect, which is from its very nature at home in dealing with unorganized matter,

space and time. But these involve self-contradictions and antinomies. Again science carries on its inquiry with a view to its results to the problems of practical life. The problem in philosophy, on the other hand is that of absolute knowledge—without reference to any utilitarian end or symbol. But in order to succeed there we must first clean our minds of the traditional habits of thinking in terms of scientific concepts. We must, in Bergson's own words "break with scientific habits" of course, thereby "we must do violence to the mind go counter to the natural bent of the intellect. But that is just the function of philosophy"†

This distrust of science represents a tendency of far reaching import in contemporary philosophy. Modern science raises high hopes for the solution of all human problems by the methods it pursues in the sphere of material facts and events. Such expectations, however are bound to remain unrealised. Hence arises a state of intellectual disappointment and an attitude of doubt. Thus when therefore man gathers up courage for a new attempt to solve his problems he proceeds cautiously and hesitatingly making sure every step, before he advances. This takes the form of approaching the philosophical problem with an attitude of general doubt and skepticism. But this skepticism is adopted not as an end in itself, but as a

† Bergson *Creative Evolution*, p. 81

means to the attainment of that which is absolutely certain. This is the very attitude with which both Bradley and Bergson approach the problem of metaphysics. Indeed Bradley takes it as the main justification for his addition of 'Appearance and Reality' to the evergrowing literature of metaphysics. "The chief need of English philosophy is", he thinks, "a sceptical study of first principles, and I do not know of any work which seems to meet this need sufficiently. By scepticism is not meant doubt about or disbelief in some tenet or tenets. I understand by it an attempt to become aware of and to doubt all preconceptions. . . . And I know no reason why the English mind, if it would but subject itself to this discipline, should not in our day produce a rational system of first principles."⁺

This reminds us of what Descartes wrote of "the necessity of undertaking. . . to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation,"[†] of the necessity, in other words, of a "general overthrow of all my former opinions"[‡] (Cf. a "general doubt or denial" in Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality', p. 136), and of his formulation, in consequence, of the principle.

⁺ Bradley. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 12.

[†] Descartes. *A Discourse on Method* (Everyman's Library), p. 72.

[‡] *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

'I will proceed by casting aside all that admits of the slightest doubt, not less than if I had discovered it to be absolutely false and I will continue always in this track until I shall find something that is certain or at least, if I can do nothing more until I shall know with certainty that there is nothing certain'* But in spite of having the same principle of universal doubt before them the two philosophers have developed entirely different systems of thought. Descartes began his enquiry with an examination of all his personal beliefs. Bradley on the other hand, started with general principles commonly supposed to govern the objective universe. Descartes point of view was essentially subjective while Bradley's was objective even though the guiding principle in both cases was the same. Moreover what Descartes expected to find the most certain and real was a substance, while Bradley was in search of a principle rather than a thing. And it is a natural consequence of these facts that after disposing off the false beliefs or the appearances as self-contradictory relative unproved or inessential, Descartes finds the one thing certain and indubitable in the "cogito ergo sum" Bradley, on the other hand finds it in the principle of intellectual harmony, consistency or non-contradiction.

The method of initial skepticism may be traced in

* *Ibid* p 86

the case of Bergson also. For he too begins by discarding all external or relative standpoints, all particular systems of symbols, all interpretations or translations. By his very definition, Metaphysics is the science which claims to dispense with symbols. And in the immediate result of such a procedure, he goes even further than Bradley in agreeing with Descartes. For the thing he first of all came to realize as certain and real was, as with Descartes, the individual self. This is the first conclusion reached by both on the path to a positive building up of the true idea of the reality. In the case of Descartes it appears in this form. "It must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition (*pronunciatum*) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind."* Bergson expressed it in the words. "There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition.... It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our self which endures. We may sympathise intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sympathise with our own selves."† But the resemblance can not, however, be pressed further. The self is apprehended by Descartes as a well-defined constant and unitary fact. Bergson, on the other hand, views self as a perpetually changing

* Descartes. Discourse on Method (Everyman's Library), p. 86.

† Bergson Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 8.

reality. Moreover, Descartes, as we have already observed, was concerned with the quest of substances the reality of which he could not doubt. Bergson, on the other hand, is seeking the duration, the continuous flux, which he calls the *Elan Vital* or the Vital Impulse.

Let us now turn to the question of criterion of absolute reality. The test which Bradley advocates is, as we have already noted, 'the idea of a whole of knowledge as wide and as consistent as may be. In speaking of system I mean always the union of these two aspects and this is the sense and the only sense in which I am defending coherence.' + In other words, the test is individuality, which has two marks, comprehensiveness and internal systematisation. Or again, in Bradley's own words, 'Perfection of... reality ... consists in positive self-subsisting individuality ... the two ways in which individuality appears. Truth must exhibit the mark of internal harmony or, again, the mark of expansion and all-inclusiveness. † These two characteristics for two reasons, he says "are diverse aspects of a single principle... though (as we shall see later) for our practice they in some degree fall apart. ‡ Bradley considers these principles as mutually dependent

+ Bradley *Essays on Truth and Reality* p. 202

† Bradley *Appearance and Reality* p. 868

‡ *Ibid* p. 868—864

For, firstly, that which contradicts itself is felt as discordant because the whole immanent within it drives its parts into collision and the only way to find harmony is to distribute these discrepancies in a wider arrangement. Secondly, a finite fact which has anything outside it is so far dependent on the latter. It ceases thus to be a self-contained individual.

These marks of reality, we wish here to point out, are, in substance, the same as the characteristics of the Absolute, which, according to Bergson, are given us through intuition. The Absolute, he says, is infinite, but what is infinity but that which has no limitations, and which, therefore, excludes nothing and includes all? Again, the Absolute is simple, it is a unity. But this unity or simplicity also is nothing other than internal harmony or self-consistency. As long as there are self-contradictions, they divide the whole into parts in conflict with each other, and as such there can be no unity or simplicity. Again Bergson points out, as Bradley does, that these two marks of all—inclusiveness and harmony are but two aspects of the same feature of the Absolute. Only in practice the difference arises as a result of points of view. Viewed from the inside, the Absolute is a simple thing, but looked at from the outside, it becomes the gold coin for which we have never been able to finish giving small change.

A problem that has become very prominent now-

adays is as to whether metaphysical inquiry ought to approach the Absolute as a limiting principle, or as a hypothetical reality or again, as a logical construct. Of course as neither Bradley nor Bergson has explicitly said anything definite on the subject, it is difficult to say anything positively in regard to their own constructive opinions on the matter. One thing however, is clear that they both reject the view of the Absolute as a logical construction by the intellect out of the manifold of immediate experience given us through the senses. The conception of the logical construct runs somewhat like this "In knowing we are faced with a reality which we do not only make but which our knowing does not alter. What is made, therefore and what is known by the aid of the making must be different. The construct is neither the knower nor his object—it is a *tertium quid*. A typical example of the construct view of reality may be found in the realistic philosophy of Bertrand Russell. For him, the immediate objects of knowledge are sense-data and things are logical constructions out of the sense-data given to different subjects and at different points of view. The view of the world from any place he calls a 'perspective', the view of the world from a place where there are sense-organs a 'perceived perspective', a 'private world', and the idea of the whole universe is a logical construction out of

infinite private worlds of perspectives

With any such conception as that of Russell, Bradley's view of the absolute reality is clearly inconsistent. By perspectives Russell means relative views of the object, and relations for him are external, subsisting apart from the object. Bradley's Absolute, on the other hand, is an all-inclusive reality. It must exhibit the mark of internal harmony, or, again, the mark of expansion and all-inclusiveness. This expansion must involve harmony, for it would bring the relative views or the appearances within the whole. The universe is a single all-containing individuality. And this all-inclusive individuality of the Absolute is the very essence of its perfection. Any appearance, so far as it more or less completely realizes this idea, possesses a greater or less degree of reality. In this scale, the lower, as its defects are made good, passes beyond itself into the higher. The end, or absolute individuality, is also the principle of growth. For it is implicated in every degree of reality. This is the meaning Bradley's metaphysics assigns to Reality, Perfection and Progress (or Development). Bradley, therefore, views the absolute as a limiting conception rather than as an intellectual construct.

In the case of Bergson, the rejection of the construct view is more explicit. We have seen this when considering his conception of metaphysics in general. It may, therefore, suffice here to quote two illustrations

he uses in his Introduction to Metaphysics in support of his position "Were all the photographs of a town taken from all points of view to go on indefinitely completing one another they would never be equivalent to the solid town in which we walk about" "Were all the translations of a poem in all possible languages, to add together their various shades of meaning, and correcting one another by a kind of mutual retouching, to give a more and more faithful image of the poems they translate, they could never yet succeed in rendering the inner meaning of the original •

Again, though not clearly expressed there are in Bergson's work also, implications of a view of Reality as a limiting conception For, in his Introduction to Metaphysics, when he tries to give his readers an idea of what he means by the duration flowing in the universe, and through the individual self, he makes use of a number of examples from every day life—unrolling of a coil its rolling up, the myriad-tinted spectrum, an infinitely small elastic body contracting to a single point, etc. the first of which he says represents the idea of reality to a certain extent, the next one to a still greater extent, and the next again to an extent greater still and so on yet none of them represents the Absolute Duration itself † Again in the 'Creative

* Bergson Introduction to Metaphysics, pp 4-6

† *Ibid* pp 10—18

Evolution', the first twenty pages emphasise the fact that even organized bodies as well as unorganized matter offer us evidence of different degrees of the durational flow which in its perfect limit is to be attainable only in the Absolute Life. All this bears a strange resemblance, we may note here, to the attempt made to explain the general nature of the Absolute by Taylor, Bradley's most prominent admirer; he also can point out only "the nearest approaches" and arrange them in a graduated scale according to the measure to which the Absolute Principle is attained in each. The idea is the same as in Bradley, only Taylor expresses it in a more clear and more commonly intelligible manner.

We shall proceed next to consider the kind of human knowledge which can give us access to the ultimate Reality. It has been generally maintained that Bradley and Bergson are radically opposed on this matter; and while Bradley's is a vicious intellectualism—as James remarked in criticism — Bergson's is a philosophy of intuition. A more careful study will, however, discover that facts are not so bad if we care to understand them in another light. Does not Bradley also admit—rather he insists on—the limits of thought in metaphysical investigation. The intellect, even for Bradley, must be transcended' to give place to a Higher Immediacy of Absolute Experience which even though

only hypothetically postulated is not less immediate than the Intellectual Sympathy or Intuition of Bergson

To this matter however, we must refer in greater detail For, the theory of knowledge as with all idealists so with Bradley and Bergson, is the very basic foundation of the two philosophies

CHAPTER THREE

IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE

By 'immediate experience' we shall, in the following pages, understand a unitary whole of psychic experience in which no awareness exists of a distinction between the knower and the known, or of a distinction between the subject and the predicate, in which all contents of knowledge are implicitly involved, and which by an inherent character of its own brings us a sense of objectivity and reality as 'given' to us in knowledge, and not constructed by our own subjective faculties of construction.

This phase of the life of man enters into philosophical discussions in connection with three distinguishable though independent problems of primary importance. First of all, there is the metaphysical question as to what status the datum of immediate experience occupies in a general scheme of the metaphysical dialectic. This question concerns itself with the manifold of experiential data received at any finite psychical centre and asks as to how far it may supply the starting point of metaphysical investigation. Secondly, we have the epistemological problem regard-

ing the nature and implication of the content of immediate experience. And, lastly, we have to determine how far the Absolute—Reality as a whole—can be the object of an immediate experience as is claimed by some religious philosophies and by mysticism in general. We can not in this chapter undertake a full discussion of each of these problems in its varied implications and off-shoots. We shall, yet, try to touch upon some of the main points regarding them in connection specially with the opinions of Bradley and of Bergson. We may however, have also to refer to earlier views to observe the course of development which speculation on the topic has followed till now.

A very general survey of history will show that in the realm of philosophy immediate experience held till late a very insignificant position. For in the days of Greek and modern rationalism, Reason was supposed to constitute the essence of mind and of reality. Universal concepts were hence believed to be the fittest instruments for the purpose of metaphysical investigation. The whole inquiry consisted in a hierarchical subsumption of lower within higher ideas. The Highest Idea was the Idea of God and the task of philosophic speculation was to show how the rest of the ideas emanate from this Supreme Idea. This indeed was the basis of the systems of Plato and Aristotle among the ancients and among the moderns, of Descartes

of Spinoza, and of Leibniz. Even the 'change' of Heraclitus was governed by a universal Law of Reason, a wise Fate, a rational Justice. It was the reason in things, the *logos*, that formed the subject-matter of all philosophical inquiry.

In fact, even the psychology of those ages recognised only two elements of human life. It was a bipartite psychology of thought and will. The soul was rational, and the soul was active. Feeling, perception or 'experience' were all only its lowest stages.

British empiricism, however, led by Locke and Berkeley, secured the recognition of experience as a valid form of knowledge. Sense-experience was regarded to be the starting data of all investigation, the source of all complex ideas. For all other knowledge was only a product of these 'given' elements reached by association or some other like principle. Even causation was thus given a definite empiricistic turn by Hume who carried this reaction to rationalistic dogmatism to its extreme limit, though it finally led him to skepticism itself.

No doubt, empiricism did attempt to keep its reaction against rationalistic dogmatism within limits. It tried to sail on two boats at once by raising the claim of experience and yet keeping the rational phase of life intact. For this purpose it made a well-marked distinction between two modes of knowledge: sensation

and reflection. The former was declared to have an independent existence of its own and to form the starting point of all knowledge. Yet the latter was also continuous with it. It was a process of construction or association for which the former supplied the materials.

But the significance which really came to be attached to empiricism was not as a compromise between experience and thought, between the given and the work of the mind. In history, the school is known generally as the other extreme to dogmatic rationalism. It gained recognition for experience, but only as a formidable rebel against the reign of Reason. A new note had no doubt been struck, for, previous to this, experience was simply dismissed as a mere obstacle to be avoided and ignored. Now it had forced itself actively as a rival, meaning a usurpation of the high seat of the accepted ideal. Now there was an open fight between two opposing tendencies leading to obviously fatal consequences for metaphysics. It was faced with a dilemma which offered two alternatives: either to reject dogmatism and, recognising the value of experience, to accept empiricism with all its skeptical conclusions, or to revert back to the old scheme and prove traitor to the intelligence which discerned the need for advance.

Kant, however, saw the elements in favour of both the sides. He saw the possibility of recognising the claim

of both—reason and experience. The idea of their mutual exclusiveness and contradictoriness—the basic belief behind the quarrel—was perceived to be not indispensable. Reason is not necessarily hostile to experience, nor experience to reason. Reason may dictate its own categories to the manifold of experiential data which shall submit and conform to them. Kant proposed thus a reconciliation and a compromise between the conceptual and the perceptual levels of knowledge.

But the Kantian compromise, as we know, was rejected. For it only placed experience between and at the mercy of two *a priori* non-empirical ideas. Sense-experience was accorded no doubt a position in the system, but a position of pitiable insignificance, being determined on the one hand by the categories of the Transcendental Ego and on the other by the Things-in-Themselves. The whole attempt, moreover, culminated in an unsatisfying jumble of dualisms and in an unknowable *Ding an sich* that was very easily seen to involve contradictions.

Fichte, therefore, returned to a scheme which, though different from the rationalisms above mentioned, placed experience at the final stage of the metaphysical dialectic. The starting point is here the Ego or the Unity of Will which together with the Aesthetic was placed by Kant after the double determination of experience by the Unity of Apperception and the Thing-in-

itself This Will of the Ego generates the Non-ego of meanings and logical relations (categories) and out of this differentiation arises the world of experience affording opportunity for the activity of the Moral Will

Yet Fichte does not degrade experience to its old position The Ego being identified with the Moral Will, the manifold of experience is a necessary factor to afford opportunity for its eternal craze after activity Experience gains rather than loses by being thus raised to the status of a factor cooperating and affording ground for the activity of the Transcendental Ego.

Still Fichte's was a scheme with which the movement for experience could not be at all satisfied The status accorded it is yet a secondary one. The starting point of the system is still an ego not attained through experience and hence liable to the criticism that it is dogmatic. Experience again, still serves as a mere patient on whom the Ego carries out his own purposes and thereby satisfies its own inherent craze. It in no way determines the Ego in itself or its purposes and activities

This status as a positive determinant of our knowledge of the absolute reality experience for the first time attains in Hegel For the first time is it realized that life must supply us with data even for metaphysical investigation and that any other initial starting point may be liable to be rejected as purely dogmatic.

Direct experience, however, implies at least some sort of justification for some reality in some form or other. The very directness of immediate experience indicates its relevance as data determining the course of enquiry "The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be nothing else," in Hegel's own words, than just "that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of the immediate, of what *is*".* Later this sense-immediacy resolves itself into conceptual knowledge when distinctions are brought out and subject and object are separated. Reflection introduces mediacy into knowledge, thereby opening up the way for the dialectic of ideas. Immediate sense-experience, then, stands at the very basis as the prior source of all knowledge.

This status given to experience by Hegel is the basis of all contemporary idealistic doctrine. The investigation may be carried on by intellectual reflection and analysis, and the end is spiritual or ideal. But the data for all this process is supplied in the first instance by immediate experience. Insight into this fact is a great event in the history of idealistic metaphysics. It was a factor of importance which the idealisms before Hegel lacked.

Moreover, Hegel's conception of sense-certainty had one great merit over all earlier conceptions of

* Hegel *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated by Baillie, second edition (1931), p. 149.

immediate experience. For, as a matter of fact, we may distinguish three different modes or stages of knowledge: indefinite immediate experience, definite sense-perception and thought. Before Hegel, the primary data of psychic life were supposed to be perceptions or sensations which belong really to the second of these stages: the first had not been perceived as a prior necessity to the second stage. Hegel's merit consists in having definitely reached the stage of indefinite immediate experience at which there are no units, no distinctions of state and state and of subject and object.

But the sense-certainty of immediate experience, thought Hegel, is too unstable to be able to make any positive contribution to the investigation of the nature of reality. Before it can serve any purpose of our inquiry it splits up into and is overwhelmed by the intellectual process, a process of analysis which destroys its unity as well as its immediacy for the sake of practical or naturalistic interests. As Bradley points out, sense-immediacy "both from within and from without, ... is compelled to pass off into the relational consciousness" its "fleeting and untrue character is perpetually forced on our notice by the hard fact of change" †

Thus indeed is it that though Hegel had made this immediacy of sense-experience the starting point of his

† Bradley *Appearance and Reality* p. 460.

investigation, he treats of it so briefly in his 'Phenomenology' that it tends to assume a very insignificant position in the system. We may indeed say that Hegel had somehow perceived its relevance and importance but could not adequately and completely fit it into the whole superstructure. His vision was mainly of a dialectic of ideas, a purely intellectual concern, only it reversed the order of ancient speculation in ending with the Highest Idea of Supreme Being rather than beginning with it as in the *apriori* method.

It was Bradley, thus, who brought immediate experience to the forefront of the philosophic field. Not only is the material for investigation supplied by immediate presentation, even the form for the absolute experience is, according to him, given in this primitive stage of knowledge. Moreover, by immediate experience is not here meant merely sense-experience, but also all other types of immediacy, for instance, of volition or of feeling.

Thus it is indeed that Bradley's whole system of metaphysics is based upon his doctrine of immediate experience. Yet, Bradley, like Hegel, recognises the unstable and fleeting character of immediate experience. In spite of this, he insists that even this primitive and unstable stage affords us both the material and the character of the Absolute. An immediacy like the one it possesses must characterise the Absolute Experi-

ence. The contents of the Absolute must all be given in immediate presentation though in an implicit state. Like immediate feeling, the Absolute must be a unity in diversity, an identity in difference. The only difference between Absolute and finite immediate experience is that the former is above and the latter below the relational level of thought. Reflection and analysis must bring out the richness of its contents, and then its immediacy must be restored to it. Thus the Absolute shall be an immediate experience only richer and more stable than the immediacy of finite experience.

Bergson however, goes further than even Bradley. For him as for Bradley, the conditions for the attainment of the real are ever being offered us in our own conscious life. The 'data' (*donnees*) for absolute knowledge are ever at our service and they are the immediate data of our consciousness. We need only part company and break off from the manipulatory and artificial habits we have formed under the influence of the intellect. But there is a difference in so far as Bergson brings out with greater force and detail the opposition that holds between immediate experience and intellectual reflection or analysis. 'Data is the very opposite of 'construction' which is the essence of intellectual activity. To obtain 'given' data we must do away with all 'middle terms', while the intellect can not work without them. We must do away with all presupposed

assumptions, with all dogmas, and with all ready-made forms and formulae. It is the immediate and only the immediate that justifies itself and has its own inherent sense of reality. Thus only can we avoid the possibility of error and be sure that we have attained something objective and real, something 'given' and not something constructed. All else distorts reality and gives merely appearance

As to the exact nature of the finite immediate experience at any human psychical centre, Bradley completely follows Hegel. Let us, therefore, briefly consider Hegel's conception of sense-immediacy.

Sense-immediacy, for Hegel, is a mode of knowledge which does not presuppose any other form or act of knowledge. It is not knowledge derived from any previous knowledge. It is not mediate. It is, in short, "given" knowledge. All else is reproductive, reflective, interpretative or inferential knowledge. The distinction, no doubt, is not easy to draw and define. For interpretational and inferential factors enter so early into our consciousness of any fact that pure immediate experience it is almost impossible to 'catch'. Yet the fact remains that there are two distinct types of knowledge, mediate and immediate, and the latter is attained only when we "accept what is given, not altering anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension (*Auffassen*) free from conceptual

comprehension (*Begreifen*)”*

Sense-certainty is a manifold taken in one a content of immense wealth and as such the richest kind of knowledge. And it supplies the most suitable data for the problem in as much as it has not as yet dropped anything from the object. The object is known in it in its full entirety and completeness. Even the distinction between the subject and the object has not been drawn. It merely says regarding what it knows: it *is*.” The ego does not distinguish itself as different from the object experienced. It becomes that object.

The I does not contain or imply a manifold of ideas: the I here does not *think*; nor does the thing mean what has a multiplicity of qualities. Rather the thing the fact *is*. It *is*—that is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and that bare fact of *being* that simple immediacy constitutes its truth. †

One special advance has here been made by Hegel in the matter of the content of immediate experience. Hitherto relations and categories had since the very beginnings of empiricism been supposed to be somehow superimposed on the experiential manifold by reflection of the ego. Hegel on the other hand pointed out that they are in the very beginning already contained in

* Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind* translated by Baillie second edition (1931) p. 149

† *Ibid.*, p. 150

experience, only discrimination is needed to bring them to notice. They are not a foreign measure applied by the mind to experience. They are only distinguished as being there in its very original nature. The flow of the dialectic is there, it has to be observed.

Upon this conception of immediacy as described by Hegel, Bradley bases his whole theory of Reality. But Hegel's conception of it, as well as all earlier definitions, suffered from one great defect, which contemporary philosophy only has perceived and pointed out. Hitherto this experience which Hegel saw to be the starting point of all knowledge had been, from Locke downwards, identified with knowledge received through the senses. It was sensations that were subjected to the associative work of the mind, sensations that were the effect of the action of the Thing-in-itself upon the senses and thus the manifold subjected to the categories, sensations that made up the experience affording opportunity for the activities of the Moral Will, and sensations that constituted the manifold of the 'certain' immediate experience of Hegel.

It was Bradley's merit to notice the defect and to improve upon it. For him, immediate experience, if it is to contribute at all as data to metaphysics, can not consist in mere sensation. Pure sensation it is rare to experience in life. It is, as James said, a 'psychological myth'. It is a fiction of analysis and marks the limit of

fact from which we start "

It seems necessary here to distinguish between two distinct meanings of the word 'sensation' in order to comprehend what exactly Bradley means by denying to sensation the status of immediate experience. For we do find Bradley often using the phrase 'sensation and feeling' to denote the data of immediate experience as if the two were synonymous.+ The word 'sensation' may, indeed, be used in two different senses which it would be a gross mistake to confuse. It may mean, on the one hand, the simple unitary constituent of experience as understood by the sensationalists, associationists and structuralists in Psychology. In this sense it may stand for each particular term of a particular class of experiences as distinguished from the other classes of ideas, images or feelings. On the other hand, again, it may mean the whole mass of sensory experience at any finite centre of psychic sentience—neither at this or any other particular moment, nor taken as the constant average mass, but the complete experiential mass taken as a whole. It is in this latter sense that the word 'sensation' was used by Bradley, and it was in this sense that he used it as synonymous with what he called mere feeling and presentation. Bradley rejects the former meaning as given it by associationists and allied schools of psychology, for it loses hopelessly that unity and continuity of our

+ Bradley *Essays on Truth and Reality*. p 203

lives which can only be realized by going beyond it and deeper to that undifferentiated feeling which is a unity, complex but without relations. The difference between these points of view may be roughly indicated in some of its aspects by saying that the psychologist deals with 'sensations' in the plural, while Bradley concerned himself only with 'sensation' in the singular as standing for the individual whole of immediate experience as such rather than for its analysed parts.

This criticism of the 'sensation' of the associationists, however, need not lead us astray into doubting the historical value of the conception. No doubt, the tendency of modern philosophic thought seems to decisively declare that the classical English school which began with Locke and ended with Spencer has ceased to exist. Yet it has fulfilled its mission—the great mission of directing the eyes of the thinking world to the justice which experience deserved and which was not being done to it. It began with Locke's taking the experience of the individual as his start and ended with Spencer's making his ground the experience of the race. And if it ended there it was only to transmit what was its own original discovery from the narrow walls of a particular school to other wider philosophical movements and to prepare the way for a practical reformatory endeavour at correcting and recasting the latter. Only it must be confessed this English school had certain deficiencies, which became

the more glaring, the more it entered into reciprocal relations with other lines of thought. Among these is the mechanical atomistic notion taken over from natural and introduced into mechanical science, which made psychical life appear as the product of independent psychical elements and society as the external connection of independent individuals. This notion was now too old for Bradley's time and its growing interest in the problem of totality rather than in the problem of elements; and was therefore summarily rejected. The very first, indeed, of Bradley's published works began with an opposition to the atomism of English psychology.

Realist philosophers have also adopted a conception of immediate experience similar to that of the psychologist. They take sensations—or, rather, 'perceptions', as they usually call it—as their ultimate data of Reality, and, consequently, fall into difficulty when asked to explain the facts of error, illusion and hallucination. Bradley submits to the realist in so far as that the world of perceptions and sensations is not a purely subjective creation of the intellect. "Our intelligence cannot construct the world of perceptions and feelings, and it depends on what is given—to so much I assent." "But", he says, "that there are given facts of perception which are independent and ultimate and above criticism, is not to my mind a true conclusion."* For, our knowledge

* Bradley *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 203-204

is, no doubt, gained by a contact of the senses with the object perceived. Yet it is possible that, as a result of this process what we actually do have is not merely a knowledge of reality in itself but also a certain external factor which may be traced to a prepossessed consciousness. Our mind which receives these perceptions is never a blank slate, it has at every moment of normal life, a definite character of its own which modifies greatly the received cognition. This factor is often described as interpretation or 'construction' and is also sometimes designated apperception. But having its origin in the perceiver rather than in the object perceived, it always renders our knowledge ever liable to error and modification. In the case of any datum of sensation or feeling, to prove that we have it wholly unmodified by this non-datal factor is in Bradley's own words, 'a hopeless undertaking' †

Bradley then totally refuses to view the nature of immediate experience in terms of any of the atomic units—be it called sensation, perception or idea. Each of these is a fragment abstracted from the continuous flow of immediate experience as a whole. Any attempt to look upon them as revealing to us the true nature of reality as immediately perceived must commit the fallacy of treating the concepts with which we have to work in dealing with some special aspects of the world of ex-

† *Ibid* p 204

perience as ultimately valid in their application to the whole system, and will, therefore, in the end, reach us only to self-contradicting appearances. The datum for our conception of reality can only be furnished by immediate experience taken as a whole.

The 'Essai sur les donnèss immediates de la conscience' is Bergson's investigation into the phenomena of psychic life. Here he points out that if we but free ourselves from the spatial and mechanical representations—the subject-matter of the intellect—which have entered the domain of our mental life from their proper sphere in the natural sciences, we shall discover that the life of our soul flows and glides like the current of a river. It is passed in time and not in space. One state penetrates into another, perhaps even when the two are states of opposite kinds. It is not a homogeneous current, qualitative changes are for ever at work within it. One colour sensation replaces another colour sensation, pain replaces joy, tension replaces relaxation, something larger something smaller, and so on. In Bergson's own words, in fact, "The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change"*. And these experiences, moreover, are not understood each in relation to its context. They are not separated from each other as are the objects which belong to the external world, each of which has its position in space

* Bergson *Creative Evolution*, p 2

Each psychical moment is continuous with the past and shares with it the duration which it has already accumulated. Only each is the best illumined part of a moving zone which comprises all that we feel or think or will—all in short that we are at any given moment.† “Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”‡ Memory, and what we call character are, Bergson thinks, outstanding examples of this continuity of psychical change.

Associationists have supposed our mental life to be composed of a successive multiplicity—an interrelated multiplicity, no doubt—of distinct isolated elements or states. Life, for Bergson on the other hand is a concrete multiplicity unfolding itself in a pure and continuous flow of duration. The notion of an inter-associated multiplicity of isolated elements is essentially a spatial representation of the immediately given by means of intellectualistic symbols. It is a mechanical conception that culminates in the representation of a mental state as a collection of elementary states the strongest of which exerts the prevailing influence and carries the others with it. It is based fundamentally on drawing sharp distinctions between the phenomena of psychic life. Experience according to it becomes nothing but

† *Ibid.*, p. 8

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 6

the resultant of a fierce conflict of psychic elements. The contents of the multiplicity of mental life seem so many distinct atomic terms determining its course through fixed laws of combination and repulsion.

This associationistic treatment of experience, as we have already seen, has also been criticised and rejected by Bradley. Opposition to such a conception is, however, peculiar neither to Bradley nor to Bergson. With the downfall of English associationism and with the simultaneous recognition of the importance of experience by most of the other schools of thought, and as a necessary condition of this recognition, the atomistic notion of experience with all its defects was rejected both in and out of England. Among the works that played an important part in this matter may be mentioned the 'Physiological Psychology' of Wundt (1874), in which he insists on the importance of apperception for the development of spiritual life. In the same year appeared the 'Introduction to Hume' of Green which contained a vigorous criticism of the principles from which the most celebrated representative of the associationist psychology had started out. In this same year also Hoffding published his 'Den engelske Filosfi i vor Tid' ('Recent English Philosophy') in which he sketched by way of critical remarks the conception which he later put forward in his 'Psychology' (1882) taking specially as his foundation the relations between healthy life and the

life of sickness. It was no doubt the 'Ethical Studies' of Bradley that marked after all the rupture with the traditional English school. In the domain of descriptive psychology James' essay on 'The Stream of Consciousness' marked an epoch by the brilliant description which he gave of the continuity of mental life, the foundation of all self-observation and of all psychological analysis. Bergson thus was not the first to criticise the employment of purely mechanical analysis in reference to spiritual life. Yet he has done it with a force and an art of exposition which puts him in this respect far above all his predecessors.

To come back to our point, the transition of the states of our consciousness has been likened to gradual ascent on a gentle slope. This continuous multiplicity of psychical phenomena it must, however, be noted, flows necessarily in time. The concept of time, too, in fact, plays an essential part in Bergson's philosophy of experience as well as of reality. In his own words, "as regards the psychical life unfolding beneath the symbols which conceal it, ... time is just the stuff it is made of." x

But the time which is the stuff of reality which reality, again, is immediately apprehended in intuition, is essentially different from time as understood in the natural sciences. As regards the 'time' of the sciences,
x *Ibid*, p. 4

we may look to mathematics for the type. That is the time that is measured. Mathematics divides time into fragments and marks them by their ends rather than by the intervals of flow between these ends. Time is, from this point of view, only an infinite number of moments put together in succession. Bergsonian 'time', however, or, rather, Duration—to employ the term which Bergson used, to avoid confusion,—is another thing, differing from the scientific 'time' at least in being (i) unmeasurable, (ii) non-homogeneous (iii) discretely rather than confusedly multiple, (iv) concrete and qualitative, (v) unforeseeable and (vi) irreversible.

The scientific definition of time is nothing but a repetition of what was said for a line—that it is composed of points put together side by side in space. And, as a result of its application to mental phenomena, the time of the reflective consciousness would be a medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted. It presupposes the externality of one moment to the next and is essentially a form of quantity and magnitude. This conception is, it is obvious, inextricably bound up with the conception of number which proceeds by spreading out in space every thing which can be directly counted. But the question arises. Is time measurable, as is often supposed? Bergson is sure that it is not. For we can count only simultaneities that are present before us all at

a time. And whenever we do say we count successive events in time, we really by an act of recollection spread the events one by one either in space and then count. The scientific conception of time, in short, which common sense has also tried to apply to facts of psychic life, is essentially characterised by a reduction of all succession to spatial side by sidedness.

And in fact, it is the spatialistic element in the scientific notion of time that is chiefly responsible for its being considered as a homogeneous medium which all data must enter just as they did enter Kant's categories of perception. And this homogeneous medium is divided into equal units or moments into each of which one state must enter and present itself to the percipient. We may indeed compare this medium to the frame which the printing press uses for 'composition' and in which frame equal spaces are sometimes marked for each letter of the text. The units in such a notion must be distinct and at the same time identical. For counting is only possible of identical and discrete units. To admit of measurement, time must be a blank frame, a homogeneous medium, divided into equal but distinct units marked at their endings.

Again, the recollective spreading out of the stages of a course of temporal events in space—which, according to Bergson, is the essence of the measurement of time—must result in a confused multiplicity. The so many

pasts as well as the present would be all brought together in one act of consciousness. The resultant of such a process would, however, be only chaos and confusion in the mental state rather than clearness or discreteness about the mental events themselves. It is an attempt obviously absurd and impracticable.

From its character as a homogeneous medium, the natural consequence is the blankness of its nature ready to fill itself, like the compositor's frame, with any combinations and associations of elementary states as we like without their being affected or determined by the particular stages of time they fall into, provided that the mutual relations of these stages be constant.

From this it also follows that the atomic contents would in no way be affected or determined by the order in which they occur in time and that any state may in itself be just as capable of occupying a particular moment of life as any other state. And, finally, the definite homogeneous nature assigned to these unit states would afford a mechanical interpretation of psychic life explaining each of them as an unavoidable and quite foreseeable resultant of its temporal antecedents.

Bergsonian Duration is, however, characterised by attributes quite opposed to those described above. As a thoroughly continuous temporal flow, it is unmeasurable and not subject to spatial categories. We no longer measure duration, but we feel it, from quantity we

return to the state of quality. The concrete, qualitative change, again, as we have already noticed, is not homogeneous but heterogeneous. For an essential feature of duration is continual creation of new unforeseeable possibilities. In this sense, the artist's is the true and the real life. "Just as the talent of the painter is formed or deformed—in any case, is modified—under the very influence of the works he produces, so each of our states, at the moment of its issue, modifies our personality, being indeed the new form that we are just assuming."* And it is in this ever creative duration that consists the individuality of all experience. "For a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly."†

But we must note that except for those attributes of Duration as conceived by Bergson which are essentially connected with its temporal character, all the rest are also attributed to immediate experience by Bradley. Immediacy, for him also, consists in being unmeasurable, non-homogeneous and concretely qualitative. It is unmeasurable, because measurement is an attribute of thought; it makes distinctions and breaks up the simplicity and unity of experience into atomic elements. Again it is non-homogeneous, in so far as it contains within itself,

* *Ibid.*, p. 7

† *Ibid.* p. 8

implicitly, not in a differentiated form, a multiplicity of qualitatively different contents which are in judgment separated and discriminated from each other. Lastly, it is qualitatively concrete in that it is not a barren abstraction, but is the 'given' in which the qualities and their existence, the 'that' and the 'what', have not been separated by an act of the intellect.

Moreover, Bradley's conception resembles that of Bergson in one very important feature. This feature consists in the fact that both conceive immediate experience to be a non-relational consciousness. The multiplicity of qualities in it are not distinct existences, they are merged into each other, although their qualitative discreteness is still retained in the undifferentiated non-relational stage.

But the temporal feature of Bergson's conception is responsible for a difference as to the exact nature of this non-relational character of the contents of immediate experience. In Bradley's conception, the qualities are brought together, as it were, in a sort of fusion in one simple act of consciousness. In Bergson's conception, on the other hand, the qualities flow in a successive transition, although the change is here continuous and interpenetrational. And thus, for Bergson, immediate experience is a discrete, while, for Bradley, it is a confused, multiplicity. To the difference between a confused and a discrete multiplicity and to their respective merits,

however we must return in our fifth chapter

Now, therefore we may pass on to briefly consider the last of the three problems we set ourselves at the beginning of our chapter—as to how far according to Bradley and Bergson Reality as a whole can be given through an immediate experience of the character we have described above

Now, Bradley draws, following Hegel, a clear distinction between two modes of knowledge what he calls 'thought' and what he calls experience. And the distinction is so well marked that it almost amounts to a belief in two corresponding faculties of the mind each having its own separate functions to perform. The latter of these experience he says may serve two specific purposes. It may, as in our normal every day life, supply us with material for the various manipulatory activities of our intellect. Or again, it may also be utilised in the service of our quest after the Absolute. In its former aspect, it is called the lower in the latter the higher immediacy. The Absolute experience is a whole that "must be immediate like feeling, but not, like feeling, immediate at a level below distinction and relation. The Absolute is immediate as holding and transcending these differences"* "To reach a mode of apprehension which is quite identical with reality, surely predicate and subject and subject and object,

*Bradley Appearance and Reality p. 242

and in short the whole relational form, must be merged"¹ It can only be known through—whether we call it a separate faculty of the mind, or only a more advanced mode of knowledge—the higher immediacy which transcends the difficulties and defects of the lower level of immediate experience arising out of its primitiveness and instability and of 'thought' or intellection arising out of its falsifying preconceptions, categories and abstractions. It is the incomparable communion with the supreme ultimate Principle of Existence. It provides us with an insight into the positive nature of 'Reality', while the lower immediacy can ensure us only of its 'Being' or existence and while 'thought' is always trying to encircle us in a baffling network of mere 'appearances'.

Again, the Absolute, being one, individual, self-subsistent existence, can not, for Bradley, be known through the intellect, which always falsifies the 'given' by modifying it through its preconceptions and through its essential categories of generality, relationality and abstraction. Reality in itself, that which is 'given', is, on the other hand, concrete, non-relational and individual. As such it can be attained only through an immediate experience of the same character as 'finite presentation' but transcending its fragmentariness and instability. The two propositions, "Reality is uniquely

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

individual and Reality is experience as Taylor puts it in his 'Elements' are synonymous and each involves and implies the other. Or again as the Buddhist would put it in more Bradleyian terms only in a knowledge of the character of indeterminate perception is the real given to us in its unique concrete individuality without having been falsified into general intellectual abstractions as in determinate perception.

As to the exact nature of the contents of the immediate experience of the higher type in which alone we can if at all possess reality as it were in itself and as a whole Bradley says it must be the consummation of all phases of experience. And in this consummation each of them sets aside its phenomenal nature which was fragmentary and full of contradictions and discrepancies and is transmuted into its original nature in the whole. 'Such a whole state would possess in a superior form that immediacy which we find (more or less) in feeling and in this whole all divisions would be healed up. It would be experience entire containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present in a higher intuition will would be there where the ideal had become reality and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfilment. Every flame of passion chaste or carnal, would still burn a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher

bliss."*

But, as to how such a state of Absolute Experience is possible and attainable, Bradley says we do not know "We cannot imagine, I admit, how in detail this can be" So far, the higher immediacy is conceived only as a hypothetical state. But it is a state which must come about, when and if at all absolute knowledge is reached and attained "If truth and fact are to be one", the resulting experience must be such as is described

The belief in a highest mode of knowledge which enables for us a direct insight into the ultimate truths of the Universe is, as even the most superficial student of history will tell us, of a very ancient origin. In fact, since the very dawn of mythical and mythological speculation, man has believed in a mode of knowledge whereby he could come face to face directly with the governing forces of nature. Nor did this belief disappear on the awakening of 'reason' and 'intellect'. The Pure Thought of Plotinus was not thought discursive, passing from idea to idea, from premise to conclusion, but intuitive, static, as it were, contemplating the system of ideas as a whole, and all at once. (Does it not resemble Bradley's conception of Absolute Experience as a non-relational whole of qualities, which qualities are what he calls 'ideas'?) Plato had conceived truth as having real existence in the Ideas and the
* *Ibid.*, p. 172.

human mind as possessing a sort of intuitive knowledge of them and Augustine adopted this same conception into his own world-view. Then we have the whole school of mystics of the twelfth century led by Richard of St. Victor who saw in mystic contemplation the highest form of knowledge far superior to the dialectic, and by Walter who spoke of logic as the source of all heresies. This was the orthodox or the church mysticism which was continued in the thirteenth century by Thomas Gallus and by John Fidanza who was called the Bonaventura. Side by side with these and in opposition to them arose the pantheistic mystics the chief figure among whom was Meister Eckhart who tried to give a rational basis to mystic speculation. In the eighteenth century, F. H. Jacobi who declared that the 'Critique of Kant logically ends in a 'system of absolute subjectivity based our knowledge of things *in-themselves* on revelation rather than on dogmatic rationalism or on criticism. At about the same time, Schelling was insisting that the universal living whole can not be grasped by the categories of science, that the universe can not be conceived organically as a unity in diversity, and that it can be known only in the inner living experience of the free moral agent in intuition.

But not only have intuitionistic schools arisen and developed inspite of the appearance of Reason on the

field of speculation and inspite of its great achievements and the overwhelming majority of thinkers which it attracted, even in the so-called rationalistic and idealistic schools themselves, traces are not wanting of explicit belief in a possibility of direct communion with the first principles of existence and truth and its unquestionable character. Spinoza in his 'Ethics' distinguished three grades of knowledge the "vague experience" of ordinary life which, he said, was little better than ignorance, the "possession of common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things", by which he meant the 'abstract' understanding of science, and "intuitive knowledge", which is the concrete insight of philosophy. His 'intuitive knowledge, which he described as *Amor Dei intellectualis* (intellectual love of God), stands in much resemblance to Bradley's higher immediacy, for the former, as the latter, is the grasp of the universe as a concrete system, not only in its universal aspect but in its unique singularity and individuality. At that stage man has absorbed the truths of the discursive reasoning of science and passed beyond it to the intuitive apprehension of philosophy. Like Bradley's admirer, Taylor, Spinoza also described its attitude as one of spiritual enlargement, as one of love. Its aim is an expansion and extension of knowledge from the knowledge of the partial, fragmentary abstractions to the knowledge of their ultimate ground, that is, God. The

scientia intuitiva as against all other science is an intuitive insight into individual essence rather than a system of universal and general abstract laws

Descartes did not posit definitely a distinct grade of intuitive knowledge. But a reading through the lines of his chapters in the *Meditations* will suffice to show that the first unquestionable truth which he finds, from which he starts to build the whole structure of his system and which he claims to reach by his method of initial skepticism,—we mean the *Cogito ergo sum*—is more of an intuition of the self than of a logical necessity. The first edition of Kant's 'Critique' again, exhibited a hesitant mood of hovering between intuition and the intellectual faculty of apperceptive synthesis.

These aspects or lines of philosophical speculation afford us sufficient hints of the growing tendency of the time towards an outlook of distrust of the utility of discursive thought for metaphysical purposes and towards a recourse instead to faith, to understanding insight or intuitive appreciation. This tendency has naturally culminated in the voluntaristic purposive and value philosophies of recent times. Of such development, the systems of Royce, Munsterberg and Taylor are perhaps the most outstanding examples.

To most of these recent movements, however, we shall have occasion to refer in the last chapter of this

study. We shall content ourselves here with only a brief notice of the extremest exposition of intuitive efficacy which has been put forward by Bergson in his philosophy of the *Elan Vital*.

Intuition is defined by Bergson as absolute knowledge of an object by an imaginal sympathetic identification of the knower and the known. It is an insertion of oneself in the object by an effort of imagination and a merging of oneself into the life of its existence. "By intuition", as he says, "is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."* Absolute Reality, thinks Bergson, is only knowable by a knowledge of this kind. For Reality is individual, while expression in conceptual analytical terms must be essentially general and abstract. The intellect takes numerous partial views of a single existing object from different points of view, and then proceeds to construct its knowledge of the whole from them. Intuition, on the other hand, in so far as it is a real 'possession' of the object, need only confine itself to the 'given'. "Intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act."†

† Again, the essence of Reality, according to Bergson, lies in duration and mobility, in an inner tendency to

* Bergson *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p 6.

† *Ibid*, p 7.

continuous change. As such it can not be attained through the intellect. For the intellect can only take static pictures of this moving and changing reality. Intuition, on the other hand installing itself within its becoming, can live its life and thereby realize its unique essence. The universe is a work of art which is always in the course of creation and it is only a dynamic understanding such as that provided in intuition that can appreciate its growth and evolution.

Like Bradley, we must note here, Bergson characterises such an intuition by an expansion of experience into an all-inclusive whole. The two opposite general types of psychic activity, instinct and intelligence, are re-integrated into this whole of immediacy. It is instinct made self-conscious and intelligence made concrete and durational. It is a "consciousness as wide as life", an insight into the essential principle of the activity and change in the universe and as such into the very principle of existence, a feeling the very throbbing of the essential pulse of things. Such a consciousness "alone, "turning around suddenly against the push of life which it feels behind, would have a vision of life complete—would it not?—even though the vision were fleeting."

Ⓐ Bergson *Creative Evolution* p. xiii

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER THREE CONCEPTION OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE IN THE INDIAN SYSTEM OF NYAYA

It may here be noted that though Hegel was, so far as our knowledge goes, the first philosopher of importance to introduce such a notion of immediate experience as he has done in so well-defined a form into the philosophical investigations of the West, the idea had found its place in Indian Philosophy even in the intellectualistic system of the Nyaya. We may, noting this, also mark that the Nyaya was, like Hegelianism, a logico-philosophy as systematic and as well-detailed as the latter and, like it, again, has been considered typical of the intellectualistic speculations of its own part of the world. It recognises four means of true knowledge, one of which is direct apprehension (*pratyaksha*). This direct apprehension, it is said, may be 'determinate' or 'indeterminate' (*savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*), of which only the latter supplies the starting-point of metaphysical investigation. Radhakrishnan gives us the following brief account of *nirvakalpa pratyaksha* as conceived by the Nyayikas

'The main tendency, however, of the Nyaya is to regard indeterminate perception as the starting-point of

all knowledge though it is not itself knowledge. It is immediate apprehension of an object which is not in the strict sense cognitive. It is a state of undifferentiated non-relational consciousness, free from the work of assimilation and discrimination analysis and synthesis. It may be regarded as dumb and inarticulate and free from verbal images. Determinate perception is a mediate differentiated relational mode of consciousness involving the results of assimilation and discrimination. It is articulate, concrete and determinate. Indeterminate perception or sense-experience and determinate perception or perceptual judgment are the rudimentary and the advanced types of a process which is essentially identical in nature. Since indeterminate perception does not transcend immediacy is dumb and unanalysed, is what James calls "raw unverbilised experience," the distinction between true and false does not apply to it.¹

The first time that we see light, in Condillac's phrase, we *are* it rather than *see* it.² There is therefore no possibility of error in simple apprehension. In perceptual judgment, where a predicate is ascribed to a subject, the logical issue arises since our judgment may or may not conform to the objective order. When we say that "That is a man," our knowledge in so far

¹ See Nilakantha's *Tarkasamgrahadīpikāprakāśa*

² James, *Principles of Psychology* vol. I, p. 4. See also *Nyaya Bhasya* iv 2 87

as it is called "that" is true, while in so far as it is described as "man," it may or may not be true ³*.

'Nyaya Bhasya iii. 2. 37'.

Radhakrishnan *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p 60.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTELLECT

In the previous chapter, we have considered the conception of immediate experience in the system of Bradley and Bergson. We shall now turn to the other source of human knowledge, the intellect. We must, however recognise that, in normal life, pure intellection, like pure immediate experience, is a rare occurrence. No doubt, the attempt has often been made to regard intellect and immediacy as two different, even opposed paths of the activity of the individual self. The former, it is said, is more adapted to the inorganic, the latter to life. The former is said to afford us the contributions of the subjective Reason the latter the contributions of present 'Reality' to our knowledge. Yet even Bergson who tried to institute a sharp contrast between the two in the earlier pages of his 'Creative Evolution' could not keep it up in the later chapters. The contrast can not be rigid—the two methods are not independent and one implies the other.

We may, in fact, say that there are various degrees of the exercise of intelligence—of the extent, in other words, to which it superimposes its own constructions over the knowledge yielded by a direct apprehension of

the Real. On the lowest plane, in this respect, stands the normal sensory experience of the average man. It derives its contents from the directly 'given'. But we should not identify it with 'sense-certainty' in Hegel's sense of the term, much less with what Bergson calls 'pure perception' in 'Matter and Memory'. Perception is a state that arises out of immediate experience when the latter is related to the analytic self-consciousness of the individual perceiver. In other words, perception develops from the sensuous immediacy through the operation of the categories. In this state of consciousness, which is ordinarily called 'perception', the contribution of intellect as against that of datum of the experience may be said to consist chiefly in the (i) abstraction of a transitory state from the continuous flow of mental life, (ii) the subject-object distinction within that momentary state and (iii) the modification of the object in so far as essential for its admittance into what has been called the total apperception mass.

With this admittance of the object into the analysed experiential mass, we enter upon a new stage of mental life the stage of judgment. Bradley has seldom referred to the stage of perception, he devotes more and elaborate attention, however, to the stage of judgment. For the former is indeed so momentary and passes so early into the latter as to suggest its own

independent duration and existence only as a set of preparatory stage to the latter. Bradley seem from some similar reason to dwell at length only upon the judgment. Yet reference to the stage of perception is not altogether lacking in his work. For in 1910 we have in the previous chapter noticed how he rejects the realistic conception of experience in terms of perceptions. He there analyses in all perceptions two elements: an aspect of datum and an aspect of interpretation or construction, in other words as we have said above a contribution of immediate apprehension and a contribution of the intellect.

Judgment, for Bradley consists in the separation of a quality from its own immediate existence and in its application in lead to the whole system of reality. Thus for a judgment two things are required. In the first place, there must be a separation of a content from its own real existence in the concrete flow of consciousness. This will supply us with a general idea for "ideality lies in the disjoining of quality from being", in its emancipation from the clutches of particularity and individuality, as the rationalist would like to put it. The idea thus obtained is to serve as the predicate of the judgment. The other requisite for the judgment is the subject to which this abstracted content is predicated. This subject, unlike the predicate must be a fact.

* Bradley: *Appearance and Reality* p. 183

and not an idea. For, "No one ever *means* to assert about anything but reality"*. Here, therefore, is present an aspect of existence which is lacking in the predicate.

Such a view of judgment indicates that it is inadequate for the purposes of metaphysical quest. For, the separation of existence and content, of the 'what' and the 'that', falsifies the nature of the real. In actuality we have neither without the interfusion of the other. 'If', in Bradley's own words, 'we try to get the "that" by itself, we do not get it, for either we have it qualified, or else we fail utterly. If we try to get the "what" by itself, we find at once that it is not all. It points to something beyond, and cannot exist by itself and as a bare adjective'.† None of these two can be isolated from the other. Reality is indivisible into these aspects.

Yet thought essentially consists in such a division. It can not work but within this distinction. In its actual processes, thought can not transcend the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'. And if it does ever attempt to transcend its own dualism, if it does try to work out an identity between the subject and the predicate of the judgment, thought must commit suicide in the attempt. At that stage there can be no thought, for it has been

* *Ibid.*, p. 164

† *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

transcended. We may call this state one of 'higher thought' if we please, but it is qualitatively different from thought discursive and relational. In describing its character we must repeat what we have already said about the higher immediacy: so that what Bradley calls higher thought and what he calls higher immediacy are really one and the same thing looked upon first as a consummation of one and then as a consummation of another phase of experience. This aspect of Bradley's thought resembles what Max Muller called the attitude of henothism in the Indian pre-Upanishadic philosophers. But it is an attitude that could not come to the forefront of Bradley's work, for he had already at length exposed the fatal consequences implied in the adoption of intellectualistic categories of thought.

But, to come back from this side-reference, thought does claim to pursue the path of metaphysics. And its claim is not altogether unjustified. For thought proceeds upon the fundamental principle of the reality of, and only of, the non-contradictory. And what is reality? Or what is truth? Truth, as Bradley defines it, is 'the predication of such content as when predicated is harmonious and removes inconsistency and with it unrest. † Truth, then is, no doubt the object of thought. And thought would attain this object if and

† *Ibid*, p. 106

when it could have a predicate consistent in itself and entirely in agreement with the subject. But this is a practical impossibility. The predicate of the judgment about Reality, however much we extend and multiply its content, must, at least, ever remain 'ideal'. It must be an abstraction of a 'what' from its own 'that'. However complete a content becomes, it would never completely signify the nature of the reality to which it is predicated. Thought, then, can multiply judgments and present truths about reality from innumerable points of view. The nature of the whole would always elude the grasp of the intellect. Thought, in short, can not attain ultimate truth.

But the conclusion drawn from these limitations in the potentialities of thought is not agnosticism. The failure of thought in the quest does not necessarily mean a theory of an unknowable or a thing-in-itself. Of course, there is the alternative of denying the relevance of the quest altogether. We may accept the notions of commonsense as final and as satisfactory for our momentary needs, so that we need not engage ourselves in the search for the ultimate reality. But this alternative, as we have noticed in our second chapter, is already ruled out for a thinker like Bradley who "burns to think consistently, and yet is too good to become a slave, either to stupid fanaticism or dishonest sophistry". He accepts the problem of metaphysics as inevitable,

but is ever harping on the inadequacy of thought as an instrument of metaphysical knowledge. Yet Bradley would not accept the formula of *'ignorabimus'* as the final say of philosophy. The theory of the unknowable is essentially based upon the presumption that man has no possible means of true knowledge other than thought. Bradley, on the other hand says, I dissent wholly from the corollary that nothing more than thought exists.* As long as there are other elements—and our experience does obviously exhibit such elements—we need not despair.

At the same time, we must admit, whatever may be the source of absolute knowledge, it can not altogether exclude thought. For though thought is only one element of the whole, as one of the elements it plays its own part with the rest of them. The rest of the elements, in short can not in any sense stand apart from and independent of this one element. Only the whole can stand by itself and it is then that each element leaves its defects and limitations behind and by an act of self transcendence merges into the reality of the absolute.

We have sketched here in outline what Bradley's philosophy has in general to say about thought. We have not gone into the details of the matter we have rather contented ourselves with those points about

* *Ibid.*, pp 167

thought in his theory as specially contribute to his general view of the method and of the path of philosophy. Let us now pass on to Bergson's treatment of the intellect or thought. His analysis of thought is not a mere discourse on logic. It is more a theory of life rather than an abstract theory of knowledge. Let us briefly survey it as put forward in his 'Creative Evolution' He himself summarises it thus in his 'Introduction' to the work

"In the first chapter, we try on the evolutionary progress the two ready-made garments that our understanding puts at our disposal, mechanism and finality, we show that they do not fit, neither the one nor the other, but that one of them might be recut and resewn, and in this new form fit less badly than the other. In order to transcend the point of view of the understanding, we try, in our second chapter, to reconstruct the main lines of evolution along which life has travelled by the side of that which has led to the human intellect. The intellect is thus brought back to its generating cause, which we then have to grasp in itself and follow in its movement. It is an effort of this kind that we attempt—incompletely indeed—in our third chapter. A fourth and last part is meant to show how our understanding itself, by submitting to a certain discipline, might prepare a philosophy which transcends it. For that, a glance over the history of systems becomes necessary, together

with an analysis of the great illusions to which, as soon as it speculates on reality in general the human understanding is exposed *

The study of thought then is here essentially historical. It is an attempt to relive the whole process, of the inception and the growth of the human intellect to its present state, and is thus a striking example of the application of the intuitive method to the problem of thought.

What, then, is the origin of the intellect? With all the defects and limitations from which it suffers how could the thinking faculty ever come to develop in man if life is nothing but an ever changing, ever continuous flow of creative evolution? Perhaps the briefest statement of Bergson's answer to this question is to be found in Bergson's own words in the pages of the 'Bulletin' where he says that after all possible intuitive contemplation of "general evolution and the continuity of life in the sum-total of the organized world, the coordination and subordination of the vital functions to one another in the same living being, the relations that psychology and physiology in combination seem to establish between cerebral activity and the mind in man, he can not but arrive at the conclusion that life is an immense effort attempted by the mind to obtain from matter something that matter does not wish

* Bergson Creative Evolution pp. xlv xvi

to give it. Matter is inert, it is the realm of necessity, it proceeds mechanically. It seems as if the mind tries to profit by this mechanical aptitude of matter, to utilize it for *actions*, to convert thus, into movements contingent in space and into events unforeseeable in time, whatever measure it bears within it of creative energy—at any rate all that this energy has that is *jouable* and capable of being exteriorized. But it is caught in a snare. The whirlwind upon which it is poised seizes it and carries it away. It becomes the prisoner of the mechanical devices it has set up. Automatism takes hold of it and, by an inevitable forgetfulness of the aim it had set itself, life, which should only be the means to a higher end, is entirely spent in an effort to preserve itself.”*

The fundamental characteristic of the intellect, as it is, arises from the fact that it is an instrument for dealing with the static world subject to mechanical laws. This characteristic, according to Bergson, is the capacity of constructing and using artificial tools. But intellect is not the only faculty of using tools. There is another, which language names ‘instinct’. But the tool which instinct uses is an organized tool and is supplied by Nature ready-made and incorporated into the organism for whose use it is intended. Intelligence, on the other

* Bulletin, May 2, 1901, pp. 55-66, quoted in Chevalier Henri Bergson, translated by Clare, pp. 212-213

hand, makes tools out of unorganized matter and is free to modify them in any way and as seen as it pleases. Instinct responds only to things while intelligence reacts to relations between them. In instinct there seems, in other words, to be a one-to-one correspondence between each stimulus and the particular response it evokes. The responses of intelligence are, on the other hand, guided by an analytic-synthetic faculty in its choice of possible variations of conduct even at stimulation from the same object.

Consequently we may say Bergson points out, that *"Intelligence in so far as it is innate, is the knowledge of a form. Instinct implies the knowledge of a matter."* • In fact form and matter are two inseparable aspects of reality. Yet, in finite knowledge they may be abstracted from each other. Matter, thus abstracted is 'what is given by the perceptive faculties taken in the elementary state. Form likewise is 'the totality of the relation set up between these materials in order to constitute a systematic knowledge.'† And in the course of the development of life, the former follows a line of evolution ending in instinct the latter manifests itself as intelligence.

Notwithstanding the fact that the intellect is incapable of knowing the uninterrupted, continuous progress

* Bergson. *Creative Evolution* p. 167

† *Ibid*, p. 168

of life, it is still a pulse of the vital flow. Instinct and intelligence ought to be amalgamated together to form a reality which can not but be "a consciousness as wide as life" itself. "And such a consciousness, turning around suddenly against the push of life which it feels behind, would have a vision of life complete—would it not?—even though the vision were fleeting." ‡

Bergson begins his 'Introduction to Metaphysics' with a distinction between "two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object, the second that we enter into it." The second is attained by inserting oneself into the object in sympathy and by an effort of imagination. Thus only is it possible to possess its absolute reality. The first, on the other hand, is a knowledge that is relative to an external point of view. But such points of view place the knower outside the object of knowledge. They can therefore never attain its original, *réal* essence. Knowledge in their terms can only afford us some hints, some clues, some circumstances other than its internal nature, whereby we may through our intellect try to construct its absolute reality. They offer us only symbols whereby we may try to understand and to infer the ultimate facts of nature. These symbols, as symbols, are in themselves meaningless. They are not wholly *unréal*. For they are after all

‡ *Ibid*, pp. xii-xiii.

symbol of the real. They do not bring its essential nature in our 'possession' they do not give us what James called 'knowledge of reality' still, they do give us what he called 'knowledge about reality'. Yet it can not be denied that in so far as they are merely symbols and external points of view they can not bring us into direct touch with the exact nature of Reality.

Bradley did not draw a positive, clear-cut line of distinction between two actual modes of knowledge corresponding to Bergson's intellect and intuition. He is not sure of the actual existence of such a faculty in man as would enable him to gain a direct insight into the original essence of things. For he is not prepared to go against the traditional difficulty regarding the possibility of absolute knowledge for man. To know the Absolute one must be absolute. The individual, were he ever to realize the Absolute would cease to be the individual and absolute knowledge would become thus an impossible goal for man to attain. This is skepticism and agnosticism disguised as idealism.

Thus Bradley has always emphasised on the incapacity of the intellect to effect a knowledge of the sort that is gained by an imaginal sympathetic merging of the knower into the object of knowledge. "Truth and thought are not the thing itself but are of it and about it." * To put us, on the other hand in an

* Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 108

immediate possession of its essence, its principle of existence, its fundamental nature—such a state is unattainable except by a self-denial and a suicide of the intellect whose function is thought, discursive, relational and symbolic. If we are to have absolute knowledge of reality, if, in other words, the identity of thought and fact is to be worked out, thought must commit a “happy suicide”, and, like a national martyr, “end in a reality which swallows up its nature.”†

But again this does not mean an exclusion of thought as an element absolutely opposed to the principle of reality “Every judgment of thought, whether positive or negative, and however frivolous its character, makes an assertion about reality. And the content asserted cannot, as we have seen, be altogether an error” This “reference to reality” may no doubt be “undefined and at large The ideal content may be applied subject to more or less transformation. But to hold a thought, so to speak, in the air, without a relation of any kind to the Real, in any of its aspects or spheres, we should find in the end to be impossible.”

The cause of the incapability of thought to go beyond this mere “reference to reality” towards a ‘possession’ of it is said to lie in its practical nature Here, too, Bergson is more explicit than Bradley. We may, however, explain it by the fact that this aspect of thought can be clearly apprehended by a study of the

† *Ibid.*, pp 172-173

origin and genesis of thought while Bradley following the rationalistic tradition overlooked questions of origin altogether and concerned himself with only an analysis of concepts of scientific and metaphysical thought

Yet Bradley does find in the world a process with two aspects. There is a constant loosening of idea from fact and a making-good once more in a new existence of this recurring discrepancy..... Now looking at the universe so we may choose to speak of thought wherever the idea becomes loose from its existence in fact and we may speak of will wherever this unity is once more made good. Thought must then be taken as the idealizing side of this process and will on the other hand must be viewed as the side which makes ideas to be real. *

Compare this statement of Bradley with Bergson's account of the origin of intellect. The course of evolution of life, he says, depends on "two series of causes: the resistance life meets from inert matter, and the explosive force—due to an unstable balance of tendencies—which life bears within itself. † This resistance from inert matter it tried to overcome by a "dint of of humility" ‡. By bending to the physical and chemical forces of matter, by consenting even to go a

* *Ibid* p 471

† Bergson *Creative Evolution* p. 103

‡ *Ibid*, p 103

part of the way with them, and for this purpose, making itself very small and unobtrusive—"It is the watch that adopts for a while the direction of the rail it is endeavouring to leave"—it sought to convert the mechanical, inert, solid body of matter into "movements contingent in space and into events inaccessible in time".⁶ But, as we have already quoted some pages back, "it is caught in a snare. The whirlwind upon which it is perched seizes it and carries it away. It becomes the prisoner of the mechanical devices it has set up. Automatism takes hold of it and by an inevitable forgetfulness of the aim it has set itself, life, which should only be the means to a higher end, is entirely spent in an effort to preserve itself." Intellect originates from this tendency to self-preservation.

The resemblance between the position of the two philosophers seems evident. The thought is the same though it is expressed in two different contexts. According to Bradley, as for Bergson, there is a double process involved in intellection. First, there is what Bradley calls the formation of the 'idea', by its separation from its existence in fact, and what Bergson speaks of as the "dint of humility" which life manifested for inert matter. In fact, Bradley has also referred to this phase as the

|| *Ibid.*, p 104

⁶ Bulletin, May 2, 1901, quoted in Chevalier Henri Bergson, pp 212-213.

undue dominance of the idea over the fact. This willing submission of existence to content Bradley would ascribe as a means to the higher end of express implication of the latter in the former of the many-content within the one Experience Reality. Bergson would call the higher end an express manifestation of the Life-Principle in even matter by converting its inert mechanical aptitude into movement contingent. And in the second place there is the forgetfulness of this higher end and falling into the snare of what Bergson termed the inertial form of matter and of what for Bradley was the ideality of the judgmental form.

The intellect, then, as it is in its misguided activity has forgotten its original function and has concerned itself with its own selfish preservation. It has abandoned its higher end of self-transcendence and busied itself on the other hand in taking practical steps to bind the individual securely in the forms and distinctions it has created. Prudence is set up as the motto and guides man's activity to a never-ending series of self-preservative actions. The series is never-ending for the intellect with all its imperfections can never afford perfect peace and satisfaction; none of its acts is ever final and each must need another to support it *ad infinitum*. Commonsense, language, practical life and positive science all are products of this practical and prudential activity of the intellect.

Considered in connection with the objective facts of the evolution of the universe—Bergson's context—, this practical nature of the intellect is evidenced in the construction of tools. "*Intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments*" * Or, again, "*intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture*" † But "the instrument constructed intelligently.... is an imperfect instrument" It can not completely satisfy, or attain the object. "For every need that it satisfies it creates a new need" ‡, and satisfaction is ever driven further and further from attainment

Considered, on the other hand, in connection with the subjective facts of knowledge—Bradley's context—, the practical aspect of the nature of thought is responsible for the ideas of primary and secondary qualities, substantive and adjective, relation and quality, space and time, and causation and thing and self. These conceptions are obviously at the back of our every day life as well as our scientific thought. Yet a thorough analysis of their implications as carried out in 'Appearance'

* Bergson *Creative Evolution*, p. 147

† *Ibid*, p. 146

‡ *Ibid*, p. 148

shows that none of them can stand by itself without involving either vagueness or self-contradiction. If carried to their logical consequences, their definitions involve either circular arguments or infinite regressions. They are all relative not absolute and hence are appearance not reality. In actual thinking we depend upon particular connections and apart from this given matter (i.e. the practical problem in hand) we should be surely unable to think. These connections cannot be taken all as inherent in the mere evidence of thought, for most of them at least seem to be empirical and supplied from outside. And I am entirely unable to see how they can be regarded as self-evident. * Each of them is in fact "a makeshift device, a mere practical compromise most necessary but in the end most indefensible." †

But practical activity must by its very nature involve abstraction. It must select the matters relevant to the problem in hand at any moment and abstract it from its natural place in experience as a whole so as to make possible due attention speculation and manipulation.

* Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 477. The second sentence in the quotation of course involves an unconsciously drawn distinction between a higher thought utilized in metaphysical investigation and a lower thought that concerns itself about practical problems of every day life.

† *Ibid.*, p. 83.

over it. Thus, as Bradley would put it, thought abstracts the contents of experience relevant to the matter from its actual existence in fact, and thereby forms its unit 'ideas' Bergson expresses the same idea when he says: "Our mind, which seeks for solid points of support, has for its main function that of representing *states* and *things* It takes, at long intervals, almost instantaneous views of the undivided mobility of the real It thus obtains *sensations* and *ideas*."†

The psychological mechanism of associationism is the natural product of intellectual abstraction and, as we have already seen in the chapter on 'Immediate Experience' has been critically exposed by Bradley and by Bergson' The very idea of a state as a self-sufficient unitary object of experience and the sharp discrimination between one state and another are obvious instances of the work of the intellect on psychical experience. In fact, only experience taken as a whole can be individual. But intellect divides it into fragments and aspects and can dwell only upon one at a time, and on that fragment only in complete abstraction from the rest. If two or more of them enter this intellectual consciousness, they do so neither as a fusion nor as in a continuous flow, but as independent entities standing in distinct relations. Apart from the internal contradiction involved in an abstract

† Bergson Introduction to Metaphysics, p 56

unit or in a relation they both represent only fragments or particular view points of the nature of the object, never its complete essence. Yet thought can not, by virtue of its perverted nature, but act with abstractions, distinctions and discriminations.*

Having then abstracted from immediate experience and having thus formed 'ideas', the unit categories with which it must work the intellect goes on to build with them its own structure of science and language. For this purpose it must bring these units together and arrange them in particular modes of connection with each other that each might gain support from the rest. In short it must relate them and put them into form. Intelligence therefore naturally makes use of relations of like with like of content to container of cause to effect etc. which are implied in every phrase in which there is a subject an attribute and a verb expressed or understood'† Intellectual construction thus essentially deals with relations. We must relate the units of experience so as to put them into forms most suited to the practical purposes in our hands. That is fundamental to the very problem thought has set before itself in forgetting its original objective. *Whatever* in fact, says Bergson *Intelligence is innate knowledge, bears on rela*

* *Ibid*, p. 188

† Bergson *Creative Evolution* p 185.

tions,"† and "in so far as it is innate, is the knowledge of a form"* "Thought", in Bradley's words, "is relational and discursive, and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide".†

The function of intelligence, then, is to establish relations. And some philosophers have supposed this function to be essentially one of unification, and, upon this belief, have tried to imagine a harmonious system of ideal contents united by relations and reflecting itself in self-conscious harmony. But Bradley and Bergson are both keenly alive to the situation and have both exposed the inconsistencies involved in such a position. For, Bergson might with justification ask if the function of the intellect in employing relations is not to divide even more than to unite¶. For Bradley, too, "It contains aspects now distinguished and taken as differences, and which tend, so far as we see, to a further separation."§ Moreover, Bergson points out that the exact nature of the unification which relational thought is supposed to carry out can never be adequately determined.|| Bradley carries the point into details when he says "How the

† *Ibid.*, p. 156

* *Ibid.*, p. 157.

† Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 170

¶ Bergson *Creative Evolution*, p. 160.

§ Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 25

|| Bergson *Creative Evolution*, p. 160.

relation can stand to the qualities is on the other side unintelligible. If it is nothing to the qualities then they are not related at all and, if so as we saw they have ceased to be qualities and their relation is a non-entity. But if it is to be something to them, then clearly we shall now require a *new* connecting relation. For the relation hardly can be the mere adjective of one or both of its terms or, at least, as such it seems indefensible. And being something itself, if it does not itself bear a relation to the terms, in what intelligible way will it succeed in being anything to them? But here again we are hurried off into the eddy of a hopeless process since we are forced to go on finding new relations without end. ☉

But if the intellect has to serve, as adequately as possible, the practical interests of every day life it must side by side with its discriminational and relational character undertake description, calculation, construction and production, in general, universal terms. 'The original purpose' as Taylor points out of all description of physical events was intercommunication with a view to social co-operation. † In a society of finite human individuals, having interrelated aims and objects, none of the individuals can hope to further greatly his own practical purposes without sufficient

☉ Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 82

† Taylor *Elements of Metaphysics* p. 281

consultation and co-operation with the rest. And intercommunication for this purpose is only possible by means of description in general terms. But, apart from this need of intercommunication and social co-operation, it is of primary practical importance to be able once and for all to formulate general rules for dealing with indefinitely numerous occurrences of typical situations, instead of having to deal with each occurrence separately as it arises. For any attempt at a solution of a practical problem implies and presupposes a possibility of foreseeing probable consequences of events before their actual occurrence. But Reality, for Bradley, is individual and its particular facts are unique in their own existence, and Bergson actually describes them as "unforeseeable". Yet in spite of this the intellect tries to ignore the particularity of these events and confines its attention only to the general elements thereof. "Though", as Bradley has put it, "in our perception of a universal the particularity always is there, it is treated as more or less irrelevant. We ignore it, or, while recognising it, we exclude it from our view entirely or partially."* Bergson, in fact, distinguishes intelligence from instinct principally by this quality of the intellect—by its power of grasping the general elements in a situation and relating it with past situations.†

* Bradley · *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 280.

† Bergson · *Creative Evolution*, pp. 147-149.

Reality, on the other hand must be individual. In individuality lies the principle of unity of which all metaphysics is the quest. Moreover it is in individuality alone that we can find a mode of existence of a unity in diversity. For individuality's unity is in concrete not bare unity in abstraction. The intellect therefore beset as it is with the difficulties we have abovementioned is pronounced by both Bradley and Bergson to be incapable of attaining Reality in itself, in its flow of experiential quality, free from all abstraction. Thought understood as thought discursive and relational however much it may try and claim to construct our world as an interpretation which attempts to restore the unity which the real has lost by making its diversity apparent, must ever escape an other, as Bradley says, which it can not possibly reach. Thought in his own words, "always is found with and appears to demand, an Other." We must always see the intellect failing in its professed objective. It failed in its attempt at scientific constructions and it meets the same fate in 'intellectualistic philosophy'. Herein consists Bradley's great contribution to present day 'anti-intellectualistic idealism' in spite of all the 'vicious' intellectualism—to quote the two words under which James summed up his whole critique of Bradley and 'absolutism'—

*Bradley Appearance and Reality p. 175

†James—A Pluralistic Universe

that he employed in his method of metaphysical argument.

Bergson comes to the same conclusion indeed when he says that "*the intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life*"*. Its purely logical and geometrical form, its measureability and its inability to escape out of the chimera of categories and relations, all exhibit its inadequacy for the quest of the metaphysician. Intellectualism may be justified only if we make philosophy no more than an equivalent to a synthetic study of the special sciences, which are the proper sphere for the activity of the intellect. But thereby we would prove traitor to the insight which raised the problem of appearance and reality.

Philosophy, then, as we have seen Bradley and Bergson to understand it, "must go further... Making a clean sweep of every thing that is only an imaginative symbol," we must reach the other beyond thought, which is free from all discrepancies and from all bondage to ready-made forms and categories. Thought discursive and relational must, therefore, be made to commit suicide and give place to Absolute Experience or Intuition.

Of course it may be questioned whether such a transcendence of the intellect is possible at all. For it may be asked. Having once been chained in the circular

* Bergson *Creative Evolution*, p. 174.

maze of the intellect, how can mind throw off the deception and get out of it? Having dwelt since the very birth of psyche in the world of distinction, discrepancy and analysis, how can man transcend the intellect and go further to an Intuitional Experience of the Reality of Life?

Bradley does not give us an answer to this question. Perhaps he would have said if pressed, Somehow, we do not know as he is apt to say in many similar matters. But this much is sure from his arguments that a vigorous effort of intellect to go further than it possibly can is implied to be necessary and a self-transcendence of thought to its other must result as a consequence. Bergson points out the same thing in more positive language. No doubt, he says. It is of the essence of reasoning to shut us up in the circle of the given (habit of intellect). But action breaks the circle. * How can we know before we try? As long as you are in the circle you think you can never get out of it. But once you make a determined effort there you are, out of it as it were, by a miracle.

But, besides this, Bergson has other evidence of the possibility of this thought-transcendence. Firstly, he believes that though intellect seems to be detached from the rest of vast reality, there has never been a clear-cut sharp line between the two. All round conceptual

* *Ibid*, pp. 202-208

thought there remains an indistinct fringe which he calls its origin. Secondly, again, the intellect is compared by him to a solid nucleus formed by means of condensation out of life. This nucleus does not in substance differ radically from the fluid surrounding it. In Bergson's own words, "From this ocean of life in which we are immersed, we are continually drawing something, and we feel that our being, or at least the intellect that guides it, has been formed therein by a kind of local concentration. Philosophy can only be an effort to dissolve again into the Whole. Intelligence reabsorbed into its principle, may thus live back again its own genesis."†

We might, in passing, note one thing more in this connection. Both Bradley and Bergson, in exposing the defects of the intellect and its categories and forms, have used the very method of the intellect itself in their arguments. They have both employed thought itself to prove its own self-contradictions. Bradley used a 'vicious intellectualism' in his book on 'Appearance' to disprove the reality of the intellect. For examples of Bergson's employment of this method, we may mention here, in particular, his treatment of Zeno's paradox regarding the concepts of motion and time and his treatment of the idea of 'nothing'.

We have, as yet, dealt with some significant re-
† *Ibid.*, p. 202.

semblances between the respective accounts of the intellect given us by Bradley and by Bergson. We shall, now, note certain factors in these respective treatments to explain the fact that Bergson's philosophy has, if we view the philosophical situation of to-day on the whole, led the march over Bradley's philosophy.

First of all, we must mark, in this connection, that the term "intellect" has a far wider significance for Bergson than for Bradley. As we have also noticed some pages back, Bradley uses the term as practically synonymous with the faculty of judgment, judgment meaning, for him, an arrangement of contents or qualities. Bergson, on the other hand, takes it to cover a wider field of application. For him it is, of course, as for Bradley, (i) the faculty of judgment, but it has two more aspects, as (ii) a wave of action arising and issuing forth from Life's flow, and as (iii) a faculty or means of adaptation to variation in environment. Hence, indeed, it is that Bradley's treatment of thought is essentially logical rather than functional and historical, while Bergson allows equal importance to the relational and the formal aspects of the intellect and to its activity elements.

Again, let us consider the position of Bradley and Bergson regarding even this common phase of their philosophies of the intellect, the phase of judgment. Now Bradley has defined 'judgment' as an application

of abstract 'ideas' to factual Reality. All judgment, he says, must be about Reality. In his own words, "No one ever *means* to assert about anything but Reality, or to do anything but qualify a 'that' by a 'what'."^{*} Does this, we may ask, mean that there is an abstract 'idea' which is referred back by us in judgment to Reality?—by which Reality is meant an Absolute Immediate Experience of Fact? Bradley seems to mean something like this when, for example, he says "Judgment is essentially the re-union of two sides, 'what', and 'that', provisionally estranged."[†] But, if it is so, surely judgment does not remain an intellectualistic function of abstraction, it becomes a unique consciousness of the home-coming of an estranged element to its original whole of Immediate Experience. Is it, then, we may ask, immediate? Or, are we to understand that judgment consists in a reference of one 'idea' to another 'idea' and the reference of this whole reference to Reality as a whole. Bradley does seem to refer to such a thing also, for example, when he insists that it is the "ultimate subject of every judgment, the subject which we mean", that is constituted by Reality as a whole of Immediate Experience. This would involve a process of double reference. And it must also imply, if we are to be consistent in what we say,

^{*} Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 164

[†] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

that the manner of reference of the one 'idea to the other idea and the way in which the 'idea —series is related to Reality as a Whole of Immediate Experience stand on planes widely different from each other. If judgment is constituted by a reference of an idea to another idea the reference of the 'idea series to Reality must involve not judgment but something else may be something akin to the immediate experience of the Absolute, which is the object of all metaphysical quest.

Bergson however does not fall into a compromising confusion of the two different types of relationship as Bradley did. He agrees with him in the treatment of the judgment as a reference of one idea to another idea. But he refuses to fall into Bradley's mistake by also adding thereto a reference of Idea to Reality as a necessary element. The latter belongs to a realm quite different from that of the former and they can be related to each other only by either reducing the former to the latter or the latter to the former. A reference of the idea series to Reality would either make Reality non-immediate which would contradict the whole trend of Bradley's thought or make the idea-series immediate, whereby judgment would cease to be a thought-unit and would become identical with Absolute Intuition. Hence it is, indeed, that Bergson insists with so much vigour on the sharp opposition which he holds to subsist between thought

and experience, or, in other words, between 'intellect' and 'intuition'.

We may, in fact, characterise the difference between Bradley and Bergson as to the degree of this opposition by saying that Bergson's treatment holds to a logic of Pure Difference while Bradley, on the other hand, adopts a logic of Identity in Difference. For Bergson all Reality given through intuition must be continuous and mobile; and, consequently, by the logic of pure difference, discontinuity and immobility, the mark of appearance and of phenomenal matter, must be radically opposed to it. Intellect, therefore, which feels at home in the realm of discontinuous and immobile matter, can not but be an absolute negation of Intuition. For Bradley, on the contrary, intellect does not mark such a sharp contrast with Immediate Experience. It is rather a step to the latter, than its absolute negation. Immediate Experience is a unity in diversity. But so is Judgment, even its relational form points everywhere to a unity. "It implies a substantial totality beyond relations and above them, a whole endeavouring without success to realize itself in their detail"* The opposition between the two, if any, lies in the words 'without success' and between the words 'relational' and 'beyond relations and above them.'

Hence, it follows that, for Bergson, all but life
 * *Ibid.*, p. 160.

itself—space matter, intellect or any thing else—must stand in radical opposition to the Reality of Intuition. They must all be immobile discontinuous, static and non-durational. Movement in their context must be foreseeable and must admit of repetition. For Bradley, on the other hand, there is no radical difference between the Absolute and the appearances. They must all each in its own degree exhibit the marks of perfect individuality, though none of them attains that end completely. There are in fact degrees of reality and consequently of appearance. There is a sort of concomitant relation that holds between the noumenal and the phenomenal features in the objects of appearance. And the great significance which Bradley attaches to this fact is apparent when he says 'To survey the field of appearances to measure each by the idea of perfect individuality, and to arrange them in an order and in a system of reality and merit—would be the task of metaphysics.' †

Indeed, Bradley seems to view thought as a necessary step to the attainment of the Absolute Immediate Experience. He would have identified Absolute Experience with immediate presentation but for two reasons because of the latter's undifferentiated homogeneity and because mere feeling is too unstable an experience for the solution of the metaphysical problem

† *Ibid* p. 489

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ABSOLUTE AND LIFE'

We have, in the preceding chapter noticed some of the chief difficulties which according to Bradley as well as according to Bergson the intellect or 'thought creates for true knowledge and the inconsistencies that both of these thinkers point out as implied in its very nature. We have seen that both Bradley and Bergson conclude from this that the intellect, if absolute knowledge is to be gained, must transcend itself and negate itself in the attempt. The true consummation of knowledge lies in an immediate apprehension of Truth and Reality. We noticed certain factors which account for the difference in the two systems of philosophy in regard to the relation between intellect and immediate experience. But both Bradley and Bergson agree in maintaining that the intellect is characterised by an inherent inability to comprehend reality as a whole, in its absolute perfection and individuality.

But are we to take this to mean that the world of things built up through perception which is undeveloped thought and thought is a subjective world dependent wholly upon the individual percipient? Has the knowledge of intellect no significant relation to

true knowledge? Such a position would be entirely unwarranted and may be easily seen, if analysed, to involve the infinite regress of explaining the subjectivity of the percipient individual himself with reference to another individual and so on. The commonsense world must, therefore, be regarded as at least a manifestation of the underlying Reality, and, as such, it must be capable of affording us some evidence of the nature of that basic original. The materials out of which the former is made must be components originally of the latter which are abstracted from their natural position and engarbed into the forms and categories of intelligence.

Again, not only must the Appearance afford us some hint into the nature of the ultimate Reality, it must also be a manifestation of that Reality, and of nothing else. The ground covered by the two, appearance and reality, must be identical. Only, the manifestation may be the result of looking at the same ground in a manner that distorts its nature through intellectualistic spectacles.

Intellectual appearances, then, can not be conceived exactly as meteors falling from the region of the life of immediate experience into a world outside and beneath this region. The analogy has no doubt been employed by Bergson to refer to the ever-creating, continuous, activity of the *Elan Vital*. But his critics

have without sufficient warrant over-emphasised a mere analogy and have raised it to the status of a central conception regarding the relation of the ultimate reality with the phenomenal world of finite objects. In fact we can not do away altogether with such intellectualistic and spatialistic symbols so long as we try to express anything in clear precise and well-defined language. Language is itself nothing but a tool invented by the intellect for its own practical ends and interests. Yet it would be truer to say—for there are degrees of truth and degrees of reality—that the reality is what is called a ground and that the appearance is its consequent, and that it is as the consequent that the latter is contained in or coincident with the former. The coincidence of the ground and the consequent is not a spatial coincidence. They coincide in the sense that the ground runs throughout the consequent and that the consequent is throughout permeated as it were by the ground. It is in this sense in fact that Bradley has described Reality as an identity in difference and a unity in multiplicity. Whatever is, when we look upon it with our average commonsense or even scientific outlook it presents us with its multifarious aspects and the varied possibilities of its manipulation according to our own interests. On the other hand, when we wish to view it as a systematic individual whole, the continuity of the multiplicity comes to the forefront of our notice and

we see in all its variety the manifestation of one single unitary principle. Bergson expressed the same belief when he spoke of the absolute as being simple and as well also infinite. "Viewed from the inside, then, an absolute is a simple thing; but looked at from the outside, that is to say, relatively to other things, it becomes, in relation to the signs which express it, the gold coin for which we never seem able to finish giving small change. Now, that which lends itself at the same time both to an indivisible apprehension and to an inexhaustible enumeration is, by the very definition of the word, an infinite." ❀

Finite objects of every day experience are, then, the multiplicity of contents abstracted from their natural places in the simple, individual whole of experience. As such they are self-contradictory appearances and can not justify themselves without recourse to external factors. Commonsense is satisfied with this chaos of appearances so far as it is not hampered in its usual pursuit of practical ends. Science, however, tries to systematise them and define the relations in which each of these in itself stands to the others and at most to classify these relations into more general laws. The question of the whole is yet not raised at all. The uniformity and rigidity of science can not suffice for the purpose. For there are elements in experience,

❀Bergson. Introduction to *Metaphysics*, p. 6.

purposes and feelings for example, that are not reducible to mechanical events, which alone the intellect is competent to study. Moreover its own reasonings are subject to contradiction and tend towards self-transcendence. Philosophy by which is meant the realization of first principles must, therefore, dive deeper and try to see into the unity that underlies the apparent multiplicity of all phenomenal events.

This indeed is the claim which both Bradley and Bergson make for their respective philosophies. They both claim to endeavour to realize how the unity of the universe is related to and explains its multiplicity. And the description either of them offers of this relation is essentially that of a relation between a ground and its consequent. Taylor says of this latter relation

Ground and consequence are thus one and the same systematic whole, only considered from two different points of view. The Ground is the pervading common nature of the system thought of as an identity pervading and determining the character of its detail the Consequence is the same system, looked at from the point of view of the detail as a plurality of differences pervaded and determined by an identical principle.¹

Reality then is a unity, but a unity containing a multiplicity of contents. The two elements unity and multiplicity however, though they are both neces-

sary to its being, can not be 'given' as separate. Nor can they be analysed and abstracted from each other without falsifying the nature of the Reality. For the two elements are not two; they are one thing, looked at in two different ways. "The Absolute", says Bradley, "is its appearances, it really is all and every one of them."^{*} "The Absolute is each appearance, and is all", though it must be added, "not any one as such."[†] Yet the two points of view make the fundamental difference. Hence the seeming paradox "All is appearance, and no appearance, nor any combination of these, is the same as Reality."[‡]

The same is the case with Bergson's account of Reality, which he designates by the term 'Life'. Life, as described by him, is an individual active principle that manifests itself in a manifold and variegated multiplicity of forms of the universe. Viewed as a unity, through an intuitive act of the mind, it is an ever-creating, explosive *Elan Vital* running through the whole universe of existence. But it implies, on the other hand, the diversity of contents of the universe which it has, by the necessity of its own nature, created, and through which it then runs, in a continuous flow of duration, illuminating the whole, as it were,

^{*} Bradley. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 486

[†] *Ibid*, p. 487.

[‡] *Ibid.*, p. 486.

with a touch of art and awakening it with a sense of life and beauty. Here again the ever-present principle of creative activity can not be analysed or abstracted as separate from the manifold of forms in which it finds expression. As, in Bradley, the separation of content and existence falsifies the nature of Reality and serves only to construct a phenomenal world of idealism or, in Bergson, the plucking off as it were, of any content from the flow of uninterrupted ever-changing and ever-growing duration, falsifies the nature of Life and serves only to degenerate it into its opposite homogeneous pace. Again as in Bradley, the phenomenal appearance is nothing but the multiplicity of the Absolute looked at from a perverted standpoint of abstract thought or in Bergson phenomenal matter is nothing but the flowing diversity of the qualities of life viewed from a sophisticated intellectualistic angle of vision. Matter thus is for him inverted life and life inverted matter. As Bergson himself would say, "Physics is psychology inverted."

Neither therefore, Bradley's Absolute nor Bergson's Life is a bare homogeneity. In fact here they may be said to part company with all ancient attempts at a monistic conception of the ultimate Reality. For the ancient Greeks as well as for the modern English, French and German philosophers, God or Absolute

was the idea of Pure Being gained by abstracting away all concrete attributes and retaining only mere existence or mere activity as such. It was the most general and the most abstract idea beyond which you can not abstract or generalize. For Bradley and Bergson, on the other hand, it is a concrete reality of contents of qualitative variety rather than a pure concept or even a homogeneous substance like Spinoza's.

In this very respect we must also note that there is a mistaken tendency among some writers to compare Bradley's Absolute with the *Brahman* of the Indian System of Vedanta and to believe them to be practically synonymous with each other. But as a matter of fact *Brahman* is a conception differing in its most fundamental aspects from the Bradleyian Absolute. Though *Brahman* is said to pervade each and every appearance of the world, it is believed that it has a reality of its own apart from the *maya* which it creates. The Absolute of Bradley is, on the other hand, nothing apart from its manifestations, from its appearances. And consequently, while the *Brahman* as conceived by Samkara is a pure, homogeneous, attributeless Being, Bradley's Absolute is a unity in diversity, an individual whole of concrete qualities.

Similarly, Life, as Bergson views it, can not be said to be a homogeneous reality. Activity and creativeness are essential to its nature. Hence in all times

it continues to be a stage in moment of which is a new quality. Life does not live the Vedānta *Brahman* by an intellectualisation of existence. "I am alone let me be busy." It is on the other hand, a living force whose very being always engaged in creating and developing a system of relations, then continuous growing and forming a unique individual whole.

A qualification however is necessary to understand what Bradley and Bergson mean by a unity, identity or identity indifference. For among contemporary philosophers there have no doubt been some, besides Bradley and Bergson who have also presented a scheme of Reality as a unity in diversity. Yet there is one characteristic of Bradley as well as of Bergson's conception which serves to mark off these two from all the rest and places them in quite a distinct category. Many of the absoluteists view the ultimate reality as relational in character. The related contents and qualities of ordinary experience are not needed but are re-arranged in the absolute. A new order of relations subsuming all finite facts and relations thus arises. The nature of the ultimate relations depends on the manner in which the absolute is conceived. Some conceive it as a purposive whole and others as an eternal order like the heavenly life of Christian theology. The relations which arise in the ultimate

order of things depend, then, on the way in which the Absolute is viewed. Bradley and Bergson, on the other hand, insist that the whole into which the diverse qualities is brought together is fundamentally non-relational. Bosanquet, for example, maintains a relational conception of the Absolute. Green goes even so far as to reduce the qualities in relation also to relations, and thus to define Reality as a system of inter-related relations^{*}. For Bradley and Bergson, on the other hand, relations are functions of thought or intellect which are transmuted and transcended in the ultimate reality. Some of the difficulties of the relational form pointed out by them have already been mentioned. All of them are best given in the original works themselves, and we need not go over the details of the matter here.

But the question arises. What, then, is the form, if not relational, of the system of unity-in-diversity that Bradley and Bergson have to offer? It is here indeed that we must see Bradley and Bergson part company. For, though Bradley has nowhere definitely expressed any positive opinion on the point, he has expressly ruled out Bergson's position.

Bradley has, in fact, been very vague in giving expression to the exact way in which the diverse qualities in the Absolute are reconciled with, or con-

* Green. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Bk. I, Ch. I.

tained in its unity. The relational form he has rejected, and along with it all discriminations and distinctions. These are only the instruments through which the diverse elements of the Absolute appear to us analysed and abstracted by thought. Yet the relational form it can not be denied does point to a unity to a totality beyond relations and above them to a whole endeavouring without success to realize itself in their detail † Now, if we go back entirely upon the relational form we find that, before thought comes upon the stage, there is only a bare undifferentiated immediate experience or in Bradley's own words mere feeling or immediate presentation. This whole, he says 'contains diversity and on the other hand is not parted by relations ‡ Here then we have an obvious instance of a unity in-diversity. But it does not yield the knowledge of the Absolute. For it is not a self-sustained and self-contained perfect individuality.

Such an experience, we must admit is most imperfect and unstable and its inconsistencies lead us at once to transcend it *. Yet it is this experience of immediate apprehension below the relational level that serves to suggest to us what a perfect experience of a unity in-multiplicity would be where will and thought

† Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 180

‡ *Ibid* p. 159

* *Ibid*, pp. 159 160

and feeling may all once more be one. It supplies us "not an experience but an abstract idea, an idea which we make by uniting given elements. And the mode of union, once more in the absolute, is actually given. Thus we know what is meant by an experience, which embraces all divisions, and yet somehow possesses the direct nature of feeling. We can form the general idea of an absolute experience in which phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness"†

From the primitive stage of immediate experience, then, Bradley gets the clue to the nature of the non-relational whole of qualities which is the Absolute. The latter must, in other words, be, like the former, an experience in order to be an individual whole. And it must be immediate, similarly, in order to be free from self-contradictions, inconsistencies, distinctions and relations. But it must be, unlike the data of immediate apprehension, perfect and stable. It must not therefore be at a stage below relations. It must, in order to gain stability and richness, pass through the relational stage. But contradictions of relational existence must be overcome and a higher all-inclusive stage of unity in difference which is beyond relations must be reached. In short, "this whole (the Absolute) must be immediate like feeling, but not, like feeling, † *Ibid.*, p. 160.

immediate at a level below distinction and relation. The Absolute is immediate as holding and transcending these differences ‡

But the answer is not complete. Bradley has provided us with only negative statements as to what the Absolute is not rather than with positive statements as to what it is in its concrete nature. He has said it is not conceivable in the relational form he has said it is akin in its nature to mere feeling, or to the finite immediate experience and at most he has also said that it is akin likewise to the artistic sense of appreciation of the ideas of goodness and beauty, for they also involve the experience of a whole beyond relations though full of diversity*. But these are all only clues the first expressly negative and the last two impliedly so for they form only too unstable and too imperfect fragmental hints taking which we have to build a higher and a perfect conception which transcends them both. Yet more than this—as to what the perfect conception thus formed would be—Bradley refuses to say. For more than that he says we can not comprehend. All that we know is that the Absolute shares some characteristics with all the three clues above mentioned. But, more than all of them it is perfect and all-comprehensive. It is not a one-

‡ *Ibid*, p. 242

* *Ibid*, p. 180

sided experience as mere volition, or mere thought, or mere feeling; but is a whole superior to and embracing all incomplete forms of life. Thus all that is finite, all that is appearance, must be contained in it, with their deficiencies made good. All qualities are within it, though not in a relational arrangement. But how such an experience is to be had and how it makes possible a non-relational apprehension of a unity-in-diversity is, according to Bradley, beyond human ken.

The Absolute is, thus, in a sense, the unknowable. But Bradley says. "Our complete inability to understand this concrete unity in detail is no ground for our declining to entertain it. Such a ground would be irrational, and its principle could hardly everywhere be adhered to. But if we can realize at all the general features of the Absolute, if we can see that somehow they come together in a way known vaguely and in the abstract, our result is certain." The 'how' is thus answered by the 'somehow', and it is claimed that this "our conclusion, so far as it goes, is real knowledge of the Absolute, positive knowledge built on experience, and inevitable when we try to think consistently"*

This semi-skeptical philosophy of the Somehow, it must be submitted, may superficially seem to have successfully avoided committing itself to any definite position. But, in so far as it has gone in any positive

* *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

action is to come in as a factor in the
 of all qualities and actions of the universe and the
 multiplicity of appearances in which we are involved
 of immediate experience, and the elements of
 nature come in as a necessary part of the only
 experience at any one time that can be said
 seems to be either a reality or a representation of
 of a yellow concrete existence of a thing
 which is not a reality or a representation of
 a part of form of them in a way which is not
 the diversity of the elements in the thinking of
 can be said to represent a reality. Otherwise
 in a lot of things to exist it would be necessary that
 the bringing together of the elements be of such a
 character that in a fraction of particular elements of
 them by a faculty of intellect can function as they
 should be conceivable and possible. But the pro-
 we wish to establish here is that in either of these
 two possibilities we have unity, a conception
 implying a complete grasp of the universe in
 all its comprehensiveness and in all its individuality
 in one single act of consciousness. He can not avoid
 both the alternatives, and in adopting either one we
 may say that Bradley passes to a static and un-
 contemplation of the Absolute a static view of it
 were, of a block-universe a treatment, in other words,
sub specie aeterni. This is a situation which he may

face, as did Spinoza, whose Substance was likewise just a standard of reality regarded as a perfect Being, a standard of reality as an existing ideal. Having gone on for some time over the right path and perceived that the Absolute must be conceived as an immediate experience, he has again turned astray on the long-proved fruitless course forgetting that an experiential character of the Absolute necessarily implies a real, living, active process of experience. The traditional way of thinking was typically instanced when McTaggart defined philosophical or absolute knowledge as "humanity's hold an totality". In the definition, as such, however, there is nothing objectionable. But its upholders absolutely ignored and lost sight of the fact that if such a conception is at all to be completely realised, we must look for an 'experience' in the true sense of the term. In other words, if the Absolute is to be 'experienced'—to use Bradley's term—, it must be as a real, living and dynamic process rather than as "a stable and timeless state", as Bradley in following the older thinkers seems to maintain.

A static philosophy of a unity-in-diversity must indeed present fatal difficulties. Bradley defines his absolute as a non-relational whole of qualities, which must be attained in an immediate experience which is a stable and timeless state. And judgment is, for him, the undue coming into importance of any one of

these qualities and its relating or identifying itself with the whole of reality. All conceptual life, then, would be an interplay of these qualities through relational activity. The point of note, however, here, is that even if the qualities be held to be 'one' in a sort of fusion each must retain its distinct place in the fusion whole which must not, therefore, become homogeneous. Is it possible, one may ask, to avoid such a picture resembling largely or reducing itself to a notion of Reality as composed of a plurality of ultimately independent finite qualities which somehow remain unaffected and unaltered in their character by various appearances which they make up and assume? So far it would be a pluralistic reality of Things-in-themselves without a Transcendental Unity of Apperception, only a somehow to knit them together in their natural positions. Yet Bradley has claimed to reject the notion of a Thing-in-itself and has well enough emphatically pointed out the defects of a pluralistic conception of Reality. We need not repeat his arguments on these topics here, but need only remark that such is the heavy price a metaphysical theory of the Absolute must pay if it ignores the fact of evolution and creative activity—which process implies that finite forms or appearances may disappear and new forms or appearances originate—as mere illusion.

If then we are in search of a positive significant

and clear experience of a unity in multiplicity, we must not forget that it must be a process, dynamic and active. Consequently, therefore, it can not be a total grasp of all the phenomenal diversity in one act of consciousness. It must be, if dynamic, a temporal process of change and flux, in which there is an ever-progressive flow of qualitative differences and forms not all at once but in continuous succession. Some forms must always be disappearing and others originating. It must, in other words, be a principle of ever creative activity. We must, that is, join Hoffding in his remark: "I can not grant that we can pass beyond the continual possibility of new processes, of new activity. Why, then, should not the Highest be a self-development through Time?"* And the boldness and zeal with which Bergson has attempted to develop a view of Reality in the light of its ever-creatively active, temporal nature, constitutes his chief contribution to the philosophical thoughts of the age.

Yet Bergson, like Bradley, also got the clue to such a conception from the immediate experience of the personal finite consciousness. He too refuses to accept any intellectualistic construction of the idea of the Absolute. If absolute knowledge is, then, to be gained, it must be through a more intimate acquaintance than thought can provide. Such a mode of knowledge we

* Hoffding *Modern Philosophers*. c .

experience often in what Bradley calls immediate presentation or immediate feeling. Like the data of immediate experience the reality must be directly realized. Bergson, thus, was on the same path as Bradley when he insisted that the Universe can only be truly known through an immediacy of the nature characterised in the very starting data of psychic life. Like the psychic life of the individual, the life of the whole can also be known only immediately through intuition.

Not only this the very concrete nature of Life—Bergson's term for the Absolute Principle of Reality—as a unity-in-diversity is reflected best in the immediate psychic consciousness of the individual. A durational flow of continuous change of psychic quality marks the latter's very nature. Its qualities do not succeed each other as solitary and unitary elementary states. Each on the other hand, announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it. No one of them begins just where another ends but they interpenetrate into each other. The past all survives in the present and thus consciousness is in a way ever swelling like a ball rolling in the snow. Consequently again the duration of psychic life is irreversible and unforeseeable. For it is ever creative. Every moment the self is creating itself and thus expanding itself endlessly.

The word Duration for Bergson sums up all these characteristics of psychic life. Consciousness, thus,

endures. Duration, again, as distinguished from the scientific conception of temporal succession of atomic units, is essentially non-relational, and hence free from the difficulties of thought. We know it just because we realize it in ourselves, not by any external or symbolical, but by internal, perception.

This duration, therefore, Bergson concludes, is the essence of all reality. It is not, however, a hypothetical absolute like Bradley's. It is a concrete, real fact, given in the positive experience of the individual. In all its phases and appearances, Reality presents us with change and flux, not successive but continuous, flowing change. We find it not only in the psychic world, it is evidenced in the world of matter likewise, though in a far lesser degree. We find it in organized bodies, that is, in the bodies of living beings. For they are closed as individuals by nature and the life of each of them may be viewed as one continuous process of the activity of growing old. It presents a unity of growth. Again, its continuity reaches far beyond its own being. In reproduction it exhibits this same tendency of perpetual duration. There is an unbroken continuity between the evolution of the embryo and the evolution of the complete organism. Life in organized matter is thus duration and ageing means but insensible, infinitely graduated, continuance of change of form. There is no instant before another instant but always an interval between,

an interval of flow which science completely ignores and philosophy must attain

Likewise there is duration in unorganized dead matter also. As studied by the mechanical sciences, matter admits of division and displacement of parts and of repetition. This view no doubt excludes altogether any facts of creation and concerns itself only with the ends of time rather than with its incessant flow. Yet matter too has a history. It is no doubt a tendency to constitute isolable systems but the tendency does not go far to the end except for certain purposes in science. The universe endures. Its duration consists in invention and creation of forms, in continual elaboration. 'Descent' is but the reverse of 'ascent'. Even isolated systems can be seen to have duration if looked at as reintegrated into the whole.

Time in the sense of duration, change in the sense of continuous flow of qualitative differences and creative activity in the sense of disappearance of some and the appearance of other new qualities or forms form then, the essential characteristics of the unity-in-multiplicity of Reality. What light do these considerations throw on the manner in which the diversity of qualities find their unity and become continuous in Life as a concrete reality? Before Bergson's time there were two broad ways open for such a question to seek its answer: mechanism and finalism. Mechanism was the path

chosen by science, finalism the path followed by ancient and modern idealistic philosophy.

Mechanism, of these two, was fundamentally atomistic and, as such, quite inadequate for metaphysical purposes. According to it a complete knowledge of the elements as such must give us a complete knowledge of the course of changes they may undergo. There is temporal change, but the consequent is already given in the nature of the antecedent. There can arise nothing new that is not already given; there is no creation. Again, a mechanistic determination of change involves measurement and calculation which presupposes the existence of a plurality of independently existing elements quantitative in nature. Time, likewise, must, in order that the temporal change may be measurable, be supposed to be but a homogeneous medium, divisible into units.

And finalism is but inverted mechanism. For if it does not determine any stage of the change from its antecedent, it determines it from the end or ideal to be ultimately achieved. All change is here relative, not, as in mechanism, to the nature of elements and to the laws of their mutual effects, but to the ready-made pattern of Ideal Existence or Supreme Idea whose realization is the metaphysical and ethical end. Here time is supposed to be confined to the stages of change in relation to each other but not to affect the end when

attained. In the Ideal there is no time. How indeed this sudden change from the in time to the timeless comes to pass, no idealist has been able to explain, except by an appeal to a 'somehow' of ignorance. Change, too, is relative to the end: it goes on only so long as the end is not reached. The moment the end is achieved, change and progress come to an end. Indeterminate creation is finally also denied by virtue of the well-defined end or Ideal which is definite and eternal.

Now Bradley's Absolute may be said to fall within the second category. It is also a finalistic conception like the God, Substance, or Being, or Eternal Consciousness of all earlier idealists. It was an ideal conception: it was an idea. The Absolute is a unity in multiplicity. For this much Bradley deserves credit: for all other idealists it was a unity from which the multiplicity flows as it were in time. But once the Absolute is said to be nothing apart from the appearances and the qualitative differences Bradley seems to think that it is an immediate collective experience of the multiplicity. And it thus becomes an Ideal Absolute Experience exactly resembling the Substance-Absolute of, say, Spinoza and determines all efforts of mankind. It is after all a given something towards which all immediate feeling, all judgment, all thought is directed, but which must be attained by transcending them all. And, as a given

substance-like ideal, it is naturally above time and 'timeless'. Bradley says it must be harmonious, and, as such, it must be 'stable'. But in all this Bradley forgets that a given Ideal implies that the activity of the universe must cease at a time and somehow. Or, if it be said that it is unattainable and hence keeps the infinity and continuity of effort intact, Bergson can not entertain such skepticism. Bradley again seems not to realize that it is possible to retain and explain successfully the activity of the universe with the help of a principle whose activity will never cease. Such a principle, of course, can not be a well-defined, complete ideal to be aimed at. It is, on the other hand, a principle which is activity itself, not relative to an end, but eternal ever creating activity.

The activity of the universe, then, and all the multiplicity of qualities or forms involved therein can be integrated into a single Whole not because of a common inspiration or a common 'given' end, but by a common impulse to activity. It is an ever fresh urge essential to the very nature of existence. But its truth is not affected by this continuous creation. Bradley had not realized that it was possible to unify and harmonise the multifarious activity of the universe by a principle that is not stable and not timeless. Time and change—not the time and the change of the scientist, but concrete qualitative and continuous duration—constitutes the very stuff of Reality. It is here that Bergson differs from and goes

further than Bradley

This *Elan Vital*, Bergson says, is an explosive force with tremendous strength which is ever manifesting itself in creating varieties of multifarious forms. Its creation runs not in a linear direction it expresses itself in infinite and divergent directions of activity. The various directions of biological evolution are all part of this huge tremendous creative evolution of Life. The movement of life has in fact been described by Bergson in these words: 'The evolution movement would be a simple one and we should have been able to determine its direction, if life had described a single course, like that of a solid ball shot from a cannon. But it proceeds rather like a shell which suddenly bursts into fragments which fragments being themselves shells burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again and so on for a time incommensurably long *

We may indeed say that this aspect of creative activity of life is of great significance in the explanation of the exact manner in which the finite multiplicity may be said to flow from or rather flow in the Ultimate Principle. Why and how should the external world of the senses, which is also the world of science be created by Life in its onward march through time? Why should Life manifest itself in the great history of the biological and psychological

* Bergson *Creative Evolution* p. 108

evolution of the universe? Bergson will say because it is by its very nature a dynamic, durational, explosive force, an active spirit. What answer, we may ask, may Bradley give to the same question? How may he explain the finite from the infinite? Why should there be the former, why should the latter allow it to be created or abstracted from its original position in Reality? Bradley can not but say "*Somehow*, we do not know". *Somehow* Reality was separated into abstract elements, diversities and discrepancies, and *somehow* these all shall be dissolved and re-integrated into the Whole of Absolute Experience.

Consequently, again, the facts of creation and destruction in the phenomenal world, which Bergson succeeds to some measure in explaining, would be utterly inexplicable for Bradley. For what room can there be for these in a world which is mere illusion or mere appearance? Or even in a mere abstraction?

Similarly Bradley and Bergson give two different answers to the question. What happen to the finite quality after it is re-integrated into its infinite whole? In the case of Bergson, each of the finite moments in time retains its concreteness and discreteness in the whole course of the evolution of life. But, in the case of Bradley, the finite is, in the process of reintegration, transmuted into something quite different, into what he does not know. It transcends its finite

character and existence and passes into a higher stage of confusion as it were with the rest of the contents of the Absolute.

All these differences need not, however, blind us to the fact that there is still much in common between Bradley and Bergson not only in the theory of the intellect and of immediate experience but in their conception of the whole system of Reality itself. Except for the recognition of the time-element by Bergson, Bradley's Absolute and his Life exhibit similar characteristics. We have already noticed how Bradley and Bergson are both aiming at a consistent conception of the ultimate as a unity-in-diversity. Both, having rejected the categories of thought as fundamentally inadequate to go beyond the phenomenal must also conceive the qualitative variety in Reality as non-relational or continuous. And such a non-relational whole of quality they both insist can be attained only in an immediate experience akin in character to the immediate psychic consciousness of the human individual. Let us examine some more points in this connection.

Firstly, we must note that both the philosophers offer us ultimately monistic systems and the monism in each case is an idealistic monism. Each of them reduces all existence to one single spiritual principle called by one the Absolute Experience and by the other

Life All else is explained as being false appearances, constructions of the intellect. For Bradley, nothing can exist beyond experience, and Life, for Bergson, is an experience. Even "The world of physical science is not something independent, but is a mere element in one total experience", says Bradley * Bergson's pages on the 'Ideal Genesis of Matter' in the 'Creative Evolution' similarly conclude that matter is but Life unmaking itself, the activity of Life checked and turned back upon itself by abstraction †

Not only do Bergson and Bradley agree on this broad point. Even on the question of the temporal character of Reality, Bergson does not, if we look carefully into the matter, differ radically from Bradley. Any way, the significance of this difference may on examination be seen to be exaggerated by most writers. For Bergson's 'duration' is not a succession of ever continuous stages of the movement of life. It is not mere change. It is a swelling force. In this transition, the past is all carried over and therefore preserved in the present and there is a gnawing forth into the future ‡ In each moment, therefore, the past has all accumulated and the future is being apperceived. In such a change the temporal obviously passes to be

* Bradley Appearance and Reality, p. 288.

† Bergson Creative Evolution, pp. 249-264

‡ *Ibid*, pp. 2-5.

virtually non-temporal and the distinction loses the significance popularly attached to it. Bergson's Life in other words tends to change into Bradley's Absolute.

Finally, we must note that the mode of knowledge which gives us the experience of the Ultimate is conceived by Bergson very similarly as by Bradley. Bradley's Absolute Experience is a Higher Immediacy in which thought, will and feeling are all blended into one single Whole, though we can not imagine & admit how in detail this can be. * Bergson's Intuition, likewise is attained by a re-union of the two divergent directions of the evolution of Life—instinct and intelligence. Instinct is bare unthinking feeling; intellect conscious thought. And the function of both is activity. A reintegration of instinct and intelligence is thus ultimately resolvable into a fusion of thought, feeling and action. Bergson's Intuition thus is not very different in nature from the Absolute Experience postulated by Bradley. Only the one is described in its complete richness of detail; the other is given only in its bare outline. Bergson's Intuition is a concrete experience which man can realize. Bradley's Higher Immediacy is a hypothetical state.

* Bradley: *Appearance and Reality* p. 167.

CHAPTER SIX

ANTI-INTELLECTUALISTIC IDEALISM

Taken literally the word "idealism" may mean a theory of reality in terms of "ideas". Some writers have, however, replaced the term 'idea' by the term 'ideal', which they think more aptly characterises the philosophy of the school generally denoted by that name. For they found it possible to be 'idealists' without having anything to do with 'ideas'. Indeed, because of this very misleading association between the terms 'idea' and 'idealism', some idealists, like Bosanquet, even went to the length of discarding the name 'idealism' and were content with describing their metaphysical enterprises merely as 'speculative philosophy'. As Hoernle has pointed out, the term 'idea' and all the great part it has played in philosophical discussions of the school, has been more or less a "historic accident". "At any rate", he concludes, "it is a term which can now be discarded as inconvenient and misleading without sacrificing anything that is essential to the statement of the several distinct types of theory which are commonly classified together under the label 'idealism'."*

* Hoernle *Idealism*, p. 18.

But then, the term ideal also could not carry us far. For, there may still be some other people who are obviously idealists but whose philosophy would not suitably be catalogued as a philosophy of ideals. For, ideals, it may be said with some truth, limit the path of active progress within exact well-defined boundaries. And for an instance, we may look to that phase of Bergsonian thought which has been often termed his philosophy of progress. The term 'ideal' for Bergson would import finalism and would be but an inversion of the hierarchical order of the Platonic philosophy of Ideas. Realization for him consists in an incessant ever creating, durational flow of explosive activity not in a static, total attainment of the absolute ideal.

Yet the term idealism has its own claim even inspite of its original association with the term idea. Even if the term idealism be retained with all its connotation not excluding the association with idea the term would have a historical significance in ever pointing out to mankind how the great ancient school began with the Greek philosopher Plato and his conception of Reality as consisting of universal immutable eternal Ideas as against the finite changing and unstable world of externality created by the impress of the Ideas on the non-being matter. And, if this historical significance be considered too unimportant and the term be rejected

it would be extremely difficult—nay, impossible—to discover or coin a new word which may claim under its fold the philosophy of ‘ideas’ and that of ‘ideals’ as well as that of ‘experience’, that of ‘appreciation’ and that of the ‘*elan vital*’ (That the last does belong to one line of thought with the rest we hope to show in this chapter.), which may, in other words, serve to convey to us a well-defined conception of the definite formulae of the school for all time past and to come.

And the cause for this fact is apparent. Idealism is, in fact, a progressive movement of thought rather than a school with any particular presupposed basic maxims. In the writings of professed idealists themselves we find the most diverse formulations of idealism, according as each thinker selects and emphasises this aspect rather than that of their common tradition. This selective emphasis is, again, determined by his own philosophical predilections, by the other intellectual movements which he seeks to support or to criticise, by the theory of epistemology that he adopts, and by the stage which scientific research has reached in his day. Indeed, modern idealism has proved, so far as our knowledge of history goes, to be an extraordinarily elastic and adaptable movement of thought, responsive to changes in scientific theory, in social and moral experience, in religious life and theology. All these affect minds; and the world of minds, and ‘mind in some sense, is

the hero of all idealistic theory. *)

Among idealists, therefore, we may look for agreement, in fact only in a common temper, in a common mood, in a common attitude with which they set upon the quest for ultimate Truth. Their problem is the problem of the origin of contradiction and discrepancy within the universe understood as the common sense world of externality. They are confident that there is some factual basis behind the mind's inherent search for unity and individuality. And, perplexed by an absence of perfect unity and individuality in the external world of every day practical experience they reject it as mere phenomena and set out upon the search for a more stable unitary, individual universe—may it be of universal immutable ideas, of perfect ideals or of incessant ever-creative continuous activity—, of a universe of which they can be certain whose life they can follow and make their own without falling into the ever-elusive net work of phenomena, and beyond which there is nothing more ultimate. It is, in summary, a movement of thought led by a burning desire to be sure about the universe to distinguish appearance from reality, with a view to enable one a life faithful to the latter to the fundamental principle of Truth.

The starting point for all idealism must, then, be

a realization of the phenomenal nature of the external world of commonsense and a consequent search after the noumenal, the Reality, the thing-in-itself. The fundamental principle of Existence must be sought beyond the objects and the relations between them given us in our every day experience.

In this sense, no doubt, all idealistic thought must be dualistic. But this dualism of the world of Reality and the world of Appearance is not a dualism in the metaphysical sense of the term implying the existence of two independent real entities. The Appearance exists, but as the appearance of the Reality. It is a dualism of the essence and the quality or manifestation, but not a dualism of primary and secondary qualities. Appearance is what appears, what appears is, and what is can not fall outside of and independent of Reality.

But the problem remains. What is the nature of the Reality that manifests itself in appearance? And how is it related to the phenomena given in experience? To these two questions idealistic thinkers have given no one definite answer. No one formula has been reached as decisive of the school. Yet, on the other hand, the attempt has continuously and vigorously been carried out since the very raising of the problem and is still going on, to last no one knows how long. The first attempt was the philosophy of Ideas, and since

then many different methods of inquiry have been adopted and various solutions of the problem have been proposed—and proved somehow or other inadequate. And every endeavour has contributed bit by bit to the building up of the great movement of idealistic philosophy. It is a trial and error process: its failures never wasting but ever enriching the experience of mankind in the path of the philosophical quest.

We may indeed, observe four broad stages of development in the progress of idealistic investigation till now. We may call them the stages of (i) logical or scientific construction, of (ii) failure or perversion of the logical interest, of (iii) skepticism and of (iv) the mystic trend. It is, of course, obvious that, of these, the first was one great step in the series of what we have called above the trial and error process, and so is the last, while the second and the third are the necessary stages of the continuous transition between them.

The first of these four stages consists of the reign of reason and intellect over the idealistic field. Reason was the first claimant for the essence of Reality when man undertook to speculate systematically. Socrates, we may probably say, laid the first foundation of systematic application of reason to ultimate questions, and his disciple's philosophy of Ideas began the movement we here intend to broadly trace. These Greeks, dis-

satisfied with the sophistications of traditional opinion and commonsense, undertook to build up a system of well-defined concepts to guide sincere and misguided seekers of truth into a more ideal and better state. Socrates kept himself to ethical concepts chiefly, while Plato definitely turned his effort into the metaphysical channel and constructed clear-cut concepts or archetypes, immutable and universal, which, he said, existed in a world of their own and of which, he thought, the objects of commonsense were copies or reflections impressed upon the 'non-being' matter. These Ideas stood, for him, in an heirarchy of order, and at their head as the fountain-origin stood the supreme Idea of Ideas, God, from which all the rest flowed in some mythologically uncertain manner. This was the beginning, and since then Reason or the most general universal Idea of Being became the ideal of philosophy, and reasoning became its method. But two ways were now open for this method of approach. Either a conception of the supreme Being could be formed in such a manner that the external world of commonsense could be shown to immanently flow, as it were, by a sort of 'representation', from its absolute nature in a systematic heirarchical manner. Or, again, this supreme conception could be conceived as constructed by starting 'upward', if we may so describe it, from the given phenomenal and unstable data of experience.

History shows that both the alternative ways of scientific construction of the Absolute Reality were tried. And, as chance would have it, the former of these was the first to be taken up by Plato and the later philosophies till Spinoza and Leibniz. We may say it had to be necessarily so for in the ancient days of Plato the opposition generally presupposed between common every day experience and philosophy of the Absolute was too exaggerated to admit of the data for the nature of the Absolute to be taken from facts of finite experience. It was thus more in accordance with the atmosphere of the times that first the Idea of God should be constructed *apriori* and then from it the rest of ideas and objects of the finite phenomenal world should flow. This attempt reached its climax in the system of Spinoza in which the Idea of God was the real Substance and all the branches of finite existence were its modes immanently flowing from it by way of a transient causation.

This solution of the problem was however, not accepted by the thinking world. For it culminated in a dogmatism in which the importance of experience in knowledge was too exaggeratedly minimised. A protest was but natural and it rose in the form of the British school of empiricism which however in its logical consequence ended in skepticism, an equally fatal doctrine.

Awakened by this struggle between dogmatism and empiricistic skepticism to a recognition of the necessity of according a just status to experience, German idealism entered upon the second alternative in the method of scientific construction of the theory of the Absolute. Experience was now viewed as a necessity for the full development of the idea of the Absolute. It was not a degradation as with the dogmatic rationalists but a step in the realization of Truth. For Fichte, it was essential for the moral activity of the Divine will in the Ego. In Schelling, the finite world was a manifestation in a hierarchy of degrees of the Divine Spirit. This scientific systematic construction upward from the finite experience to the Absolute Idea was completely carried out by Hegel. He started with the unstable data of the sense-certainty of immediate experience which gave rise to judgment, and posited a complete hierarchy of ideas in dialectic leading ultimately to the Highest Idea, the Idea of Being.

The speculative philosophy—as the German school of idealism was called—, though starting with some sort of a finite world of sense experience, could not carry out a complete continuity of progress between the primitive stage of every day immediate experience and the higher stage of the dialectic. It was accused, thus, of being ‘speculative’, of ignoring the facts, or of attempting to spin them out of its own inner consciousness. More-

over speculative philosophy had also lost its empirical foot hold by assuming without sufficient warrant a sort of transcendental faculty in man, of a sort of artistic intuition in Fichte and Schelling and the metaphysical dialectic in Hegel which were conceptions as dogmatic as the Ideas of Plato and the Substance of Spinoza.

By the forties of the nineteenth century—upto which time Hegelianism had been the reigning philosophy—we must note here, if we are to understand the fall and birth of schools of intellectual progress of this period natural science had reached a stage of development which was becoming the cause of a growing contempt for the abstract investigations of metaphysics. The triumph of natural science encouraged the growth of materialism and brought about for a time an eclipse of the philosophy of idealism. A challenge was thrown open to idealism to the effect that reason if it is to avoid dogmatism and superstition must follow the path of science. A scientific study of experience and empirical data was invited and positivism and evolutionary naturalism were the result. Philosophy which was before rationalistic and speculative was now turned into a synthetic scientific philosophy whose function was but to combine into a consistent system the universal truths arrived at by the particular sciences.

This now was the culmination of the philosophy

of reason, of the philosophy of the intellect. Both the possibilities of intellectual systematic construction were tried and both were found to be inadequate to the purpose of philosophy. The naturalists and positivists took this chance and sought to change the very conception of philosophy so as to turn it into a problem solvable with the help of intellect. Success to some measure having been already attained in science, philosophy was perverted into the form of a 'scientific philosophy', which was distinguished from the various particular sciences themselves by saying that its function was synthetic. Thus there came about during the nineteenth century a certain vogue of science and of the philosophy of science, which fascinated thinking men and to a remarkable extent impregnated general culture. One picturesque embodiment of it was the figure of Herbert Spencer setting out in the fifties upon the great adventure of showing how everything in the whole round of human interests is to be rendered scientific. ethics, politics, sociology, religion, even, in a manner of speaking, science itself, and, finally, thus, philosophy. In the same spirit, although perhaps less ambitiously, worked such teachers as John Stuart Mill and Alexander Bain. Comte was another example.

This scientific movement was the result of two powerful forces scientific discovery and rationalistic criticism. On the one hand, criticism had shaken the

foundations of theological and speculative beliefs. On the other hand, science had been steadily piling up ever again in the crumbling fabric of idealistic dogma an impressive accumulation of authenticated truths which invited criticism which could prove themselves reliable and, besides being reliable could place their genuine usefulness beyond doubt. At such a time when religious and metaphysical doctrine were already under suspicion, both as to whether they were true and as to whether it served any good purpose to have people believe in them the teaching of science appeared as both genuinely authentic and productive of good—if not of good in the ultimate sense, yet of good of a very real and tangible sort—in the command they gave man over nature in the assistance they gave him in preventing famine and disease and in promoting all the finer amenities of life. To many enlightened minds indeed it seemed as though science were destined one day to take over from religion and philosophy the entire direction of social life and as if the sooner that day, the better. Green speaks of such a tendency in those days as also affecting the field of ethics so that it thus would not be wonderful that, with most enquirers and teachers the interest once taken in Moral Philosophy should be mainly transferred to the physical science conveniently called Anthropology even if the insufficiency of the latter to deal with the most important

questions of Moral Philosophy were admitted."⁴

This perversion of the scientific interest, as time went by, awakened, as it was bound to awaken, a reaction. A whole line of metaphysical activity again ensued, a widespread and many-sided recovery by philosophy of something nearer to the classical bent of idealistic theory. Science was but a development of the materialistic and naturalistic tendencies which it had ever been the function of idealism to resent. For the hard and sharp distinction it drew between appearance and reality required that the reality should be on a plane which is spiritual rather than material, 'ideal' rather than 'natural'.

Green, Bradley, Royce, Munsterberg and Taylor, among professed idealists, may be mentioned as some of the outstanding figures in this 'idealistic reaction against science'. We have maintained throughout these pages that Bergson too ought to be viewed as part and parcel of the same reaction-movement. To substantiate this opinion we propose in the pages that follow to note the chief characteristics of this movement in general and then to briefly trace the same characteristics in Bergson's system of philosophical mysticism. Having done that it will only remain to bring out the historical significance of Bradley's philosophy in this period of idealistic revival.

⁴ Green *Prolegomena to Ethics*,

Now this movement we must note which was directed against the scientific (in the sense of naturalistic) spirit in the metaphysics of the mid-nineteenth century, had a distinctive feature of its own which marked a striking contrast to all earlier idealistic protests against naturalism. This distinctive feature consisted in an agreement with its antagonists in the recognition of the fact that an intellectualistic method of philosophy can not consistently proceed apart from and independently of the natural sciences. If abstract reasoning is to be the guiding spirit of philosophical investigation and if reason is to be the essence of the spirit, such a philosophy must to be consistent, be scientific. It is futile and absurd to claim the banner of reason on its side and to indulge in speculations which are far removed from the natural categories and products of reasoning. Abstract mathematical reason can be at home only in a naturalistic universe of discourse but the spirit of such a universe is essentially opposed to the spirit of idealistic philosophy.

But, having made this submission in agreement with the naturalists, the idealists refused to accept the conclusion drawn by the former that for that reason the problem of philosophy ought to be restated and termed scientific in order to suit the method of mechanical scientific calculation. For that would be proving traitor to the discovery of the idealistic problem of

philosophy for the sake of a convenient method. Granted that the method at our disposal does prove inadequate to the problem in hand, does it necessarily mean that we should abandon and deny the problem and seek another that does submit obediently to the method? Or should it not be truer to the spirit of philosophical investigation, to 'the spirit that burns with the desire' to know and to be sure about what one knows that the ready-made method at our disposal be let to confine itself to its own proper sphere and a method more suited and adequate for the given problem be sought?

This is the protest of the idealists of the last and the present century against all attempts to naturalize philosophy. Reason in the sense of abstract mechanical reasoning, granted, is more at home in the world of science—which is but commonsense carried further to consistency in its defects as well as in its merits. But, then, let us confine this method to science and seek another for metaphysics. The problem of philosophy can not be ignored. The philosopher is out for Truth as against falsehood, for Reality as against appearance and illusion and the quest must be carried out at all costs, however many methods may have to be sought, tried and rejected, until we are sure that we are at our object, at the original spirit. If reason as applied in the natural sciences does not go with us till that

end something also must

Thus begin, then, a reparting of ways between logical scientific thought and philosophical investigation not in rivalry for the same end but as a division of labour between problems ultimate and problem secondary, problems interpretative and problems descriptive. Indeed a chief feature of contemporary idealism consists in this distinct division of problems into philosophic and scientific the latter aiming at utilitarian naturalistic description of phenomenal abstractions of nature and the former trying an interpretation of the absolute reality behind the whole universe. The path of one is discriminated as bounded within the hard and fast categories of the 'intellect' as distinguished from the understanding, the method of the other. The whole of Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* is in fact an expression of resentment against the spirit of naturalism in metaphysics and moral philosophy. Bradley examines each of the scientific categories one by one in his *'Appearance and Reality'* and finds them all to be wanting in precision consistency and self-subsistence and hence unsuitable for absolute knowledge. The value-philosophies similarly allot distinct functions to science and philosophy the function of one being defined as mere description of the other as appreciation of ultimate principles purposes and values. Prof Taylor likewise in whom we find a queer mixture of many types of idealistic theory makes the same simple

distinction when he says "the goal of experimental science is the Description of facts, the goal of Metaphysics their Interpretation."^{*}

Side by side with this restatement in clear terms of the problem of metaphysical investigation, came the recognition of another important fact. It came thus to be realized that reason, which had been, by earlier rationalists and idealists, supposed to be the essence of the Supreme Spirit, is really only one side, only one phase of its existence. Feeling and action, which had hitherto been entirely ignored, are now seen to be essential elements of the Ultimate. All these three must there find consummation, or else philosophy is still far off from the Truth.

This belief finds its complete expression only in Bradley when he defines the Absolute as an experience in which thought, feeling and will all blend and fuse into one whole, the defects of each being made good in this blending. But there is evidence that Green did share this idea in that his 'self-distinguishing self-seeking consciousness' was not a barren abstract faculty of reason but a self in which feeling and will are made conscious under supervision, as it were, of a rational intelligence. His conception of free-will essentially involved a motive and the ultimate end was, for him, a development of all the capacities of 'personality',

^{*} Taylor Elements of Metaphysics, pp. 192-193

of which the intellect comprised only one constituent

The third peculiar feature of this period of idealistic revival consists in the re-instatement of the self as a psychic experience which admits of no natural explanation but is the condition of there being nature. Again and again does Green emphasise throughout the metaphysical introduction to his *Prolegomena* that man has in him a spiritual principle a principle that can not spring from nature and which is yet an essential pre-supposition of the very existence of nature at all. Bradley similarly says about nature that 'beyond experience nothing can exist'*. A margin of experience not the experience of any finite centre . . . cannot be called impossible. But it seems another thing to place such matter in Nature. For Nature is constituted and upheld by a division in experience. It is, in its essence, a product of distinction and opposition. And to take this product as existing outside finite centres seems indefensible. The Nature that falls outside we must insist may perhaps not be nothing but it is not Nature. If it is fact it is fact which we must not call physical"†

Obviously the self now reinstated in philosophy is not the self of older days—which was a faculty or an agent of psychic activity. It is, on the other hand a centre of experience in which the experience itself

* Bradley *Appearance and Reality* p. 272

† *Ibid* , pp. 278-274

is the whole reality and the centre is nothing apart from it. The self is the experience, it does not own experience. It is psychic consciousness. It is a system, an organization of qualities known. It is not a being over and above the contents of the experience; it is in the experience-whole itself. Green would say it is the spiritual principle running through knowledge. Bradley examines various conceptions of the self and comes to the conclusion that "the inner core of feeling, resting mainly on what is called Coenesthesia, is the foundation of the self."†

There is, similarly, a simultaneous change in the conception of the Absolute, which is now not viewed as a transcendental being or substance, or idea, but as an experience. Absolute Experience is thus essentially an organization, a union in many, rather than a barren homogeneous general conception like the idea of Being. It is, again, an individual rather than a substance. It is, in short, an ideal principle.

This Absolute is, here, as in all earlier idealism, a final and ultimate ideal towards which all existence, all change, all activity, is always moving. But even thus there is a difference. For all idealism before this period, the end of ethical and metaphysical discipline was a given, and thus dogmatic, *apriori* end. The method of contemporary idealism, on the other hand,

† *Ibid.*, p. 80.

is not teleological in any such objectionable sense. The knowledge of the end, now in reference to which evolution and progress must be explained, is derived solely and rigorously from analysis of man's present estate. It is now *interpretatio* and not *anticipatio* that is the key note of philosophical explanation. We may call this the truly empirical trend in idealistic philosophy. What is experience? is now the question with which every idealist starts his quest after ultimate Truth.

Thus it is indeed, that the idealists of the present period all take their clues about the nature of the Absolute from the phenomena of individual experience. The individual is, thus re-instated not only as a non-natural condition of there being nature, but also as a miniature model of Absolute Experience. The Absolute is pictured essentially on the pattern of a finite individual centre of human 'psychic' experience. Thus at the very beginning of this period Green postulated a Divine Consciousness which was but the personal self-distinguishing intelligence with its finitude turned infinity and, among the latest in the line, Taylor speaks of the Absolute as an immediate experience of the same essential character as immediate feeling or presentation at any finite centre, only made richer more comprehensive and stable.

It is, of course, possible to call this the deep-rooted

anthropomorphic bias of idealistic philosophers. But there it is, a fact which can not be denied, nor ignored or abstracted. Man, as the most developed of all beings, must be the measure of all things, and there it is alone that we can reasonably seek for a satisfactory clue to the ultimate principle behind the change, the activity, the evolution, that has given rise to his existence and his superb nature

These, then, are the most obvious features of the present stage of the idealistic movement. And of all these what characterises it most is its protest against the naturalization of philosophy by introducing what are called 'scientific' methods into its investigations. This, indeed, is the common spirit, the common tie that binds the idealists of this age together in one joint effort at checking the materialistic and naturalistic tendencies in the civilization and culture of to-day. Naturalistic, evolutionistic and positivistic schools of thought had attempted to turn metaphysic into a mere synthetic study of the special sciences. And, more than all else, contemporary idealism is a wide-spread and many-sided reaction, a protest, against this 'scientific' spirit in metaphysics

Bergson's thought, we believe, is but a somewhat late product of this reaction. It is an expression of that same general philosophical revolt, though it is a late manifestation of it. This is apparent from the

introduction in his *Creative Evolution* where he speaks of the evolutionist philosophy which does not hesitate to extend to the things of life the same methods of explanation which have succeeded in the case of unorganised matter * And the culmination of this attempt in an abandonment of the idealistic problem of appearance and reality, and in consequence treason to the insight that determined the problem for the sake of logical and scientific convenience is very aptly described when he writes. Boldly it proceeds with the powers of conceptual thought alone, to the ideal reconstruction of all things even of life True, it hurtles in its course against such formidable difficulties it sees its logical end in such strange contradictions, that it very speedily renounces its first ambition It is no longer reality itself it says that it will reconstruct, but only an imitation of the real or rather a symbolical image the essence of things escapes us and will escape us always we move among relations the absolute is not in our province we are brought to a stand before the Unknowable —But for the human intellect after too much pride this is really an excess of humility †

Bergson then in agreement with the basic trend of present day idealistic philosophy insists on a parting of ways between science and philosophy, assigning to them

* Bergson *Creative Evolution* pp. x xi

† *Ibid*, p. xi

different universes of discourse, different aims and different methods. The latter would deal with the real flux of duration which the former can not lay hold on. For, science is bound to the cinematographical method, which only philosophy may set aside. It is philosophy alone that calls upon the mind to completely "renounce its most cherished habits. It is within becoming that it would have transported us by an effort of sympathy."† Thus alone is it possible to attain the absolute. Science aims only at the relative and the practical.

In fact, it is in Bergson that we have a completely worked out separation of the two branches of knowledge. relative knowledge and absolute knowledge, science and philosophy. Green had insisted on the withdrawal of causality and other scientific categories from the arena of metaphysics. But he, as a matter of fact, retained the category of 'relation', which he raised to the status of the very central core of his system. Consequently, his philosophy became as rationalistic as that of Spinoza. Bradley analysed all the conceptual categories of thought and showed their defects with admirable precision. Yet his treatment of Absolute Experience was as logical as possible except for the occasional interpolations of the irrational 'Somehow' to explain the transmutation of the finite in the infinite, the self-transcendence of thought into its own other. Royce
† *Ibid.*, pp 361-362

similarly based his whole conception of the Absolute and its representation in the finite on his investigations into the significance of the abstract number series of mathematics. As such he implies the conception of a system as a whole of parts external to one another as the object of enquiry. Moreover, all these thinkers ignored the fact of time and change in reality. With their ancestors they started with the traditional bias that reality must be timeless and changeless and stable, rather than temporal and changing. It is Bergson's merit to have broken off from all these relics of intellectualism in idealistic philosophy.

Yet Bergson does not deny that science has a value of its own in its proper sphere. It has the advantage of enabling us to foresee the future and of making us in some measure master of events. * What he insists on is a protest against the unwarranted and unjustified invasion by science into the realm of metaphysics. Let there be he says a division of labour between the two. Science must be pursued but not at the cost of philosophy. The intellect may satisfy the finite practical needs of every day phenomenal life but the other knowledge " " if it succeeds it is reality itself that it will hold in a firm and final embrace. † Moreover it is philosophy that will give us a new inter

* *Ibid* p. 882

† *Ibid* p. 882

pretation, a new outlook to scientific knowledge. "Not only may we thus complete the intellect and its knowledge of matter by accustoming it to install itself within the moving, but by developing also another faculty, complementary to the intellect, we may open a perspective on the other half of the real. For, as soon as we are confronted with true duration, we see that it means creation, and that if that which is being unmade endures, it can only be because it is inseparably bound to what is making itself. Thus will appear the necessity of a continual growth of the universe, I should say of a *life* of the real. And thus will be seen in a new light the life which we find on the surface of our planet, a life directed the same way as that of the universe, and inverse of materiality. To intellect, in short, there will be added intuition".*

Secondly, Bergson, like the idealists, conceives absolute knowledge as a re-integration of the various phases of life-experience, of which 'thought' is one and only one element. Thought, feeling and will are the chief constituents of the whole for the idealist. And so, for Bergson, are intelligence and instinct. But what is intelligence but the faculty of 'thought and action' and instinct but the faculty of 'feeling and action'? And in saying that the *Elan Vital* can be realized only by a re-integration of these two divergent directions of

* *Ibid.*, p. 362

clusion. Bergson has really put the idealist position in a new and more concrete form.

Again, Bergson also insists upon the requirement in philosophy of an indeterminate spiritual self. And this self thus constituted by him is not an abstract unit over and above the qualities of its experience. It is a self that consists in the phenomena themselves. An intuition of self must be an intuition of the qualities of its experience. In fact, the first of Bergson's three chief works, "Time and Free Will" is little else than a proclamation of the fact that genuine selfhood exists and an investigation into the immediate data of its constitution.

Yet Bergson's self is not quite the same self that was reinstated by Green, the first thinker of importance in the reaction-movement we have traced here. Green based his conception on the facts of the knowledge of relations between separate individual objects which may themselves be relations. The very separateness which people find between things in nature and carry over into their interpretation of the mind, the very separateness between objects which occupy different places in space or events which occur at different times implies a self which knows it as such. In short for Green selfhood is involved in the distinctness of things for an experience. For Bergson, on the other hand, objects of knowledge are always given in a continuous interpe-

netration into each other. For Green, the essence of the 'self' was to be found in the faculty of inter-relation. Bergson finds it, on the contrary, in that of intuitive observation. The former is a faculty of construction lurking in Green's mind inspite of his protest against 'scientific' conceptions in philosophy, the latter is one of vision, in the sense of an insight into things as they really are. Relating is not in the latter case necessary for there exists for Bergson a unity of interpenetration among qualities of experience which is much higher than any unity which intellectual construction can yield. In relating, thought really disintegrates and disperses its contents into atomic fragments of psychic process, only to knit them together by some sort of artificial associations through habit and custom.

By this advance upon other contemporary idealists, Bergson has in fact worked out the most consistent critique of an associationistic conception of experience. Green objected to psychological mechanism. Bradley exposed the abstractions it involved. Yet Bergson alone succeeds in maintaining throughout his philosophy the position that associationism spells determinism and in developing a positive constructive theory regarding the exact manner in which the unity of an individual experience is to be reconciled with the multiplicity of the qualities that are its contents. This he does in his description of mental life as 'a flow of qualitative

differences in interpenetration with each other. Such a richly detailed empirical description of the immediate data of consciousness as Bergson gives in *Time and Free Will* is perhaps to be found in no other work on psychology and philosophy except to some measure in James' essay on the *Stream of Consciousness*.

Again Bergson's conception of Life is fundamentally in line with the conception of the Absolute among contemporary idealists. It is not a homogeneous principle from which the heterogeneity of finite qualities flow. Nor is it a substance, a final cause of appearing phenomena. It is on the contrary, an organization, a many in one, a unity-in-multiplicity, a system. Its essence consists in an inner impetus to activity, to mobility in duration. But such a tendency by its very nature implies change and creation. And hence the many must be necessarily implied in this one common original principle of life, the *Elan Vital*.

This conception of Life we must admit, is in a sense teleological like the Absolute. For, all development, all evolution in the universe aims at a satisfaction of the ever fresh urge for change, activity and movement. There is a way in which Bergson's finalism differs from the finalism of modern idealism. For his is a finalism of a common impetus rather than a finalism of a common goal or ideal. Yet again, here as with the absolutists the knowledge of the ideal principle is given not *a priori*

but in the nature of human experience itself. With Bergson as with the absolutist, *interpretatio* and not *anticipatio* is the principle of teleology.

Thus, Bergson, too, takes his clue for the conception of Life from facts of individual psychic experience. It is the non-relational, interpenetrational flow of consciousness that is the essential basis for the view of the whole movement of the evolution of the universe as a durational flow of an *Elan Vital*.

All these facts, then, bring Bergson in a line with the idealists of the present stage of its growth. Moreover, even in the spirit of inquiry, his attitude is essentially that of the idealist. His thought exhibits the most general characteristics of all idealism of any age or period in that he starts with a more or less rigid distinction between two kinds of existence, reality and appearance. The realm of the intellect is the world of appearance, while that which is gained in intuition is reality in itself and as a whole.

In fact, Bergson is an idealist by intention, if not by profession. He accepts the duality of appearance and reality not in the sense of a metaphysical dualism but as a dualism of viewing the same existence from two different points of view, in two different aspects of its being. He is an idealist, again, in so far as he seeks to be sure about the universe not by making common-sense quantitatively precise and calculative, but by an

investigation into an underlying qualitative principle of reality. And lastly he shares the anthropomorphism characteristic of idealism, of expecting the fundamental principle at the basis of all things to be friendly and akin to the specifically human capacities of man which may generally be subsumed under an understanding of life and experience in man and in nature.

Moreover Bergson ought to be looked upon as in a line with contemporary idealists in view of the fact that in him we find a completely worked out expression and vindication of that mystic trend of thought in idealistic philosophy which has been growing since Green by way of a positive system-building side by side with the protest against scientific or intellectualistic philosophy. The whole movement of anti-intellectualistic idealism as a reaction against the philosophy of thought must ultimately turn to a philosophy of life and intuition if more than a mere polemic is to be the object of metaphysical investigation. This in fact is the mystic trend of contemporary idealism which we called the fourth stage in the development of the idealistic movement since Plato. The first stage was that of the reign of reason represented by logic and intellectual construction. The second stage was the perversion of the logical and intellectualistic interest by bringing in a transcendental logic to remove the defects of ordinary logic which could no longer be ignored. Thus though

constructions of ordinary thought were seen to be unmaintainable, attempts at construction continued in terms of what was claimed to be higher logic. This stage thus implied the confession of the deficiencies and limits of finite logic. And the fabric of transcendental logic was only to be a short-lived conservatism to give place to a total abandonment of all logic and to a renewed attempt, this time, at an idealism of experience rather than one of thought, of 'understanding', 'appreciation' or 'intuition' rather than of the intellectual 'concept'.

But, before effort is directly and positively turned towards a definitely mystic system of philosophy, a transitional stage of doubt and skepticism must naturally come to pass. The mistaken traditions are here completely discarded and there is a strange inkling into what the nature of future idealistic philosophy would be. But how it shall be seems inexplicable. This stage of skepticism, it is perhaps obvious, is traceable in Bradley's thought. For, the traditional 'concepts' he has discarded all. The clues to the true nature of reality, he has come to the conclusion, are to be found in immediate presentation. The stability and fragmentariness of immediate feeling, he also knows, can not belong to the Absolute. But what such an Absolute, which shares the qualities of immediate presentation and transcends its limitations, can be, he does not know

and he thinks, he can not, as a finite being, ever come to know

And in Bradley does this skepticism present itself more than in any other of the idealists of note in this period. Green, we have already seen had not yet absolutely given up the rationalistic tendencies of construction and so there was not yet the occasion for the stage of skepticism in the transition from intellectualistic to anti-intellectualistic idealism. And after Bradley the positive building up of an anti-intellectualistic idealism has definitely taken its course. In Bradley alone do we have a position where there is a complete break from traditional categories of thought combined with a skeptical attitude towards the exact nature of absolute reality.

In fact, Bradley's merit consisted just in the realization of the fact that a transcendentalisation of thought such as that attempted by Hegel was bound to change fundamentally the very nature of thought. 'Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if thinking is not used with some strange implication that never was a part of the meaning of the word a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational.' Without a metaphor, feeling belongs to perfect thought or it does not. If it does not there is at once a side of existence beyond thought. But if it does belong, then thought is different

from thought discursive and relational To make it include immediate experience, its character must be transformed.”*

Bradley has thus pointed out the difficulty of rationalism and intellectualism. “In the Absolute we must keep every item of our experience” But as to the exact solution of this problem, as to how an all-inclusive Absolute Experience, in which all forms of knowledge are subsumed, and in which all divisions are healed up, “We can not imagine, I admit, how in detail this can be” Thus we find Bradley turning from the road of intellectualism to the opposite road of anti-intellectualism, but there stopped at the very start by a sense of inferiority to the task before him, a sense of his own finitude and limitations. With great energy of thought, he is absorbed in one ideal that thought must be transcended, which is a continual stimulus to his reflection, and brings him nearer, now to mysticism, now to skepticism.

Bradley, then, should be called a mystic; for he believes that reality, if known at all, would be known only as an immediate experience. And that he certainly is when his thought comes to rest, and when he enters upon a thorough polemic against the conceptions of commonsense and science But a certain skepticism characterises Bradley in that he lays more stress on the impossibility of a conclusion than on the possible

* Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, p. 171.

determination of reality. He is skeptical also in the sense that he explains some particular problems as insoluble. We can not, he says, derive the manifold of reality the many finite centres out of which we construct experience, all the fragmentary, with which we must stop from a single principle even if the manifold is not opposed to there being a comprehensive unity.

This skeptical character of Bradley's conclusions may be explained by the fact that the traditional influences under which he worked were those of the skepticism introduced into English philosophy by Hume, the absolutist bias regarding the unreality and insignificance of the individual, and hence the bias regarding the unreality of finite experience. All of these determined Bradley's semi-skeptical philosophy. Bergson, on the other hand, was influenced largely by Descartes' intuition of the self, Fichte's intuition of moral activity of the universe and Plotinus' mysticism in general. Naturally therefore he had less hesitation than Bradley in speaking of an intuitive experience of reality as a whole as possible for the finite personal self.

Yet the fact remains that while Bergson's is a philosophical mysticism, Bradley's is a mysticism in spite of philosophy and both form as a matter of fact two well marked stages in the present period of the development of idealistic thought which period is character

used throughout its course by a protest against any conception of idealistic philosophy in intellectualistic terms.

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PĀR[^]DHĪ OR TĀKANKĀRĪ.

The Pār[^]dhīs are a wandering tribe of fowlers in Chanda and Berar. They are mostly snarers and are therefore also called Phāsa Pār[^]dhīs. Their dialect has been returned from the following districts —

Where spoken	Number of speakers
Chanda	25
Amraoti	500
Akola	1,635
Ellichpur	1,000
Buldana	250
Wun	2,000
TOTAL	5,410

The Tākankārīs are a similar tribe of vagrant mill-grinders. They have been returned as speaking a separate dialect from Amraoti, Akola, Ellichpur, and Buldana. The following are the revised figures —

Amraoti	200
Akola	2,323
Ellichpur	500
Buldana	215
TOTAL	3,238

Specimens have been received in both dialects from Akola. Another specimen, which has been forwarded from Melkapur in Buldana, professes to illustrate both dialects. And the specimens clearly show that this Pār[^]dhī and Tākankārī are in reality identical. By adding the figures just given we therefore arrive at the following total for the dialect —

Pār [^] dhī	5,410
Tākankārī	3,238
TOTAL	8,648

The dialect under consideration is a form of Gujarātī-Bhīlī. In some points it agrees with Khāndēśī, and there is also a slight admixture of Marāthī. This latter element is, however, insignificant, and is clearly a loan.

The characteristic features of the dialect will be seen from the specimens printed below, and I shall here only draw attention to a few points.

An *s* is very commonly replaced by *kh*, i.e. probably *kḥ*; thus, *paṛikḥō*, money, *kḥāmlina*, having heard, Gujarātī *sābhalinē*, and so on. The same substitution of *kh* for *s* also occurs in Sīyālgīrī. *S* is, however, often retained, thus, *sū*, what, *dēs* and *dēś*, country, etc. The real sound is probably that of *ch* in German 'ach,' and I have therefore written *kḥ*. Compare the corresponding *ḥ* in the Bhīlī of Edar and neighbourhood.

Ca is sometimes interchangeable with *s* thus, *jāyack* and *jās*, thou goest. It is, accordingly, possible that *ca* has the sound of *s* as in other Bhili dialects.

r is dropped before palatal vowels; thus, *ikā* twenty //i ring

Nouns.—There is a tendency to replace the neuter by the masculine gender; thus, *dp-mō pē*, his own belly. On the whole, however, the genders are correctly distinguished.

The nominative is sometimes used instead of the case of the agent; thus, *bānō dida* the father gave (// it was given). The suffixes of the case of the agent are *ē* *mē* and *mī* thus, *dā-mī-yē* by the man *dhani-mē* by the rich man; *ti-na*, by him. Occasionally we also find *nō*; thus, *ti nō* by him.

The suffixes of the dative and the locative are *n* and *na*, *ma* and *mō*, respectively; thus, *dā-mī n* to a man; *bānō na* to the father *mula-ma* in the country *gald-mō* on the neck

In most other respects the inflexion of nouns agrees with Gujarāṭī. Thus *ghōḍō* a horse *ghōḍā* horses. Occasionally however we find Marāṭhī forms such as *chāḍyā* instead of the common *chāḍyō*, a son

I is *āḥ*; in Bukdara, however *mī* as in Marāṭhī. Note the form *āḥ* what? The oblique form *iyā* that, is Marāṭhī.

Verbs.—The usual form of the present tense of the verb substantive is *chāa* in all persons and numbers. Other forms, however, also occur. Thus, *chāḥ* I am; *chāē* thou art, he is, they are, etc. Compare Gujarāṭī.

The present tense of finite verbs has many various forms. The regular ones of *mār-āḥ*, to strike are,—

Sing 1 <i>mārās</i> .	Plur 1 <i>māris</i>
2 <i>māras</i>	2 <i>mārōs</i>
3 <i>māras</i>	3 <i>mārās</i>

Compare Khāndōṭī and other Bhili dialects. *Ca* is often substituted for *s*; thus, *mārācā*, you strike. See above.

The past tense is usually regular. Thus, *gēyō* and *gayo* he went *gayō* they went. The form ending in *d* is, however also used in the singular thus, *rāḍ* he lived. Compare Nouns, above. On the other hand, we also find forms such as *dyō*, they came, and there seems to be a tendency to obliterate the difference between the two numbers. *S* is sometimes also added in the past tense; thus, *raḥyās* they lived.

The neuter form of the past tense sometimes ends in *i* instead of in *yw* thus, *ma-na pdp karī*, by me sin was done

The conjunctive participle ends in *i* or *ina* (in); thus, *karī* and *karīna* (karin) having done. Marāṭhī forms such as *jāw* having gone, also occur

The verbal noun ends in *ed* and *i*; thus, *chārdēd-n* in order to tend *aq'chān pēṭi lāḍi* distress began to come.

Other forms will be easily recognizable from the specimens.

The first of the specimens which follow is the beginning of a version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son which has been received from Melkapur in Bukdara. It professes to illustrate both the dialects in question. The second is the deposition of a witness in Pār-dhī, received from Akola. The third is a version of the Parable in Tākapkārī, received from Akola. It will be seen that it is written in the same dialect as the two preceding specimens.

[No 61.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP.

BHĪLĪ OR BHILŌDĪ

PHĀSĪ PĀR'DHĪ DIALECT.

(DISTRICT BULDANA)

SPECIMEN I.

Kau ēk ād'min bē chhīyā hōtā Tin-tī nhānō chhīyō
Some one to-man two sons were Them-from younger son
 bān kawā lāgē, 'bā, māiā hīkhā-nī jīn'gī ma-na da'
to-father to-say began, 'father, my share-of property me-to give'
 Mhun bāya āp'li jīn'gī baihōn wātī dadī
Therefore by-the-father his-own property to-both having-divided was-given
 Thōdā din-tī nhānō chhīyō āp'li ākhī jīn'gī lēn
Few days-from the-younger son his-own all property having-taken
 mulūkh-pai gayō 'Tyāgē ti-na chain-bājī-ma āp'li ākhī jīn'gī
country-to went There him-by luxury-in his all property
 udā-dadī Tī-nō ākhō paisā kharch thāyā-par tyā mulukh-ma
was-squandered His all money spent become-after that country-in
 mōtō kāl padō Ti-na khawā-nī badī ad'chan padī Mag tō ēk
great famine fell. Him-to eating-of great difficulty fell Then he one
 ād'mī-kana jāi rhā Tyō dhanī-nē ti-na dukar iākh'wān āp-nā
man-near having-gone stayed That rich-man-by him some to-keep his
 khēt-ma mukyō Tā jāga tyā ād'miyē duk'rā khāi
field-in he-was-sent That in-place that by-man squire having-eaten
 rākhī dadu kōndyā-na kluśī-na āp-nō pēt bhari āsas
having lept onen husks-by gladly his-own belly filled would-have-been.
 Pan ti-na kālhi kōna dadu nahī Tin-tī tī-nā dōlā ughādyā
But him-to anything by-anyone was given not Then his eyes were-opened
 'Tyāru tyō āp'lē manā-ti kawā lāgyā, 'mārā bā-nā naukaī-nā-kana
Then he his-own mind-to to-say began, 'my father-of servants-of-with
 veldu dhan hun in-tī adhik chha Mi hyā jāga bhukyā
so-much wealth having-been that-than more is I this at-place hungry
 marū Tar ham-nā bā-nā ghari jāun kahu kī,
am-dying Then our father-of to-house having-gone I-shall-say that,
 "bī, tumirō wa Dēw-nō badī āp'rādhi chha Wa mē tumārō chhīyō
"father, thou and God-of great sinner I-am And I thy son
 bag'iyī mīphak nahī Ham-nā ātā mōl'kaī gatī bagāw " Yeldō
to-be considered worthy not Me now servant-as consider " So-much

ichyār karī tyō nīk'īn āp'hā bā kana āyō. Tyō āw'tā
reflection having-made he having-started his father-near came. He coming,
 bāya dur-ū dēkhā. Tī-na āvin dīk'rā-nā galā mō paqyō,
by-the-father far-from was-seen Him-by having-come now-of neck-on fell,
 ī-nā mukō lādō.
his his was-taken.

[No. 62.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

BHĪLĪ OR BHILŌDĪ.

PHĀSĪ PĀR'DHĪ DIALECT.

(DISTRICT AKOLA)

SPECIMEN II.

DEPOSITION OF A WITNESS

Aj^amā pandhar dan huyāsī, Suk^ara-vārī rāti hū, mārī bāwan, an ba
About fifteen days have-elapsed, Friday at-night I, my wife, and two
 chhiyā kbuī rahyā-thā. Tyā-wakh^{ti} ba-pahār rāt-nā khumārī mārā
children having-slept stayed. That-time-at two-watches night-of about my
 bāwan-nī jāgī karyā an kah^awā lāgī kī, 'ghar-ma wāsan
wife-by awakening was-made and to-say she-began that, 'house-in pots
 wājī rahyā-sa, mānas-nu chahāl āvi rahyō. Tyō uthō.
jingling are, man-of sound having-come is Therefore arise'
 Tyā-war^anī hū uthyō an bhīt-nā bhanī jōyū, tē chhēkū
That upon I arose and wall-of towards it-was-seen, then a-hole
 dithū Tyā-war^anī mārī khātrī hōi kē kōi-tarī ad^amī ghar
was-seen That-upon my conviction became that someone man house
 phōdīn andar chhiyō Ghar-ma diwō nōtō Mārā pāthar-nā hēta
having-broken inside was House-in lamp was-not My carpet-of under
 angār-pēti hatī Ti tuiata-ch kādhin lagādīn. At^arā-ma
fire-box was That quickly-veryly having-taken-out was-lighted Meantime-in
 hā ārōpi bhīt pād^awā-nā chhēkā-kanhā jāwā lāgyō Tyā-par mārī
this accused in-wall bored hole-near to-go began Him-on my
 najar gēyā-par ma ti-na dharyō an ti-nu hāt dharīn ti-na
eyes gone-on by-me him was-held and his hand having-seized him-to
 bōlyō, 'arē chōttō, kyāhā jāyach?' Tyā-war^anī ti-nī mā-rī kustī
was-said, 'O thief, where goest?' That-upon his my wrestling
 hōi. Ma ghar-ma mōthō-ch kallō karyō Tyā-war^anī ghar-nā
became By-me house-in great-veryly noise was-made That-upon house-of
 sējārī lōk Sitārām an Ithōbā āyō At^arā-mā-oh mārā bāwan-
neighbour people Sitārām and Vithōbā came Meantime-in-veryly my wife-by
 diwō lagādyō an ghar-nā khākālī kādhī, an tyō ikham
lamp was-lighted and house-of chain was unfastened, and those persons
 ghar-ma āyā Tyāhātū ma-na ghanu jōr āyō Tinā-kanha pāch khan
house-in same Then me-to great violence came. Him-near five preces

chāli-nā nakalyā. Tyē khaṇ tran rupyā kīmat nā ohha Tyē māñā
cost-of were-found These pieces three rupees worth-of are These mine
 chha.
are

Ārōpi kōṇṭā gām nā chha, ti nu nām āu chha ām-na
The-accused which village-of is, his name what is wa-to
 mālūm nahī Kāran tyō hamāra gām-nā nahī Ma divā lagdṇā-
known is-not Because he our village-of is-not By-me lamp lighting
 kājan abṅār-pēti n lāk dū tānbyū, at'rā ma ārōpi chhēkū kanha
for fire-box-of a-match was-rubbed meantime in the-accused hole-near
 diṭhō. Tyā mula ma-na diwō lagdṇā āvō nahī. Bhīt-na paḍēlā
was-seen. Therefore time-to lamp lighting came not Wall-to bored
 chhēkū ma ti mānas aḍṇan-ti āwā jāwā khakē. Kōrat-mā hōllō khilō
hole-in-from a-man difficultly-with come go can Court-in being wall
 jī na bhīt na chhēkū pāḍṇyū tyō ma na chhēkū kanha nhān) ma
which-with the-wall-to hole was-bored that me-to the-hole-near bath room-in
 khāpṇā.
was-found

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING

On a Friday night, about a fortnight ago I, my wife, and two children were sleeping. About midnight my wife awakened me and said 'there is some noise in the house and I heard foot-steps. Therefore arise.' I got up and looked towards the wall where I saw a hole. Then I understood that some one had broken into the house. There was no lamp burning but there was a match box under the carpet. I quickly seized it and lighted a match. Then the accused went towards the hole in the wall. When I saw him, I seized his hand and said 'now thief, where are you going?' Thereupon we began to wrestle and I made great noise so that my neighbours Sitārām and Vihābā came. In the meantime my wife lighted the lamp and opened the door so that they could come in. Then I felt very strong (and overcame him). We found five pieces of cloth on him. They were worth five rupees and belonged to me.

I do not know the village or the name of the accused because he is not of our village. I had no lamp burning therefore I lighted a match. Then I saw the accused near the hole. Therefore I could not light the lamp. The hole in the wall was large enough for a man to get through it with difficulty. The bar with which the hole in the wall was made has been produced in the Court. I found it in the bath-room.

[No 63]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

BHĪLĪ OR BHILŌDĪ.

PHĀSĪ PĀR'DHĪ OR TĀKANKĀRĪ DIALECT

(DISTRICT AKOLA)

SPECIMEN III.

Kōn-ēk admī-na bē chhiyā thāyā. Tī-nō nānō bā-na
A-certain man-to two sons were. Them-of the-younger father-to
 kawānō, 'bā, jō sampat-nō wātō mana āwānā tō ma-na
said, 'father, which property-of share me-to to-come that me-to
 da' Mag tī-na tyā sampat wātī dīdhī. Pachha thōdā
give' Then him-by him property having-divided was-given. Then a-few
 dan-ma nānō chhiyā ākhī jamā-kārī dūr dēs-mō gayō ;
days-in the-younger son all having-collected distant country-into went ;
 tyā jāī udh^alēpan-tī chālyō ān āp^anī sampat
there having-gone eat^a extravagance-with he-remained and his-own property
 udāī dīdhī. Pachha tī-na ākhī kharchyā-par tyā
having-squandered was-given. Then him-by all expended-after that
 dēs-mā mōthō kāl padyō Yēū thāyā-par tī-na
country-in great famine fell. This having-happened-after him-to
 ad^achan padī lāgī. Tahē tyē tyā dēs-ma-na ēkā admī-kana
difficulty to-fall began Then he that country-in-of one man-near
 jāīna rahyō Tī-nō tī-na dukaldā charāwāna āp^anā khētar-ma
having-gone lived. -Him-by him swine to-graze his-own field-in
 mōk^alyō Tahē dukaldā jē tar^apanā khātā asa tinā-par tī-na, 'āpnu
was-sent Then swine which husks eating were that-upon him-to, 'my-own
 pēt bhariyē,' yahu tī-nā dīl-ma āyu. Pachha kōīwa
belly I-should-fill,' so his mind-in it-came. Then by-any-one-even
 tī-na kāhī dadhu nahī Tyāru tyō dēh-par āīna kawā
him-to any-thing was-given not Then he senses-on having-come to-say
 lāgyō, 'māīā bā-nā ghar kēldā mōl^akaryā-na ghanā ōldā malas,
began, 'my father's at-house how-many labourers-to much bread is-obtained,
 āb hū bhuk-tē marus Hū uthīna mārā bā-nā ghamī
and I with-hunger am-dying I having-arisen my father-of near
 jāīs, ān tī-na kalīs, "bā, ma-na Dēw-nā virīdh ān tārā
will-go, and him-to will-say, "father, me-by God-of against and thy
 āgwādē pāp kārī Ham^anā-kantī tārō dīk^arō kawā-na asal nahī,
before sin was-done Henceforth thy son to-be-called fit am-not,

ap'nā ēkn mōl'haryu ghati muk'' hantar tyō uṭhina āp'nā
thy-own one labourer like keep'' Then he having-arisen his-own
 hā ghami gayō. Tāhō tyō dūr chha tēdā ma ti-nā bā ti na
father-ward went Then he distant was the-meantime-in his father him
 dēkhina tar'mali gayō, ān hājīdhāin ti-nā galā ma mīthi ghālī
having-seen having-piled went and running his neck-in embracing was-put
 ān ti nā mukkā lādā. Pachha dīk'rō ti na kawānō bā, Dēw nā
and his kisses were-taken Then the-son him-to said 'father God-of
 viridh ān tārā āgwādō ma-na pap kari, ān ham'na kantī turū
against and of thee before me-by sin was-done and to-day-from thy
 dīk'rō kawāna hū asal nahl.' Parantu bayō āpna sal'dār-na
son to-be-called I fit am-not' But by-the-father his-own servant-to
 kayu asal jhagō bhina ti na ghālō, an ti nā hāt ma lī
it was-said, good garment having-brought him to put-on, and his hand-on a-ring
 ān pag-mō khākḥ dā ghālō Pachha āpūn khāina barikh kaḍāu.
and feet-on shoes put Then we having-eaten merriment will-do
 Kāran yō mārā dīk'rō marī gayō thō, tyō paohha jītō thāyō
Because this my son having-died gone was he again alive became :
 ān khōl gayō thō, tyō sāp'dyō.' Tāhō tyō khuṣī kar'wā lagyā.
and lost gone was, he is-found' Then they merriment to-do began.

Tyā wakia ti nō mōthō dīk'rō khētar-mō hōtō. Pachha tyō āina
At that time his elder son field in was. Then he having-come
 ghar kan āvin-tēnyā bājya ān nāoh khām lyō. Tāhō sāḍqar-ma
house-ward having-come music and dancing was heard. Then servants-among
 ēk na bulāina puohh'wā lāgyō, 'hā su chha? Ti-na pachha kayu
one-to having-called to-ask he-began this what is?' Him-by then it-was-said
 kī tarū bhāī āyō, ān tārā bā na khuṣī hāī thī mīlyō, inā-khāṭu
that thy brother came, and thy father-to in-good-condition was-obtained therefore
 ti na mōṭhī paṅgat kari chha. Tāhō tyō rikḥō bharin māhō
him-by great a-feast made is' Then he with-anger being-filled inside
 gayō nahl. Pachha ti nō bā bāhār āina ti na kham'jāw'na lāgyō
went not Then his father out having-come him to-entreat began.
 Parantu ti-na bā-na bōl'wā lāgyō kī, 'pahā, ādā warkha
But his father-to to-say he-began that 'see so-many years
 tāru chāk'rī kari, an tārī ājā kadhī bhāngī nahl
thy service was-done and thy commandment ever was-broken not
 Hū mārā dōstā-barōbar chāin kar'wā, inā khāṭu tyō ma-na kar'dī
I my friends-with pleasure might-make therefore thee-by me-to a-kind
 suddhā dēdhu nahl. Ān jī-na tārī sampat kar'han saṅga
even was-given not And whom-by thy property karlots with
 uḍāī dādō tyū ā tārō dīk'rō āyō tāhō tū tinā-khāṭu
having-squandered was-given that this thy son came then by-thee him-for

mōthu khāū karyu chha,' Pachha ti-na kawu, 'dik'rō, tū nēh'mī
a-great feast made is' Then him-by it-was-said, 'son, thou always
 mārā barōbar chha, ān mārī dhan-sampadā ākhī tārī chha. Parantu
of-me with art, and my wealth-and-property all thine is But
 ānand ān cham kariyē yō assal hōtu. Karan yō tārā bhāī
rejoicing and pleasure we-should-do this proper was. Because this thy brother
 mārī gayō thō, tyō pachha jītō thāyō, ān khōī gayō thō, tyō
having-died gone was, he again alive became; and lost gone was, he
 sāp'dyō'
is found'

SIYĀLGIRI

The Siyālgirs are a criminal nomadic tribe, numbering about 120 souls, in the Dantan Thana of the Bengal District of Midnapore, where they are found in the following villages —

Nimpur
Gomunda,

|
Saipur

Lalmohanpatna,
Dhukurda,

A few Siyālgirs are also found in Suga and Simla in District Balasore.

The tribe seems to have immigrated into its present habitat some 150 years ago, and their language shows that they have come from Western India. It is, therefore probable that they entered Bengal as camp-followers to the Bhonslas, who invaded Bengal in the middle of the eighteenth century.

Their features do not give any clue as to their origin. They now look like ordinary Bengali peasants.

Most of the preceding remarks have been taken from the following —

AUTHORITY—

GIBSON GROSS A.—*Note on a Dialect of Gujarātī discovered in the District of Midnapur. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Vol. LVIII, Part I, 1898, pp. 183 and ff.*

Siyālgiri is derived from a dialect closely related to Gujarātī Bhili and the tribe has probably originally come from the border districts between Central India, Rajputana, and the Bombay Presidency the stronghold of the Bhil tribes. On their way towards the east they have come into contact with various tribes, and the results can be traced in their speech, which now presents a mixed appearance though the original base is easily recognizable.

The only source of our knowledge of Siyālgiri is a version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son which has been forwarded by Babu Krishna Kisor Acharji, Secretary to the Midnapore District Board. See the paper quoted as Authority above.

The materials are not sufficient to solve all the problems connected with the dialect. There cannot, however, be any doubt with regard to its general character. The ensuing remarks are entirely based on the specimen.

Pronunciation.—In many Bhil dialects an *s* is regularly replaced by a sound which is something between *s* and *k* somewhat like the *ck* in German *ack*. In Pārābhi *kh* is used instead of this *k* thus, *paikāb* money *ikā*, twenty etc. Similarly *kh* is usually substituted for *s* in Siyālgiri. Thus, *khāb* for *sab* all *dākh* for *dās* country; *kāsmibya-n* Gujarātī *sābhāraṇā*, to hear (compare *hāsmān*, having heard, in the Bhil dialects of Jhabua and Kotra) *barakh*, Gujarātī *caras* a year; *khā-kāsm* having become awakened (compare *hāsmā* thought in the Bhil dialect of Ratlam).

We have no information as to the pronunciation of this *kh*. It is, however probable that it is pronounced in the same way as in other Bhil dialects. For we occasionally find *k* and even *g* used instead thus *kākhān* a hawk *rig anger* I have therefore substituted the sign *kh* for the *kh* of the original.

The *kā* in *kākhā*, share, is probably due to the influence of *angā*, share, in the Bengali text from which the translation was originally prepared.

A cerebral *d* between vowels is pronounced as an *r*, as is also the case in other Bhil dialects, thus, *thōṛā*, few.

L is sometimes substituted for *n*; thus, *lāchu*, dancing, and perhaps also *lāsin*, running. The same change is common in many Bhil dialects, but may also be due to the influence of eastern vernaculars.

V is sometimes dropped before *i* and *ē*, as is usually the case in many Bhil dialects and in the Marāthī of Berar and the Central Provinces. Thus, *ēglasta*, Gujarātī *vēg'lū*, distant, *ītī*, Gujarātī *vītī*, ring. In *āt*, word, *w* has been dropped before *ā*. In other cases *w* becomes *b* as in eastern vernaculars, thus, *barakh*, year, *jībat*, living, *sēbā*, service.

Nouns.—The various genders are constantly confounded. Thus, *sō khab kharach-patra kudhi*, that all expended was made, *tārī āt parhīkōlā*, thy word was transgressed.

The plural seems to have the same form as the singular. Thus, *dīkī ā*, a son, and sons.

With regard to cases, the case of the agent is never used. The subject of transitive verbs is put in the nominative case even when the verb is a passive form. Thus, *bāb kahū*, the-father (-by) it was said.

The nominative singular of strong masculine bases ends in *ā* as in Marāthī and eastern vernaculars, thus, *dīkrā*, a son. Traces of the Gujarātī termination *ō* are, however, found in the adjectives, thus, *mōtō dīkrā*, the big (= elder) son.

The usual case suffixes are as follows —

Dative, *nē*, *n*, *kō*

Ablative, *sē*

Genitive, *nā*, *n*

Locative, *mē*, *m*, *mō*.

Thus, *mānkhā-n*, to a man, *bābā-nē*, to the father, *ghar-m-kō*, to-in-the house, into the house, *barakh-sē*, years-from, *ēk marād-nā baya dīkrā thēi*, one man of two sons were, *māra bābā-n kētlā ghānā darmō-pāun chākēr*, how many hired servants of my father's, *gāmīā-m*, in the village, *undēl-mē*, on the neck, *bil-mō*, in the field. Old locatives are *dēkhēhē*, in the country, *bilē*, in the fields.

It will be seen that an oblique base ending in *ā* seems to occur in some of these forms. Compare *bāb*, the father, *bābā-nē*, to the father.

Most of the suffixes just mentioned occur in other Bhil dialects. The locative suffix *mō* and the dative suffix *kō* are perhaps borrowed from Rājasthānī or some eastern dialect. Similar forms, however, also occur in the speech of other Bhil tribes.

Adjectives.—There is no fixed rule for the inflexion of adjectives. Thus, *āp-nu bābā-nē*, to his father, *āp-nā chākēr-nē*, to his servant, *āp-nā pēt*, his belly.

Pronouns.—‘I’ is *mu*. This form also occurs in some Bhil dialects. ‘My’ is *māra*. The suffix of the dative of pronouns is *hē*, thus, *minhē* or *manhē*, to me. The dative suffix *hē* is common in some Bhil dialects. It corresponds to a genitive suffix *hō* as *nē* corresponds to the genitive ending in *nō*. The genitive suffix *hō* occurs in forms such as *tūhu āgal*, before thee; *inhā hāthē*, on his hand, etc.

To the genitive *māra*, my, corresponds a dative *māra*, to me. It will be seen that the various dative suffixes correspond to genitives formed by adding the same suffix with another termination. The three pairs of suffixes also occur in other Bhil dialects.

‘Thou’ is *tu*, genitive *tūhu*, *tār*, and *tē-rā*.

The demonstrative pronouns seem to be derived from various sources. Thus, we find *ā*, this, *ēhi*, this; *tinha*, and *inha*, he, *hīyē*, he, *sō*, that, *tō*, that, *tē-krā* his,

lar bad, that after, etc. The forms *ināka* and *ināka* are perhaps originally the case of the agent.

'What ?' is *āhā*, corresponding to *āh* in Gujarati Bhill.

Verbs.—There is apparently no difference between the singular and the plural. Thus, *rahiu* means 'he was' and 'they were'

Of the verb substantive the following forms occur *raha*, thou art ; *ihā*, it is ; *hahā*, he was ; *ihāi* they were.

The conjunctive present is used both as a present and as a past thus, *maru* I die *kahē* he said ; *rahē*, he lived *jāi kō-ni*, he would not go. All these forms are Gujarati-Bhill. The same is the case with the ordinary past thus, *āya* he came *dikrā kahā* the son(-by) it was said ; *hikāha didāu* the share was given *giya* he went *lāgā*, they went ; *jō lār kākāja khādāu* who ate thy property etc.

The future is formed as in Gujarati Bhill thus, *kahiē* I shall say

Eastern forms are perhaps *khāiu* they ate ; *rahiu* he lived It is, however possible that the final *u* in such forms corresponds to the *u* in the past tense of Khāndāli and some Bhill dialects. Compare *lāgin* he began, they began, etc., in the Naikādi dialect of Surat.

The conjunctive participle ends in *i* or *in*, *u* or *uu* thus, *kari* having done *lāin*, having taken ; *jāu* having gone *khādūu*, having eaten. The form *kar-kē* having done, is borrowed from Hindi.

The negative particle is *kō-ni*, not. The same form occurs in some Rajasthani and Bhill dialects

The inflexion of Siyālgiri is, as the preceding remarks will have shown mainly the same as in Gujarati Bhill. The same is the case with the vocabulary. I am not however able to explain all the words occurring in the specimen. Compare *agā* father (probably the Turki *agā* master borrowed through Hindustani) ; *badl ihēl* against ; *ba-bhāin*, thereupon *ihā-ihā*, then (probably the ablative of the base contained in *ihā-ohi ihā*, that) ; *chāyā* (perhaps a corruption of the Bengali *chāyā*) in *darkār ghānu chāyā khādūu*, more food than necessary ; *dayā-bāhi* pitying (perhaps, compassion having flowed) *lāsin* having run ; *uqēl* neck etc.

For further particulars the student is referred to the specimen which follows —

[No. 64.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

BHĪLĪ OR BHILŌDĪ.

SIYĀLGIRĪ DIALECT

(DANTAN THANA, MIDNAPORE.)

Ēk maraḍ-nā baṃa dīkrā thēi Tinha-bīchē nānha dīkrā āp-nu bābā-nē
One man-of two sons were. Them-among the-younger son his-own father-to
 kahē, 'bāb, māra hīksha māia dē.' Inha ba-bhain hīksha ālaha ālaha
says, 'father, my share me-to give' By-him thereupon share separate separate
 karī dīdha. Thōrā dan rahin nānha dīkrā āp-nu khab
having-made was-given Few days having-remained the-younger son his-own all
 hīksha lēin ēglasta pārha giya. Āur tīthē ghanu kharach-patra
share having-taken distant country went And there much expenditure
 karin āp-nu khab urāi dīdhu Sō khab kharach-patra
having-made his-own all having-wasted was-given. That all expenditure
 kīdhi, tō dēkhēhē barī akāl parī giya Hiya barī dukhī
was-made, that in-country great famine having-fallen went - He very miserable
 thaī giya Tinha ēlā-tō jāu tō-ch gāmra-mi ēk mānkhān
having-become went He then having-gone that-very village-in one of-man
 bēla jhāl rīha Tinha āp-nu bilē ghusrī charān mukh
near having-gone stayed By-him his-own in-field swine to-graze having-sent
 dīdha Ghusrī jō chhatrīyā khāin tō dēin āp-nā pēt bharāū
was-given Swine what husks ate those having-given my-own belly I-may-fill
 khōjē Tinhē kinha dīdhu kō-ni Pāchhu khāk-hāun
he-sought To-him by-any-one was-given at-all-not. Then awakened-having-become
 tinha kahū, 'māra bābān kēt'lā jhānā darmō-pāun chākēi darkār
by-him it-was-said, 'my of-father how-many men wage-getting servants need
 ghanu chhēya khādu pāvē ā mu hyākhē bhūkhē maru Mu hā-ta
much than food get and I here with-hunger die. I here-from
 uthin māra āgā-kēnē parhā jāu tinha kahis, "bāb, mu Gōkhāi
having-arisen my father-to near may-go to-him will-say, "father, by-me God
 badī-thēi tūhu āgal pāp kīdhu. Mu āu tār dīkrā bulī ōlakhi-pāris
against of-thee before sin was-done. I again thy son having-said be-considered-can
 kō-ni. Minhē tu ēk darmō-pāun chākēr karī rākh." Pāchhu tinha
at-all-not. Me thou one wages-getting servant having-made keep" ' Afterwards he
 uthin āp-nu āgā-kēnē giya Tinha ēglastē rahē, tēkrā āgā jōyān pāvē,
having-arisen his-own father-to went He far was, his father to-see got,
 inha dayā-bahī lāsīn jāin undēl-mē lēin buchrā dīdha.
he pitying having-run having-gone neck-on having-taken kisses were-given.

Dikrā tindhō kahū 'bāb, āu Gōkhāi badī thēi tōrū āgal pāp kīdhu.
The-son(-by) to-him it-was said, 'father now God against thy before sin was-done
 'Mā āur tār dikrā bulī olakhī pāris kō-nī Bāb āp-nā
I again thy son having said be-considered-can at-all-not' The-father(-by) his
 chākēr-nō kabū, 'hēlu khāu lukhā lī āin inhō parāihā
servants to it-was-said, quickly good clothes having-taken having-come to-him put-on
 dē Inhā hātō īlī āur gōrō khamrā dō. Hēmō inhō lāin
gave His on hand ring and on foot shoe gave I/He him having-taken
 khādu khāun khual rahin Jē-sō mārā dikrā mari giya, jībat
dinner having-eaten happy will-remain Because my son having-died went, alive
 thāin hāji giya ta, pāo-tā lāya ha.' Tar-bād khual thāyan lagā
became; lost gone-was found was got-is' That-after merry to-become they-began

Tinha mōjō dikrā bil-mō hutā. Tō āin ghīrō lāchu bāyū
His elder son field-in was He having-come in-house dancing playing
 khāmōyān pāū. Tab tinha ēk chākēr-nō kānbō bōlāin puchhu,
to-earl was-got Then by him one servant near having-called it was-asked
 ā khab khū? Sō inhō kahū, tār bhāiyā āwa, tar āgā
'this all what?' Him(-by) to-him it-was-said, 'thy brother come-is thy father(-by)
 khāu khādu taiyār kīdhu. Kīn-sō? tinha tindhō khūthīn khāu jōyān
good food prepared was-made Why? by him him safe well to-see
 pāū. Tinha rig kīdhu, ghar-mī kō jāl kō-nī. Pāohhu tinha
it-was-got By-him anger was-done house-in to he-goes at-all-not Afterwards his
 āgā bāhar āin bujhāin kīdhu. Sō jawāb kar-kō āp-nā
father outside having-come entreating was-done He answer made-having his-own
 āgā nō kabō, ētnā barakh-sō tāri sōbā karū. Tāri at kēdō parhī kōlā
father-to say, 'so many years from thy service I-do. Thy word ever disobeyed-was-made
 kō-nī. Tō tu manhē kēdō ēk bakri nu chēliu kō dēi nī jō mārū bandhu nō
at-all not Still thou to-me ever one goat-of a lid gave-not that my friends
 lāin hēkhē. Tār ēhī dikrā jō kabābin khātō rahin
having-taken I-might laugh Thy this son whom(-by) karlots with having-lived
 tār khābāj khādu hiya jab āvya tu inī-guriyō khādu khāu taiyār
thy properly was-eaten, he when came thee(-by) him for food good prepared
 kīdhu.' Sō tindhō kahū 'dikrā, tu mār barōbbhar raha. Mārū
was-made' (By) him to-him it-was-said, 'son, thou me with lived Mine
 jētu [thā, sō khab tārū. Khual jāin rīha Tār āyab bhāiyā
whatever is that all thine Merry having-become is(-proper) Thy this brother
 mari giya ta, jībit thāin āvya; hāji giya ta, pāvya'
having died gone-was, alive having-become came; lost gone-was, was found

KHĀNDEŚI AND ITS SUB-DIALECTS

Under this heading are included Khāndēśī proper, and the sub-dialects of that form of speech entitled Pāṅgi and Raṅgārī. These are all dealt with in detail in the following pages. The total number of speakers is as follows :—

Khāndēśī proper	1,217 738
Pāṅgi	21,700
Raṅgārī	3,630
TOTAL	<u>1,253,068</u>

The so-called Kun bhāṭ is included under Khāndēśī proper

KHĀNDEŚI, AHIRĀNĪ OR PHĒḢ GUJARĪ

The district of Khandesh is surrounded by territories belonging to three distinct languages. Gujarātī is spoken towards the west and north-west, Rājasthānī towards the north, and Marāṭhī in the districts to the east and south. Gujarātī is also spoken by the higher class husbandmen in Khandesh to the north of the Tapi, and it is the language of trade throughout the district. Marāṭhī is, to some extent, spoken in the south and west. It is also the language of Government offices and schools, and it is stated to be gradually gaining ascendancy.

The principal language of the district is, however, a form of speech which shares some of the characteristic features of Gujarātī and in others agrees with Marāṭhī. It is sometimes simply called Khāndēśī, *i.e.*, the language of Khandesh. Another name is Ahirāṇī *i.e.*, the language of the Ahirs or cowherds, a name which is also reported from other parts of India. Lastly, the denomination PhēḢ Gujarī connects the language with a group of low-caste husbandmen. The Kuṇ'bis are stated to speak a separate dialect called Kuṇ'bhāṭ or Kuṇ'bī. It does not, however, differ from the current language of the district in any essential points.

The territory within which Khāndēśī is spoken does not exactly correspond to the district of Khandesh. It also comprises the northern border of Nāsik and the Burhanpur Tahsil of Nīmar. This latter district is still spoken of as Khandesh by the inhabitants. Burhanpur was the capital of Khandesh before Akbar overthrew the dynasty. The dialect of Burhanpur has formerly been classed as Varhāḍī, and only 186 Sonars were reported as speaking Ahirāṇī.

Khāndēśī is further spoken by 500 individuals in Baldana, on the Khandesh frontier and in some border-villages near Jalgaon in Akola.

The following are the revised figures forwarded for the use of this Survey :—

Khandesh	1,030,000
Nāsik	125,000
Nīmar	42,030
Baldana	500
Akola	200
TOTAL	<u>1,217 738</u>

Of the 1,050,000 speakers returned from Khandesh, 400,000 have been reported as speaking Kunbāū.

AUTHORITY—

Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. xii, Khāndesh. Bombay, 1880 Account of the language on pp 42 and ff

Pronunciation.—*A*, *ā* and *ē* are not seldom interchanged, thus, *sa*, *sā*, and *sē*, he is; *bāp-lē* and *bāp-lā*, to the father, *mānus-nē* and *mānus-nā*, by a man As in the Marāthī of Berar, neuter bases end in *a* where Dēśī Marāthī has *ē*, thus, *asa wāt^ana*, so it appeared; *sōna*, gold

Ē is interchangeable with *yā*; thus, *tē* and *tyā*, they.

The palatals are pronounced as in Gujarātī and Rājasthānī Thus, *mī jāś*, I go; *thōdā-ch dīn-thī*, after a few days Note the emphatic particle *ch* in the last instance. It agrees with Marāthī *ts* and apparently not with Gujarātī *j* Compare, however, the pronunciation of *j* as *s* and *ch* in Bhīl dialects.

The cerebrals are pronounced as in Marāthī and Gujarātī Thus, *ghōdā*, a horse The cerebral *n* is very irregularly used, and a dental *n* is often used instead, thus, *kōnī* and *kōnī*, some one In Nīmar there seems to be a strong tendency to use the cerebral sound Thus, we find *mā-nā*, my, *tyā-nā*, his.

The cerebral *l* is sometimes replaced by the dental one in one set of specimens received from Khandesh, where we find forms such as *dōlā*, eye, *pal*, run. The specimens forwarded from Nandurbar, Amalner, and Nīmar, however, always distinguish the two *l*-sounds The same is the case in the dialect spoken in the Dangs, and the writing of *l* instead of *l* is, therefore, probably inaccurate. The cerebral *l* is commonly pronounced like the *l mouillé* in French, and it is, accordingly, often written as a *y*; thus, *dōyā*, eye, *pay*, run. *Y* instead of *l* is very common in the specimens received from Amalner According to the District Gazetteer, however, it represents the common pronunciation in Khandesh Compare the substitution of *y* and *r* for *l* in the Marāthī of Berar, and for *r* in Dravidian languages

V is pronounced as in Marāthī and Gujarātī. It is sometimes dropped before *i*, as is also the case in the Marāthī of Berar. Thus, *ichāra*, it was asked, *ikat*, buying

Aspirated letters sometimes lose their aspiration. Thus, the usual ablative postposition is written both *thī* and *tī*.

The Anunāsika is rarely met with and seems to be very faintly sounded. Thus, *asā*, but usually *asa*; thus, (*ghar-*)*mā*, in (the house), and only occasionally (*hāt-*)*mā*, on (the hand)

The phonetical system is, on the whole, the same as in Marāthī and Gujarātī Where those two languages differ, it sometimes agrees with the latter, but in most cases with the former.

Nouns.—Gender.—There are three genders as in Marāthī and Gujarātī The neuter is, however, constantly confounded with the masculine. Thus, *it^ana wāt^anā*, so-much appeared, *pāp kar^anā sā*, sin is made In these instances the subject is neuter, but the verb is put in the masculine.

Number.—There are two numbers, the singular and the plural They are, however, constantly confounded. Thus, the plural is used as an honorific singular in *tyās-lē*, to him, *ghōdās-nā jān*, the saddle of the horse. Much more common is the

use of the singular instead of the plural thus, *chākar-lē*, to the servants *hai dukkar rahind*, these swine are. Compare verbs below. The plural of weak masculine bases is formed without any addition. Thus, *dādōr*, a son, and sons. Strong masculine bases end in *ā* in the singular, as is also the case in Marāṭhī. In the plural they usually preserve the *ā* as in Mālvī and Gujarātī; thus, *ghōḍā*, horses; *chāḍk-rā* sons. Occasionally however, we also find Marāṭhī forms such as *ghōḍē*.

Weak feminine bases seem to form their plural as in Marāṭhī and Mālvī thus, *gāyā* cows; *porī* daughters. Strong feminine bases form their plural as in Marāṭhī and Mālvī; thus, *ghōḍyā* mares.

Weak neuter bases seem to form their plural in *ē* thus, *duk-rē* swine. But also *dukkar* swine. Strong neuter bases end in *a* in the singular; thus, *sōna*, gold. No instances are available for the plural.

Case—Cases are formed by adding suffixes. In the singular they are added directly to the base, as is also the case in Mālvī and Gujarātī. Thus, *bāp-lē* to the father *ghōḍā-mā* of the horse. Marāṭhī forms, such as *ghōḍyā-war*, on a horse *tār'khē-mā* on that day, occur in a few instances. According to the grammatical sketch in the District Gazetteer, however, they are not justified. The only exception is said to be *bhāṅgōḍā* a bee, oblique *bhāṅgōḍyā*.

The plural has a separate oblique form ending in *s* or in the case of weak masculine and neuter bases, *ē*. Thus *bāpēs-lē*, to fathers *pōris-lē* to daughters *bhātas-mā* in the walls *ghōḍās-mā* of the horses. It has already been noted that the singular form is often used instead; thus, *bāp-lē* to fathers; *mānas-lē* and *mān'ēs-lē* to the men.

The usual case postpositions are—Instrumental *ai wari ghāl* case of the agent, *mā*, *ai*, *mē*; dative *lē lē mē mā* ablative *thi jaw'ān*; *pāin pāy pāin pun* genitive, *mā* fem. *ai* neut. *na* locative *mā mē mē* and *māj'hār*. Thus, *dōr'ka ai* with ropes; *bāp-mā* by the father; *kisē lē* to (my) share *ghar-mā* in the house *ghōḍās mā* of the horses.

In Dīmar the instrumental and the case of the agent usually end in *ā* as in Gujarātī thus, *bāpā* by the father *bhukā*, by hunger. Similar forms occasionally also occur in Khandesh.

The instrumental suffix *ai* is Marāṭhī. The same is the case with the ablative suffix *jaw'ān* which is not, however, used in any specimen but only occurs in a list of words received from Khandesh.

The suffixes of the case of the agent correspond to Marāṭhī *sa*, *mē* and Mālvī *mā*. The usual dative suffix is *lē* as in the Marāṭhī of Berar. Besides we also find the usual Marāṭhī form *lā*. *L* and *s* seem to be interchangeable in this suffix, so that we also find it in the forms *mē* and *mā*. We may, therefore, perhaps compare Mālvī and Gujarātī *mē*.

The usual suffix of the ablative is *thi* as in Gujarātī. With this latter language also the suffix of the genitive agrees. The locative suffix *mā mē* corresponds to Gujarātī *mā* and *mē* to Mālvī *mē*, *mā*.

An old locative is *ghar* in the house.

It will be seen that the inflexion of nouns agrees with Marāṭhī in some suffixes and the formation of most plural forms. The main principles of the inflexion, however, where the oblique form does not differ from the base, is quite different from

that prevailing in Marāthī. In this respect Khāndēśī approaches Gujarātī and Mālvi, with which languages it also shares most case suffixes.

Adjectives.—Adjectives are inflected in gender and number as in Marāthī. Thus, *bhalā mānus*, a good man, *bhal^ayā bāy^akā*, good women. The form usually remains unchanged when the qualified noun is inflected. Thus, *thōdā-ch den-thī*, after few days, *tyā-nā galā-mā*, on his neck. In some cases, however, we find Marāthī forms, such as *bhalyā mānus-lē*, to a good man. An oblique form seems to end in *i*; thus, *jan nī ghar*, in a man's house, *tu-nī samōr*, before thee.

Numerals.—The numerals are formed as in Marāthī. In Nimar, however, Gujarātī forms, such as *chha*, six, *das*, ten, *pachās*, fifty, and *sō*, hundred, are used. *Sō* and *das* also occur in Khandesh.

Pronouns.—The personal pronouns are mainly the same as in Marāthī. The case suffixes are the same as in the case of nouns. 'I' is *mī*, but also *ma*, as in Mēwātī. 'We' is *ham* or *ām*, as in Mēwātī, 'you' is *tum*, as in Mēwātī. Other forms are *āmhū*, we, *āpan*, we, including the person addressed, *āmī*, *ām-ē* and *āmhū*, by us, *tumī*, *tumhī*, and *tumē*, by you, etc.

The pronouns *tō*, that, he, and *jō*, which, have three genders as in Marāthī. The same is the case with *han* and *au*, thus compare Marāthī *hā*, Rajpipla Bhilī *ān*, Māwchī, Dēhawālī and Dhōdiā *ō*, Mālvi *yō*.

Kōn, who? does not change in the oblique form.

Verbs.—The Khāndēśī verb has developed several characteristic features of its own. It has already been remarked that the two numbers are often confounded. Thus, *jāyāt*, they became, is also used in the sense of 'he became', *rahmā*, he lived, is sometimes used with a plural subject.

Verbs are used in the active, passive, and impersonal constructions as in Marāthī and Gujarātī. Instead of the neuter form of the verb in the impersonal construction we, however, often find the masculine, thus, *bāp-nā sāng^anā*, instead of *sāng^ana*, the father said. The past tense of transitive verbs often agrees with an inflected object, as is also the case in Gujarātī. Thus, *tyā-ē tī-lē balāvī*, he called her. The past tense of transitive verbs is sometimes also actively construed, thus, *tō kar^anā*, he did.

Verb substantive.—The present tense is formed from the base *sa* which also occurs in many Bhil dialects, and in the Ahirwātī and Mēwātī dialects of Rājasthānī. In Nimar we also find *chhē* as in Nimārī and Gujarātī. The forms *sā*, *sē*, and *śē* are used for all persons in the singular. The corresponding plural form is *śētas*, or, in Nimar, *śētēs*. *Sas* and *śēs* are also used instead of *sā* and *śē*, respectively, in the second and third persons singular. The singular form is often also used for the plural, and *vice versa*.

The past tense is formed from the base *hōta* or *whata*. Compare Marāthī *hōta*, Gujarātī *hata*. The regular forms are,—singular, 1, *whatū*, 2, *whatā*; 3, *whatā*, plural, 1, *whatūt*, 2, *whatāt*, 3, *whatāt*. The form *whatā* is only used with a masculine subject. The corresponding feminine and neuter forms are *whatī* and *whata*, respectively.

The first person singular is often identical with the second and third. Thus, *mī hōtā*, I was. The singular is also commonly used for the plural. Sometimes the terminations of the present tense are added, thus, *hōtās*, thou art, you are, they are, etc.

The infinitive is *kōna* or *asna*, to be. The conjunctive participle is *hōi-san*, having been. Marāthī forms such as *asūn*, however, also occur.

Finite verb—There are only a few instances of the old present in the specimens. Thus *jāy-nā* he would not go.

The ordinary present has the same terminations as in the case of the verb substantive. Thus, *karas* I, thou, or he, does; *kar'tas*, we, you, or they do. In Nimar the plural is *kar'jās* we do; *kar'tās* you and they do. In the same district we also find forms such as *jās* I go.

The past tense is often formed as in High Hindi, thus, *lāgā*, he began; *tyā-nā* *mārā*, he struck. Commonly, however, a suffix *nā* is added. Thus, *tā pāṭ'nā*, he fell *tā pāṭ'nā*, she fell. This suffix must be compared with the common *n*-suffix in Bhilli and the suffix *nā* of the past tense of Sadri Korwa and other broken dialects spoken by aborigines—See Vol vi p. 222. Compare also forms such as *bandhāṅṅ* bound; *dikhāṅṅ* seen quoted in the Khandeah Gazetteer from Northern Gujarātī.

The suffix *nā* is sometimes also transferred to the present tense thus, *mā chāṭ'nā*, I go *tā rāṭ'nā* he lives. A corresponding present participle is *rāṭ'nā*, being

The wide use of this *n*-suffix for past time in Gujarātī Bhilli, and Khândēṣī (it also occurs in Eastern Hindi) may suggest that it is of a different origin from the Aryan suffix *ta*. It can perhaps sometimes be compared with the suffix *na* which forms relative participles in Telugu and other Dravidian forms of speech or with the common *n*-suffix in Mundā languages.

The usual singular form of the past tense ends in *ā*, fem. *ī*, neut. *a* the corresponding plural in *ā* thus, *gyā*, I thou or he, went; *gyā*, we, you, or they went. The first persons singular and plural have sometimes special forms; thus, *mā gā* I went *kām gā* we went. The singular is very often used instead of the plural thus, *jāyā* they became; *lāgā* they began.

In the case of transitive verbs, the past tense agrees with the object or is put in the neuter singular. Thus, *rup'gā kām līkāt* who took the rupees? The final *a* of the past tense neuter is often dropped thus, *tyā-mā ghar bādhā* he built a house.

Periphrastic tenses are formed by adding the verb substantive to the present, past, and pluperfect participles. Thus, *tyā khatā tā* they were eating *tā rāṭ'ī tā* she was crying *pāp kida tā* sin has been done *chālī tā* I have walked *mār'ā kōṭā*, he had died. The past tense of the verb substantive has, as will be seen from the instances just quoted, sometimes the form *tā* etc., in such compound tenses. This *tā* is perhaps only abbreviated from *kōṭā*. It is, however possible that it is identical with Mālvi and Mewāṭī *tā* and the Bundellī *tā*. This latter form at least seems to occur in *tā-tā* I took; *tā-tā* you took. Compare *bāṭ rāṭ nā tā* he is sitting.

The future is formed by adding an *s*-suffix as in Gujarātī. In the third person singular and plural, however we usually find the Marāṭhī forms. Thus, *kar'sā* I shall do; *kar'sī* *karis* and *kari*, thou wilt do *kari* and *karā*, he will do *kar'sā* and *kar'sā*, we shall do *kar'sā* *kar'sā*(*ī*) and *kar'sā* you will do; *kar'īs*(*ī*) and *kar'tis*, they will do. The form *kari* is said to be optionally used for all persons and numbers.

A past conjunctive is formed from the present participle thus, *mā bhāṭā tā*, (if) I had recognized *tā āṅ'nā pāṭ' bhar'tā*, he would have filled his stomach *tā dātā*, (if) she had given.

The imperative is formed as in Marāṭhī; thus, *kar* do; *chālā*, go ye.

An infinitive is formed with the suffix *ā* (*u*); thus, *karā lāṅ'nā*, he began to do. Sometimes *lāṅ'nā* is added to the conjunctive participle thus, *tā kari lāṅ'nā*, he began to do

Other verbal nouns end in *nā*, *ā*, and *wā*; thus, *nāch^{nā}*, dancing, *khāwā-lē*, in order to eat, *sāng^{wā}-lē*, in order to say; *chārā-lē*, in order to tend.

The present participle ends in *t*, or, in the strong form, *tā*; thus, *yēt*, coming; *khātā*, eating. The past participle passive ends in *ā* or *nā*, thus, *kyā*, *kīdā* or *kar^{nā}*, done. It has already been stated that the suffix *nā* is occasionally also used to form a present participle, thus, *rāh^{nā}*, living.

A pluperfect participle is formed as in Gujarātī by adding *l* to the past participle; thus, *chālēl*, having gone, *gayāl* and *gayōl*, having gone, *gamāwōl*, who had been lost; *mārēl*, who had been struck, *marēlā*, who had died.

A future participle passive is formed as in Marāthī. Thus, *pōt bhar^{wā}*, the belly should be filled.

The conjunctive participle is formed as in Gujarātī by means of the suffix *ī*, to which *n*, *nē*, *nī*, *san*, and *sanī* may be added. Thus, *dēī*, having given, *uthēn* and *uthinē*, having arisen; *khāyīnī*, having eaten, *lēī-san*, having taken, *mhanī-s^{nī}*, having said. In a few instances we find Marāthī forms such as *karūn*, having done; *mhanūn* and *mhūn*, having said.

The preceding remarks will have shown the mixed nature of the Khāndēśī verb. Just as the language differs from Marāthī and approaches the languages of the inner circle in the formation of the oblique base, so it agrees with these latter forms of speech in other important test points. The past tense is not formed by means of an *l*-suffix; it has an *s*-future, and its conjunctive participle takes the suffix *ī*.

The preceding remarks will also have shown that there is a great variety of forms in common use. The regular inflexion will be seen from the short skeleton grammar which follows —

KHĀNDEŚĪ SKELETON GRAMMAR.

I.—NOUNS

Singular	Masculine		Feminine		Neuter
Nom	<i>bāp</i> , a father	<i>ghēdā</i> , a horse	<i>gā</i> , a cow	<i>ghōdī</i> , a mare	<i>pāp</i> , a son
Instr	<i>bāp-nī</i>	<i>ghōḍā-nī</i>	<i>gā-nī</i>	<i>ghōḍī nī</i>	<i>pāp nī</i>
Dat.	<i>bāp-lē</i>	<i>ghōḍā lē</i>	<i>gā-lē</i>	<i>ghōḍī lē</i>	<i>pāp lē</i>
Abl	<i>bāp thī</i>	<i>ghōḍā-thī</i>	<i>gā thī</i>	<i>ghōḍī thī</i>	<i>pāp-thī</i>
Gen	<i>bāp na</i>	<i>ghōḍā-na</i>	<i>gā na</i>	<i>ghōḍī na</i>	<i>pāp na</i>
Loc	<i>bāp mā</i>	<i>ghōḍā mā</i>	<i>gā-mā</i>	<i>ghōḍī-mā</i>	<i>pāp-mā</i>
Plural					
Nom	<i>bāp</i>	<i>ghōḍā, ghōḍē</i>	<i>gāyā</i>	<i>ghōḍyā</i>	<i>pāp</i>
Obl	<i>bāpēs</i>	<i>ghōḍās</i>	<i>gāyās</i>	<i>ghōḍyās</i>	<i>pāpēs</i>

ADJECTIVES — Weak adjectives are not inflected. Strong adjectives, including the genitive, are inflected for gender and number, but not for case. Thus, *dhāl^{lā}*, small, fem. *dhāl^{lī}*, neut. *dhāl^{lā}*, plural *dhāl^{lē}* and *dhāl^{lā}*, fem. *dhāl^{līyā}*, neut. *dhāl^{līē}* (?)

The oblique Marāthī form occasionally occurs. Thus, *dhāl^{lē} ghar mā*, in the small house.

II.—PRONOUNS.

	I.		Thou.		Who?	What?
	Singular	Plural	Singular	Plural	—	—
Nom.	<i>mi, mei</i>	<i>ken km, kpen</i>	<i>ti</i>	<i>tem</i>	<i>khu</i>	<i>kky</i>
Instr.	<i>mi, mi</i>	<i>kmi, kmik</i>	<i>ti, tu-ai</i>	<i>temi, temik</i>	<i>khu-ai</i>	<i>kai-ai.</i>
Obj.	<i>ma-i</i>	<i>km-i</i>	<i>tu-i</i>	<i>tem(i)-i</i>	<i>khu-i</i>	<i>kai-i.</i>
Gen.	<i>ma-na</i>	<i>km-na</i>	<i>tu-na</i>	<i>tem-na</i>	<i>ti na</i>	<i>kai-na.</i>

	It, that, he				
	M.	F.	N.	Plural.	
Nom.	<i>ti</i>	<i>ti</i>	<i>ti</i>	<i>ti tyi</i>	See also <i>ti, who. It is, this, becomes kai (or ki) in the feminine and reuter. Oblique (i)tyi, tem, and reut. i. Plural kyi, yi, obi, mae. kyi tem, and reut. ki.</i>
Obj.	<i>tyi-i</i>	<i>ti-i</i>	<i>tyi-i</i>	<i>tyi-tyi</i>	
Gen.	<i>tyi-na</i>	<i>ti-na</i>	<i>tyi-na</i>	<i>tyi-tyi</i>	

III.—VERBS.

A.—Verb Substantive.—*ai-na, kha, to be.*

	Present.		Past.		Future.		Imperative.
	Singular.	Plural.	Singular.	Plural.	Singular.	Plural.	—
1	<i>ti</i>	<i>ti-na</i>	<i>ti-ai</i>	<i>ti-ai(ki)</i>	<i>ti-ai</i>	<i>ti-ai(i)</i>	<i>ai, ti.</i>
2	<i>ti(i)</i>	<i>ti-na</i>	<i>ti-ai</i>	<i>ti-ai</i>	<i>ti-ai</i>	<i>ti-ai(i)</i>	
3	<i>ti(i)</i>	<i>ti-na</i>	<i>ti-ai</i>	<i>ti-ai</i>	<i>ti-ai</i>	<i>ti-ai(i)</i>	

B.—Finite Verb.—*pa-na, to fall.*

Verbal Nouns, *pa-i, pa-na, pa-i-i pa-na-i.*

Participles.—Present, *pa-i, pa-na*; Past, *pa-i, pa-na*; Pluperfect, *pa-i pa-na*; Future passive *pa-na.*

Conjunctive Participle, *pa-i, pa-na, pa-i na, having fallen.*

	Present.		Past.		Future.		Imperative
	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.	Sing.	Plur.	
1	<i>pa-i</i>		<i>pa-na (-ai)</i>		<i>pa-na</i>		
2	<i>pa-i</i>		<i>pa-na</i>		<i>pa-na</i>		<i>pa-i</i>
3	<i>pa-i</i>		<i>pa-na</i>		<i>pa-na</i>		
1	<i>pa-na</i>		<i>pa-na (-ai)</i>		<i>pa-na(i)</i>		<i>pa-na</i>
2	<i>pa-na</i>		<i>pa-na</i>		<i>pa-na(i)</i>		<i>pa-na</i>
3	<i>pa-na</i>		<i>pa-na</i>		<i>pa-na(i)</i>		

Present definite, *mi pa-i ti*; Imperfect, *mi pa-na-i*; Perfect, *mi pa-na ti*; Pluperfect, *mi pa-na-i*; Past Conditional, *mi pa-na, if I had fallen.*

Similarly all other verbs. In the past tense *ai* may be substituted for *na*; thus, *ai kyi or ki-na* she began. Transitive verbs are passively construed in the past tense. Thus, *tyi-ai kyi-ai* he read the book.

C.—Irregular Verbs.—Several verbs form their past tense irregularly. Thus, *ti-na, to go*, past *gi (i)tyi* I went; *gi-na, to come*, past *wa-i*; *ti-na, to become*, past *kyi*; *ku-na, to do*, past *ku (i)tyi, kyi, ki-i, and ku-na* I do, to take, past *ti(i)tyi, ki-i, and ki-i*; *ti-na, to give*, past *ti(i)tyi, ki-i, etc.*

Of the three specimens which follow, the two first have come from Khandesh, and the third represents the dialect of the Sonars of Burhanpur in Nimar.

The first specimen, a translation of the Parable of the Prodigal Son from Nandurbar Taluka, is a fairly good example. The second is the statement of a witness in a dialect which shows strong traces of the influence of Marāthī. The third specimen has been translated from a Marāthī reader. It more closely agrees with Gujarātī than is the case with the other specimens. Thus the instrumental always ends in *ē*, e.g., *bāpē*, by the father, etc.

[No. 65]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP

KHANDEŚĪ.

SPECIMEN I.

(DISTRICT KHANDESH.)

कोणी-एक माणसले दोन आडोर म्हतस । त्यामाना धाकला आपले बापले म्हनना, बावा, मना हिस्साले जी जिनगी येई ती माले दे । आनी त्यानी त्यासले आपली जिनगी वाटी दिदी । थोडाच दिनथी आपनी समदी जिनगी लयिनी दूर देसमा निधी-ग्या । आनी तठे आपनी समदी जिनगी उडाई-दिदी । त्यानी समदी जिनगी उडाई दिदी आन तठे मोठा दस्काळ पडना । आनी तठे त्याले खावा-पीवा-नी मोठी पंचईत पडनी । आनी तठे तो त्या देसना एक जननी घर न्हायना । त्याने त्याले आपना खेतमा डुकरे राखाले लावी-दिधा । डुकरे जो कोंडा^१ खातस तो कोडा राजीखुषीथी खायिनी आपन पेट भरता । पन तो बी त्याले मिळना नही । तवळ तो सुध-वर उना' आनी म्हना लागना की, मना बापना नोकरमा कित्येकाले पुरेनी उरे इतली भाकर मिळसनी मी भुक्क्या मरस । मी उठिसनी मना बापना गमे जास आनी त्याला म्हनस, बावा, तुनी समोर देवना मी अपराध कया । आते मी तुना आडोर म्हनी-लेवाले लायक नही । माले तुना एक पगारी चाकर कर । अस म्हनीसनी तो उठीनी बाप-गमे गया । तो दूरच शे तितलकमा त्याना बापनी देखा । त्याले दया येईसनी तो त्यान पान दवडत ग्या आनी त्याना गळामा पडिसनी त्यानी सुका लिधा । तवळ आडोर आपना बापले म्हनना, बावा, आते मी तुना आडोर म्हनी-लेवाले लायक नही । तुनी समोर देवना मी अपराध कया । पन बाप चाकरले हाक मारिसनी म्हनना चागली कुडची लेईनी त्याना अगमा घाला, हातमा मुदी घाला, पायमा जोडा घाला । खाई-पियिसनी मजा करवो चला । ह्यो मना आडोर मरी ग्या था, तो आते जिवंत हुई उना, तो खोवाई ग्या था, तो मिळना । आनी त्या मजा करू लागनात ।

इबाग त्याना मोठा भाऊ खेतमा होता । तो घर येत होता । तो घरना नजीक उना तवळ त्याले नाचन बजावन ऐकू उन । तवळ त्यानी एक चाकरले बोलाविसनी इचार, आठे काय चाली-हयन । तो म्हनना तुना भाऊ मजामा उना शे म्हनून तुना बाप मेजवानी करस हे ऐकिसनी त्याले राग उना, आनी तो घरमा जायना । म्हनून त्याना बाप बाहेर उना आनी

[No. 65.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHĀNDEŚĪ.

SPECIMEN I

(DISTRICT KHANDESH.)

TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION.

Kōnī-ēk mānas-lē dōn āndōr whatas. Tyā-mā-nā dhāk'lā āp'lē bāp-lē
A-certain man-to two sons were Them-in-of the-younger his-own father-to
 mhan'nā, 'bābā, ma-nā hussā-lē jī jin'gī yēi tī mā-lē dē' Ānī
said, 'father, my share-to what property may-come that me-to give' And
 tyā-nī tyās-lē āp'lī jin'gī wātī dīdī. Thōdā-oh dīn-thī
him-by them-to his-own property having-divided was-given. A-few-only days-in
 āp'nī sam'dī jin'gī layī-nī dūr dēs-mā ninghī-gyā Ānī
his-own all property having-taken a-far country-into having-started-went And
 tathē āp'nī sam'dī jin'gī udāi dīdī. Tyā-nī sam'dī
there his-own all property having-squandered was-given Him-by all
 jin'gī udāi dīdī, ān tathē mōthā dukāl pad'nā Ānī tathē
property having-wasted was-given, and there a-great famine fell And there
 tyā-lē khāwā-piwā-nī mōthī pañchaīt pad'nī. Ānī tathē tō tyā dēs-nā
him-to eating-and-drinking-of great difficulty fell. And there he that country-of
 ēk jan-nī ghar rhāy'nā Tyā-nē tyā-lē āp-nā khēt-mā duk'rē
one person-of (at)-house remained Him-by him-to his-own field-into swine
 rākhā-lē lābī dīdhā. Duk'rē jō kōndā khātas tō kōndā
to-keep having-employed was-given. Swine what husks eat that husks
 rājī-khushī-thī khāyī-nī āp'na pēt bhar'tā. Pan tō bī
gladness-with having-eaten his-own belly would-have-filled. But that even
 tyā-lē mī'nā nahī Tawal tō sudh-war unā, ānī mhanā lāg'nā kī,
him to was-obtained not. Then he senses-on came, and to-say began that,
 'ma-nā bāp-nā nōkar-mā kityēk-lē purēnī urē it'lī
'my father-of servants-among several-to having-sufficed might-be-spared so-much
 bhākar mīlas'nī mī bhukyā maras. Mī uthī-s'nī ma-nā
bread having-been obtained I hungry am-dying. I having-arisen my
 bap-nā gamē jās anī tyā-lā mhanas, "bābā, tu-nī samōr
father-of near go and him-to say, "father, your in-presence

Dêw-nâ ml aprâdh kayâ; âtô ml tu-nâ âpôr mhanl lëwâ lë
God-of (by)-me sin was-done; therefore I your son having said-to-take
 lâyak nahl. âtô lë tu-nâ êk pagâri châkar kar'' Aa mhanl s'ni
worldly am-not Me-to your one paid servant make'' So having-said
 tō u'hini hâp gaunê gayâ. Tō dâra-ch êtô it'lak mâ
he having-returned father near went He at-a-distance is in the-mean-time
 tyâ nâ hâp-ni dëkhâ. Tyâ lë dayâ yêl-s'ni tō tyâ na
his father-by was-seen. Him-to compassion having-come he him-of
 jûna daw'dat gyâ âni tyâ-nâ galâ mâ paçî-s'ni tyâ ni mukâ
near running went and him-of on-the-neck having-fallen him-by kiss
 lîkhâ. Tawaj âpôr âp-nâ hâp-lë mhan'nâ, 'bâbâ, âtô ml
was-taken. Then the-son his-own father-to said 'father now I
 to-nâ âpôr mhanl lëwâ lë lâyak nahl; tu ni samôr Dêw nâ ml
your son to-be-called worldly am-not; your in presence God-of (by)-me
 aprâdh kayâ.' Pan hâp châkar-lë hâk mârî-s'ni mhan'nâ
sin was-done' But the-father servant to a-call having-struck said,
 'châg'li kufçhi lëi ni tyâ nâ aûg mâ ghâla, lîst mâ mundi ghâ,
god a-rod having-taken his body-on put, hand-on a-ring put,
 piy mâ jûk ghâla; khâl-piyi-s'ni majâ kar'wô-chalâ. Hân
foot-on shoes put; having-taken-and-drunk merriment let-us-make This
 ma-nâ âpôr mari gyâ thâ, tō âtô jiwant hui unâ tō
my son having-died gone was he now alive having-become came he
 khôwâl gyâ thâ, tō mî'nâ. Âni tyâ majâ karu
having-born-out gone was he to-found.' And they merriment to-do
 lig'nâl.
 began.

Ilâg tyâ-nâ mōjliâ bhâû khâl mâ bôta Tū ghar yêt
At this-time his elder son field-in was He to-house coming
 bhâ. Tō ghar-nâ majik unâ tawaj tyâ lë nâch'na hajâw'na alkû unâ.
was. He house-of near came then him-to dancing music to-hear came.
 Tawaj tyâ ni êk châkar-lë bôlâvî-s'ni lehâra, 'âjhb kây châû
Then him-by one servant to having-called was-asked, 'here what going-on
 rhay'na?' Tu mhan'nâ, 'tu nâ bhâû majâ mâ unâ-lë, mhanûn tu nâ
was?' He said, 'your brother health-in come-is therefore your
 hâp mêt'wâni karaa. Ilô aiki-s'ni tyâ lë râg unâ; âni tō
father a-frost to-making This having-heard him to anger came; and he
 ghar-mâ jây'nâ. Mhanûn tyâ-nâ hâp bâbâr unâ, âni ârjawa
house-in would-not-go. Therefore his father out came and entreaties
 kari lig'nâ. Âpôr hâp-lë mhan'nâ 'bâbâ, dëkh, ml tu ni itla
to-make began. The-son father-to said, father see I your so-many
 waris jâyâ tu-ni châk'ri karaa, pan tum-nâ hukûm âj-lagan
years have-gone your service am-doing, but your order today-until

mōdā nahī, tarī-bī mā-lē ma-nā sōb^atī barōbar khāwā-piwā-lē ēk
was-broken not ; still-even me-to my friends with to-eat and drink one
 bak^arī-na bachcha pan dīdha nahī Pan jyā-nē tu-nī jin^agī
she-goat-of young-one even given is-not But whom-by your property
 randī-bājī-mā udāī dīdhī, tō. tu-nā āndōr yētā barōbar
harlotry-in having-wasted was-given, that your son on-coming immediately
 tū trā-nī kar^atā mēj^awānī karas^a Tawal bāp āndōr-lē mhan^anā,
you him-of for a-feast make.' • Then the-father son-to said,
 'pōryā, tū ma-nā pās sē, ānī ma-nā pāna jē kāhī sē tē
'son, you of-me near are, and my near what some-thing is that
 sam^ada tu-na-ch sē Pan hau tu-nā bhāū mai^a-gyā thā, tō jiwant
all your-alone is But this your brother dead-gone was, he alive
 huī unā, khōwāi-gyā thā, tō mil^anā, mhanūn āpan khush
having-become came, lost-gone was, he is-found, therefore we glad -
 hōi-s^anī majā kar^avī hai ,barōbar sē'
having-become meiriment should-be-made this proper is'

[No 68]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

KHANDESL

SPECIMEN II

STATEMENT OF A WITNESS.

(DISTRICT KHANDESL)

मी १५ तारखेला सिद्धेचाने बाजार गेला। मी बुडामय, तानाजी, एकच गाडीमा गेलात। बाजार करीसन परत उलात। दीन निरगुडीनी जोडे गया। घसीं अर्वा माइल पाडिनी तेच पावत उला। ते चोर आडवा लाया। एक चोरन दमड मारला। तो मनी गारुला लागा। चोरन गासडी सोडला। मनी गासडी आन तानाजीनी गासडी सोडनी। मने गासडी मारून दोन माथा एक माथू बंधे रुपये ११ आन खुर्दा आंगडी आडीच रुपयाना इतना माळ ली गया। तानाजीन गासडी मारून सी साद्या खानना तुकडे तीन, बंधे रुपये सात ली गयात। मीमा बंधे चार रुपये आन तीन रुपयाना खुर्दा आताळ। एक चोरन मळा माळा टोचला। मंग ते चोर निरगुडीनी नाम घरा पळना। मंग आमन सामान आवरीसन घरसी गया। तीख पोलीस पाटीलना खबर करला। तन्ही त्या चोर इकर काडीं आतलागा। मंग त्यासन घरघर पाहारा बठार दीला। त्या लोक लुकाळू उला ते आपला का माळूम लाहा। बी चोर आमने माचला छत। आन ते मला इमिड दिखामा छत। चोरनी जाग ओळखतु तर त्या मारतात अमळ। लुकी वळख दिनातला।

[No. 66]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHĀNDEŚĪ.

SPECIMEN II.

STATEMENT OF A WITNESS.

(DISTRICT KHANDESH.)

TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION.

Mi pand'rā tār'khē-nā Sind'khēdyā-nē bājār gayāl Mī, Chudāman
I on-the-fifteenth date Sindkhedā-of bazar(to) had-gone I, Chudāman
 Tānājī, ēka-ch gādī-mā gayāt Bājār karī-san parat unāt
Tānājī, the-same carriage-in had-gone Marketing having-done back we-came
 Dīn Nir'gudī-nī-jōdē gayā Warsī aīdhā māīl rāhīnī tēth-pāwat unā.
The-day Nirgudī-of-near went Warsī half a-mile remained there-up-to (we)-came
 Tē chōr ād'wā jāyā Ēk chōr-na dagad mār'nā, tō ma-nī gāl-nā
The thieves across became One thief-by stone was-thrown, that my cheek-to
 lāgā Chōr-na gās'dī sōd'nā. Ma-nī gās'dī ān Tānājī-nī gās'dī
hit. The-thief-by bundle (of-clothes) was-loosed. My bundle and Tānājī-of bundle
 sōd'nī. Manē gās'dī-māīn dōn sādya, ēk sālū, bandhē rupayē tētīs
was-loosed My bundle-in-from two sadies, one salu, whole rupees thirty-three
 ān khurdā āngrajī ādī-ch rupayā-nā it'nā māl
and copper-pieces English-(coin) two-and-a-half rupees-of so-much property
 lī-gayā Tānājī-na gās'dī-māīn sau sādya khan-nā tuk'dē tīn, bandhē
was-taken away Tānājī-of bundle-in-from six sadies khan-of pieces three, whole
 rupayē sāt lī-gayāt. Tē-mā bandhē chār rupayē ān tīn rupayā-nā
rupees seven were-taken-away. That-in whole four rupees and three rupees-of
 khurdā ātāl. Ēk chōr-na ma-lā bhālā tōch'nā. Mang tē chōr
copper was. One thief-by me-to a-spear was-pierced. Then those thieves
 Nir'gudī-nī bāg-warā paī'nā Mang ām-na sāmān āw'rī-san War'sī
Nirgudī-of garden-up-to ran Then our luggage having-collected to-Warsī
 gayā Tītha pōlis pītil-nā khabar kar'nā. Tawhī tyā chōr hajar
acc-went There police patil-to information was-made Then those thieves pres nt
 tīhī āt'lī-nā Mang tyās-na ghar-war pāhārā bathī dīnā Tyā
at-all were-not Then by-him house-on a-watch having-placed was-given Those
 lok hawhīlū unā tē āplā kā mālūm nāhā Au chōr ām-nō gāw-nā
people when came that to-us anyhow known was-not Those thieves our millage-of

sat; ān tō mā nā hamē dēkhā mā-sat. Chōr nī jāg ḍakh'tu tar
 were; and they we-to always sight-in-are The-thieves-of place if I recognize then
 tājā mār'tit ām-lā. Bihani walakh dīcāt nā.
 they would have beaten us-to. Therefore recognition was-not-given.

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING

On the fifteenth I had gone to the bazar of Sindkheda. I and Chudāman Tānāji went in the same carriage. After having done marketing we returned. On that day we went to Nirguḍī and came so far as half-a-mile from Warā, when we were waylaid by thieves. One of the thieves threw a stone which hit me on the cheek. The thieves unlocked our bundles, both mine and Tānāji's. From my bundle they took two saris, a turban and thirty three rupee-pieces and two-and-a-half rupees in English coppers. From Tānāji's bundle they took six saris and three pieces of 'khan,'¹ and seven rupees cash of which four were in whole rupees and three in coppers. One of the thieves pricked me with a spear.

Then the thieves fled towards the garden of Nirguḍī, and we collected our kit and went to Warā. There we made an information to the police master. The thieves were not then present, but he had their house watched. We do not know when they came in. Those thieves belong to our village and I always see them. If I had shown that I recognised the thieves then they would have killed us, and therefore I did not show any recognition.

¹ Squares or divisions of the land/7 a web for the CIAI.

[No. 67.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHANDESI

SPECIMEN III.

(DISTRICT NIMAR)

A POPULAR TALE

एक छोकरा निसाळे लिखवाले जाता-ता । त्याए एक दाडा एक छोकरानी वस्त चुरावीने त्याए ते पोतानी मायले दीदी । तिणें छोकराले शिच्चा करवी ते न करतौं उलटी श्वासकी दीदी, ने त्याले एक जाव फळ खावाले दीद । त्या-उपरात पक्षी तो छोकरा जसा-जसा मोठा होता गया तसा-तसा मोठ्या मोठ्या चोऱ्या करवा लागा । कोई एक दाडे तो चोरीमाँ पकडायना । पक्षी त्याले फाँशी देवाले सरकारना शिपाई लई गया । तो तमासा जीवा-करतौं लोकोंना थाट मळना-ता । तडे त्यांनी माय-वी एईने हुसासा लाखी लाखीने रडती ती । तीले देखीने तो त्याए सरकारना शिपाईले सांग के दादा हो, एक वखत माणी मायना वरी माणा मिलाप करावा । त ऐकीने त्याले दया वनी वरी त्याए तिले पासे बलावी । ते वखत हुस्माँ त्याए तिणा कान चावी खादा । अयि जोईने लोक सांगवा लागा, काय-हो खराब से आऊ पोऱ्या । जीवा, जीवा, आऊ फासी जावानी वखत बी अयि म्हा पातक करवाले बी चुकना न्हँ । त ऐकीने त्याए उत्तर दीदा । भाउ हो, माणी विनती ऐका । मे या मायना प्राण बी ये वखत लीदा तो-बी मल्ले दोस लागता न्हँ । असँ काँ सांगव के, मूळ भी न्हना, होता, तदक निसाळमाती एक छोकरानी वस्त मे चोरावीने ईना-पासे दीदी, तदकच ये माणा पारपत्य करती, ने मले जाव फळ न देतो, तो आज ये दशा मले काँ प्राप्त होती ॥

SPECIMEN III

A POPULAR TALE

(DISTRICT NIMAR.)

TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION

Ek chhōkṛā nīśāḷ līkṛwā-lō jāṭā tā. Tyāō ēk dādā ēk
One boy in-a school to-learn going-was By-him one day one
 chhōkṛā nī wāst churāvinō tyāō lō pōṭā-nī māy lō dīdī.
boy-of a thing having-stolen by-him that his-own mother-to was-given.
 Tīō chhōkṛā lō sīkṛā kārṭī lō nā kārṭī utṭī
By-her the-boy-to punishment should have-been-done that not doing on-the-contrary
 sībāṭkī dīdī. nō tyā lō ēk jāmb phāḷ khāwā lō dīdā. Tyā
applause was-given and him-to one guava fruit calling-for was-given. That
 uprāt pachhī tō chhōkṛā jāṣ jāṣ mōḷhā bōṭā gayā tāsā tāsā mōḷhā
after them that boy as as great becoming went so so great
 mōḷhā chōṛyā karwā lāgā. Kōī ēk dādō tō chōṛī mī pakṣhā'nā.
great thefts to-do began Certain a on-day he in-a theft was-caught
 Pachhī tyā lō phāṭī dōwā lō Sārkar-nā sīpāl lāl gayā.
Then him-to hanging give-to Government-of police having-taken went
 Tō tāmā jōwā kārṭī kōḷō-nā thāṭ mā'nā-tā. Taḥō tyā nī māy
That spectacle seeing-for people-of a-crowd gathered was. There his mother
 bī tī nō hūṣā lākhi-lākhiṇō raḍṭī-tī. Tī lō dōkhīṇō tō
also having-come sobbing making crying-was. Her-to having-seen then
 tyāō Sārkar-nā sīpāl lō sāṅga kō, dādā hō, ēk wakhat
by-him Government-of the-police-to it was-told that brothers O one time
 māṅī māy nā wārī mānā mīlāp karāwā. Ta aḷkīṇō tyā lō
my mother-of and my meeting should-be-made That having-heard them to
 dayā wārī, wārī tyāō tī lō pīṣō balāṇī Tō wakhat ghūṣā-mī tyāō
pity came and by-them her-to near was-called That at time in-anger by him
 tīṇā kōn chāṇī khōḍā Ayī jōṇō lōk sāṅg-wā lāgā,
her car having-bitten was-eaten This having-seen the-people to-say began,
 kāy hō, kharāb sō āṇ pōṛyā. Jōwā, Jōwā, āṇ phāṣī jāwā-nī wakhat bī
'what, O bad is this boy Look! Look! This execution going-of at-time even
 ayī mahā patak karwā lō bī chuk'nā nahī Ta aḷkīṇō tyāō utṭar
this great a sin to-do also failed not That having heard by him a-reply

didā, 'bhāu hō, mānī vinantī aikā. Mē yā māy-nā
was-given, 'good-people O, my statement you-hear. By-me this mother-of
 prāṇ bī yē wakhat lidā tō-bī ma-lyē dōs lāg'tā
life even this time (if)-was-taken yet me-to blame would-have-applied
 nahī Asā kṣā sāṅg-wa kē, mūl mī nhānā hōtā, tadaḷ
not So why should-be-said that, at-first I young was, at-that-time
 nisāl-mā-tī ēk chhōk'rā-nī wast mē chōrāvinē inā-pāsē didī,
the-school-in-from one boy-of a-thing by-me having-stolen of-her-near was-given,
 tadaḷ-ach yē mānā par'paty kar'ti, nē ma-lē jāmb phal
just-at-that-time she me of chastisement (if)-had done, and me-to a-guava fruit
 na dētī, tō āṇ yē daśā ma-lē kṣā prāpt hōtī'
not had-given, then to-day this state me-to how obtained would-have-been'

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING.

A certain boy went to a school. One day he stole something which belonged to another boy, and brought it to his mother. Instead of punishing the boy as she ought to have done, she approved of his action and gave him a guava fruit to eat. After that time the boy began to commit greater and greater thefts as he grew up, till at last he was caught in a theft. The Government officers brought him away to be hanged. A crowd of people gathered in order to see the spectacle, and among them was also his mother who was incessantly sobbing and crying. When he caught sight of her, he asked the officers to let him join his mother for a moment. Out of pity they called the mother to him. Then he angrily bit her ear off. Seeing this the people said, 'see, see how wicked this boy is. Even on his way to the gallows he does not fail to commit so great a sin.' Having heard this he retorted, 'good people, listen to my statement. Even if I had now taken my mother's life, no blame would have been attached to me. And I will tell you why. When a small boy I once brought her something which I had stolen from another boy at school. Had she at that occasion punished me, and not given me a guava fruit, then I should not to-day have come to such a pass.'

The dialect spoken by the Kur'bis of Khandesh has been returned as Kur'bi or Kur'ba. Specimens have been received from Amalner and they show that the dialect does not differ from ordinary Khândeshi, as will be seen from the Parable of the Prodigal Son which follows.

[No. 68]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

KHANDĒSHĪ

SO-CALLED KUR'BAU DIALECT

(DISTRICT KHANDĒSH)

કોના એકા માનુસને દોઢ બાંદોર હોત । ત્યા મજારના ધાકલા બાંદોર ચાપને જ્યસ વાલા બાપને ઘરમા જો પેના જોરે વ મનિ જિયામે જે ધેરે, તે માને દે । મંગ જ્વાનો જે ઘરમા હોત તે ત્યાને દિધ । મંગ યોદ્ધા દિનમા વાલના બાંદોર મમદ જમા વાદન જાંચ દેગમા વ્યા । બાજિ ત્યા ગાંવમા જાઈસન આપના-જોઈ જે હોત તે માર પેનવાજીમા જણી ટાક । મંગ ત્યા દેશમા મોઠી આજાઈ પઢતી । ત્યા મુયે ત્યાના મોઠા જાન જાયાત । તથય તો ત્યા દેશ મમ્કારીન માનુસ પાન જ્વાઈસન રાજિના । મંગ ત્યા માનુસને આપના હોત મમ્કાર જુજરે ચારામે ઘાઢ । તથક જુજરે જી માલ જાત હોત ત્યા-જર આપના પોટ મરવ થસ ત્યાને વાટન । મંગ ત્યાને જોષી વાજી દિધ નાજી । મંગી તો મુદ-જર ધેલન ચોલના, મના વાપ પાન જ્યા વાજર ગોતમ જ્વાસને પોટમર માજર મિકસ બાજિ માને જાવામે જી મિકત નાજી । મી મના વાપ પાન જાઈસન, જ્વામે સાંગજી જી, મી આમાયના વિરુદ વ તુના મમોર પાપ જ્યે । બાજિ પાર્જન મી તુના બાંદોર યે થસ નાજી । તૂ-પાન જયે વાજર મિતજ તથે માને જી ઠેવ । મંગ હઠીસન વાપ-જકે વ્યા । તથય તો દૂર મે રતક દેખીસન જ્વાને જાર જાઈટ વાટન । મંગ તો ધાવત ધેઈસન ગઢામા મિઠી ઘાલી વ ત્યાના મુલા મિધા । મંગ બાંદોર જ્વાને ચોલના, આમાયના વિરુદ તુના મમોર મી મોઠ પાપ જ્યે જનૂન બાજિ પાર્જન મી તુના બાંદોર જી થસ ચોલન જર નાજી । ત્યા જર આપને વાજર માનુસને સાંધ, સાંગલા મંગા બાજિસન યાના આંગ મમ્કાર ઘાલ । જ્વાન જાત-મમ્કાર મુંદી વ પાયમા જુત ઘાલ । મંગ દેખીસન જુઘાલ જોષ । જો મના બાંદોર મરી ગયતા તો જિરીસન જીવત જાયા । જે દેખીસન જ્વાના મોઠા બાનંદ જાયા ।

તથય ત્યાના મોઠા બાંદોર હોતમા હોતા । ત્યાન જર પાન ધેઈસન વાજત નાજત દેલ । તથય એક માનુસને જીવ, જે જાય થી । મંગ જ્વાને સાંગ, તુના ધાકલા માલ ધેલ થી । બાજિ તુના વાપને જુજરુપ ધેઈસન મિકના જનૂન જ્વાને મોઠા બાનંદ જાયા । તથય તો મોઠા રાગમા ધેઈસન ઘરમા જાયાના । ત્યા વજત જ્વાના વાપ જ્વાની સમજુત ઘાલી જામના । જ્વા વજત તો વાપને જનૂ જાગના જી દેલ મી રૂંતલા જરીસ જાયા વાજરી જરસ બાજી તુન સાંગન જયી મોઢ નાજી । થસા બસીસન મના જીવતી જરોજર માને જોતર-જી દિન નાજી । જ્યા બાંદોરની તુના સમદા પેસા રંજીવાજી-મમ્કાર જણી ટાક, બાન તો જના જયીસન મોઠ જીવન જાવન જ્યે । વાપ જ્વાને જીલના જી, તૂ મા પાન થી બાજિ મનપાન જે થી તે જી સમદ તુન થી । પન જી તુના માલ જ્યા હોતા તો માને ધેઈસન મિકના જનૂન જી માને બાનંદ જાયા તો જરોજર થી ।

[No 68.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHĀNDEŚI

SPECIFIED KUNJĀRĪ DIALECT.

(DISTRICT KHANDESH.)

TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION.

it ka dēkhi-san tyā lō phār wāhṭ wāṭ'na. Māng tō dhāwat yēi-san
this-much having-seen him to very bad was-felt Then he running having-come
 galā mā mīthī ghālī wa tyā nā muka līdhā. Māng āṇḍōr tyā lō
the-neck-in embracing was-put, and his kiss was-taken. Then the-son him-to
 bol'nā, 'ābhāy nā virūd tu nā-samūr mī mōṭha pap kyō mhaqūn
said 'the-cause-of-against of thee-before by-me great sin was-done therefore
 ātō-pāin mī tu nā āṇḍōr tō asa bol'nā kham nāhī' Tyā war āp'lō
henceforth I thy son am so to-speak true is-not.' That upon his-own
 chākar-māpūs-lō sāṅga, 'chāṅṅ'lā jhagā āpi-san yā nā nāg majhār
servants-men-to it-was-told 'good a-robe having-brought this-of on the-person
 ghāl. Tyā na hat majhār mudi wa jay mā juta ghāl. Māng dēkhi-san khudāl
put. His hand-in a-ring and feet in shoes put Then having-seen happy
 hōsū. Hau ma nā āṇḍōr marī gay-lā tō phīrī san jīwat jāyā.
we-will be This my son having-died gone-was he again alive became
 Hō dēkhi-san tyā lō mōṭha ānand jāyā.
This having-seen him to great joy became

Tadhay tyā nā mōṭha āṇḍōr khēt mā hōtā, tyā na ghar-pān yēi-san
At that time his elder son field in was him-by house-near having-come
 wājat nāchat aīka. Tadhay ēk mānus-lō wōdha, hai kāy tō?
music dancing was-heard Then one man to it was-asked this what is?
 Māng tyā nō sāṅga, 'tu nā dhuk'lā bhāū yēi tō. Āpi tu nā bāp-lō
Then him-by it-was-told thy younger brother come is And thy father-to
 sukh rūp yēi-san mīl'nā mhaqūn trā lō mōṭhā ānand jāyā. Tadhay
safe having-come was-obtained therefore him to great joy became Then
 tō mōṭhā rāg-mā yēi-san ghar-mā jāy nā Tyā wakhat tyā nā bāp
he great anger-in having-come house-in would not-go. At-that time his father
 tyā nī sam'jut ghālī lāg'nā. Tyā wakhat tō bāp-lō mhaqū lag'nā kī
his persuasion to-put began At that time he the-father-to to-say began that,
 'dēkh, mī it'lā waris jāyā chāk'rī karnas ānī tu na sāṅg'na kadhī
see I so-many years became service am-doing and thy order ever
 mōḍa nāhī. Asa aī-san ma-nā sōb'tī barōbar mā lō phōṭar-bī dīna
was-broken not Such having-been my friends-with me-to a lamb-even was-given
 nāhī. Jyā āṇḍōr-nī tu-nā sam'dā paisā raqḍī-bāji-majhār kharohī tākā
not. Which son-by thy all money harlotry-in having-spent was-thrown
 ān tō ānā mhaqī-san mōṭha jōwan khāwan kyō. Bāp tyā lō
and he came therefore great a feast eating is-made' The-father him to
 bol'nā kī, 'tīl mā pān tō āpi ma-na-pān jō tō tō-bī sam'da tu-na
said that thou me-near art and me-with what is that too all thine
 tō. Pan hau tu nā bhāū gyā hōtā, tō mā lō yēi-san mīl'nā, mhūn
is But this thy brother gone was he me-to having-come was-obtained, therefore
 jō mā lō ānand jāyā tō barōbar tō.
what me-to joy became that proper is."

DĀNGĪ.

The Dangs State, on the western frontier of Khandesh, had, in 1891, a population of 32,900 souls, 31,700 of whom were stated to speak Dāngī. Specimens have been forwarded in that dialect, and one of them, a version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son, will be found below.

The so-called Dāngī is almost identical with the current language of Khandesh.

There is a tendency to pronounce an *a* as an *o*. Thus *bās*, a father, is pronounced as *bōs*, or rather as *bās*, with the same vowel as that occurring in English 'all', but pronounced through the nose. Similarly *pal*, to run, is pronounced *pāl*.

The cerebral *n* is very irregularly used. Thus we find *ānā* and *ānā*, he came, *lāgⁿnā* and *lāgⁿnā*, he began. The pronunciation is probably always that of a dental *n*.

The inflexion of nouns and pronouns is the same as in Khāndēśī. Only the ablative suffix is *tīn* and not *thī* or *tī*, thus, *dur-tīn*, from a distance.

'I' is *mā* and *mī*, 'we' *āmhi* and *āpan*, 'you' *tumhī*, and so on. *Jī*, which, is apparently used for all genders. Thus, *jī wātā*, which share, *jī-kāhī*, what-ever. The neuter gender is, on the whole, very seldom used. We find neuter forms such as *sag^lla*, all, but usually the masculine, and sometimes also the feminine, is used instead. Thus, *mōthā pāp*, a great sin, *asī tē-nā man-mā wanā*, such a thing entered his mind.

The verb substantive has the same form as in Khāndēśī, thus, *tō sē*, he is. Sometimes, however, *āhā* or *ha* is used instead.

The inflexion of verbs does not call for any remarks. We may only note the Marāthī form *jāin*, I shall go, but *mhan^ssū*, I shall say, infinitives such as *mhanu-lā*, in order to say, etc.

The vocabulary is, to some extent, different from that of Khāndēśī. Compare *bās*, a father, *gōhō*, a man, and so on.

The specimen which follows is not very correct. It is, however, sufficient to show how closely Dāngī agrees with ordinary Khāndēśī.

[No. 69.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHĀNDEŚĪ.

SO-CALLED DĀNGĪ DIALECT.

(THE DANGS STATE.)

कोणता-येक गोहारा दोन पोसा जतात । त्याहून लाहाना पोसा बांसला म्हणु लागना, बा, जी आपली आमदानीना वाटा देण जेवा तो माला दे । मग बांसने त्यासला आपली आमदानी वाटी दीधी । मग थोडाच दीवसमा लाहाना पोसा आपली वाटानी आमदानी सगळी गोळा-करीसनी येखादी सुलख-वर निधी गया । तडे उधाळपणा-खाल वागना, व आपनी आमदानी सगळी पण कुल उडवी टाकी । त्या-पासन सगळ खर्ची गया । मंग त्या सुलख-वर मोठा काळ पडा त्या-पासीन त्याला मोठी येला पडी । मंग तो त्या सुलख-मा येक गोहो-पान जाई रहींना । त्या गोहोनी त्याले आपना डुकरा चारुला खेतमा लावा । तठ डुकरा जी काही

જાત ત જાર્દનન પેટ ભરવા બસી તેની મનમા થના , વ જોની જાણી જાણે દીધા નહી . મંગ તો જુદ-વર બાપા, વ મનમા જુનાને જાગા, મના જાંઠના ઘર મોજાકરી મોજોમને જ્યા પોઠ મર મા જરી મીઠતોય, વ મા તે જુજા મરમ . મા બાપા મના જાંઠના ઘર જાર્દન, વ જાણે જુજા બરે મના જાંઠ, મી દેવના ઘમોર વ જુના ઘમોર મીઠા પાપ જ્યા મા જુના પોંમા જાર્દ નર્ . પન માને જુના યેજાંદા મજુરજાર-મારજા રાજ . બમા મનમા રજાર કરીસની જાંઠ જાંઠે નવા . તજઠા-મખાર તો દુરતીન દેખતાય જાંઠના મયા બાપી બાપી જાણી જાર્દસની પોંસાના મજાજા જીજગી પઢા, વ જાંઠા ગુરજા જીધા . તવજ તો પોંમા જુજા જાગના, જાંઠ, મા દેવના જમીર વ જુના ઘમોર મોઠા પાપ જરના . બાપા મા જુના પોંમા નહી . મંગ જાંઠની બાપના યેજા જમારજા જાંઠા જી, ઘરમા જાર્દ જાંઠા જાંઠા જ્યા તર જાંઠા પાવાના દે . વ જાતમા યેજાંદી જુદી વ પાવમા પાવતન જ્યા તો જાણી હે . મંગ બાપન મજા જહ . જાજ મના પોંમા મરી મયેજ વ જીરમની જીજત જાયા વ દજહેજ તો જાપજના . તવજ મજા જહ જી જગનાત .

તવજ મના જહીજ પોંમા જેતમા જતા . તો ઘર જહે યેવાને જાગા તવજ જાણે જાર્દ જાજા વ નાવ પેજુ બાપા . તવજ મજુરજાર પયજી યેજા જનના તો જહાજ જી જગના જાર્દ મમંત જસાની જ . તવજ મજુરજારનો જાજે જાંઠા જી જુના માજા થના-જ બાપી તો જાંઠના જુજે-મનમાને યેર્દ મીઠના જનીમની જાંઠની મોઠી જેવનાવજા જર્દ . તવજ તો રાગી મરના વ ઘરમા જાર્દ જાર્દ ના . મય તેના જાંઠ જાણે જાર્દ યેર્દમની જમજાવાને જાગા . પન જાણે જાંઠના જાંઠા જી, મી જતજા દીજહ જુની જાજરી જરીમની જુ જાંઠજ તવજ યેજા જધી જુના મજદ મીઠા નહી . માને મના મિજામ-જરોજર જધી જનગી જહ દીધી નહી . બાપી જાણી જુની જમજી દોજત જાજવાંતીના જર નાજી ટાજી તો જા જુના પોંમા થના તવજ જાજાઠી મોઠી જેવનાવજા જર્દ . તવજ જાંઠ જાજા જુજુ જાગા જી, જુ મના-જવજા નિજમી જતાય, વ જાર્દ જમજી બામજાની જુજીજ ઈ . પન બાપન જનજા મીઠમની મજા જહ . જારજ જાજ જુના માજા મરી મયેજ તો જાંઠીમની જીવત જાયા વ દજહેજ તો જાંઠજના .

[No. 69.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHANDEŚĪ

SO-CALLED DĀNGĪ DIALLECT

(THE DANGS STATE.)

TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION.

Kōn^atā-yēk gōhā-lā dōn pōsā whatāt 'Tyā-hūn lāhānā pōsā bās-lā
A-certain man-to two sons were Them-from the-younger son father-to
 mhanu lāg^anā, 'bā, jī āp^ali ām^adānī-nā wātā dēnā whawā tō
to-say began, 'father, which my-own property-of share to-be-given might-be that
 mā-lā dē' Mang bās-nē tyās-lā āp^ali ām^adānī
me-to you-give' Then the-father-by them-to his-own property
 wātī didhī Mang thōdā-ch dīwas-mā lāhānā pōsā āp^ali
having-divided was-given Then few days-in the-younger son his-own
 wātā-nī ām^adānī sag^ali gōlā-karī-s^anī yēkhāndī mulakh-war ninghī
share-of property all together-made-having a-certain country-to having-gone
 gayā Tathē udhāl^apanā-khāl wāg^anā, wa āp^anī ām^adānī sag^ali pan kul
went There riotousness-with he-behaved, and his-own property all wealth all
 ud^avī tākī. Tyā-pās-na sag^ala kharchī-gayā Mang tyā
having-squandered was-thrown. him-near-of all was-spent Then that
 mulakh-war mōthā kāl padā Tyā-pāsīna tyā-lā mōthī yēlā padī Mang
country-in great famine fell. Therefore him-to great difficulty fell Then
 tō tyā mulakh-mā yēk gōhō-pān jāī rahīnā. Tyā gōhō-nī
he that country-in one man-to having-gone lived. That man-by
 tyā-lē āp^anā duk^aiā chāru-lā khēt-mā lāwā Taṭha duk^arā jī
him-to his-own swine to-feed into-field he-was-applied There the-swine which
 kāhī khāt tē khāī-san pēt bhar^awā asī tē-nī man-mā wanā
something ate that having-eaten belly should-be-filled so his mind-in came;
 wa kōnī kāhī tyā-lē dīdhā nahī. Mang tō sud-war ānā, wa
and by-any-one anything him-to was-given not Then he senses-on came, and
 man-mā mhanā-lē lāgā, ma-nā bās-nā ghar mōl^akarī gōhōs-lē kaśā
mind-in to-say began, my father's in-house servants people-to how
 pōṭh-bhar bhāk^arī mī^atī-sa, wa mā tē bhukyā maras Mā ātā ma-nā
belly-full bread obtained-is, and I then with-hunger die I now my
 bās-nā ghar jāīn wa tyā-lē mhan^asu, "aīē ma-nā bās, mī Dēw-nā
father-of house shall-go and him-to will-say, "O my father, by-me God-of
 samōr wa tu-nā samōr mōthā pāp kayā, mā tu-nā pōsā kāī nāī.
before and of-thee before great sin was-made, I thy son any-how am-not.

Pau mā lē tu-nā yēkhāndā majur'karā-ārkhā rākh." Anā man mā lēhyār
But in-to thy some-one servant-like keep " So in-mind thought
 kari'nī lē-kaḍa gayā. Tawādhā majhār tō dur-tin dēkh'tā-eh
having-made father-to be-went In the-moment-like him from-a-distance seeing-only
 lē-lā mayā ānī, ānī tyā-nī jāi'nī pōā mā gajā lā bligī
father-to pity come and him-by having-gone son-of the-neck to having-adhered
 paḍā wa tyā-nī gurjā līlī. Tawā tō pōā mhanu lā lāgā, bā,
fell, and he a his was-taken. Then that son to-say began, 'father
 mā Dēw-nā samār wa tu-nā samār mōḍhā pāp kar'nā. Āā mā tu-nā pōā
I God-of before and of-the before great sin made Am I thy son
 nahl." Maḥg lē-nī āp'nā yēk kamārā lā āhḡā kī, 'ghar-mā
was-not.' Then the-father-by him-own one servant to it-was told that 'house-in
 lēi kōḍh-kōḍh whawā tar tyā-lā khiwā-lā dē wa hāi mā yēkhāndī
something (if)-there-be then him-to to-let give; and the-hand in one
 mādī wa pāy-mā pāy-tan whawā tō ghālī dē maḥg āpāp
ring and the-feet-in alone (if)-there-be that having-put-on give, then so
 majā karu. Hāō mā nā pōā marī gayā, wa phir'nī jīwat
merriment shall-make This my son dead had-gone, and again alive
 jāyā; wa dāw'ā, tō mōḍ'nā." Tawā majā karu bī lāg'nā.
became; and had-been-told, he to-serve " Then merriment to-make also began

Tawā tu-nā wāḍlī pōā khetī mā whālā Tū ghar-kaḍō yēwā-lō lāgā
At-that-time he elder son field-in was He house to to-come began
 tadā tyā lō lēi wājā wa nēch āiku ānā Tādā majur'kar-
then him-to something music and dancing to-hear come Then the-servant-
 payā yēk jāu-lā tō lēhīru-lī lāg'nā, 'hāl gamant kas nī ha?'
from-coming one man-to he to-ask-also began 'this display-of joy what-of is?'
 Tawā majur'kar-nī tyā-lō āhḡā kī, 'tu nā bhāō wānā ha; ānī tō
Then the-servant by him-to it-was-told that 'thy brother come-is; and he
 lē-lā rukhā-mā'mānō yēi mī'nā mhanī'nī lē-nī mōḍhī jōw'nāwā
father-to ask-and-sound having-come met therefore father-by great a-feast
 kāl. Tawā tō rīgō bhār'nā wa ghar-mā kāl jāi'nā.
was-made Then he with-anger was-filled and house-in in-any-way would-not-go.
 Maḥg tō-nā lē tyā-lō bāhār yēi'nī sam jāwā-lō lāgā. Pan tyā nō
Then his father him-to out having-come to-entreat began But him-by
 lē-lā āhḡā kī, 'mī lī lā diwās tu nī chāk'rī kari'nī tu
father-to it-was-told that 'I so-many days thy service having-made (by) thee
 āḡōḡī lāyā nīkā, kadhlī tu-nā sabad mōḍā nahlī mā-lō
it had-been-told so it-was-heard ever thy word was-broken not; me-to
 mā-nā sōjā-barōḥar kadhlī māḡī karu didhlī nahlī; ānī tyā-nī tu-nī
my friends-with ever friendship to-make was-given not; and him-by thy
 māḡī dāulat kā'wāntī-nā ghar nālī (āki tō hā tu-nā
all properly harlots-of (in-)house having-wasted was-thrown that this thy

pōsā wanā tawal tyāsāthī mōṭhī jēw'nāwal kai ' Tawal bās tyā-lā
son came then him-for great a-feast is-made' Then the-father him-to
 mhanu lāgā, kī, 'tu ma-nā-jawal nēh'mī whatās wa hāi sag'li ām'dānī
to-say began, that, 'thou me-of-near always wast and this whole property
 tu-nī-ch sē, pan āpan sag'lā mīlas'nī majā karu, kāran
thine-alone is, but we all having-met-together merry let-us-make, because
 hāū tu-nā bhāū marī gayēl, tō phirī s'nī jīwat jāyā, wa
this thy brother having-died had-gone, he again alive became ; and
 daw'dēl, tō sāpad'nā '
had-been-lost, he is-found'

RANGĀRĪ

The Raṅgārīs or dyers of Berar speak a dialect which is related to Khāṇḍēśī. The dialect is not uniform but differs slightly in the various districts. Some Raṅgārīs have also abandoned their old speech and adopted the Marāṭhī used by their neighbours. Thus the specimens received from Ellichpur were written in Kōshī, a form of that language. It is, however, possible that some of the 250 speakers returned from that district use the same dialect as the Raṅgārīs of Akola, and the Ellichpur figures have therefore been added to the estimated number of speakers in the other districts.

The revised figures for Raṅgārī are as follows —

Akola	2,700
Ellichpur	250
Baldana	680
TOTAL	3,630

Two specimens of Raṅgārī will be found below. The first is a version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son received from Akola, and the second the beginning of a similar version forwarded from the Melkapur Taluka of District Buldana. The latter is not correct, and in some minor points it presents forms which differ from those used in the Akola specimen. The difference is, however, not important, and it is, therefore, possible to deal with both specimens conjointly.

Pronunciation—The pronunciation is mainly the same as in the Marāṭhī of Berar. Thus we find *ḍḍḍ* and *ḍḍyḍ*, an *eye* *is* and *cis* twenty etc. The palatals are transliterated *ch* *j* etc. It is, however, probable that they are really pronounced *ṣ* *ḍ* etc., as in Marāṭhī.

Nouns—The inflexion of nouns is mainly the same as in Gujarātī. Strong masculine bases end in *ō*, plural *ḍ*; strong feminine bases in *ī* plural *yḍ* and strong neuter bases in *u*. No instance is available of the plural of a strong neuter noun. Thus, *pōr'gō* son *pōr'gḍ* sons *pōr'gī*, daughter; *pōr'gyḍ* daughters *ḍḍu* gold. A suffix *ān* or *ānu* (as in Mālvī) is sometimes added in the plural thus, *mōl'karī-ānu-mḍ* to the labourers *chāḍk'rō-ānu-mḍ* to the servants. Compare the honorific pronoun *tḍ-ān*, he, in the second specimen. The Gujarātī plural suffix *ḍ* in *chāḍk'rō-ānu-mḍ* also occurs in *ḍḍp-ḍ-mḍ*, to father's.

The usual case-suffixes are, dative *nō na*; case of the agent *nē na*, *n* ablative *tī*, *tḍ* genitive *nō*, *nī*, *nu*; locative *mḍ mḍ*. Thus, *ḍḍp-nō*, *ḍḍp-na* to the father *ḍḍp-nḍ* by the father *ḍḍp-nḍ pḍs-tī*, from the father; *mḍnu-nō*, of a man; *gkar-mḍ*, in the house *pḍy-mḍ*, on the feet.

Pronouns—The following are the personal pronouns —

<i>mī</i> I	<i>tḍ</i> , thou	<i>tḍ</i> , he.
<i>ma-na</i> , me	<i>tu-na</i> , thee	<i>tḍnḍ tḍ-na</i> , him.
<i>mḍ-rō</i> my	<i>tḍ rō</i> thy	<i>tḍ-nḍ</i> his.
<i>ḍumhī</i> we	<i>tumhī</i> , you	<i>tḍ</i> , they
<i>ḍumḍrō</i> , our	<i>tumḍrō</i> , your	<i>tḍ-nḍ</i> , their.

Other forms are *myā*, by me ; *tē-na*, by him , *tamayē* (sic), to him , *tē-hun-na*, to them 'Who ?' is *kōn*, and 'what ?' is *kāy*

Verbs.—The present tense of the verb substantive is *sa* or *sē* in all persons and numbers The corresponding past tense is *hōtō*, fem. *hōtī*, neut *hōtu* The plural is *hōtā* or *hōtē*, etc

The present tense of finite verbs ends in *s* Thus, from *mār^anu*, to strike, we find,—

Sing 1. *mārus*
2. *māras*
3. *māras*

Plur 1. *mārus*
2. *māras, mārōs*
3. *māras*

The form *mārus*, I strike, is perhaps a honorific plural Forms such as *rahēs* and *rahīs*, I am, are used as well

The suffix of the past tense is *ī* or *ē* Thus, *gayē*, I, thou, or he, went , *gayā*, we, you, or they, went , *myā karē*, or *karī*, I did We also find forms such as *gaē-n*, he went , *padē-l*, it fell Compare Khāndēśī

A perfect and a pluperfect are formed from the past , thus, *sāp^adē-s*, he has been found , *gayē-tō*, I had gone.

The future of *mār^anu*, to strike, is inflected as follows —

Sing 1. *mārīs*
2. *mārīs*
3. *mār^aśī*

Plur 1. *mārūs, mār^asū*
2. *mār^asō*
3. *mār^aśī*

The imperative is formed as in Gujarātī Thus, *mār*, strike , *bas-ō*, sit ye

Conjunctive participles are formed by adding the suffixes *ī* (*ē*), *īn*, or *ī-san* Thus, *wātī*, having divided , *jāīn*, having gone , *uthī-san*, having arisen

For further details the specimens which follow should be consulted

[No. 70]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHĀNDEŚĪ.

SPECIMEN I.

RANGARĪ DIALECT

(DISTRICT AKOLA)

कोन एक मानुसन दोन बेटा होता । तेमा धाकटो बापन म्हने, बापो, जे जिन्दगीनो वाटो मना आवानु ते द । मग तेन तेहुनन पैसो वाटी दिधो । मगन थोडका दिवसमा धाकटो बेटो सर्वो जमाकरीन दूर सुलुकमा गये । आनि तय उधळपनान वागीन अपनी सपति उडाई । मग तेन अवधु खर्चा-वरी ते देसमा मोठो दुकाल पडे । ते-मुळे तेन अडचन पडवा लागी । तज्हा ते ते देसमा एक ग्रहस्थना याहान जाईन रहे । तेन तर तेन डकुंरा चारवान आपना शेतमा धाडी । तज्हा डकुंरा जे साल्टा खाता होता तेन-वर तेन आपली पोटा भरन असु तेन याटी । आनि कोन तेन काही दिधु नही । मंगन ते सुधमा आईन म्हने, मारा बापना किती मोलकरीहुनना भरपूर भाकरो स । आनि मी भुक्तीन मरेस । मी उठीन आपली बापना कडे जाईस, व तेनो म्हनीस, हे बापो, म्या देवना विरुध व तारो सोमोर पाप करीस ।

આજ પાનતિન તારો બેટો મનવાન જોયતો નહિ આપનો એક મોરુકરી સારસુ મન ઠેવ । નંતર તે સઠીન આપના બાપ-જાહે ગયે । તજ્ઞા તે મંબી સ રતજમા તેનો બાપ તેન સેજીન કર જાહે, આનિ તેન ધાર્જન તેના ગણમા મિઠી ધામ્મી, વ તેન મુલો સિસુ । મગ બેટો તેનો જુને બાપો જૈવના વિદ્યથ અન તારા સામને મ્યા પાપ કરીસ । આનિ આજ-પાનતિન તારો બેટો મનવાન મી યોમ્ય નહિ । પન બાપન આપના જાકરોજાનના સારી સત્તમ મરો બાપીન તેન ધામ્મો આનિ તેના જાતમા સુન્દી વ પાયમો જોહો ધાલો] । મગ આપન ધાર્જન પિરંન જરીલ જરુમ । જાણી જે મારો બેટો મરે જોતો તે ફિરીન જોતો જોયે વ જરપે જોતો, તે સાપહેસ । તજ્ઞા તે સર્વા આનંદ કરવા જામ્યા ।

તે જાહે તેનો મોઠો બેટો રીતમા જોતો । મગ તે આર્જન ઘર ધામ આયા વર તેન બાજો વ જાજ પાજે । તજ્ઞા જાકર માતીન એકન જનાર્જન તેન વિચારી જે જાય સ । તમયે તેન સાંગી કી તારો માર્ક આયે સ આનિ તારા બાપનો તિતે જુજામ મિમે, તેના-વરી તેન મોઠી વંગત કરી । તજ્ઞા તે રાગ મરીન આતમા જાયના । ધેના વરી તેનો બાપ જાફેર આર્જન તેન સમવાયન જાગી । પરતુ તેન બાપન સત્તર રેષુ કી, રેષુ, મી રતસે થરીસ તારી જાકરી કરેસ । આનિ તારી આજ્ઞા મ્યાં જાજી જી મોહી નહિ । તરી મ્યા આપના ગંઢીજાનના સંગ વયેન કરવાની જુબીન મન ગુન કદી રેખીતુ પિલ દેહ નહિ । આનિ જોન તારી મંપતિ કિજવન સંગ ધાર્જન ઢાલો તે જે તારો બેટો આયેસ તજ્ઞા તુન તેના] સાઠ મોઠી જવનાલ કરીસ । તજ્ઞા તેન મમી, બેટા તુ સદાર્ મારા સંગ સ આનિ મારી મારુ મહામત તારીચ સ । પરંતુ જરીલ વ આનંદ જરુત જે જલ જોતુ । જારન કી જે તારો માર્ક મરે જોતો તે ફિરીન જિતો જોયેલ વ જરપે જોતો તે સાપહેસ ।

[No 70.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHÄNDĒŚĪ.

SPECIMEN I.

RANGĀRĪ DIALECT

(DISTRICT AKOLA)

TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION.

Kōn ēk mānus-na dōn bētā hōtā Tē-mā dhāk^atō bāp-na mhanē,
Certain one man-to two sons were. Them-in the-younger father-to said,
 'bāpō, jē jind^agī-nō wātō ma-nā āwānu tē da' Mag tē-na tē-hun-na
'father, what property-of share me-to to-come that give' Then him-by to-them
 paisō wātī dīdhō Mangan thōd^akā diwas-mā dhāk^atō bētō
wealth having-divided was-given Then a-few days-in the-younger son
 sarwō jamā-kaiin dūr muluk-mā gayē Āni tatha udhal^apanān
all together-having-made a-far into-country went And there extravagance-with
 wāgīn ap^anī sampatti udāi Mag tē-na aw^aghu
having-behaved his-own wealth was-squandered. Then him-by all
 khaichā-warī tē dēs-mā mōthō dukāl padē Tē-mulē tē-na ad^achan
being-spent-on that country-in great famine fell That-owing-to him-to difficulty
 pad^awā lāgī Tawhā tē tē dēs-mā ēk grahastha-nā yāhān jāin
to-fall began. Then he that country-in one gentleman-of near having-gone
 rahē Tē-na tar tē-na dukkarā chār^awān āp^anā śēt-mā dhādī. Tawhā
lived Him-by also him pigs to-feed his-own field-into was-sent Then
 dukkarā jē sāl^atā khātā hōtā tēna-war tē-na āp^alō pōt bharan
swine which husks eating were that-upon him-by his-own belly should-be-filled
 asu tē-na wātī. Āni kōn tē-na kāhī dīdhu nahī Mangan
so him-to it-occurred. And by-any-one him-to anything was-given not Then
 tē sudh-mā āin mhanē, 'mārā bāp-nā kitī mōl^akarī-hun-nā
he senses-on having-come said, 'my father-from how-many servants-to
 bhar-pūi bhāk^arō sa. Āni mī bhuk-tin marēs. Mī uthin āp^alō
enough bread is And I hunger-from am-dying. I having-arisen my-own
 bāp-nā-kadē jāis, wa tē-nō mhanīs, "hē bāpō, myā Dēw-nā virudh
father-of-near will-go, and him-to-also shall-say, "O father, by-me God-of against
 wa tārō sōmōr pāp karīs, āj-pās-tin tārō bētō man^awān jōg^atō nahi,
and of-thee before sin is-made; to-day-from thy son to-be-called fit am-not,
 āp^anō ēk mōl^akarī sār^akhu ma-na thēw'' Nantar tē uthin āp^anā
thy-own one servant like me-to keep'' Then he having-arisen his-own
 bāp-kadē gayē. Tawhā tē lambō sa itak-mā tē-nō bāp tē-na dēkhin
father-to went Then he far is mean-while his father him having-seen
 kar^awalē, āni tē-na dhāin tē-nā galā-mā muthī ghālī wa
is-moved, and him-by having-run him-of on-the-neck embracing was-put and

ū-na mutō kōhu. Mag bēṣo tō-nō mhanō, 'bāpō, Dēw nā virudh
 him-by a-kiss was-taken. Then the-son him-to said 'father, God-of against
 an ūrā sīm'nō myā pāp karā. Ani āp-pā tin tārō bēṣo man'wān
 and of-thee before by-me sin was-made And to-day from thy son to-be-called
 mī yūgya nahī.' I'an bāp-na āp'nā chāk'rō-bhān-nā sāgī "uttam
 I fit am-not' But the-father-by his-own servants-to it-was-told "excellent
 jhagō ānā ū-na ghālō; āpī tō-nā hāt mā mundi, wa pāy mō
 robe having-brought him to put; and of him hand-on a ring and foot-on
 jōṣ ghālō Mag āpan khālā pīlā harik karā. Kā kī
 a-shoe put Then we having-taken having-drunk rejoicing shall make For,
 hō mārō bēṣo mārō bōṭā, tē phirīn jītō bōyē; wa har'pō hōṭō, tō
 this my son dead was he again alive became and lost was he
 āp'pā. Tawhā tō warwā ānand karwā lāgyā.
 to-found.' Then they all joy to-make began

Tē-tē tō-nō mājhō bēṣo āt-mā bōṭā. Mag tō ān
 At-that-time his elder son field-in was Then he having-come
 ghar pō āyā war ū-na bāṣo wa nāch pāhō. Tawhā
 house-ward having-come-on him-by music and dancing was-seen. Then
 chāṭar-mī-tin āk na bālān ūna vicārī, 'hō kāy sa?'
 servants-in from one-to having-called him to it-was-asked this what is?'
 Tamayā ū-na sāgī kī 'tārō bhāl āyē an ānī tārī bāp-nō tō
 To him him-by it-was-told that, thy brother come is and thy father-to he
 khūāl mīlā tēnā warī ū-na mājhī pāghat karī.' Tawhā tō rāg-bhārīn
 safe was-got therefore him-by great a-feast was-made' Then he becoming-angry
 āt mā jīy nā. Yēnā-warī ū-nō bāp bāhēr ān tō-na sam'jāyan
 inside would-not-go This-for his father out having-come him to-entreat
 lāgi. Parantu ū-na bāp-na uttar dēḍhu kī 'dēkbō, mī it'kō
 began. But him-by father-to reply was-given that see I so-many
 warā tārī chāk'rī karā, ānī tārī ādnyā myā kadbi-hī mōḍī nahī; tārī
 years thy service do, and thy order by-me ever was-broken not still
 myā āp'nā gaḍī hun mā-māga chayēn karwānī mhanān mā-na
 by-me my-own friends-of-with merriment should-be-made having-said me-to
 tu mā kadī ālī nu pīlā dēḍhu nahī. Ani jō-na tārī sampattī
 thee-by ever the-goal-of young-one was-given not And whom-by thy property
 kīṭhan-sāg khālā (ākl tō hō tārō bēṣo āyē, tawhā ū-na
 hostile-with having-taken was-thrown that this thy son come-is then thee-by
 tō-nā ālha mājhī jaw'nāl karā.' Tawhā tō-na mānī bēṣā, tō sadāl
 him-of for great a-feast made-is' Then him-by it was-said 'son, thou always
 mārā sāg sa, āpī mārī mā malāmat tārī-ch sa. Parantu harik wa
 of-me with art, and my property thine-alone is But merriment and
 ānand kar'nu hō warwā bōṭu; kārap kī hō tārō bhāl mārō bōṭō, tō
 joy to-make this better was; because that this thy brother dead was, he
 phirīn jītō bōyē; wa har'pō hōṭō, tō āp'pā.
 again alive become-is; and lost was he to-found

[No. 71.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

KHĀNDEŚĪ.

SPECIMEN II.

RANGĀRĪ DIALECT.

(DISTRICT BULDANA)

कोन एक दोन पोरगा होता । दोन जना-मनि लहानो बापनो म्हनस, बाबा, मारो हिस्सो द । म्हनून बापने जिनगी दोन्हीन वाटून दिली । थोडा दिवस ते लहानो आपली जिनगी लेईन दुसऱ्या गाव गएन । याती गए आपली जिनगी चनती उडाई । या रितिती पैसो खर्च होए मग मोठो काय पडे । काय पडेल तेनाती मोठी खावानी पंचाईत पडी । मगन दुसऱ्यान घर जाईन रहे । तेन डुकर, राखान ठेई । तेजान तेन डुकरन कोडो खाईन हेस कोडो देतो त खुषीन खादो असतो । पन तेन ते ही देदो नाहीं । येना-ती डोया उघडया तेन्हा आपुन म्हनेस । आपला बाप जवळ नौकर स तेना जवळ पैसा उरीन पुरसी । मी याज्जान उपासी मरी रहिस । त आतां बापा-कडे जाईन म्हनूस बाबा देवना आणि तारो फार अपराध करे । मी तारी पोरगो असल्या-वर लेवानो दयो रहे नहि । तू आपलो मजूर सारखो वागाळ । असो विचार करीन आपला बाप-कडे आये । ते आवताना बापना दूर-ती देखे । तेन दया आई आपला पोरगाना गया-मा ज्ञात घाले व तेन सुको लेदो ॥

TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION

hān-ek dōn pōr-gā bōhā. Dān-jān-mani lahānō bāp-nō mhanāa,
Certain two sons were Two-men-among the-younger the-father-to said
 'tāhā, māro hīwā da. Alhānūn bāp-nō jin'gi dōnhī na
'father, my share give' Therefore the-father-by property both to
 wāhūn dīl. Thōjā dīwā tō lahānō āp'lī jin'gi
having-divided was-given. A few days-in that younger his-own property
 kīn dūryā gāw gān. Lāhī gāb āp'lī jin'gi
having-taken another to-town went There having-gone his-own property
 chān-ī uqīl. Yā rīlī lī pālō khārō hōe māg
pleasure-with was-wasted This way-in money spent having-become then
 mōhō kīy pōf kīy pōf lī tēn-ī mōhī khīwā nī pālōhāt
a-great famine fell Famine had fallen on-that-account great eating-of difficulty
 pōf. Māhgan dūryā na ghar jīn rahō. Tē-na dukar rakhān
fell Then another's house having-gone he-lierd. Him-by means to-feed
 bōl. Tē-hīn tē-na dukar na kōpō khīn hēn kōpō dēō
was-kept He him-to receive-by hanks having-eaten such hanks if-had given
 tā khūhī na khāō arō. Pan tē-na tē-hī dēō nāhī
then gladness-with eaten would-have-been. But him-to that-even was-given not
 Yēn-ī dōyā ughāyā. Tōhā āpan mhanā, āp'lā bāp-jawā
Therefore eyes were-opened Then he(himself) said my-own father-near
 nākar nā, tē-nā-jawā pālō urī purāl. Mī yāhān
arrange are, them-near money having-been-spared will-be-enough I here
 upāī māī-rahō. Tā kī bāp-kaqō jān mhanā, "bābā, Dōw-nā
hungry am-dying So now father-to having-gone shall-say "father God-of
 kōī tārō pāh arādīh karō. Mī tārō pōr-gō arīyā-war lōwā nō dayō
and thy great fault I-did I thy son being-on taking-of fit
 rahō nāhī. Tū āp'lō majār ar'kō wāgī ' ' Aō wīhār karīn
am not Thou thy-own a-labourer like treat ' So thought having-made
 āp'lā bāp kaqō āyā. Tō āwtānā bāp-nā dūr-ī dākā, tē-na
his-own father-to came He while-coming the-father-by far-from was-seen, him-to
 dayā āī, āp'lā pōr-gā nā gayā mā hāt ghālō wā tē-na mukō
ply came, his-own son-of on-the-neck hand was put and him to kiss
 lēdā.
 was-taken.

STANDARD LIST OF WORDS AND

English	Bhili (Mahikanttha)	Bhili (Edar)	Bāori (Lahore).
1 One . . .	Ēk . . .	Ēk . . .	Ēk . . .
2 Two . . .	Bē . . .	Bē . . .	Bai . . .
3 Three . . .	Tēn, or tan . . .	Tan . . .	Trēn . . .
4 Four . . .	Syār, or éyar . . .	Syār . . .	Chār . . .
5 Five . . .	Pōs, pās . . .	Pōs . . .	Pāch . . .
6 Six . . .	Sō . . .	Sō . . .	Chhau . . .
7 Seven . . .	Hāt . . .	Hāt . . .	Khāt . . .
8 Eight . . .	Āth . . .	Āth . . .	Āth . . .
9 Nine . . .	Nōw, naw . . .	Nōw . . .	Nauw . . .
10 Ten . . .	Dōh, dah . . .	Dah, dōh . . .	Daukh . . .
11 Twenty . . .	Viḥ, vi . . .	Viḥ, vi . . .	Vikh . . .
12 Fifty . . .	Adhi viḥ, sāliḥ nē dōh, pasāḥ . . .	Adhi dōh, sāliḥ nē dōh . . .	Pañjāh . . .
13 Hundred . . .	Hō, pōs viḥū . . .	Hō . . .	Khan . . .
14 I . . .	Hū . . .	Hū . . .	Hū . . .
15 Of me . . .	Mārō . . .	Mārō, (-ri, -rū) . . .	Mhārō, mārō . . .
16 Mine . . .	Mārō . . .	Mārō, (-ri, -rū) . . .	Mhārō, mārō . . .
17 We . . .	Amā, amē, āpādā . . .	Amē, amē . . .	Hamē . . .
18 Of us . . .	Amārō . . .	Amārō, (-ri, -rū) . . .	Hamārō . . .
19 Our . . .	Amārō . . .	Amārō, (-ri, -rū) . . .	Hamārō . . .
20 Thou . . .	Tū . . .	Tū . . .	Tau, tū . . .
21 Of thee . . .	Tārō, thārō . . .	Tārō, thārō, (-ri, -rū) . . .	Tāhārō, tārō . . .
22 Thine . . .	Tārō, thārō . . .	Tārō, thārō, (-ri, -rū) . . .	Tāhārō, tārō . . .
23 You . . .	Tamā, tamē, tamō . . .	Tamā, tamō . . .	Tamē, tamhē . . .
24 Of you . . .	Tamārō . . .	Tamārō, (-ri, -rū) . . .	Tamāhārō . . .
25 Your . . .	Tamārō . . .	Tamārō, (-ri, -rū) . . .	Tamāhārō . . .

SENTENCES IN BHILI AND KHÄNDESI

Khds-MR (Khondak).	Kuy-MR (Khondak).	English.
Rk	Rk	1. One.
Dën	Dën	2. Two.
Tin	Tin	3. Three.
Chär	Chär	4. Four.
Päsh	Päsh	5. Five.
Few ähla	Fah	6. Six.
Sat	Sat	7. Seven.
Äph	Äph	8. Eight.
Xat	Xat	9. Nine.
Dat	Dat	10. Ten.
Vin	Is	11. Twenty.
Tuante, parhla	Tuante	12. Fifty.
Sat, number	Samhar	13. Hundred.
Mi	Mi	14. I.
Ma-na	Ma-na	15. Of us.
Ma-na	Ma-na	16. Mine.
Am, Apen	Äpen	17. We.
Am-na	Am-na	18. Of us.
Am-na	Am-na	19. Our.
Tä	Tä	20. Thou.
Tu-na	Tu-na	21. Of thee.
Tu-na	Tu-na	22. Thine.
Tam	Tamki	23. You.
Tam-na	Tam-na	24. Of you.
Tam-na	Tam-na	25. Your.

English.	Bhīlī (Mahkauthe)	Bhīlī (Edar)	Bāorī (Lahore)
26 He . .	Vi, wō, ī, pēlō	Pēlō, vi, wō	Pēllō, yōh, tiō . . .
27 Of him . .	(W)anā nō, (v)ī-nō, pēlā-nō	I-nō, vē-nō, wanā nō, anā-nō	Pēllā-nō, inhō, ih ^a nō, tinnō
28 His .	(W)anā-nō, (v)ī-nō, pēlā-nō	I-nō, vē-nō, wanā-nō, anā-nō	Pēllā-nō, inhō, ih ^a nō, tinnō
29 They . .	Wā, f vi, pēlā .	Pēlā, wā	Tē, tēhē . .
30 Of them . .	Wanā-nō, pēlā-nō	Wanā-nō, pēlā-nō	Tēhō-nō, tihō nō
31 Their	Wanā-nō, pēlā-nō	Wanā-nō, pēlā-nō	Tēhō-nō, tihō-nō
32 Hand .	Hāth	Hāth .	Hāth
33 Foot .	Pōg, pag	Pōg	Godā .
34 Nose . .	Nāk, nakhōrū	Nāk, nakhōrū	Nāk .
35 Eye . .	Ākh, ōkh .	Ākh, ōkh	Akh .
36 Mouth . .	Mōdū, mudū	Mudū, mōdū, (mudhū, mōdhū)	Bālō . . .
37 Tooth	Dāt, dōt .	Dāt, dōt .	Dāt .
38 Ear .	Kān, kōn	Kan, kōn .	Kān
39 Hair .	Wāl, latsyā	Wāl	Khekh .
40 Head . .	Mūd, māthū	Mūd, māthū	Mōd . . .
41 Tongue .	Jib	Jibh	Jib
42 Belly . .	Pēt, ōjh ^a rū	Pēt .	Ōj ^a rō .
43 Back	Būdi, wōhō	Būdi, bōsō, bōdō	Maur, dhōgō .
44 Iron .	Lōarū, lōdū	Lōarū, lōdū	Loh ^a rō .
45 Gold .	Hōnū .	Hōnū	Khōnō .
46 Silver .	Rupū .	Rupū .	Chād .
47 Father . . .	Āto, bāp, bā, dādō .	Āto, bā, bāp, dādō	Agō
48 Mother . .	Āi, mā .	Āi, mā . .	Āi .
49 Brother . .	Bhāl .	Phāl	Bhāl . . .
50 Sister . .	Bāl, bun, bōn .	Bāl, bun, bōn . . .	Balb ^a n . . .
51 Man . . .	Ād ^a mi . . .	Ād ^a mi . . .	Manukhō . . .
52 Woman . . .	Baurī, lāgāl	Baurū, lāgāl .	Man ^a si . . .

Khanduk (Khanduk).	Kapidi (Khanduk).	Engl.
To	To	26. He.
Ti-an, tyi-an	Tyi-an	27. Of him.
Ta-an, tyi-an	Tyi-an	28. His.
To	Tyi, ti	29. They
Tyi-an, tyi-an	Tyi-an	30. Of them
Tyi-an, tyi-an	Tyi-an	31. Their.
Hai	Hai	32. Head
Fai, fai	Fai	33. Feet.
Kai	Kai	34. Nose
Fai, fai	Fai	35. Eye.
Tai, tai	Tai	36. Mouth.
Dai	Dai	37. Tooth.
Kai	Kai	38. Ear
Kai	Kai	39. Hair
Fai, fai	Fai	40. Head.
Jai	Jai	41. Tongue
Fai, fai	Fai	42. Belly
Fai, fai	Fai	43. Back.
Lai, lai	Lai	44. Iron.
Fai	Fai	45. Gold.
Fai, fai	Fai	46. Silver
Fai	Fai	47. Father
Mai, ai, mai	Mai	48. Mother
hai	Hai	49. Brother
Bai, bai	Bai	50. Sister
Mai, mai	Mai	51. Man.
Mai	Mai	52. Woman.

English.	Bhili (Mahikantha)	Bhili (Edar)	Bhōri (Lahore)
53 Wife . . .	Bari . . .	Bairũ, oral . . .	Bāwan . . .
54 Child . . .	Sorũ, sayũ . . .	Sorũ, sayũ	Ohhō
55 Son . . .	Sorō, sayō, dikrō	Sorō, sayō, dik*rō . . .	Dik*rō
56 Daughter . . .	Sorī, dikrī . . .	Sorī, dik*rī . . .	Dik*rī, ohhōrī . . .
57. Slave	,	Molō hdhō
58 Cultivator . . .	Kamānyō . . .	Kamānyō . . .	Hal-wāh . . .
59 Shepaerd . . .	Guwāl	Guwāl	Ur*nā-chār
60 God	Bhag*wān . . .	Bhag*wān . . .	Rabb
61 Devil . . .	Bhūt, palit . . .	Bhūt, palit . . .	<u>K</u> batān
62. Sun	Dan-bāw*si, huraḡ	Dan, huraḡ . . .	Dann
63 Moon	Sādamā, sādō-bāw*si . . .	Sādamā . . .	Chand
64 Star . . .	Tārō . . .	Tārō . . .	Tārō
65 Fire . . .	Āg, wāhadi	Āg, wāhadi	Āg
66 Water . . .	Pōṇi . . .	Pōni . . .	Pāni
67 House . . .	Ghēr, gēr, khēr . . .	Ghēr, gēr, khēr . . .	Ghar
68 Horse . . .	Ghōdō, khōrō . . .	Ghōdō, khōrō . . .	Ghōrō
69 Cow	Tāhi, tāhō, gāy	Gāy, tāhō, tāhi	Gāō
70 Dog . . .	Kut*rũ . . .	Kut*rũ . . .	Lupdiō
71 Cat	Mēn*ko, minō . . .	Mēn*ko, minō . . .	Min*ki
72 Cock . . .	Kuk*rũ	Kuk*rō	Kūk*ṛō
73 Duck . . .	Batck	Batck	Bakt
74 Ass	Gadērũ, khollũ	Gadērũ, khollũ . . .	Gadō
75 Camel . . .	Ūtũ, ūt . . .	Ūtũ, ūt . . .	Aũth
76. Bird . . .	Pākhi, pakhi . . .	Pākhi, pākhi . . .	Chik*liũ
77 Go . . .	Jā . . .	Jā . . .	Jā
78 Fat . . .	Khā . . .	Khā	Khāḡ-lō
79 S . . .	Bah	Bah	Besl-jā

Khadak (Khadak).	Koyak (Khadak).	English.
Bil, awari, bil'is	Kawri	53. Wife.
Por chik'is	Por	54. Child.
Ap'ar chik'is	Ap'ar	55. Son.
Ap'ar jay'i	Ap'ar	56. Daughter.
Chitar gellin	Gellin	57. Slave.
Kis'ik, khar'wal	Khar'wal	58. Cultivator.
Dy'it, dhar'gar	Dhar'gar	59. Shepherd.
Daw	I'tw	60. God.
Kilabaz, kil'it	Kilim	61. Devil.
S'ay'a	S'ay'a	62. Sun.
Chad	Chad	63. Moon.
Chad'a, chad'ay'i	Chad'a	64. Star.
Vidaw	Inta	65. Fire.
P'ad	P'ad	66. Water.
Ghar	Ghar	67. House.
Ghar'a	Ghar'a	68. Horse.
Gai	Giy	69. Cow.
Katra	Katra	70. Dog.
Maj'ar, lil'aj'i	Mil'ar	71. Cat.
Kam'aj'i	Kam'aj'i	72. Cock.
Badak	Badak	73. Duck.
Gad'ha'a	Gad'ha'a	74. Ass.
U'i	U'i: kay	75. Camel.
Pak'ra, pak'it	Pak'ra	76. Bird.
Ja	Ja	77. Go.
Kha	Kha	78. Eat.
Bajh, kula	Bajh	79. Sit.

English	Bhili (Mabikantha)	Bhili (Edar)	Bāori (Lahore)
80 Come . . .	Āw .	Āw . . .	Āvi-jā . . .
81 Beat . . .	Mār, kut . .	Mār, kut . . .	Mār .
82 Stand . . .	Up, ubā thā	Up, ubā thā . . .	Ubhō thāi-jā . . .
83 Die . . .	Mar, gudar .	Mar, gudar . . .	Mar
84 Give . . .	Āl, dī .	Āl, dī . . .	Dē
85 Run . . .	Thām, dōd	Thām, dōd . . .	Nasī-jā
86 Up	Upar, upēr, māthē .	Upar, upēr, māthē . .	Ūpar
87 Near . . .	Kanē, pāhē	Kanē, pāhē . . .	Harō
88 Down . . .	Hēthē	Hēthē	Hithō
89 Far . . .	Sētū, vēg ^a lū, dūr .	Kanēhē, sētū, vēg ^a lū .	Vēg ^a lō
90 Before . . .	Pāhē, āgal . . .	Pāhē, āgal . . .	Āgal
91 Behind . . .	Wōhē, pūthan, pasādi	Wōhē, pūthan, pasādi .	Kēpē
92 Who	Kuṇ, kōṇ . . .	Kuṇ, kōṇ	Kaun
93 What	Ḥū	Ḥū	Khō, khū, hō, hū . .
94. Why . . .	Kim	Kim, kēm, ḥū kar ^a wā .	Sē
95 And	Nō, anō	Nō anō	Thār, tē
96 But	Puṇ, pōṇ	Pan, anō	Par
97 If	Jō	Jō	Jē
98 Yes	Hōvē, hū-kū . . .	Hā kū, hōvō	Havō
99 No	Ūhū, nahī, nā . .	Ūhū, nahī, nā	Nū
100 Alas	Arō Rām, hūy-hāy .	Arō Rām, hāy hāy, arērō .	Loh ^a ṛō
101 A father ? . .	Āto, bāp	Āto	Āgō
102 Of a father . .	Ātā-nō	Ātā-nō, (-nī, -nū) . . .	Āgā-nō
103 To a father . .	Ātā-nē, ātā-ō . . .	Ātā-nē	Āgā-nū
104 From a father .	Ātā-ḥū, ātā-kauē-thī	Ātā-ḥū	Āgā-kannō
105 Two fathers . .	Bē ātā	Bē ātā	Bai āgā
106 Fathers	Āta	Ātā	Ghanā āgā

Khà-dét (Khà-dét).	Khà-dét (Khà-dét).	English.
Yà	Yà	80. Come.
Mà	Mà	81. Doat.
Ukhà khà	Ukh	82. Stand.
Mà	Mà	83. Die.
Dà	Dà	84. Give.
Fal, daf	Fay	85. Run.
Wà	Wà	86. Up.
Xà, khà, pà	Jaway jà	87. Near.
Khà	Khà	88. Down.
Dà	Dà	89. Far.
Suà, pà	Suà, pà	90. Before.
Mà, pà, khà	Mà, khà; mào, gào	91. Behind.
Kà	Kà	92. What.
Ki	Ki	93. What.
Kà, khà	Ki-mi-tà	94. Why.
À, khà, wà	À	95. And.
Fà	Fà	96. But.
Jà	Jà	97. If.
Hà, khà	Wà	98. Yes.
Kà, khà	Khà	99. No.
À	À	100. Also.
Bà	Bà	101. A father.
Bà-pà	Bà-pà	102. Of a father.
Bà-pà, khà-pà	Bà-pà	103. To a father.
Bà-pà, khà-pà, khà-pà	Bà-pà	104. From a father.
Dà, khà	Dà, khà	105. Two fathers.
Bà	Bà	106. Fathers.

Khé-mé (Khé-mé).	Ké-pé (Khé-mé).	Ké-pé.
Bé-pa	Bé-pa-né	107 Of fathers.
Bé-pé	Bé-pé-lé	108 To fathers.
Bé-pa-jou-té	Bé-pa-pa	109 From fathers.
Pé (ché-ké)	Á-pé	110 A daughter.
Pé-pa	Á-pé-né	111 Of a daughter.
Pé-pé	Á-pé-lé	112 To a daughter.
Pé-pa-jou-té	Á-pé-pa	113 From a daughter.
Deu pé (ché-ké)	Deu Á-pé	114 Two daughters.
Pé (ché-ké)	Á-pé	115 Daughters.
Pé-pa	Á-pé-né	116 Of daughters.
Pé-pé	Á-pé-lé	117 To daughters.
Pé-pa-jou-té	Á-pé-pa	118 From daughters.
Ché-gé mé-té	Mé-té mé-té	119 A good man.
Ché-gé mé-té-pa	Mé-té mé-té-né	120 Of a good man.
Ché-gé mé-té-lé	Mé-té mé-té-lé	121 To a good man.
Ché-gé mé-té-jou-té	Mé-té mé-té-pa	122 From a good man.
Deu ché-gé mé-té	Deu Mé-té mé-té	123 Two good men.
Ché-gé mé-té	Mé-té mé-té	124 Good men.
Ché-gé mé-té-pa	Mé-té mé-té-né	125 Of good men.
Ché-gé mé-té-lé	Mé-té mé-té-lé	126 To good men.
Ché-gé mé-té-jou-té	Mé-té mé-té-pa	127 From good men.
Ché-gé té	Mé-té mé-té-mé-té	128 A good woman.
Ké-té pé	Deu pé-gé ; agun-gé	129 A bad boy.
Ché-gé té	Mé-té té-gé-mé-té	130 Good women.
Ké-té pé	Deu pé-gé ; agun-gé	131 A bad girl.
Ché-gé	Ché-gé	132 Good.
Té-mé ché-gé (better than that).	Deu ché-gé	133 Better.

English.	Bhili (Mahikantha)	Bhili (Edar)	Bāori (Lahōrō)
134. Best . . .	Kharā-mā kharā . . .	Kharā-mā kharā . . .	Balāh changō . . .
135 High . . .	Ūsū . . .	Usū . . .	Ūchō . . .
136 Higher . . .	Warhē ūsū . . .	Warhē ūsū . . .	Inē-thō ūchō . . .
137. Highest . . .	Badhāhē ūsū . . .	Badhāhē ūsū . . .	Balāh ūchō . . .
138 A horse . . .	Khōrō, khōrū . . .	Khōrō, khōrū . . .	Ēk ghōrō . . .
139 A mare . . .	Khōrī . . .	Khōrī . . .	Ēk ghōrī . . .
140. Horses . . .	Khōrā, khōrā . . .	Khōrā, khōrā . . .	Ghanā khārā ghōrā
141 Mares . . .	Khōrī(-yō) . . .	Khōrīyō . . .	Ghanī khārī ghōrī . . .
142 A bull . . .	Kāti, baḷadiyō, ṭāhō	Kāti, baḷadiyō, ṭāhō . . .	Ēk dhaṭṭō . . .
143 A cow . . .	Ṭāhē, tāhī, gāy . . .	Ṭāhē . . .	Ēk gāē . . .
144 Bulls . . .	Kāṭi, baḷad, ṭāhā . . .	Kāti . . .	Ghanā khārā dhaṭṭō . . .
145 Cows . . .	Tāhī(-yō) , gāi(-yō) . . .	Ṭāhē . . .	Ghanī khārī gāē . . .
146 A dog . . .	Kut ^a rō, kut ^a rū . . .	Kut ^a ro, Kut ^a rū . . .	Ēk lundīō . . .
147 A bitch . . .	Kut ^a rī . . .	Kut ^a rī . . .	Ēk laudan . . .
148 Dogs . . .	Kut ^a rā, kut ^a rā . . .	Kut ^a rā, kut ^a rā . . .	Ghanā khārā lundīā . . .
149 Bitches . . .	Kut ^a rī(-yō) . . .	Kut ^a riyō . . .	Ghanī khārī laud ^a nē . . .
150 A he-goat . . .	Bukariyō, tētō, wādariyō	Bukariyō, tētō, wādariyō . . .	Ēk bāk ^a rō . . .
151 A female goat . . .	Bākari, sāli, tūhī . . .	Bākari, sāli, tūhī . . .	Ēk bāk ^a ri . . .
152. Goats . . .	Bukariyā, tētā, wādariyā	Bukariyā . . .	Ghanā khārā bāk ^a rā . . .
153 A male deer . . .	Hannō . . .	Hannō . . .	Ēk har ^a n . . .
154 A female deer . . .	Hannī . . .	Hannī . . .	Ēk har ^a nī . . .
155 Deer . . .	Hannā . . .	Hannā . . .	Har ^a nō . . .
156 I am . . .	Hū hū . . .	Hū hū . . .	Hū sō . . .
157 Thou art . . .	Tū hē . . .	Tū hē . . .	Taū sai . . .
158 He is . . .	Vi hē . . .	Vi hē . . .	Yōh sai . . .
159 We are . . .	Amā hū (or haīyē) . . .	Amē hū, (or haīyē) . . .	Hamē saū, sō . . .
160 You are . . .	Tamū hō . . .	Tamē hō . . .	Tamē sō . . .

Khondok (Khondok).	Kuy'idā (Khondok).	Englsh.
Ami	Bto	134. Best.
Uch	Uchch	135. High.
Miya uch	Haku uchch	136. Higher.
Phu-mi uoyā tch	Lai uchch	137. Highest.
Ghaḥa	Ghaḥa	138. A horse.
Ghaḥi	Ghaḥi	139. A mare.
Ghaḥa, ghaḥi	Ghaḥa	140. Horses.
Ghaḥya	Ghaḥya	141. Mares.
Bali	Dhaḥya	142. A bull.
Gai	Gai	143. A cow.
Ḥaḥi	Diapḥa	144. Bulla.
Giyā	Gai	145. Cows.
Katā	Katā	146. A dog.
Katā	Katā	147. A black.
Katā, katā	Katā	148. Dogs.
Katya	Katya	149. Bitches.
Bakaḥ	Bakaḥ	150. A hog-pig.
Bakā	Bakā	151. A female goat.
Bakḥa	Bakḥa; bakḥya	152. Goats.
Chāḥa, harā	Kai	153. A male deer.
Harā, harā	Harā	154. A female deer.
Harā	Harā	155. Deer.
Mi an (or aḥ)	Mi ā	156. I am.
Tā an (aḥ)	Tā ā	157. Thou art.
To an (aḥ)	To ā	158. He is.
Ham an (or ha aḥa)	Amhā ātin	159. We are.
Tam an (or aḥa)	Tamhā ātin	160. You are.


English.	Phili (Mahikantha)	Bhili (Edar).	Bāori (Lahore)
161 They are . .	Wā hē (or hē) .	Wā hē . .	Tē saī . .
162. I was .	Hū atō .	Hū atō	Hū uttō . .
163 Thou wast . .	Tū atō .	Tū atō .	Taū uttō .
164 He was . . .	Vi atō .	Vi atō .	Yōh uttō
165 We were .	Amā atā .	Amā atā .	Hamā uttā .
166 You were	Tamā atā	Tamā atā	Tamā uttā .
167 They were. .	Wā atā (<i>fem vi atī</i>)	Wā atā	Tē uttā . .
168 Be .	Hō	Hō .	Thāi-jā . .
169 To be . .	Hōwū .	Hōwū .	Thānō . .
170. Being .	Hōtā . .	Hōtā .	Thāi
171 Having been	Hōinē . .	Hōinē .	Thāi-kē .
172 I may be	Hū hōū, hū ugū .	Hū hōū, hū ugū . .	
173 I shall be .	Hū hōih, hū ahjē .	Hū hōih, hū ahjē	Hōis . .
174 I should be . .	Hū hōih, hū ugēk	Hū hōih	
175 Beat .	Kut, mār	Mār, or kut (<i>and so throughout</i>)	Mār .
176 To beat . .	Kut ^a wū, mār ^a wū .	Mār ^a wū . . .	Mār ^a nō
177 Beating .	Kut ^a tā, mār ^a tā .	Mār ^a tā . .	Mār ^a tō .
178 Having beaten	Kutinē, mār ^a nē	Mār ^a nē . .	Mār ^a m . .
179 I beat	Hū mārū (-hū)	Hū mārū-hū . .	Hū mārō .
180 Thou beatest .	Tū mārō (-hē)	Tū mārō-hē .	Taū mārō . .
181 He beats	Vi mārō (-hē)	Vi mārō-hē . .	Yōh mārō
182 We beat . .	Amā mārū (-hā), amā mār ^a yēh	Amā mār ^a yēh .	Hamā mārō .
183 You beat	Tamā mārō (-hō) .	Tamā mārō-hō	Tamā mārō . .
184 They beat . .	Wā mārō (hē) . .	Wā mārō-hē . .	Tēhō mārō . . .
185 I beat (<i>Past Tense</i>) .	Mō mār ^a yyū (<i>or mār^ayū, or mārū, and so throughout</i>)	Mō mārū (<i>or mār^ayū</i>)	Mī mārō .
186 Thou beatest (<i>Past Tense</i>)	Tē mār ^a yyū .	Tē mārū .	Tī mārō . .
187 He beat (<i>Past Tense</i>) .	Wapō mār ^a yyū .	Wapō mārū .	Pēllō mārō . .

Bhāṣā (Kāśī)	Kyāṣā (Kāśī)	English
Tā na (or tyā nāṇa)	Tyā nāṇa	161. They are.
Mī nāṇa (or hāṇa)	Mī nāṇa	162. I was.
Tā nāṇa (or hāṇa)	Tā nāṇa	163. Thou wast.
Tā nāṇa (or hāṇa)	Tā nāṇa	164. He was.
Ham nāṇa (ām hāṇa)	Āmāṇ nāṇa	165. We were.
Tem nāṇa (tām hāṇa)	Temāṇ nāṇa	166. You were.
Tā nāṇa (tyā hāṇa)	Tyā nāṇa	167. They were.
Āa	Āa	168. Be.
Ā-a-a	Ā-a-a	169. To be.
Hāṇā (hā)	Hāṇa ; hāṇa	170. Being
Āṇa	Āṇa-a-a ; whāṇā	171. Having been.
Māṇ aṇa (mā hāṇa)	Mī whāṇ	172. I may be
Māṇ aṇa (mā hāṇa)	Mī hāṇ	173. I shall be
Māṇ aṇa (mā hāṇā-ch)	Mī-whāṇ	174. I should be
Māṇ	Māṇ	175. Beat.
Māṇa	Māṇa	176. To beat.
Māṇā	Māṇa	177. Beating
Māṇāṇ	Māṇa-māṇ	178. Having beaten.
Māṇ māṇāṇ	Mī māṇa	179. I beat.
Tā māṇāṇ	Tā māṇa	180. Thou beatest.
Tā māṇāṇ	Tā māṇa	181. He beats.
Ham māṇāṇ (ām māṇāṇ)	Āmāṇ māṇāṇ	182. We beat.
Tem māṇāṇ (tām māṇāṇ)	Temāṇ māṇāṇ	183. You beat.
Tā māṇāṇ (tyā māṇāṇ)	Tyā māṇāṇ	184. They beat.
Māṇ māṇāṇ (mā māṇ)	Mī māṇa	185. I beat (Past Tense).
Tā-mā māṇāṇ (tā māṇ)	Tā māṇa	186. Thou beatest (Past Tense).
Tā māṇāṇ (tyā māṇ)	Tyā-mā māṇa	187. He beat (Past Tense).

English	Bhili (Mahikantba).	Bhili (Edar)	Bāori (Lahore)
188 We beat (<i>Past Tense</i>)	Āmñ mār ^a ḡyũ .	Amē māi ũ .	Hamē mārīō . .
189 You beat (<i>Past Tense</i>)	Tamñ mār ^a ḡyũ . . .	Tamē mārũ . . .	Tamē māriō
190 They beat (<i>Past Tense</i>)	Wapñō mār ^a ḡyũ .	Wanūō māi ũ .	Tēhē mārīō .
191 I am beating . .	Hũ mārũ ḡũ . . .	Hũ mārũ-ḡũ	Hũ mārō-sō
192 I was beating . .	Hũ mār ^a tō atō . .	Hũ mār ^a tō atō .	Hũ mār ^a tō-tō
193 I had beaten .	Mē mār ^a ḡyũ tũ .	Mē mārũ-tũ .	Mī mārīō tō .
194 I may beat	Hũ mārũ	Hũ māi ũ	
195 I shall beat	Hũ mārũḡ, or mārũḡ	Hũ mārũḡ, or, mārũḡ	Hũ mārīs
196 Thou wilt beat	Tũ mārũḡ (or mār ^a ḡē) .	Tũ māri(ḡ) .	Taũ mār ^a sē .
197 He will beat	Vi mār ^a ḡē	Vi mār ^a ḡē	Pello mār ^a sē .
198 We shall beat .	Amñ mār ^a ḡñ	Amē mār ^a ḡñ . .	Hamē mār ^a sē
199 You will beat	Tamñ mār ^a ḡō	Tamē mār ^a ḡō	Tamhē mār ^a sēō
200 They will beat	Wā mār ^a ḡē	Wā mār ^a ḡē	Tēhē mār ^a sēn . .
201 I should beat	Hũ mārũ, hũ mār ^a tō ugēk	Hũ mārũ .	
202 I am beaten	Ma-nē mārō ḡē, hũ mārānō ḡũ	Manē mārō ḡē	Mannē mārē-sai
203 I was beaten .	Ma-nē mār ^a ḡyō atō, hũ mārānō atō	Manē mārīyō atō	Mannē mārīō
204 I shall be beaten	Hũ mārāũ, or mār ^a ḡyō jāũ	Hũ mārāũ, hũ mārḡyō jāũ	Mannē mār ^a sē . .
205 I go . . .	Hũ jāũ ḡũ .	Hũ jāũ-sũ	Hũ jāō-sō .
206 Thou goest	Tũ jāō ḡē .	Tũ jāy-sē	Taũ jāē-sai
207 He goes .	Vi jāō ḡē .	Vi jāy-sē	Pello jāē-sai .
208 We go	Amñ jāīyē ḡiyē, amñ jā ḡñ .	Amē jāīyē-siyē	Hamē jāīō-sō
209 You go .	Tamñ jāō ḡō	Tamē jāō-sō	Tamhē jāō-sō
210 They go	Wā jāō ḡē	Wā jāy-sē	Tē jāē-sai
211 I went .	Hũ ḡīyō .	Hũ ḡīyō .	Hũ ḡīō .
212 Thou wentest .	Tũ ḡīyō .	Tũ ḡīyō	Taũ ḡīō .
213 He went	Vi ḡīyō	Vi ḡīyō	Pello ḡīō
214 We went	Amñ ḡīyā	Amē ḡīyā .	Hamē ḡīā

Kikanda (Kikanda).	Kuanda (Kikanda).	English.
Mand mabé (amé mabé)	Amé mabé	188. We beat (<i>Past Tense</i>).
Tamé mabé (témé mabé)	Tamé mabé	189. You beat (<i>Past Tense</i>).
Tyé mabé (tyé mabé)	Tyé mabé	190. They beat (<i>Past Tense</i>).
Mai mabé (mabé)	Mi mabé	191. I am beating.
Mai mabé (mabé) (mi mabé)	Mi mabé	192. I was beating.
(Mi mabé) (mi mabé)	Mi mabé	193. I had beaten.
Mai mabé (mi mabé)	Mi mabé	194. I may beat.
Mai mabé (mi mabé)	Mi mabé	195. I shall beat.
Té mabé (té mabé)	Té mabé	196. Thou wilt beat.
Té mabé	Té mabé	197. He will beat.
Ham mabé (ham mabé)	Amé mabé	198. We shall beat.
Tam mabé (tam mabé)	Tamé mabé	199. You will beat.
Té mabé (tyé mabé)	Tyé mabé	200. They will beat.
Mai mabé (mi mabé)	Mi mabé	201. I should beat.
Mé-mé mabé (mi mabé) (mé)	Mé-mé mabé	202. I am beaten.
(Mi mabé) (mé-mé)	Mé-mé mabé	203. I was beaten.
Mé-mé mabé (mi mabé) (mé)	Mé-mé mabé	204. I shall be beaten.
Mai chabé (mi chabé)	Mi chabé	205. I go.
Té chabé (té chabé)	Té chabé	206. Thou goest.
Té chabé (to chabé)	Té chabé	207. He goes.
Ham chabé (ham chabé)	Amé chabé	208. We go.
Tam chabé (tam chabé)	Tamé chabé	209. You go.
Té chabé (tyé chabé)	Tyé chabé	210. They go.
Mai gya	Mi gya	211. I went.
Té gya	Té gya	212. Thou wentest.
Té gya	Té gya	213. He went.
Ham gya	Amé gya	214. We went.

English	Bhili (Mahtikantba)	Bhili (Edar)	Bāori (Lahore)
215 You went . . .	Tamñ giyyā . . .	Tamē giyyā . . .	Tamē giā . . .
216 They went . . .	Wā giyyā . . .	Wā giyyā . . .	Tē giā . . .
217 Go . . .	Jā, jāō . . .	Jā, jāō . . .	Jā . . .
218 Going . . .	Jātñ . . .	Jātñ . . .	Jātō . . .
219 Gone . . .	Giyyñ, gō . . .	Giyyñ, gō . . .	Gaiō, giō . . .
220 What is your name ? . . .	Tamārñ hñ nām ? . . .	Tamārñ hñ nām ? . . .	Tārō nām hñ sai ? . . .
221 How old is this horse? . . .	Apā khōrā-nē kat'rñ varah thāyyñ hñ ? . . .	Ānā khōrā-nē kat'rñ varah thāyyñ hñ ? . . .	Hā ghōrāni kat'li umar sai ? . . .
222 How far is it from here to Kashmir ? . . .	Iyō-hñ Kāsmir kat'rñ vēgññ hñ ? . . .	Iyōhñ Kāsmir kat'rñ lōbēnā hñ ? . . .	Kashmir hñ-thō kit'lā gāu sai ? . . .
223 How many sons are there in your father's house ? . . .	Tamārā ātā-nā khēr-mñ kat'rā saiyā hñ ? . . .	Tamārā ātā-nā khēr-mñ kat'rā saiyā hñ ? . . .	Tārā āgā-nē gharē kit'lā dik'rā ? . . .
224 I have walked a long way to-day . . .	Āj khañō hēd'yyō hñ . . .	Āj khañō hēd'iyō hñ . . .	Āj hñ vēg'lā-thō āvēō . . .
225 The son of my uncle is married to his sister . . .	Mārā kākā-nō sōrō vi-nō bōnē paññēlō hñ . . .	Mārā kākā-nō saiyō inī hññ parapiyō hñ . . .	Mhārā kākā-nō dik'rō inhi baih'nō par'nñēō . . .
226 In the house is the sad- dle of the white horse . . .	Thōlā khōrā-nñ palōñ khēr- mñ hñ . . .	Thōlā khōrā-nñ palōñ khēr- mñ hñ . . .	Dhañlā ghōrāni kāthi gharē pañ . . .
227 Put the saddle upon his back . . .	Apā upar palōñ dadō . . .	Anā upar palōñ dadō . . .	Kāthi ghōrā-ni dñnā ūpar ghatti dō . . .
228 I have beaten his son with many stripes . . .	Anā-nā dik'rā-nē mē khañā kōllā mār'yyā hñ . . .	Apā-nā dik'rā-nē mē khañā kōllā māriyā hñ . . .	Inhā dik'rā-nñ hñ chhitēhō mārō . . .
229 He is grazing cattle on the top of the hill . . .	Pēli magari upēr tōdñ sārē hñ . . .	Pēli magari upēr tōdñ sārē- hñ . . .	Pēlō manukhō pahār-ni chōti ūpar dhēdhā chārē . . .
230 He is sitting on a horse under that tree . . .	Pēñ rukhadñ nēsāl khōrā- māthē bēhēlō hñ . . .	Pēñ rukhadñ nēsāl khōrā- māthē bēhēlō hñ . . .	Ghōrā-nē ūpar chaphiō hōiō ād'mi jhārāñ-nē hēth ūbhō . . .
231 His brother is taller than his sister . . .	Ī-ni bun kar'tē i-nō bhāi ūsō hñ . . .	I-ni bun kar'tē i-nō phāi ūsō hñ . . .	Inhi baih'nē-thō inhō bhāi lāmbo sai . . .
232 The price of that is two rupees and a half . . .	Ī-ni kimēt adhī rupiyā (or rupēyyā) hñ . . .	I-ni kimēt adhī rupēyyā hñ . . .	Pēllā-nō mōl dhāi rupaiñ sai . . .
233 My father lives in that small house . . .	Mārō ātō pēlā nān'kā khēr- mñ rē-hñ . . .	Mārō ātō pēlā nān'kā khēr- mñ rē-hñ . . .	Mhārō āgō pēllā nanōrā ghar-mē rahē . . .
234 Give this rupee to him . . .	Ā rupiyō i-nē āl . . .	Ā rupiyō inē āl . . .	Hyōh rūpaiō pēllā-nñ dai dē . . .
235 Take those rupees from him . . .	Apā kanē rupiyā hñ tē lai liyō . . .	Apā kanē rupiyā hñ tē lai liyō . . .	Pēllā rūpaiñ pēllā-kan-thō jāi lē . . .
236 Beat him well and bind him with ropes . . .	Ī-nē khub kutō nē rāhñ mādō . . .	Inē khūb kutō nē rāhñ mādō . . .	Pēllā-nñ māri māri bādi- nakh . . .
237 Draw water from the well . . .	Kuwā-mē-hñ pōpi kādho . . .	Kuwā-mē-hñ pōpi kādho . . .	Kūñ-māh-thō pāni kādhi lē . . .
238 Walk before me . . .	May mōrē hēd . . .	May-mōri hēd . . .	Mō āgal āgal hīnd . . .
239 Whose boy comes be- hind you ? . . .	Tamārī wōhē ki-nō saiyō āvē hñ ? . . .	Tamārī wōhē kinō saiyō āvē-hñ ? . . .	Tō kēpē kinō dik'rō āvē ? . . .
240 From whom did you buy that ? . . .	Tamñ ā ki-ni kanē-hñ vēsātñ lētñ hñ ? . . .	Tamñ ā kinī kanē hñ vēsātñ ? . . .	Pēllō kaun kan-thō mōlē hñhō ? . . .
241 From a shopkeeper of the village . . .	Gom-nā wōpyā kanē-hñ . . .	Gom-nā wōpyā-kanē-hñ . . .	Gēw'rā-nē karār-kannē thō . . .

Khoshk (Khoshk).	Kashk (Kashk).	English.
Tum gyā	Tumh gyā	215. You went.
Tē gyā	Tyā gyā	216. They went.
Jā	Jā	217. Go.
Chāl'nd (Jā)	Jānan	218. Going.
Goyā	Jāh	219. Goss.
Te-  hīy?	Te-an nīw hīy dō?	220. What is your name?
Han ghojā hī'nd amar-nā m?	Han ghojā hī'nd wari-nā dō?	221. How old is this horse?
Han ghw...hī'nd dār m?	Athān Kānmīr hī'nd dār dō?	222. How far is it from here to Kashmir?
Te-an hāp-nā ghar-nā hī- ka pōr m?	Te-nā hāp-nā ghar-nā hī'nd apjōr dōmā?	223. How many sons are there in your father's house?
Mā s j dār gya	Mī s j thā lām chāl'nd dō	224. I have walked a long way to-day.
Te-an bāhā mār hī'nd pōr-nā lōgā hō'nd.	Mā-nā chāl'nd-nā apjōr-nā lōgā tyā-nā lāhā-nā chāl'nd dō.	225. The son of my uncle is married to his sister.
Ohar-nā pōjōr'nd ghojō-nā jō m.	Tyā ghar'nd ghojō-nā khogir ghar-nā dō.	226. In the house is the middle of the white horse.
Ohar-nā pōjōr jō chōr	Tyā-nā pōjōr-wār khogir ghāl	227. Put the middle upon his back.
Mā thā-nā pōr-nā hāp mār-nā.	Mī tyā-nā apjōr-nā chāhāt wār hī'nd mār'nd dō.	228. I have broken his son with many stripes.
Te hā'nd-wār ghōrā chār'nd rak'nd.	Te hā'nd-nā mīth-wār ghōrā chār'nd.	229. He is grazing cattle on the top of the hill.
Te ghojō-wār hān jhā hāl hān rak'nd.	Tyā jhā-nā hā'nd s ghojō-wār bājān.	230. He is sitting on a horse under that tree.
Tā-nā thā thā-nā bāhā-nā dō m.	Tyā-nā thā thā-nā bāhā-nā thā hān mār'nd dō.	231. His brother is taller than his sister.
Tā-nā hīnā sōch rōpā s m	Tyā-nā mōl sōch rōpā dō	232. The price of that is two rupes and a half.
Mā-nā hāp dāh'nd ghar-nā rak'nd.	Mā-nā hāp tyā lāhā ghar- nā rāhā.	233. My father lives in that small house.
Han rōpā thā dō	Han rōpā tyā dō	234. Give this rupee to him.
Tā-pā s rōpā s	Tyā rōpā tyā-nā-pā s	235. Take these rupes from him.
Tā-nā hāp mār dār'nd hān.	Tyā-nā hā (hāt ān chār'nd) wār hān.	236. Beat him well and bind him with ropes.
Vāhīr-māy pāl hāh	Elār-māhān pāl hāh	237. Draw water from the well.
Mā-nā mār'nd chāl	Mā-nā mār'nd chāl	238. Walk before me.
Te-nā pōjō-māgō kōn yā rak'nd m?	Kā-nā apjōr te-nā māgō yā?	239. Whose boy comes be- hind you?
Hā kōn-pāy hī'nd lōk m?	Tā s kōn-pāy hī'nd lōk m?	240. From whom did you buy that?
Uāw-nā dāhā'dār-pāy hān.	Tyā khājā-nā dāhā'dār- pāy.	241. From a shopkeeper of the village.

BANJĀRĪ OR LABHĀNĪ AND BAHRUPĪA.

BANJĀRĪ OR LABHĀNĪ

The Banjāris are the well known tribe of carriers who are found all over Western and Southern India. One of their principal sub-castes is known under the name of 'Labhānī, and this name (or some related one) is often applied to the whole tribe. The two names appear each under many variations, such as Banjārī, Wajārī, Brinjārī, Labhānī, Labhānī, Labhānī, Labhānī, Labhānī, Labhānī, Labhānī, and Labhānī. At the census of 1891 the number of Banjāris (under any of their names) recorded was as follows —

Province or State.	Number recorded.
* Ajmer-Merwara	103
Bengal and States	31
Berar	110,009
Bombay and States	137,295
Central Provinces and States	39,049
Cowp	156
Madras and States	38,067
Panjab and States	67,231
United Provinces and States	75,006
Qattah	1
Halderabad	300,348
Darwad	759
Mysore	41,185
Kashmir	5,117
Rajasthan	20,237
Central India	40,963
TOTAL	894,701

In many parts of India these people merely use the language of the population of the country in which they dwell but in Berar, Bombay the Central Provinces, the Panjab the United Provinces and Central India, they are reported to have a language of their own the name of which varies according to the local name of the tribe. Although

widely spread over North-Western India, the Banjārās are strongest in the Deccan, where they are found in the greatest numbers, and where they retain much more of their primitive manners and customs than elsewhere. The name 'Banjārā' and its congeners is probably derived from the Sanskrit *Vāṇijyakārahas*, a merchant, through the Prakrit *Vāṇijjāraḥ*, a trader¹. The derivation of 'Labhānī' or 'Labānī,' etc., is obscure. It has been suggested that it means 'salt carrier' from the Sanskrit *lavanah*, salt, because the tribe carried salt, but this explanation goes against several phonetic rules, and does not account for the forms of the word like 'Labhānī' or 'Lambānī.'

The tribe has been known in India for centuries. It appears to be a mixed race and to owe its origin and organization to the wars of the Delhi Emperors in Southern India, where they carried the commissariat of the armies. They are often said to be mentioned by name in Sanskrit literature so early as the 6th century A.D., but this is a mistake. The earliest certain dated reference² to them is believed to be in the *Tārīkh-e Khān-Jahān Lōdī* of Nī'āmattu'llāh, written about 1612 A.D., and referring to events of 1504 A.D. He says —

'As scarcity was felt in his [the Sultān's] camp, in consequence of the non-arrival of the Banjārās, he despatched 'Azam Humāyūn for the purpose of bringing in supplies'

That the tribe existed and practised the vocation of grain-carriers long before this is certain, and it is probable that the Sanskrit writer Dandin (about 6th century A.D.) had them in his mind, though he did not distinctly mention them, when he wrote the oft-quoted passage above referred to³.

The Banjārās of the Deccan claim descent from the great Brahman and Rajput tribes of Northern India, and this is partly borne out by the fact that their language is certainly connected with that spoken at the present day in Western Rajputana.

The following are the more important accounts of the Banjārās.

AUTHORITIES—

- BEIGGS, Capt J, — *An account of the Origin, History and Manners of . . . Banjaras* Transactions of the Literary Society of Bombay, 1 (1819), pp 61 and ff
- BALFOUR, EDWARD, — *On the Migratory Tribes of Natives in Central India* Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal. Vol. xiii, Pt. I (1844), pp 1 and ff. Account of *The Gohur, called by Europeans and Natives Banjari, or Lambars*, pp 2 and ff. Gohuric Vocabulary on pp 17 and ff. ['Gōwro' is a common Labhānī word for 'man']
- ELLIOT, (Sir) H. M., — *Memoirs on the History, Folk-lore, and Distribution of the Races of the North-Western Provinces of India*, being an amplified edition of the *Supplemental Glossary of Indian Terms* written [in 1814] by the late Sir H. M. E. Edited, revised, and re-arranged by John Beames. London, 1869. Account of the Banjāra on pp 52 and ff.
- Gazetteer for the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, commonly called Berār* — Edited by A. O. Lyall, Commissioner of West Berār. Bombay, 1870. On pp 195 and ff. *Sketch of the Banjaras of Berār* mainly by N. R. Cumberlege (see below)
- CUMBERLEGE, N. R., — *Some account of the Banjarrah Class* (see above) Bombay, 1882.
- SYED HOSAIN BHOORANI and C. WILKINSON, — *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions*. Bombay, 1883. Account of the Banjāras on pp 337 and ff.
- HUTTON, DENZIL CHARLES JEFF, — *Outline of Punjab Ethnography, being Extracts from the Punjab Census Report of 1881 treating of Religion, Language and Caste*. Calcutta, 1883. Account of the Banjāras para 547, of the Labhānī, para 548.

¹ The derivation from the Persian *banjār*, a rice-trader, though the analogy of this word may account for the form (Banjārā) and from Sanskrit *banj*, to burn the jungle, are untenable.

² Elliot, v, 109; Elliot's *History*, i, 670. See also Yule and Burnell's *Holsten-Jobson*, p. v. 'Brijjary' for other names.

³ The passage occurs in the 6th and 11th of the *Dastan-i-Bahadur*.

Quarter of Aurangabad.—Bombay 1834.—Account of the Banjāras on pp. 291 and 2.

Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency Vol. xxi, Belgaum (1834).—Account of the Lamāns on pp. 124 and 2. Vol. xxii, Dhārwar (1834). Account of the Lavinas on pp. 121 and 2. Vol. xxiii, Bijapur (1834). Account of the Lamāns on pp. 205 and 2.

CADDES W.—*The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*.—Calcutta, 1896. Vol. i, pp. 119 and 2.

FACCHET F.—*Camps along by the Lumbhika*. *Indian Antiquary* Vol. xix (1901), pp. 547 and 2.

The following are the figures for the number of people estimated to speak the Banjāri language for the purpose of this Survey :—

Table showing the number of speakers of Banjāri as reported for this Survey

Where spoken.		Number of speakers.
Berar—		
Amaravati	1,900	67,625
Atala	1,375	
Dahmane	7,500	
Wan	23,000	
Dashin	25,850	
Bombay —		
Paach Mahale	1,300	19,724
Thana	3,400	
Kulk	1,000	
Almodragu	400	
Dalgum	2,000	
Dharwar	8,800	
Bijapur	6,124	
Central Provinces—		
Mandla	1,000	87,349
Soni	1,100	
Hoshangabad and Makrai	938	
Nimar	8,150	
Betal	290	
Chhindwara	1,250	
Wardha	700	
Kagpur	250	
Carried over	10,788	

Separate figures for the Banjāri language were not systematically recorded for all provinces in the Census of 1901, and it is therefore impossible to compare census figures with those given above.

Banjāri falls into two main dialects—that of the Panjab and Gujarat, and that of elsewhere (of which we may take the Labhāṇī of Berar as the standard). To these we may add the Labāṇkī of Muzaffargarh in the Panjab, which differs from that spoken in the rest of the province. The dialects of the kakērs, or comb-makers, of Jhansi in the United Provinces, and of the Bahrūpīs of the Panjab have also, on examination, turned out to be the same as the Labhāṇī of Berar. We therefore find the total number of speakers of Banjāri to be as follows:—

Labhāṇī of Muzaffargarh	—	436
Labhāṇī of the rest of the Panjab	22,433	
Labāṇkī of Gujarat	1,200	
	<hr/>	23,733
Other Banjāri	131,419	
Kakāri	40	
Bahrūpī of the Panjab	2,572	
	<hr/>	134,531
Total Speakers of Banjāri		<hr/> 1,38,500

All these different dialects are ultimately to be referred to the language of Western Rajputana. The few speakers of Labāṇkī in Muzaffargarh employ ordinary Bikanēri, and my only reason for entering their language above is that it is not the vernacular of Muzaffargarh, which is Lahndā.

The Labhāṇī of the Panjab is most nearly connected with the Bāgrī spoken in Hissar and in the adjoining parts of Bikaner.

For the other Banjāri dialects, we must take the Labhāṇī of Berar as the standard. It is in this locality that the tribe has most strongly preserved its racial characteristics, and employs the purest form of its speech. Elsewhere (except in the Panjab and Gujarat) the same dialect is spoken but more and more corrupt as we go eastwards, westwards or northwards from Berar. I have little information regarding the Banjāri of Hyderabad and the rest of Southern India as the Linguistic Survey does not touch those tracts, but from what I have learnt concerning it, it appears to me that the dialect of Hyderabad closely resembles that of Berar while that of Madras is more mixed with the surrounding Dravidian languages.

The Labhāṇī of Berar possesses the characteristics of an old form of speech, which has been preserved unchanged for some centuries. It may be said to be based partly on Mārwāṇī and partly on Northern Gujarātī, and gives one the idea of being derived from the original language from which these closely connected forms of speech have sprung in comparatively late times.

In the following pages, I shall first deal with the Labhāṇī of Berar as the standard. I shall then describe the Labāṇī of the Bombay Deccan, next the Labhāṇī of the Central Provinces, and then the Banjāri of the United Provinces. In connexion with this, I shall deal with the Kakāri of Jhansi. I shall next describe the Labāṇkī of the Panjab (devoting a few lines to that of Muzaffargarh) and then the Labāṇī of Gujarat. Finally, I shall describe the Bahrūpī of the Panjab, which properly belongs to the Berar dialect, but which is here placed on account of its geographical habitat.

It should be observed that nowhere, not even in Berar, is Banjārī a pure language. It is everywhere mixed, to a greater or less extent, with the vernacular of the country in which its speakers dwell. The amount of the mixture varies greatly, and is probably, in each case, much dependent on the personal equation of the speaker.

No specimens of Banjārī have been received from the Central India Agency. We may assume that the language is the same as that of the Central Provinces and of Berar.

LABHĀNĪ OF BERAR

The Labhānī or Wanjāri of Berar is a rough kind of Western Rājasthānī much mixed with Gujarātī. It does not vary materially over the whole province, and two specimens will suffice. Its pronunciation is in the main that of Berar not of Gujarat or Rajputana. For instance there is no change of *s* to *h* or of *chā* to *s*.

No one who is familiar with Gujarātī or Mārwārī will find any difficulty in reading it. I therefore give only a brief account of its grammatical peculiarities.

In pronunciation the cerebral *ḷ* is common as in *gōḷā* collected. There is a tendency to aspirate consonants, as in *mōḷāḷ*, for *mōḷō* great *ḷāḷāḷ* for *ḷāḷāḷ*, a certain one *chāḷamō* for *chāmō* kissed; *ḷgḷā* or *ḷgḷ*, before.

The vowel scale is indefinite. We find *i* changed to *a* in words like *daḷ* for *dī* a day *barāḷ* he shines and *u* changed to *a* in *sakḷi* for *sukḷi* happy. A final *ḷ* is often weakened to *a*, as in *chā* for *chāḷ* he is *sa* or *mā* to *ra* or *rā* the locative of *rō* of. Similarly a final *ḷ* often becomes *ā*, as in *dēḷā* for *dēḷḷā*, seen *rā* for *rō* of. Initial *u* often becomes *wa* as in *waḷḷāḷ* *paḷō* (for *uḷḷāḷ*-*paḷō*) debauchery *waḷḷā-dēḷō* for *wāḷā dēḷō* he squandered.

The declension of nouns is very irregular. No doubt all strong nouns of a base originally had their nominatives singular in *ō*, with an oblique form in *ā*. Thus, *ghōḷō*, a horse oblique form *ghōḷā*. But the Labhānīs in the course of their wanderings have also picked up the Hindōstānī idiom of making these nouns have their nominatives in *ā*, with an oblique form in *ō*. Thus, *ghōḷā*, a horse oblique form *ghōḷō*. We meet the same word sometimes with one termination and sometimes with the other, and there is absolutely no rule on the subject. It is a matter of mere caprice. We even find both forms in the same sentence. Good examples are *ghāḷō ḷāḷōḷ karpḷā*, a very good robe *māḷō chāḷōḷ*, my son *mōḷō chāḷōḷ* the elder son.

Many nouns, even those ending in consonants have an oblique form in *ō*. Thus *bāpā*, a father *bāpō-mā* to a father *daḷ*, a day *daḷ-mā* in (a few) days *kāḷ* a field *kāḷō-mā* in a field *hāt* a hand *hātō-mā* on (his) hand *bāḷḷ*, hunger *bāḷḷ-ḷi* by hunger and many others. The plural of nouns in *ō* or *ā* ends in *ō* or *ḷ*. Thus *bēḷō* a son plural *bēḷā* *bēḷā* a son plural *bēḷḷ*. Examples of the plural of feminine nouns are *bīr* a woman plural *bīrḷ* *bēḷi* a daughter plural *bēḷiyḷ*. Other nouns form their plural as in Western Rājasthānī.

For the various cases we have the following postpositions.

For the agent, we have *mā*, often weakened to *wa* as in *ō-mā*, by him; *ḷ-mā*, by whom. The use of the agent case is, however rare. More usually the nominative is used, and governs transitive verbs just as if they were intransitives. Thus we have *mā* *māryō* I struck; *kam māḷō*, we struck. As an example of the agent case we have *ō-mā* *mēiyō* he sent. On the other hand we have *bāp kypō* the father said.

For the dative-accusative we have the usual locatives of the genitive postpositions. Thus *mā* often weakened to *wa*, and *rā* (or *ro*). Thus *bāpō-mā* to the father *māḷi-mā*, to a man; *dāḷ-rā* to a country. We have also the form *mā*, sometimes pronounced *mō* which was probably picked up in the Panjab. Thus *bāpō-mā* and *bāpō-mō* to the father.

The suffix of the ablative is usually *ḷi* as in *waḷḷāḷ-paḷō-ḷi* by debauchery.

The suffix of the genitive is usually *rō*. Sometimes we meet the Gujarātī *nō*, as in *bētī-nō*, of a daughter. *Rō* has its oblique masculine *rā*, its feminine *rē*, and its locative (agreeing with nouns in the locative and dative) *rē*, as in Mārwarī. It is sometimes pronounced *rū*. The whole series is, however, much confused. We find cases of *rā* being used for *rō*, and *vice versa*. *Rē* often becomes *ra*, and is once (*ō-rē māl-matā*, his property) used for *rō*. Examples are *bāpē-rō bēlō*, the son of the father; but *ō-rā* (not *ō-rō*) *pēt*, his belly, *ghōdē-rō ghōgīr*, the saddle of the horse, *baḡrā-ra* (for *baḡrā-rō*) *pīlā*, the young of a goat, *ō-rō* (for *ō-rā*) *galā-ma*, on his neck; *ghāḍē-rē hētā*, at the bottom of the tree.

The usual sign of the locative is *mē*, *ma*, or *mā*. Thus, *hātē-mē*, on the hand; *galā-ma*, on the neck; *sudē-mā*, in one's right-mind.

The sense of gender is very capricious. Thus we have *sēwā* (feminine) *kīdō* (masculine), service was done.

Adjectives follow the Mārwarī rules. They are put in the locative in *ē* to agree with a noun in that case.

Pronouns.—The pronouns of the first and second person make no distinction between the nominative and the agent cases. Both are the same. The following forms occur:—

Mē, *ma*, *may*, I, *mhārō*, *mārō*, my, *manē*, *mana*, *mārē*, *māra*, to me; *ham*, we; *hamārō*, our.

Tū, *tū*, thou, *tārō*, thy; *tanē*, *tana*, *tārē*, *tāra*, to thee, *tam*, *tamō* (this is a Gujarātī form), you, *tamārō*, your.

For Demonstrative pronouns (including the pronoun of the third person, we have *ū*, *ō*, he, that, they, *ō-nē*, by him (but *ū hyō*, he said), *ō-rō*, his, *ō-rē*, *ō-na*, to him, *ānu-rō* or *anu-rō*, their.

Tō-nē, *tō-na*, him, to him, *tē*, they.

Ā or *ī*, this, *yē ghōḍē-nō*, of this horse.

Āpan, we (including the person addressed), *āp^anē-nē*, to us, *āp^anō*, own.

Jō, *jakō*, who, what, *jē-na*, by whom, *kūn*, who? *kē-rō*, whose? *kāi*, what? *kaṣō-rō*, of what? *kaṣā-na*, for what, why? *lōi*, anyone, *ēāt^arā*, this many, *kat^arā*, how many (with pleonastic *k* of Rājasthānī, *kat^arā-k*), *sē*, all, the whole.

Conjugation.—The present tense of the verb substantive closely follows colloquial Gujarātī. It is as follows —

	Sing	Plur
1	<i>chhū</i> or <i>chha</i>	<i>chhā</i> or <i>chha</i>
2	<i>chhi</i> or <i>chha</i>	<i>chhō</i> or <i>chha</i>
3	<i>chhē</i> or <i>chha</i>	<i>chhē</i> or <i>chha</i>

It will be observed that, as in some forms of colloquial Gujarātī, *chha* may be used for all persons and both numbers.

The past is *vētō*. *Vētō* is sometimes written *whētō*, which shows that the word is only a by-form of the Gujarātī *hatō*. When used as an auxiliary it becomes simply *tō*, as in colloquial Gujarātī. Thus *mār^atō-tō*, was striking. Indeed *vētō-tō*, itself (corresponding to the Hindōstānī *hōtā-thā*), is generally used to mean 'was'.

Wherever it occurs in the specimens or list, the masculine plural of *edā* is *edā*, not *edā*, as it ought to be.

As for Fāto verbs, the Infinitive, Present Participle, and Past Participle are as in Rājasthānī, *etc.*, *mārāō* to strike *mārāō* striking *mārō*, struck. In the past participle however the *y* is often omitted, so that we also have *mārō*. So *dāāō* for *dāāō*, seen and others.

The simple present is conjugated much like the corresponding tense in Gujarātī and Rājasthānī. Thus—

I strike, *etc.*

	Sing.	Plur.
1	<i>mārā</i>	<i>mārā</i>
2	<i>mārā</i>	<i>mārā</i>
3	<i>mārā</i>	<i>mārā</i>

The present definite is also conjugated as in these languages, the auxiliary verb being added to the simple present, and not to the present participle. Thus *mārā-āāō* or *mārā-āāō* I am beating. Other examples are (often with the sense of a future) *mārā-āāō*, I die; *kidā-āāō*, we may eat; *āāō-āāō*, let us become

The Imperfect is *mārāō-āāō*, was striking

The Past tense is as usual, except that this tense in the case of transitive verbs agrees with the subject. Thus *mā mārāō* I struck; *kām mārā* we struck.

The Perfect is *mārāō-āāō* or *mārāō-āāō* I have struck. In the former case the auxiliary verb agrees with the subject. So also in *pāp kidā-āāō* I have done sin.

The Pluperfect is *mārāō-āāō*, had struck. In *uāāō-rī* he got up the *rī* is probably a contraction of *raāō*

The Future is mainly based on the *ā* future of Mārāpī. It has some peculiar forms. It is conjugated as follows:—

I shall strike, *etc.*

	Sing.	Plur.
1	<i>mārāyā</i> or <i>mārāyā</i>	The same as the singular
2	<i>mā āyā</i> or <i>mārāyā</i>	
3	<i>mā āyā</i> or <i>mārāyā</i>	

In the specimens we find *āāō* added in *jāyā-āāō* I will go; *uāāō-āāō* I will arise; *dī-āāō* it will come. The exact meaning of these forms is doubtful. The *āāō* possibly really represents an *s* so that we have here examples of an *s*-future as in Gujarātī. Another form in the specimens is *kāāō* I will say. This seems to be borrowed from Mārāpī.

Irregular Past Participles are *kāāō* eaten; *kidā*, done; *dāāō* or *dāāō*, given *lāāāō*, got; *kāāō* *kāāō* or *kāāō* said; *rāāō* remained; *gāāō* or *gāāō*, gone. In *edā pāāō-gāāō* want fell, *gāāō* seems to be used as a feminine instead of *gāāō*.

The conjunctive participle is formed by adding *an* to the root. Thus *māran*, having beaten. A sort of continuous conjunctive participle is formed by adding *tānī* (for *thānē*, having become, as we see from the Central Provinces specimens) to the root, as in *rē-tānī*, while remaining, *dē-tānī*, while giving

Vocabulary.—The Rājasthānī idiom of employing *kō-nī*, at-all not, for the negative is very common

The following unusual words occur in the specimen —

<i>ajī</i> , or <i>wajī</i> , and		<i>lumēdī</i> , a bird
<i>āt</i> , a sound		<i>kēldā</i> , <i>kēldū</i> , a calf
<i>bātī</i> , bread		<i>kīratī ā</i> (= <i>kutīrā</i>), a dog
<i>dhyā</i> , with		<i>mātī</i> , a man
<i>yādī</i> , a mother		

[No I.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

LABHĀNĪ OR WANJĀRĪ

(BERAR)

SPECIMEN I.

Ēkē	māti-na	dī	bētā	vētē-tē	Anu-mē	nānakyā			
<i>A</i>	<i>man-to</i>	<i>two</i>	<i>sons</i>	<i>becoming-were</i>	<i>Them-among</i>	<i>the-younger</i>			
āp ⁿ nē	bāpē-nē	kyō,	‘bāpū,	jō	manē	āyī-chha,	ō	māl-matā-rū	
<i>his-own</i>	<i>father-to</i>	<i>said,</i>	<i>‘father,</i>	<i>what</i>	<i>to-me</i>	<i>will-come,</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>the-property-of</i>	
vētō	manē	dē-nāk	’	O-nē	ō-rē	māl-matā	anu-mē	vēt-dinō	
<i>share</i>	<i>to-me</i>	<i>give-away.</i>		<i>Him-by</i>	<i>his</i>	<i>the-property</i>	<i>them-among</i>	<i>was-divided</i>	
Wajī	nānakyā	ohhōrā	thōdā	danē-mē	sē	māl-matā	gōlā	kar-lidō,	
<i>And</i>	<i>the-younger</i>	<i>son</i>	<i>a-few</i>	<i>days-in</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>wealth</i>	<i>collected</i>	<i>made,</i>	
wajī	ghan-mē	gyō	Wajī	wattē	rē-tānī	wadhāl-panē-tī	sē		
<i>and</i>	<i>a-far-land-in</i>	<i>he-went.</i>	<i>And</i>	<i>there</i>	<i>whole-remaining</i>	<i>debauchery-by</i>	<i>all</i>		
pīsā	wadā-dēnō	Janā	ō-nē	sē	pīsā	kharach	kar-nākō,		
<i>money</i>	<i>he-squandered</i>	<i>When</i>	<i>him-by</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>money</i>	<i>expended</i>	<i>was-made-entirely,</i>		
janā	ō	dēs-ma	mōthō	kāl	pad-gō,	jē-na	tō-nē	vēlā	pad-gē,
<i>then</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>country-in</i>	<i>a-great</i>	<i>famine</i>	<i>fell,</i>	<i>by-which</i>	<i>him-to</i>	<i>want</i>	<i>fell,</i>
ajī	ū	gyō,	ajī	ō	dēs-rē	ēkhādi	bhalē	mānas-jērē	pagēli
<i>and</i>	<i>he</i>	<i>went,</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>country-in-of</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>rich</i>	<i>man-near</i>	<i>servant</i>
ryō	Wajī	ō nē	sūrī	charāy-nē	āp ⁿ nē	khētē-mē	ō-na		
<i>remained</i>	<i>And</i>	<i>him-by</i>	<i>swine</i>	<i>feeding-for</i>	<i>in-his-own</i>	<i>field-in</i>	<i>as-for-him</i>		
mēlyō	Wajī	jakō	sūr	bhaskō	khādō,	ō	bhaskā-tī	ō nē	
<i>he-was-sent</i>	<i>And</i>	<i>what</i>	<i>the-swine</i>	<i>chaff</i>	<i>ate,</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>chaff-with</i>	<i>him-to</i>	
ō-rā	pēt	khushī-tī		bharā-jātō.		Ajī	ō-na	na-kōi	dinō
<i>his-own</i>	<i>belly</i>	<i>happiness-with</i>	<i>he-would-have-been-filled</i>			<i>And</i>	<i>him-to</i>	<i>no-one</i>	<i>gave.</i>

Janā ū sudā-mā āyō, janā ū kyō, 'māhārō bāpt-rō nōk'rō-mō-ti
Then he came-in came, then he said, 'my father-of servants-in from
 lat'ā k rōj-dār ād'mi-na pēt bhar aji mān-maktō bēti māli-jāy,
how-many-veryly hired men-to belly full and to-spare bread is-got
 aji mā bhukt-ti marū-chhō ātō uhl-chha, aji māro bāpō-kanō
and I hunger by dying-was. I will-arise and in-my father in-cially
 jāhrū-chha, aji ō-na kahēn "bāpō, mā Bhag'wānō-rō-par ān
will-go, and him to I will say, "father, I God-of-on and
 tār-ēga pāp kido-chhō, wajī aji-ti tārō bēto kahwānō mā
there-before in dome-here, and to-day-from thy son to-be-called I
 āhbbō kō-nl. Tārō rōj-dār mān'mā-mē-ti mānō ēk rōj-dār kar' '
good at-all-not(-am) Thy hired men-in from me one hired make"
 āji ū uibā, aji ō-rō bāpt-āmō āyō. Pāp janā ū
And he arose, and him of father-near came But when he
 pān nē-ti vētō ō-rō bāp ō-na dēkbbō; wajī kiw āw-gi
distance-to-came was his father him saw; and compassion came;
 wajī dhātō; wajī ō-rō galā mā pad-gō, aji ō-na ohhumō. Aji
and he-ran; and his neck-on he fell, and him he-kissed And
 chhōrō ō-na kahē 'bāpō, Bhag'wānō-rō-par aji tār-ēga mā pāp
the-one him-to says, 'father, God-of-on and there-before I in
 kido-chhō, wajī aji-ti tārō bēto kahwānō mā āhbbō kō-nl.
dome-here and to-day-from thy son to-be-called I good at-all-not(-am).'
 Pāp bāp āpōb nāuk'rō-nō kyō, ghapō āhbbō kap'dā māgā,
But the-father his-own servants to said 'very good robe bring
 aji ō-na ō pēt'rāw; aji ō-rō hātō-mō vihl ghāl, wajī ō-rō
and him-to it put-on; and on-his hand-on a-ring put and on his
 pāst-mā jōjā ghāl; wajī ō lāt kōlā war līyā aji ō-na kā-nākh;
foot-on shoes put and that felled calf bring-here and it slaughter;
 wajī ō-na khād-chha ān khush hōd chha; kā'ki ā māro chhōrō
and it we-eat and happy become; because this my son
 mar-gū-thō, wajī pharan bach-gō; ō gamā-gū-thō, wajī lābbō. Wajī
dead-gone-was, and again escaped; he lost gone-was, and was-got' And
 tā chhān karō lāg
they rejoicing to-do began

Āji ō-rō mōbbō chhōrō khētō-mō vētō-tō. Wajī janā ū
And him-to the-elder son field-in becoming-was. And when he
 āyō wajī ghari tōjō nik'li pūch-gō, janā nāch-tamāō ō-nā
came and the-house-to near arrived, then dancing-festival him-to
 āt-āyō. Wajī ō-nō nāuk'rō-mō-ti ākō-na bulāyō
sound-came And him-by servants-in-from as-for-one he-was-called
 wajī ō-na pūchhyō, 'I kāō-rō chha?' Wajī ū ō-na kahē,
and as for him he-asked 'this what-of is?' And he him-to says

tārō bhāī āyō-chha, wajī tārē bapē-nē latā kēldū-na kātō-chha,
thy brother come-is, and thy father-by the-fatted calf-as-for it-slaughtered-is,
kal-kī ū hasī-khusī-sō tō-na mal-gō.' Wajī ō-na rīsh āw-gō
because he safe-and-sound him-to has been-met.' And him to anger came
wajī gharē-mē jāy-nī Kal-kī ō-rē bāp bhār āyō,
and the-house-in he-goes-not. Therefore him-to the-father outside came,
ajī ō-na sam^ajāyō Wajī ū ō-rē bāpē-nū watār dē-tānī
and him-to remonstrated And he his father-to answer while-giving
kahē, 'dēkh, mē ēāt^arā waras tārē sēwā kīdō, wajī mē kōyē
says, 'see, I so-many years to-thee service did, and I at-any
ghat^akā-r-upar tārō hukūm • mōdō kō-nī, ajī hī manē tū
time-of-on thy order disobeyed at-all-not, and yet to-me thou
na-karhāī bak^arā-ra pilā dīnō kī mē mārē dōstē-rē baiābar
not-ever a-goat-of young-one gavest that I my friends-in-of with
ānand karū-chha Pan jē-na tāiō māl-matā kach^anī-nē warād-dīnō,
rejoicing make But by-whom thy property harlots-to was-squandered,
ā tārō chhōrō ātē barābar ō-rē karitā lat kēldū tu
this thy son on-coming with him-for for fatted calf thou
kātō-chha' Wajī ū ō-na kēhō, 'chhōrā, tū nēh^amī mārē dhyā
slaughtered-hast' And he him-to said, 'son, thou always to-me near
chhī, wajī mārō jē-kōī chha, tē sārō tārō chha. Wajī āpan ānand
art, and mine whatever is, that all thine is And we rejoicing
karū-chha, ajī sakhī hōū-chha, ī āp^anē-nē āchhō chha, kal-kī ā tarō
make, and happy become, this us-to good is, because this thy
bhāī mar-gō-thō, wajī pharī bach-gō, ajī ū gamā-gō-thō, wajī
brother dead-gone-was, and again escaped; and he lost-gone-was, and
lābhō'
was-found'

[No. 2]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP.

LADHĀNĪ OR WĀNJĀRĪ

(BENAR.)

SPECIMEN II

Nāp lēl-rō jhag'ō vē-gū Nāp-phēraṇa bēṭa rīaṇ
A-father son-of quarrel occurred. The-father-with the-son being-angry
 chāl-gū Yāḍī mānī, 'bēṭa, bēṭa pharī a jū. Yāḍī-rō
went-away The-mother remonstrated 'son, back again come.' The-mother-to
 kō-nī mādā. It'ō rāyō-līyō dīg'rō-chāk. Wān wāb-nō
at-all-not he-herd The-son being-very-angry went forward. A foreign-land-to
 dāg'rō-chāk. Janā jārā-ekō Ēg chālō-gō, janā jam'nī bājā
he-went-forward. Then a-little-distance ahead he-went, then right side
 mōḍā lālā an dāl bājā aṣī bōll. Āg dēkhā tō
a-protect across and left side a-facket howled In front he-saw verily
 ēk wāṭ chhō minā-rī suk'hā-rī vēṭīl. Dux'rīyō wāṭ tīnō
one road six months-of happiness-of being-was Another road three
 minā-rī duk'hā-rī vēṭīl. It'ō suk'hā-rī wāṭ chhōḍ
months-of sorrow-of being-was The-son happiness-of road abandoning
 duk'hā-rī wāṭ g'yā Ēg dēkhā tō wāgū dā sūtōrō vēṭō-chhā
sorrow-of road went ahead he-saw indeed a-tiger asleep lying-is
 O uṭhō kyō kī, 'bēṭa, kimē-rō chālō?' It'ō kyō kī,
He arose said that 'son where-to do-you-go?' The-son said that,
 'wān'wā-nā jāḍ-chhō. Wāg'b'ō kyō kī, 'wān'wā-nō kim
'a-foreign-land-to going-I-am' The-tiger said that 'foreign-land to why
 jāw-chhī? dī-dī hā nīṭa dēkhā.
going-art-thou? two-two (ie one or two each) hands (ie feet) here show
 Pāhīl-rē chōṭ tū hī kar, rō bēṭa. O kyō kī, 'pāhīl-rō
At-the-first blow thou verily act, O son He said that 'at-the-first
 chōṭ tū hī kar māmā' Ūk'hē-rī wāṭ lēṭā chōṭ kīdō
blow thou verily act, O-maternal-uncle Had-of affair the-son blow made
 pāp chhāl-gī. Uṭhō-rī wāg'l'dā pāk dārō līdō, an ū nā māri nakhō.
but missed. Uprone the-tiger seized took, and him killed.

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING.

A quarrel took place between a father and a son; and the latter got angry with the former, and set out on a journey. The mother remonstrated saying, 'child, return back;' he did not heed his mother, but being angry and indifferent went forth and set

out for a distant country. When he went a little distance ahead, he heard a peacock scream on his right, and a jackal howl on the left¹. He then looked before him, and saw one road of six months resulting in happiness, the other of three months resulting in grief. The son left the happy one and took the other full of misery. No sooner did he throw a glance ahead than he saw a tiger lying down asleep. He got up and said, 'child, where are you going?' The boy said, 'I am going to a distant country.' The tiger said 'what do you go for to a distant country? Show me your skill in fighting once or twice here. Child, begin you with the first stroke.' The boy said, 'no nunkey, you begin with the first stroke.' At last the boy gave the first cut, but missed, and the tiger sprang up, seized him, and killed him.

¹ These are unlucky omens.

[No 3]

INDO ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP

LADHANI OR WANJARI

(DERA.)

SPECIMEN III

TWO LADHANI SONGS.

I

Rāchō Bwābbāyā.

True Swaddled

Tā-rē kachā kachā-qi kāyā.

His-to crystal gold-of body

Bwābbāyā rē-gū.

Swaddled haring-green-is-gone

Rā-kā-nā gidi dā-gū.

Sabb-to throne haring-green-is-gone

Jī-lā nō purān rē-go.

Jī-lā-to pleased haring-green-is-gone

Bhāyā dī-lāl jō-gū.

Swaddled wealth accumulated.

Tā-rē Tulārām chhā gō-gū.

His-to Tulārām is horse

Dachchā dū-lāl bhārī.

Prosperity wealth great

Nē-gārō āb'dāgīr.

Drama umbrellas

Mīrāmāyā gārō dhādī.

Mīrāmāyā flags the-bird

Jē-nā ān dhan dē-gō bhārī.

Thom-to food wealth is-to-be-given much.

II

Dāgh lagīchya dharamō-ri bāwādī.

Grove(-and)-garden virtue-of a-well

Jattō barājō purō Rām.

Here shines the-great Rām

Rām tō-nō āchhō kariyō nyāhal (1)

Rām the-to good may-make prosperity (1)

Sattatē-rī Sītā, pattē-rō Lachh^hmanā,
Obstinty-of Sītā, faithfulness-of Lakshman,
 Hanumān jōdhā tārē sāt.
Hanumān warrior of-thee with.

Rām tō-nē āchhō kariyō nyāhāl (2)
Rām thee-to good may-make prosperity. (2)

Nahī-tō dhōkī dōrī dōrī Dārakā.
Not-veryly pilgrimage twice twice (to-)Dwārakā
 Haradē-mē warasō Bhagawān.
The-heart-in dwells God

Bālā-jī-nī Dārakā, Kṛṣṇ-jī-nī Dārakā.
Bālā-jī-of Dwārakā, Kṛṣṇ-jī-of Dvārakā.

Rām tō-nē āchhō kariyō nyāhāl. (3)
Rām thee-to good may-make prosperity (3)

Dharamitō Bābā Bālā-jī sādār,
Dharamitō Bābā Bālā-jī-of devotee,
 Bhar bhar pasī dē-ohha dān.
Full full handfuls giving-is gifts

Rām tō-nē āchhō kariyō nyāhāl (4)
Rām thee-to good may-make prosperity (4)

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING.

I

(*A poem in honour of Sēwābhāyā, a Labhānā hero.*)

There was Sēwābhāyā. His body was brilliant as silver and gold.
 Sēwābhāyā is dead and gone. He left his throne to Sūkā, and gave Jētā his blessing.

Great wealth had Sēwābhāyā amassed He had the horse Tulārām.
 Worldly wealth had he in plenty He had drums and umbrellas as tokens of his royalty.

Mēhmadyā the Bard sings this song. To him it is every one's duty to give many presents of food and money

II.

(In praise of Dharmilô Bâhâ, who planted a grove and built a masonry well)

(1) There is a grove and a garden, and a well built as an act of clarity, where shines the great Râm himself in all his glory (and grants all the wishes of the donor) May Râm endow thee with good prosperity

(2) Sîtâ the chaste, Lakshman the faithful, Hanuman the mighty warrior are all with thee May Râm endow thee with good prosperity

(3) It is useless to make two pilgrimages to Dvârakâ for it is in thy heart that God dwells. There, too, is the Dvârakâ of Bâlsâji,¹ the Dvârakâ of Kṛishṇa. May Râm endow thee with good prosperity

(4) Dharmilô Bâhâ, the devotee of Bâlsâji, gives gifts in full handfuls. May Râm endow thee with good prosperity

¹ Bâlsâji is the name given to the infant Kṛishṇa. Dharmilô is, I need hardly say, devoted to Kṛishṇa.

LAMĀNĪ OF NASIK:

The Labhānī or, as it is locally called, Lamānī of Nasik differs in no way from that of Berar. As a specimen, it will be sufficient to give an extract from a popular poem. The specimen gives a good example of the very peculiar vocabulary of the tribe. I am not certain that all the words have been correctly translated. They are not found in any dictionary, and I give the meanings as they have been reported to me. -

[No. 4.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

LAMĀNĪ.

(DISTRICT NASIK)

Ohhān	tō	tōd,	tādō	lādē-dō,	rē	Isarā	
<i>Camp</i>	<i>verily</i>	<i>having-broken,</i>	<i>bullock-herd</i>	<i>load,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā.</i>	
Ohhān	tō	tōd,	tādō	lādē-dō	lādē-dō	ra.	(1)
<i>Camp</i>	<i>verily</i>	<i>having-broken,</i>	<i>bullock-herd</i>	<i>load</i>	<i>load</i>	<i>O</i>	(1)
Ohōdō	sō	dēkhan,	tādō	dhāl-dō,	rē	Isarā.	
<i>The-plain</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>having-seen,</i>	<i>the-bullock-herd</i>	<i>let-loose,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā.</i>	
Chōdō ¹	sō	dēkhan,	tādō	dhāl-dō,	dhāl-dō	ra	(2)
<i>The-plain</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>having-seen,</i>	<i>the-bullock-herd</i>	<i>let-loose,</i>	<i>let-loose</i>	<i>O.</i>	(2)
Adā-mōdā-rō	pālā	mādē-dō,	rē	Isarā.			(3)
<i>Rooms-of</i>	<i>bags</i>	<i>arrange,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā</i>			(3)
Lāl	charuñjā	pāl	mādē-dō,	rē	Isarā		(4)
<i>Red</i>	<i>stretching-with-strings</i>	<i>tent</i>	<i>arrange,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā.</i>		(4)
Tāt	palān	pāni-mā	nākhē-dō,	rē	Isarā		(5)
<i>Saddle-cloth</i>	<i>saddle</i>	<i>water-in</i>	<i>put,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā</i>		(5)
Bāpē	bētā-rō	jhagadō	māchō,	rē	Isarā		(6)
<i>Father</i>	<i>son-of</i>	<i>quarrel</i>	<i>arose,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā.</i>		(6)
Ābkē-rō	pērhō,	bētā,	jāyē-dō,	rē	Isarā		(7)
<i>This-of</i>	<i>year,</i>	<i>son,</i>	<i>go-let,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā.</i>		(7)
Tāt	palān	pāni-mī-tī	kādhē-lō,	rē	Isarā		(8)
<i>Saddle-cloth</i>	<i>saddle</i>	<i>water-in-from</i>	<i>out-take,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā</i>		(8)
Ghūyē	galē-na	ghōdā	mēlē-dō,	rē	Isarā.		(9)
<i>Ghee</i>	<i>molasses-for</i>	<i>horses</i>	<i>send,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā</i>		(9)
Ohāwal	bharē-na	khādū	mēlē-dō,	rē	Isarā		(10)
<i>Rice</i>	<i>filling-for</i>	<i>bullock</i>	<i>send,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā</i>		(10)
Dālī-sānē-nē	bhēla	karē-lō,	rē	Isarā			(11)
<i>Wise-men-of</i>	<i>collection</i>	<i>make,</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Isarā</i>			(11)

¹ Each line is repeated exactly after the model of the first two. I shall not write the repetition again.

- Pahl-sāpt-na bhōla karō-lō, rō Isārā. (12)
Wise-women-of collection make, O Isard. (12)
 Āb ghīyō galē-rō ghōḍā āwa-gē, rō Isārā. (13)
Now ghee molasses-of horses are-come, O Isard. (13)
 Chāwa| bhārē-na khāḍā āvō-gō, rō Isārā. (14)
Rice filling-for bullock is-come O Isard (14)
 Bīr balāyan na nāwan mālō-dō, rō Isārā. (15)
Women calling for a barber send O Isard (15)
 Sāyīṭ-thāwar sādī tāpē-lō, rō Isārā (16)
On-Saturday the-veil stretch, O Isard. (16)
 Pāch ghaḍwā rō ghōḍā ghōḍē-lō, rō Isārā. (17)
Five jars-of āḥaṅg-sherbet compound, O Isard. (17)
 Pāch lōḥ rō garu rō mālē-dō, rō Isārā (18)
Five pots-of the-priest-of send O Isard (18)
 Pahl-sāpt-rō wachan māḡē-lō, rō Isārā. (19)
Wise-men-of blessing ask O Isard (19)
 Āchhā jagatērō māḡawō jīmāḍō, rō Isārā. (20)
We'll make-arrangements the-guests feed, O Isard. (20)

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING.

(The song deals with the adventures of the Lohānā hero Isārā. In the first verses he is addressed by his father.)

(1) 'O Isārā, break our camp and load our pack-bullocks. Look out for a wide plain, and there let the cattle loose. Make a room of the grain-bags and over them stretch a red cloth so as to form a tent. (3) Put the bullock harness into water to clean it.

(Isārā demands to be married at once, but his father at first refuses.)

A quarrel arose between the father and the son. My son, let this year pass. In the meantime take the bullock harness out of water.

(Isārā insists, and at length the father consents to an immediate marriage. In the following lines the marriage procedure is referred to.)

'Send for horses loaded with ghee and molasses, (10) and for bullocks laden with rice. Call a meeting of wise men and wise women (and take their advice). Here come the horses laden with ghee and molasses, and the bullocks laden with rice. (15) Send a barber to invite the women, and on Saturday have the veil stretched out.¹ Make five farfals of āḥaṅg-sherbet, and offer five pots full to the family priest. Invoke blessings from the wise men (2) and make good arrangements for giving the guests a dinner.

(The rest of the poem, which is a long one, has not been recorded. It describes Isārā's marriage, and the heroic feats performed by him and by his bride. Isārā's best friend had become his foe on account of the marriage, having become himself enamoured of the bride. It was with him that the struggle took place which resulted in Isārā's complete victory.)

¹ Invitations to a wedding are carried by a barber. Just before the marriage ceremony proper four men hold a cloth or veil, stretched out like a canopy over the heads of the bride and bridegroom.

LAMĀNĪ OF BELGAUM.

It will suffice to give one more specimen of the Lamānī of the Bombay Deccan, a short extract from a version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son which comes from Belgaum. An example is, indeed, hardly necessary, for it will be seen that the dialect is the same as that of Berar. The only small point of difference is that in words like *ra*, to, the final *a* is sometimes dropped so that we get simply *r*. Thus, *mālī-r*, for *mālī-ra*, to a man.

[No. 5.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

LAMĀNĪ

(DISTRICT BELGAUM.)

Ekē	mātī-r	dī	bētā	vētē-tē.	Ōnō-r-māyī	nān ^a kyā	bētā
<i>One</i>	<i>man-to</i>	<i>two</i>	<i>sons</i>	<i>were</i>	<i>Them-of-in</i>	<i>the-younger</i>	<i>son</i>
bāpē-na	kyō,	'bāp,	tārō	mālē-māy-tī	manna	āy-rō	vētō
<i>the-father-to</i>	<i>said,</i>	<i>'father,</i>	<i>thy</i>	<i>property-in-from</i>	<i>to-me</i>	<i>coming-of</i>	<i>share</i>
manna	dē'	Bāpū	ōnō-r-māyī	ō-rō	mālē	pād-dīnō-ehhē	Nān ^a kyā
<i>to-me</i>	<i>give'</i>	<i>The-father</i>	<i>them-of-in</i>	<i>him-of</i>	<i>property</i>	<i>divided</i>	<i>The-younger</i>
bētā	ō-rō	vētō	lēna	ghan-mē	malkē-na	jana	ghan
<i>son</i>	<i>him-of</i>	<i>share</i>	<i>having-taken</i>	<i>far-in</i>	<i>country-to</i>	<i>having-gone</i>	<i>many</i>
dād	kō-nī	hōyē-tō.	Atarājya-mā	ū	anādī	vēna	ō-rō
<i>days</i>	<i>any-not</i>	<i>were</i>	<i>The-meantime-in</i>	<i>he</i>	<i>riotous</i>	<i>having-become</i>	<i>him-of</i>
mālē	śē	gamā-lhō	Ū	yū	kīdō,	jērē	pachya
<i>property</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>squandered.</i>	<i>He</i>	<i>thus</i>	<i>did,</i>	<i>then</i>	<i>afterwards</i>
malkē-mā	mōtō	kāl	padana	onna	garībī	āw-gī.	
<i>country-in</i>	<i>great</i>	<i>famine</i>	<i>having-fallen</i>	<i>to-him</i>	<i>poverty</i>	<i>came.</i>	

LABHĀNĪ OF THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

The Labhānī of the Central Provinces differs only from that of Berar in being more corrupt. It is everywhere mixed with the local vernacular of the tract where the speakers are found, but its basis, as in Berar, is the language of West Rajputana and North Gujarat.

I give three specimens of it, one from the centre of the Provinces, one from the west, and one from the east.

LABHĀNĪ OF MANDLA.

The following version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son comes from Mandla, and is a good example of the Labhānī current in the Central Provinces. Everywhere in these Provinces it is based on the same dialect as that which we found in Berar but it is always much corrupted by being strongly mixed with the local dialect of the place. I have selected the Mandla version because it is fairly central, and because it has been very carefully prepared. Here it will be seen that the language is mixed with the Eastern Hindi of that district. Indeed, the Eastern Hindi element often predominates to the total exclusion of the Labhānī forms. For instance, in the very first line we have the Eastern Hindi genitive termination *kār* instead of the true Labhānī *rō* or *āō*.

The Labhānī element itself is a good deal altered. We find the letter *r* by itself used to indicate the genitive case, instead of *rō* and this *r* is even added to words which are already in the genitive as in *tārō-r* thy and even *tār-r bādī* thy brother. This *r* is even added to the adverb *ōīō*, there, so that we have *ōīō-r* of there, used to mean of him.

For the locative postposition we have *tānī* or *tānē*, as in *gālō-tānī* on the neck. *Tānī* is literally the Gujarātī *tānē* having been, and it, as well as the cognate form *chānē* or *chānī*, formed from the verb *chāō*, he is, is used to make conjunctive participles, as in *uī-chānē* having arisen *dēkh-tānē* having seen *dawp-tānī*, having run. So in Berar we had *dō-tānī* (for *dō-tānē*) on giving.

The verb substantive is conjugated as follows —

Present

	Eng.	Phn.
1	<i>chāō</i>	<i>chāō</i>
2	<i>chāōi, chāō</i>	<i>chāō chāō</i>
3	<i>chāōa, chāō</i>	<i>chāōi, chāō</i>

The plural is often used for the singular. Thus, *hām chāō* I am.

The following very peculiar forms are given in a list received from Mandla. I have met them nowhere else, and hence have been unable to check them.

	Eng.	Phn.
1	<i>chāōhām</i>	<i>chāōh'ram</i>
2	<i>chāōh'ram</i>
3	...	<i>chāōh'ram</i>

The word for was, were is *achāchāō* or *chāō*. The Eastern Hindi *raō* is also common.

Chāō is added to almost any verbal form without affecting the meaning. Thus, beside present definites like *mārī-chāō*, I am dying, and imperfects like *kādī-chāō*, they

were eating, we have it added to the simple past, as in *kahō-chhē*, he said, *gaya-chhē*, he went, *kāṭ-chhē*, he spent (time), so we have in the future *javā-chhē*, we (I) will go, *kah^owā-chhē*, we (I) will say. In fact the future is almost the same as the present definite, *mār-chhū*, I will strike, *mār-chhō*, you will strike, and so on, besides *mārū-chhē*; *mārō-chhē*, and other forms

Again *chhē* is added to the Imperative in *kar-chhē*, make (me as one of thy servants); and even to a verbal noun as in *rahanwārē-chhē madhē*, amongst the inhabitants. In *bhāran-chhē*, he wished to fill, the words appear to mean literally 'he was for filling'

As already said, the conjunctive participle is formed by adding *chhānē*, *thānē* or *thānī*. We have also the Eastern Hindī suffix *ke*, and a parallel form, *kō*, in *nikāl-kō*, having taken out

In one instance *kahō*, he said, is contracted to *kōh*

Note the Rājasthānī method of forming casual verbs by adding *r*, as in *rakhārō*, kept

[No 6]

INDO ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

LABIANI OR BANJARL

(DISTRICT MANDLA.)

kōl ad'mi-kēr di chhōrā achōbhē Un mē-sō nān'kiya
A-certain man-of two sons were Them in from the-younger
 bāp-sō kahō-chhō nī bāū dhan madhō jō-jō hamār bājō
the-father-to said O father the-wealth in whatever my share
 hālī sō hamō dēnē Tab ū ap'nō dhan bāj dīnō.
will be that to-me (is)-to-be-given Then he his-own wealth dividing gave
 Thōrō din gya-chhō kī nān kīrā chhōrā sārī kuchhī sakalē-kōr
A few days passed that the-younger son all whatever collected having
 dūr muluk dāgar-gayu, aur ōtē bad'māl mē din kāt-chhō ap'nō
a far country went, and there riotous-conduct in days spent his-own
 dhan khō-dīnō. Jab ū suganī khārōh kar nākō tab us mulk mē
wealth squandered When he all had-expended then that country-in
 khūb kāl parō, aur ū khūb garīb hō-gāō aur ū ū mulk kē
great famine fell and he very poor became and he that country-of
 rahān-wārē-chhō madhī ēk kō yalī rah'wā-chhō jō ō-nō ap'nō
inhabitants among one-of near remained Tho him his-own
 khēt mē sūr chārāy kō mēlō-chhē. Aur ū un chhūmiyō-sō jōn
field-in sower grazing-for sent And he those hawks with which
 sūr khāt chhō āpan pēt bhāran-chhē. Kōl kō-nī dōwō-
sucine eating-were his-own belly for-filling-was Anybody at-all-not giving
 rahō. Tab ū nō khabar bhāl aur ū kahō, hamār bāp-kō
was Then him-to senses came and he said, my father-to
 kat'rā k bhūtiyō-kō khānā-sō wār'āk bājī hō-gī, aur ham bhūkhō
how-many labourers-of eating than more bread became and I of hunger
 marī-chhē. Ham ūth-chhānē jāwā-chhō bāp dāhar aur ō-nō
dying-am I arising will-go father wear and him-to
 kah'wā-chhā, "hō bāū, ham nō Bādāl kō ul'tā aur āp-kō mun-dhāngō
I-will say "O father me-by Heaven-of against and your in presence
 pāp kīdō-chhō; aur ham tār chhōrā kahān layak kō-nī ohhā,
sin done-was; and I thy son to-be-called fit at-all not are(i.e am)
 tār nōkar-kē ēk kō barābar rakhā. Ū ūth thānī ap'nō bāp
thy servants-of one-of equal keep (me). ' He arisen-having his-own father
 dhal dāgrō. Par ū nāgī dūr rahō ō-rū bāū ū ūpar dēkh thānē
near went But he yet far was his father him-upon seeing

dayā rakhārō, daur-thānī galō-thānī, lapat-kē chūmō
compassion did, run-having neck-on having-stuck kissed(him)
 Chhōrā ō-nē kōh, 'hē bāū, Swarg-kē bīruddh aur tumhār mun-
The-son him-to said, 'O father, Heaven-of against and your in-
 dhāngē pāp kidī-chhā Ab ham tār lar^akā kahān lāyak kō-nī
presence sin done-was Now I thy son to-be-called fit at-all-not
 chhā' Par bāū ap^anō chākar-nē kōh, 'achhō-mē achhō
am' But the-father his-own servants-to said, 'good-among good
 kap^arā nikāl-kō ō-nō pah^arā-dō; ōtē-r hāthē ūtī aur
robe having-taken-out him-on put; there-of in-hand a-ring and
 pagē-mē pan^ahī pah^arā-dō, aur tājā bātī kar-chhē, aur ham khāvē
feet-in shoes put, and ready bread make, and we may-eat
 aur khuśyālī karē Ī hamār chhōr mar-gaō, aur phīran
and merriment may-make This my son was-dead, and again
 jī-āyō, khō-gaō, phīran mil-gaō' Tab ōū khuśyālī karan
to-life-came, was-lost, again is-found.' Then they merriment to-do
 lāgō
 began.

Ō-nō mōtō chhōrā khēt-mē rahō Jab ū ātō-rahō gharē dhāi
His elder son field-in was. When he coming-was house near
 pahuchō-gaō, tab gājā-bājā aur nāchā-kē ō-r āwāj sam^arō, aur
reached, then music and dancing-of that-of sound he-heard, and
 ū ap^anō chākar-madhē ēk-lā bulā-kē pūchhō-chhē, 'Ī kaī
he his-own servants-among one-to called-having asked, 'This what
 chhē?' Ū ō-nē kahō, 'tārō bhāī āī-chhē, aur tumhār bāū
is?' He him-to said, 'thy brother come-is; and your father
 barā bhōjan banāyē-chhē, ē-rē-wāstē kī ī chhōrā achchhō rahai'
great feast prepared-has; this-of-for that this son well is'
 Par ū rīs kīdō aur andar jānō kīnō na chāhō. Ē-r-wāstē
But he anger did and in going to-do not wished This-of-for
 ō-rō bāū manānō lagō. Ō-rī bāū-sē jabāb dīnā, 'dēkb,
his father to-remonstrate began His father-to answer (he)-gave, 'see,
 it^anā baras tārī sēwā kar^atē-hō, aur tārō hukum kadhī nanī
so-many years thy service doing-(I)am, and thy order ever not
 tārō, aur āp mannē kō-nō dīnō, bak^arā na dīnō,
(I)-disregarded, and you to-me anything-not gave, a-goat not gave,
 kī ham ap^anē dōs^adārō sāthē-r-māhē khuśī rahē-tē; ī tārō-r
that I my-own friends with merry might-be; this thy
 chhōrā kas^abī-r sāthō-r rahō-kē tārō dhanō khān-nakhā, janā ū
son (who) harlots-of with-of living thy wealth devoured, when he
 āyō tabhī ō-r-wāstē barō khānō banāyē-chhē' Bāp ō-nē
came then-even him-of-for a-great feast prepared-is.' The-father him-to

kahō, 'hō chhōrā tū sārō din hamār saṅg banō rahiyō jō
 said, 'O son thow all day of me with at-ease hast lived what
 hamār chhō sū tārō chhō; khuṣī-karū kar rahiyā, kī ī
 mine is, thot thine is merry-making lei us-live for this
 tarī-r bhāī mar-gaō, aur phir jī-āyō khū-gaō, phiran
 thy brother was-died and again to-life-came was-lost, again
 mil gaō.
 is-found'

LABĀNĪ OF HOSHANGABAD.

In Hoshangabad, in the west of the Central Provinces, the Labhānī is corrupt like that of Mandla, but not so corrupt. On the other hand, many of the corruptions of the Labhānī of this district clearly come from the Punjab. This is specially evident in the frequent use of *dā* (*dē*, *dī*) as the suffix of the genitive, and of *nī* as the suffix of the dative. The basis is, however, the same as that of the Labhānī of Berar, *viz.*, the language of Western Rajputana and Gujarat.

The following points may be noted. There is the usual *rō* suffix of the genitive, as in *lōṛiyā-rī māṇ*, the mother of the children, *kur'mī-rā ghar*, in a Kurmī's house; *u-raī bōlī*, by her (*i e*, she) said.

We have the Panjābī *dā* series in *bām'nā-dī* (for *-dē*) *ghar*, in the house of a Brāhman, *kē-dā bānā*, the arrows of some, *putā-dī-ōrat*, the wife of the son; *u-dē*, to him, for her, *u-dyā byāw*, her marriage.

The Gujarātī-Panjābī *nō* series is also common, as in *putā-nī ōrat*, the wife of the son, *putā-nī*, *puttā-nī*, to the son (or sons), *u-nē putā-nē*, to her son; *puttā-nī chalā-gyā*, by the six sons it was gone, the six sons went away, *jē-nī*, by whom, *kānā-nū*, for eating, *dharī-nō*, having carried. Note that the *n* of the suffix is often cerebralized.

Note how the word *yādī*, mother, here appears under the form *yānī*, in the meaning of 'female.'

Note also the use of *vē* (*i.e.* *whē*) for 'was.'

[No. 7.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

LABHĀNĪ.

(DISTRICT HOSHANGABAD.)

Ek	rājā	rah-vē	U-dē	sat	lar'kē	rah-vē	Jidu
A-certain	king	there-lived.	His-to	seven	sons	there-were.	When
mah'lyā-par		charhū-gyā	bānā	phēkyā,	tō	kē-dā	tō
on(-the-terrace-of)-the-palace		they-mounted	arrows	they-threw,	then	some-of	indeed
rājī-ghar	gyā,	kē-dā	kumhārā-par	gyā,	aur	kē-dā	bānā
on-king's-house	went,	some of	potter('s-house)-on	went	and	some-of	arrows
jōgyā-pu	gyā,	kē-dā	tēhyā-par	gyā,	ēk	bām'nā-dī	
joor('s-hut) on	went,	some-of	oil-monger('s-house)-on	went,	one	Brāhman-of	
ghar	gyā,	kē-dā	kur'mī-rā	ghar	gyā,	kē-dā	vyāpārī-
on-house	went,	some-of	Kurmī-of	on-house	went,	some-of	on-a-tradesman's-
ghar	gyā	Tēhyā-kā	ghar	lōī	hī,	u-dyā	byāw
house	was	The-oil-monger's on-house	a-girl	was,	her-of	marriage	became;
kur'miyā-ghar	lōī	hī,	u-dyā	byāw	hui-gyā;	vyāpārī-ghar	
in-the-Kurmī's-house	a-girl	was,	her-of	marriage	became;	in-the-trader's-house	

l'gi hi u-dra hhi byaw hui-gyā; kumārā-ghar ek l'gi hi,
 a-girl was her-of also marriage become in-the-potter's house one girl was
 u-dra hhi byaw hui-gyā; lam nā ghar l'gi hi, u-dyā hhi
 her-of also marriage become in the Brāhmaṇa's-house a-girl was her-of also
 byaw hui-gyā rājā ghar l'gi hui, u-dyā hhi byaw
 marriage become in-the-king's-house a girl was her-of also marriage
 hui-gyā; aur jūgiya l'bhā bād'ri hi u-dyā hhi byaw
 become; and the jūgi near a female-monkey was, her-of also marriage
 kiā Jad l'giyā ri m'ā uttā ghar khānā nū
 was-made Then the-children-of the-mother the-seven to-house calling-for
 gal, jad aur l'bhā kē 'chhā-n, u l'giyā byāhi
 went then she said that, six to surely girls have-been-married
 tās putā n' lād'ri byāhi. Tu u-dā ghar khānā nū
 one son-to a-female-monkey is married. Then he in-house calling-for
 gal lād' khānā-dānā pakāyā. Jad u mī u pē putā nō hōi
 eleven Therefore the-fool was prepared Then she her son-to said
 ki uti ai kithi? Jadā ā l'bhā nū grā Bād'ri nū
 that thy wife where-is? Then he bringing-for went The-female-monkey to
 bandh-pur dharbō. Avā Bād'ri yāni khōi
 shoulder-on take-taking become The-female-monkey female outer-covering
 ānāni an aul parī nī l'āl. Phir wō dōnū bhīgyā haihī-kō
 took-off and a-real fairy came-out Then they both together sat having
 wān nūwā khānā khāyā. Jadī wō uhi ghar gal, jadī
 mother-in-law-with food ate Then she arising house went then
 wō b'li kē 'chhā putā-nī ōrāl Bī-thl'vā u pē khānā-dānā achōhā
 she said that six son-of mine have-come by them food-etc good
 nāhi pakāyā, aur wō tās putā-di ōrāl khānā-dānā aul pakāyā
 not was-cooked and that one son-of wife food excellent prepared
 Phir u-dā pō mahāl bād'wāyā aur chhā putā-nī dōyā dē
 Then her-of near a-palace was-built, and the-six sons-by another country
 chālā-gyā. Jā-nī yā bād'ri byāhi jēryō tō
 it-went-gone It-came-by this female-monkey had-married by-her indeed
 mahāl bād'hai kē utthā rahiyā. Bād'riyā-di aul parī
 a-palace-was-got-built and there they-lived The-female-monkey-of a-real fairy
 hui-gi, an tak dīn nikānī
 become and fate resulted

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING.

A certain king had seven sons. One day they all went up on to the top of the
 palace and each shot an arrow. The arrow of one fell on a king's house of another on a
 potter's of another on an ascetic's, of another on an oil monger's, of another on a

Brahman's, of another on a Kurmī's, and of another on a merchant's. The oil-monger had a daughter, and the prince who shot the arrow which fell on his house married her. Similarly, another prince married the Kurmī's daughter, another the merchant's, another the potter's, another the Brāhman's, and another the king's. But in the ascetic's house there was only a she-monkey, and the prince whose arrow fell there married her.

Then the mother of the princes went round to eat dinner at each of her seven sons' houses. Last of all she came to the house of the prince who had married the monkey and he made dinner ready. 'Where is your wife?' said she. So he went off and came back with the monkey sitting on his shoulder. As soon as he came before the queen, the monkey took off her outer garment, and, lo and behold, she turned into a beautiful fairy. Then they all sat down and ate their meal. When the old queen got up to go home she said, 'the wives of my six other sons can't cook a bit, but this son's wife has given me a first-rate dinner.' So she had a palace built for the couple, and banished the six other sons with their wives. So the prince who married the monkey got a fine palace to live in, and she turned into a beautiful fairy. That is the way that luck turns out.

LABHĀNĪ OF KANKER

As a last example of the Labhānī of the Central Provinces, I give a specimen from the State of Kanker which lies well to the east. It will be seen that if we take the Uttar Labhānī as the standard it is much purer than that of Mandla or of Hoshangabad. The infusion of the local Chhattisgarhi is comparatively small. Note the pronunciation of *light a tiger* as *balāp*. The Gujarati root *śākar* bear appears here as *śamar*. The preposition *at* is frequently employed to indicate the case of the Agent. Note also *varī* meaning *he* *śamā* said; the Rājasthānī futures, *dikhā* I shall give and *rikhai* (*rikhākhai*) it will be; and the numerous conjunctive participles in *thānīn*.

[No 8]

INDO ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

LABHĀNĪ OR BANJARI

(STATE KANKER)

Ek balāp kōi jhāqī mē jarpō sūt rahē Tikāēk khūb
 I tiger ascertain forest-in fallen asleep was Suddenly many
 undar apnō daurā wā nikal jarpō Wō-ri āt-wō bahāg
 under there-from hole-from emerged Then-of sound-from the-tiger
 chāmk-gau, wajī wārā jarpī ēk undar par par-gau. Nis-wā
 started-up and āt-of gave one mouse-on fell tiger from
 ā-thānīn bahāg-nā wō-nō undar-ko mārē-nō man lagu-thū.
 once having the-tiger-by that to mouse-to killing-for mind fixed-was
 Urdarā-nō arjī kīdū kō, 'ōp apnī wajī maru-
 The-mouse-by petition man-made that Your-Honour your-own and of-me
 āmū dēkh mārī mārē-nā āp-rā kīlārī k hapāl vihai?
 before look my killing-from Your-Honour-to how-much greatness will-be?
 I āmar thānīn bahāg undarā nā chhōp-dinō. Undar-nō kaulī,
 This heard having the-tiger the-mouse-to released The mouse-by it-was-said
 dhan mārī bhāg, dēkh thānī chhōp-dinō kōi dinē-par āpē-rā
 'Heres! my luck, seen having I-was released Some day-on Your-Honour-of
 I dayā ra badlā dikhū I āmar-thānīn bahāg hāsū,
 this mercy-of return I-will-give This heard having the-tiger laughed
 wajī jhāqī mē dāgar gau kōi din pāchhō ā jhāpī mōh
 and the-forest-in way went Some days afterwards that forest in
 rahē wārē-nō jhāqō laru-thānīn bahāg nō phādāyō Kuñkar-kō wārī
 the-the-killers-by a noose fixed having the-tiger noosed. Because-that he
 hardā-nō karāī karāī mār nāg'wō-tū. Bahāg phādā-wō
 the-cattle when-when (i.e., now-and-then) killing-was The-tiger the-mouse-from

nīkarē wāstē khūb chāhō, tō kō-nī nīkar sakō, wajī wō
getting-out for much wished, but at-all-not get-out could, and he
 dukhē-r mārī garaṇē lāgō Ū-j undar jō-kō bahāg chhōr-dīnō-tō
grief-of dying to-roar began That-very mouse whom the-tiger, released-had
 ū garaṇē sāmār-thanīn, 'ū mārō up'kār karō-wārō,' wā-rī bōli
that roar heard-having, 'that my benefit doer,' him-of voice
 balakh-lidō, wajī dhūdh'tō dhūdh'tō watē ān-pahūchō jatē bahāg phādō
recognized, and seeking seeking there arrived where the-tiger noosed
 parō-tō. Ū wā-rī chakhērī dātē-sō phādē-nē, katar-nākhō, bahāg-nē
fallen-was He him-of pointed teeth-with the-noose cut, the-tiger
 chhōr-lidō
released.

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING.

A tiger once lay asleep in a certain forest, when there suddenly came out from their hole a number of mice. The tiger, startled by the noise they made, awoke, and his paw fell on one of them. In his anger he determined to kill the little creature, but the mouse made a humble petition saying, 'let Your Honour compare Your Honour's self and this poor me. What credit will Your Honour get from killing so tiny a creature?' Then the tiger relented and let him go, and the mouse said, 'bless my luck! Your Honour saw the difference between us, and let me go. Some day or other I will return this kindness which Your Honour has shown me.' When the tiger heard these words he laughed in scorn, and took his way into the heart of the forest. Some days afterwards the forest men set a springe for the tiger, as he had been every now and then killing their cattle, and into the springe the tiger fell. The tiger did his best to get out of the noose, but could not do so, and, feeling fit to die for grief, began to roar. Now that very mouse whom the tiger had released heard the roar, and recognized the voice as that of his benefactor. So he searched about till he found him lying caught in the springe. With his sharp teeth he cut the string of the noose, and released the tiger.

BANJARI OF THE UNITED PROVINCES

The language of the United Provinces is usually called Banjari. It closely resembles that of Berar though it is much corrupted and is also much mixed with the vernacular dialects of the localities in which it is found. As in Berar its basis is the language of Western Rajputana and of Northern Gujarat. I give a complete set of examples from the district of Saharanpur, and also a short extract from Khiri. It is unnecessary to give further specimens, as throughout the provinces the only variation is the greater or less admixture of the local dialect.

BANJĀRĪ OF SAHARANPUR.

We may note the following peculiarities of the Banjārī of Saharanpur —

As in Northern Gujarat, a cerebral *l* is represented by *r*. Thus, *kāl*, famine, becomes *r*.

As usual the nominative of strong *a*-bases ends in *ō*, with an oblique form in *ā*. Thus, *ghōiō*, a horse, oblique form, *ghōiā*. Nouns ending in consonants have an oblique form in *ē*. Thus, *māl*, property, genitive *mālē-rō* *mulh*, a country, locative, *mulhē-rē-māi*, in a country *bāt*, a thing *bātē-rē*, for a thing.

The usual case postpositions are—agent, *nē*; dative-accusative, *rē*, as in *qāorā-rē*, to a man, *ū-rē*, him. Sometimes we have the Gujarātī *nē*, as in *nōk^orē-nē*, to a servant. For the genitive we generally have *rō* (oblique *rā*, feminine *rī*). When it agrees with a noun in the locative, it becomes *rē*. Sometimes we have the Gujarātī *nō*, as in *ū-nō*, of him. For the locative we have *māi*, usually suffixed to the locative of the genitive, as in *mulhē-rē-māi*, in a country.

The word for 'two' is *dī*, as in Berar, not *dō*.

The Pronouns generally are as in Berar. *Manahī* or *manēhē*, is 'to me'. The word for 'he' is *ū* or *wōhō*. 'One's own' is *ap-rō*. *Āp* is also used to mean 'we,' including the person addressed. Its genitive is then *āp-rō*, and its dative *āp-rē*.

The Present tense of the Verb Substantive is conjugated as follows:—

	Sing.	Plur.
1	<i>chhū</i> or <i>chhō</i>	<i>chhā</i> or <i>chhē</i>
2	<i>chhē</i>	<i>chhō</i> or <i>chhē</i>
3	<i>chhē</i>	<i>chhē</i> , <i>chhāi</i>

It will be observed that *chhē* can be used for all persons in both numbers.

The Past Tense is the Mālvī *thō*, was. Its feminine is *thī*. We should expect its masculine plural to be *thā*, but in the places where it occurs the ordinary Hindōstānī *thī* is used instead. In other parts of the United Provinces *chhē* is also employed for the past tense.

The Finite verb is as in Berar. The definite present is formed by suffixing the auxiliary verb to the simple present, and not to the present participle. Thus, *mai ū-chhū*, I am dying.

The Past Participle does not take *y*. Thus, *lahō*, not *lahyō*, said.

The Conjunctive Participle usually takes the suffix *tī* or *thīn* (compare the Berar *tanī*, Central Provinces *thānī*). Thus, *chhadū-tī*, having left, *kar-thīn*, having done, and many others. We have also a form like *dēkhīn*, having seen. Compare Gujarātī *corinī*, having struck.

The Rājasthānī negative *lō-nē*, occurs.

Transitive verbs in the past tense generally, but not always, have the subject in the accusative case.

[No 9]

INDO ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

BANJARI

(DISTRICT SAHARANPUR.)

SPECIMEN I

Ek	giara rē	di	biṭṭa	thē	Unṭe-māi rō	lōharkā nē
One	now-to	two	sons	were	Them in from	the-younger by
lō-mā	kāṭe,	āi	bīhu	manahī	j,	māṭe-rō
the-father-to	it-was-said	O	father	to-me	what	property-of
ṭu-bāchhē	manthā	dā	Jadhē	ū rō	māi	bhī
arrived	to-me	give	Then	him-of	the-property	having-decided
dinā	Aur	thara	dinō	ṭilohē	lōharkā	biṭṭa nē
was-given	and	a few	days	afterwards	the-younger	son by
kāṭṭin,	ēk	ḍun-rē	mukṭe māi	saṭar	kḍbō	aur
made-arrang	a	distance-of	country-in	journey	was-made	and
uthē	ap-rō	māi	hadmā l mē	kḍ-dinā	Aur	jadhū
there	him-own	property	misconduct in	was-lost	And	when
kharach	kāṭ-dinā,	jadhē	wob,	mukṭe-rē-māi	bāru	kar
expended	was-made	then	that	country-of-in	a-great	famine
ṭārā	Aur	ū	jadhē	kaṅgāl	bō-gayō	aur
fell	And	he	when	needy	became	and
kāi	lhi	nā	rahō,	jad	ū	ēk
anything	even	not	remained	then	he	a
jē	lagō.	Wob	kōr	ap-rā	kḍēṭ-māi	
having-gone	attached-himself	That	landlord	his-own	fields-in	
sār	chuzāwā	bhējō	aur	ū nē	yeḥ	bāṭe-rō
since	to-feed	sent,	and	him-by	this	thing-for
thi	kō	un	chudāṭ-s	junḍ-nō	sār	khātō-thē
was	that	those	books-with	which	the-same	calling-were
ṭāi	bharē	par	wob	chhōrā nē	kōi	nā
belly	he-may-fill	but	that	boy to	any-one	not
Jadhē	bōḥ-māi	ā thin	kalū	kē	'mihārō	bāu rō
Then	seems in	come-having	it-was-said	that	my	father-to
kḍrā	mehentiṭ-rō	lāi	thi	aur	māi	bhūkō
look-many	servants-to	bread	was	and	I	hungry
Māi	uth-thin	ap-rō	bāu	chhāi	jāṭ-chhū	aur
I	arisen-having	my-own	father	near	going-am,	and

kēhū, "rē bāhu, maĩ thārō aur āsmānē-rō burō kīdhō-ohhē,
I-say, " O father, by-me thy and Heaven-of evil done-is,
 aur abhī yeh māfik kō-nī kē thārō bittā keh'laũ.
and now this like at-all-not that thy son I-may-be-called
 Manahĩ ap-rē mehenti-rē wāgar banā." ' Jadhē ū ap-rē
Me thine-own servant-of like make" ' Then he his-own
 bāū-rē dhāĩ chāl lāyō, aur ū abhī dūr thō, jadhē
father-of near step brought, and he yet far was, then
 ū-rē dēkhīn ū bāū-rē taras āyō, aur daur-thīn
him-to having-seen that father-to compassion came, and run-having
 gōdī-māĩ lē-līdhō, aur barō pyār kīdhō Ohhōrā-nē
lap-in he-was-taken, and much love was-made. The-son-by
 bāū-rē kahō kē, 'rē bāhu, maĩ thārō aur
the-father-to it-was-said that, ' O father, by-me thy and
 āsmānē-rō burō kīdhō-ohhē, aur abhī yeh māfik kō-nī
Heaven-of evil done-is, and now this like at-all-not
 kē thārō bittā keh'laũ ' Bāū-nē ap-rē nōk'rō-sē
that thy son I-may-be-called.' The-father-by his-own servants-to
 kahō kē, 'āchhā-sē āchhō lattō kādh-lāō, aur wōhē
it-was-said that, 'good-than good robe out-bring, and him
 pērā-dēō; aur woh-rē hātē-rē-māĩ gunthī, aur pagā-māĩ jūtā
clothe, and him-of hand-of-in a-ring, and feet-in shoes
 pērāō, aur ham khāwā aur khushī manāwā, kāk-rē
put-on; and we may-eat and happiness may-celebrate; because
 mhārō ohhōrō marō-thō, abē jī-gayō, herāy-gayō-thō, abē
my son dead-was, now became-alive, lost-gone-was, now
 pā-gayō-ohhē ' Jadhē wō khushī karē lāgē
got-gone-is ' Then they happiness to-do began.
 Ū-rō mōtō bittā khētē-māĩ thō Jadhē gharē-rē
Him-of the-great son the-field-in was. When house-of
 dhāĩ āyō gāyē-rī aur nāchē-rī āwāz sunī Jadhē
near he-came singing-of and dancing-of noise was-heard. Then
 ēk nōk'rē-nē balā-thīn pūchhō kē, 'ēī kāē karē-ohhē?
a servant-to called-having it-was-asked that, 'this what doing-are?'
 Uh ū-nē kahō kē, 'thārō bhaiyā āyō-ohhē, aur
By-him him-to it-was-said that, 'thy brother come-is, and
 thārē bāū barī khātar kīdhī-ohhē, ēhē wāstē kē
thy father-(by) a-great feast made-is, this for that
 wōhō wōhō-nē rājī khushī pāyō-ohhē.' Ū gusē hō-thīn
he him-by well happy found-is ' He angry become-having
 ap'rē man-mē ohāhō kē, māĩ nā jāũ? Jadhē ū-rē
his-own mind-in wished that, within not I-go? Then him-of

bāū	a thīn	uhō	manāyō	Ū	ap'rō			
the-father (by)	come-having	to-him	it-was-remonstrated	He	his-own			
bāū rō	kabhō,	'dēkh,	at'rā	bar'ō-sō	maī	thārī	sōwn	
father-to	said,	'see,	so-many	years-from	I	thy	service	
kar'ū-chhū	kadhō	thārō	hukum	anārūkārī	nā	kidhō		
doing-am	ever-even	thy	order	disobedience	not	was-done		
ch	iē	kadhī	ēk	ba'k'rī rō	bachohā	na	diyō	kō
but	by-thee	erer	a	goat-of	young-one	not	was-given	that
maī	ap'rō	milōwālō-rō	ēth	khughī	kar'ū.	Aur	jadhō	
I	my-own	friends-of	with	happiness	may-make	And	when	
yō	thārō	bl(ā	āyō	jīn	thārō	māl	kāchaniyā māl	
this	thy	son	came,	by-whom	thy	property	karlots-in	
uḍā-dinō-chhō	tō	ā rō	wāstō	barī	khātar	kidhī-chhō		
wasted-is	by-thee	him-of	for	a-great	feast	made-is.		
Ū rō	bāū	kabhō	kō,	tā	tō	mharō	dhālī	
Him-of	father (by)	it-was said	that	thou	verily	of-me	near	
sādō	rahō-chhō,	nur	jō	kālī	mharō	chhō	ohī	hajō
always	remaining-art,	and	what	ever	mine	is	that	all
thārō	chhō.	Par	khughī	mananō	nur	khughī	hōnō	
thine	is	But	happiness	to-celebrate	and	happy	to-become	
ohābō-thō,	kabhō-l	ēhō	thārō	bhalyā	marō-thō,	sō	jī	
proper-was	because-that	this	thy	brother	dead-was	he	alive-	
gayō-chhō;	khōyō-thō,	sō	mīl-gayō-chhō.					
gone-is	lost was	he	found-gone-is					

CENTRAL GROUP.

(DISTRICT SAHARANPUR.)

Maĩ das baras lag reāsat Nāhanē-māĩ nōk'ri kidhī Aur abhī
By-me ten years for state Nāhan-in service was-done And now

ēk bar'sē-sē nōk'ri chhadā-tī ap'nē ghar ā-gayō-chhē Uthē-rē
one year-from service abandoned-having my-own house come-am There-to

hawā bōhat āchhī chhē, par hamārē dēsē-rē ād'miyō-rō uthē jī
climate very good is, but our country-of men-of there mind

kō-nī lāgē-chhē, kāhē-k uthē-rē kōr apār chhaĩ, aur un
at-all-not engages, because-that there-to blind beyond-limit are, and those

pahāryō-rē bōlī āp-rē samajh kō-nī jāvē Par dus'rē pahārī
mountaineers-to speech us-to understood at-all-not goes But other hill

Rājō-sē Nāhanē Rājā-rī tayat ap'ri jubān sāvārē khātar
Rājās-than Nāhan Rājā-of subjects their-own tongue polishing for

parē-rē bōhat kōsis kar-rahē-chhē Aur Rājā-rē dilē-māĩ bhī ehā-j
reading-for much effort making-is And Rājā-of mind-in also this-very

bāt hō-rahī-chhē kē, 'mhārē mulkē-rē ād'mī paiē aur ap'ri
thing occurring-is that, 'my country-in-of men may-read and their-own

jubān sāvārē ' Ehī-j khātar jagā-jagā madar'sā kāyam
language may-improve ' This-very for place-place schools established

kar-rakhē-chhē Ehē hamārē dēsē-rī jubān un gōarā barī dērē
making-he-is And our country-of language those men great by-delay

sam'jhē pāvē-chhē Par ham yakīn karā-chhē kē, jabē wōhō
to-understand getting-are But we certain making-are that, when that

Rājā-rī kōsis jubān sāvārē-rē hō-rahī-chhē, jaldiha-j unō-rī
Rājā-of effort language improving-for being-made-is, quickly-veryly their

jubān sāvār jāēgī.
tongue improved will-go.

I served for ten years in the State of Nāhan, and came home a year ago. The climate there is very good, but does not please the people of our country, for the mountaineers there are very ignorant, and we find it difficult to understand their speech. But the Rājā of Nāhan is making greater efforts than the neighbouring Rājās are doing to

educate the people and to polish their language. The Rājā's mind is full of this idea,—
'I must teach my subjects to read and must polish their language. With this object
he is establishing schools here and there.

The people of that country very slowly understand our language, but now that the
Raja is endeavouring to improve theirs, it will very quickly become quite polished.

OUDH BANJĀRĪ.

In Oudh, the Banjārī does not differ from that of Saharanpur. A few short sentences will serve to show this. I have selected them to exemplify the use of *chhē* to mean 'was,' as stated when dealing with the Saharanpur Banjārī. We may note a few Rājasthānī forms which did not occur in the specimens from the latter district. Such are *man*, I, and *thaĩ*, thou.

[No. II.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

BANJĀRĪ.

(DISTRICT KHERĪ)

Dī	bhāī	gharē-mā̃	takrār	karē-chhē	Larāī	bakhērā-tah
<i>Two</i>	<i>brothers</i>	<i>the-house-in</i>	<i>dispute</i>	<i>making-were.</i>	<i>Quarrel</i>	<i>dispute-from</i>
ap'rē	mālē	pāchhō	karē-chhē.	Aki	bhāī	kahō, 'thaĩ
<i>their-own</i>	<i>property</i>	<i>after</i>	<i>doing-they-were</i>	<i>One</i>	<i>brother</i>	<i>said, 'thou</i>
nyārō	kar-dē	Chār	pañch	bulāī,	sō	usō usō
<i>divided</i>	<i>make</i>	<i>Four</i>	<i>arbitrators</i>	<i>having-called,</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>half-and-half</i>
bāt-dē,	man	chāhō	mālō	khāũ	chāhō	urāũ
<i>dividing-having-given,</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>whether</i>	<i>the-property</i>	<i>eat</i>	<i>or-whether</i>	<i>I-squander</i>
tū-sē	kōhai	jarū	nahĩ	chhē'		
<i>thee-with</i>	<i>any</i>	<i>concern</i>	<i>not</i>	<i>is.'</i>		

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING

Two brothers, living in the same house, used to quarrel about their property. One said to the other, 'let us partition the property. We can call four arbitrators, and they can divide it half and half, and then whether I use my property or dissipate it, it will be no concern of yours.'

KĀKERI

The Kākēri are a small tribe of comb makers who are settled in the district of Jham in the United Provinces. They are said to have immigrated thither from Ajmer about two hundred years ago. They have a language of their own. Only some forty speakers of it have been recorded. I give two specimens of it—an extract from the Parāṇ of the Prolīṇā Śam and a folk tale.

It will be seen that the language is exactly the same as that form of Lāḥiānī of which the standard is found in Herāt. In other words, it is based on the language of South-West Ilāḥiṭāna and of North Gujrat.

[No 12]

INDO ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

KĀKĒRI

KĀKĒRI DIALECT

(DISTRICT JHAMSL)

SPECIMEN I

Ek jām-ē dī chīḥāṭ hātē Ōn chīḥāṭ chīḥāṭ apnā hāp-āṭ
One man to two men were His younger son his-own father to
 Lal, ē dāḥā, ē dīḥā-mī-āṭ j, mār hāw-mā hāḥā
said, O father that property-is form with my share-in may-be-set
 w, dī-ḥā, Tab tā dīḥā bī, dīḥā Ḥahut dīḥā nī hū
that piece-away Then he properly dividing gave Many days not be-came
 chīḥā chīḥā wā kuchh hāḥā pād-ā-mā chāḥ-gāṭ ōr
the-possessor are all this, collecting a fore-own-country-into went-away and
 ōḥ hūḥ-pād-ā-mā wāḥṇ dīḥā up-dīḥā Jāḥ bā wāḥṇ dīḥā
there evil-conduct-in all fortune wasted-away When he all fortune
 up-dīḥā, wā ō dīḥā-mā bāp kāl pād. Ab ō kāḥgāl
had-wasted then that country-in great famine fell Now he indigent
 h, pā, aur ōḥṇ rāḥāḥ-mā fāḥṇ nāḥṇ rāḥṇ lāḥ; jū
became and that-place-of inhabitants in one-of near to-live began; who
 ōḥṇ wāḥ chāḥṇ nāḥ pād-āḥ-dīḥā Aur jām-wī bhūs wāḥ khāḥ-
him were feeding-for sent-away And which asks the-own used-to
 tā āḥṇ khūḥ-āṭ ō bhūs khāḥ chāḥ-āṭ. Kāḥ-nā
eat his-own pleasure-with those asks to-eat wishing he-was Anybody-by
 nī dīḥā
not was-given.

[No. 13.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

BANJĀRĪ.

KĀKĒRĪ DIALECT.

(DISTRICT JHANSI.)

SPECIMEN II.

Ēk rājā-rī ēk sundar chhōrī hatī Ō-rē gurūē ū
A king-of a beautiful daughter was. By-his religious-guide that
 bēti-rē lānē ap'nē manē-ma pāp bihārō So rājā-nē
daughter-of for his-own mind-in sin was-thought So the-king-to
 kaī kī, 'tārī bēti-nē kaj lag-gaī.' Tō Rājā
it-was-said that, 'thy daughter-to an-ill-omen has-seized.' Then the-king
 hāt jōr-kē gurū-rē āgē thārō-huō, aur kaī
hand folded-having the-religious-guide-of before stood-up, and it-was-said
 kī, 'mārī bēti-rī kaj kāī taiē chhutē?' Tō
that, 'my daughter-of ill-omen what in-way may-leave?' Then
 guruē kaī kī, 'rājā, tū ēk chand'nē-rō
by-the-religious-guide it-was-said that, 'O-king, thou one sandal-wood-of
 kath'rā banā, aur ū-ma ī bēti-nē banthār-kē samundarē-ma
box make, and that-in this daughter making-to-sit the-sea-in
 bōā-dai' Rājā bē tarē karō Āp'nē bēti-nē
make-to-float-away' The-king that very-way-in did His-own daughter
 kath'rā-ma banthār-kē samundarē-ma bōā-dīnī Ab
box-in making-to-sit sea-in she-was-caused-to-float-away Now
 ō-iō guār bēāōtā sīkār khēl'tō-tō, sō ū kath'rā dēkhō Āp'nē
her man wedded hunting -playing-was, that he the-box saw His-own
 sāgatī-nē kaī kī, 'ē-nē pak'rō' Sō baī samundarē-ma
friends-to it-was-said that, 'this take-hold-of' So they the-sea-into
 kūḍ-parē aur jhat kath'rā-nē pakar-līnō, aur ō-nē pārē-pa lē-āyē.
jumped and at-once the-box took-hold-of, and it beach-on brought.
 Sō ō-nē khōlō, aur dēkhō, ū-ma bēti hatī Ū jō
Now him-by it-was opened, and it-was-seen, that-in a-girl was. She when
 āp'nē guārē-nē dēkhō, sō āp'nō mōh dhāk-līnō. Bēti-nē
her-own husband saw, then her-own face covered The-girl-to
 guār kathē chhē kī, 'tū, kasē āī?' Baī kaī kī,
the-husband says that, 'thou, how came?' By-her it-was-said that,
 'mārē bāpē-rē gurū hatō. Ū bāpē-nē kaī-kē mā-nē
'my father-of religious-guide was. He the-father-to saying me

kār-wāc Gurū mān-mā mē-aeī pāp bīchārō
 set turned-east By the-religious-guide mind in me towards sin was thought
 Ye ebbi lai aur kāl nēī ebbē' O-rē gurū
 This was the-case either anything not is' By-her husband
 kāl lī ghārō chāl pāl kāl kī, māī aibō
 it-would that home come By-her it-was-said that I in this way
 chālō lī dīgērō bandārō th kākē ch mā bē-d-u, aur kālī rā
 someone that forest-of money one bringing this-in shut up and the box
 l idhā Tāh māī ghārō-rō chāl jādī O-rē gurū
 on relief-money Then I home-to I-will come By her man
 jālī kāl
 seven it-was-done

Gurū rō samundārōrī tīpū jā ghār hātū So
 Th set p our-guide the-sea-of island-in a horse was So
 kīrā ebbē' kāl kī, kālīrā nā pāl rā ē
 his-own dis-pen-to it-was lī that the box take hold-of They
 samundārā nā kīr jādī aur kālīrā-rī pālāpīlū.
 the-mule jumped a d the-box they-cought

Gurū Gurū kīrā ghār-mā dīhārā-dīhā,
 By the-religious-guide it-for his-own horse-in it-was covered to-be placed
 aur ebbē' kāl kī kī khol dīhārā kār-nē aur
 out the-disciples-to it-would that today well Ayana make and
 jō hām l amē, to l dīr nāl th chēlā dīhārā kār
 if I may-well then speak do-well You the disciples Ayana to-make
 hāt kīr jādī pā gurū ō kālīrā lāpī khar l-āī
 born mid-achit by the-religious-guide that her great pleasure-with

kāl kō lārīrā nīkīr aur gurū-ū gār-ū
 un-repented So the-money come-out and the-religious-guide with need by
 l pāl aur chī kīhō. kī gurū mān-gāō. Jāh
 he-cought and term-it-open. So the-religious-guide died It hen
 gurū nēī ujbē-chhā a chēlā kēwār-rī sandē-mā
 the-religious-guide not rises then by-the-disciples the-door-of hole-in
 hīkē dākīhō; gurū mān-pāpū sō kēwār
 through it-was-open; the-religious-guide dead was lying So the-door
 kīhō aur lārīrā bhāg-gāō. Aur chēlā kāl
 they-repented and the-money ran-away And by the-disciples it was said
 jīkī mān gurū nō mān nākha.
 in this-way our religious-guide-to it-was-killed

ŚIKSHĀ.

MORAL.

Jō jasī karanī karē, jō jasī phala pāe.
Who as action does, he so fruit obtains.

Sundarī baithī apanē gharē, bābā-nē bandara khāe.
The-fair-one sat in-her-own in-house, the-holy-man-to the-monkey eats.

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING

A certain king had a very beautiful daughter. His private chaplain looked upon her with evil intent, and to gratify it, said to the king that she was under the influence of some evil omen. The king stood before the monk with joined hands and asked him how the evil might be removed from his daughter. The monk then said, 'Make a chest of sandal-wood, and having shut up your daughter therein, throw her into the sea.'

The king did as he was told, and having shut her up in the chest threw her into the sea.

The girl's husband, who was out hunting, saw the floating chest, and ordered his men to jump into the sea and fetch it ashore. His men did so. When the chest was brought on land and opened, lo! there was the girl alive. As soon as she recognized her husband, she covered her face. The husband asked her how she had been thus shut up. She replied that her father's chaplain, who had an evil intent with regard to her, had brought her into this predicament. Then the husband asked her to come home with him, but she refused and said that she could not do so unless a monkey brought from the forest was placed in her stead, and the chest left floating.

Her husband did so, and she went to her husband's house.

Meanwhile the monk whose monastery was situated on an island on the sea, saw the chest floating and ordered his disciples to bring it ashore.

They did so and he had it removed to his own room.

Then he ordered his disciples to go on with their usual hymns with great vigor, and added that even if he should call them, they need not attend.

Then at midnight, full of joy, he opened the chest, but to his surprise, he found there a fierce monkey who fell upon him and tore his throat open, so that he fell down dead.

Next morning, when the disciples saw that their master did not come out though it was late in the day, they peeped through a hole in the door, and saw that he lay dead. They opened the door, and out ran the monkey.

Then they understood that the monkey must have killed their preceptor.

MORAL.—As a man sows, so does he reap. Beauty sits quiet at home, while the monk is killed by the monkey.

LABĀNKĪ OF THE PUNJAB

The Labānkī (locally called Labānī or Labānki) of the Punjab is also based on Rājasthānī. But its original is rather the Dāgri of north west Rajputana, than the half Mārwāṇī half Gujarātī which we have observed in the Central Provinces. It will be remembered that one of the typical peculiarities of Dāgri is that the initial *k* of the genitive postposition is changed to *g* so that *ku* becomes *gū*. In Punjab Labānī this principle is carried still further. The dative postposition *kū* becomes *gū*, the ablative postposition *hi* becomes *di*, the past tense of the verb substantive *to*, was, becomes *du* and similarly the illative conjunction *tō* then, becomes *dō*. We even find the word *phārdō*, *ci* the changed to *diārdō*.

The declension of nouns follows the usual north western Rājasthānī forms. The nominative of strong masculine *a* bases ends in *ō* not *ā* and its oblique form and plural ends in *ā* not *ī*. Thus, *ghōṛō* a horse oblique form *ghōṛī*. There is the usual locative in *ē* as in *ghōṛē* on a horse. The agent case however takes the postposition *nē* and is regularly employed before the past tenses of transitive verbs.

The usual postpositions are—

Dative accusative *kāḍ gū gī* (locative of the genitive) *kū* (borrowed from Hīndostānī) *nē* (a Gujarātī form), *nū* (Panjabī)

Ablative *di* *en* *kāḍ* (from near) Genitive *gū* (Dāgri) *ro* (Mārwāṇī) *kā* (Hīndostānī) Locative *nū*

Sometimes *nē* is used as a sign of the agent case as in *na nē dīn*, he gave; *jin nē* by whom. The genitive postpositions end in *ē* when agreeing with a noun in the locative as in *in-ē* *enāḍē* for this. In one case we have *nē* the locative of the Gujarātī genitive suffix *nō* viz., in *chillār-nē kārē* with the husks. *Idā* is used as the sign of the accusative in *jē-nī sur kākē-dō*, what the swine were eating.

The vocative particle is *nē* when addressing men and *nī* when addressing women.

The oblique plural sometimes ends in *on* as in Rājasthānī. Thus, *ākhān nū* in eyes; *ghān-on* on the feet.

As a general rule Hīndostānī and Panjabī forms are also freely used so that though based on Rājasthānī, the language is essentially mixed in character.

The numerals are as in Hīndostānī. It will be noticed that the form *dī* for two, which we met in the Central Provinces, is not found in the Labānī of the Punjab.

The first two personal pronouns are as follows. The agent case is the same as the nominative —

Mē I by me *māḍrō*, my; *mā kāḍ* to me *kām* we, by us; *kāmīrō* our

Tū or *kāḍ* thou, by thee; *kāḍrō* thy *tām* (a regular Rājasthānī and Gujarātī form) you, by you *kāmīrō* your

In both pronouns Hīndostānī forms are also freely employed.

'He' 'that' is *ō* or *ecā* oblique singular *ū*, nom pl *ē* or *ecā* oblique plural *ū* or *en*. We have also forms like *nūkh ghār-nū* in that house *nūkh nūkh nū* in that country. *Tēh* or *yōh* is this' *i-gē* (accusative), it; *i-gū* of this one; *inākh ghōṛā gī* *enar* the age of this horse.

Other pronominal forms are *jō*, who; *jō-rā* (acc.) what *kām*, *kāh jō* who? *kū-gō* whose? *kā*, *kā-ē* what? *kī nū-k* (with Rājasthānī pleonastic *k*) how many?

Ghar-gō, of the house, is regularly used to mean 'one's own,' like the Hindōstānī *ap'nā*

The verb substantive is thus declined in the present —

Sing		Plur
1	ō, ā, āũ	ā
2	ē, ī	ā, ē
3	ē	ā, ē.

The following forms are also used —

Sing		Plur
1	<i>haigō, chhaigō</i>	<i>haigā, chhaigā</i>
2	<i>haigō, chhaigō</i>	<i>haigā, chhaigā</i>
3.	<i>haigō, chhaigō</i>	<i>haigā, chhaigā</i>

Note that, as in Northern Gujarātī, the second person singular is the same as the first person singular. Note, also, that all persons of the plural end in *ā*

Finally, *har* or *chhar* can be used for any person of the present tense. This also occurs in Gujarātī dialects.

The past tense is *dō*, *hēgō-dō*, or *chhēgō-dō*. The masculine plural is *dā*, *hēgā-dā*, or *chhēgā-dā*

The simple present tense of the finite verb takes the following forms Thus, 'I strike,' etc —

Sing		Plur
1	<i>mārũ</i>	<i>mārā</i>
2	<i>mārũ</i>	<i>mārē</i>
3	<i>mārē</i>	<i>mārē</i>

The Present Definite is formed as in Rājasthānī and Gujarātī, by conjugating the verb substantive with the simple present, and not with the present participle Thus, *maĩ māĩ āũ-āũ*, I am striking. Similarly we have an Imperfect *khāvē-dā*, they were eating.

The Future has *s* for its characteristic letter as in eastern Rājasthānī and Gujarātī. It is conjugated as follows 'I shall strike, etc'.—

Sing		Plur
1	<i>mārūs</i>	<i>mār^sā</i>
2	<i>mārās</i>	<i>mār^sō,</i>
3	<i>mār^sī</i>	<i>mār^san, mār^sē</i>

There is a future passive participle in *de*, which can also be used for the future, as in *kar-de*, it is to be done i.e., (we) shall do.

The Imperative is as usual. Thus, *de-lhad*, give away. Special forms are *li-as* bring with the Rājasthānī pleonastic *s*; *khafe* eat; *ko/ð* become *chārf/ð* go.

It seems that the syllable *gō* (feminine *gī*) may be added to all these forms without affecting the sense. Thus, *de-de-gō*, it may come *chāhī-gō* it is proper *chārf/ð-gī*, go ye women.

The past participle ends in *īō*. Thus, *mārīō* struck. From this past tense are formed exactly as in Hindūstānī. Thus, *ū-nē mārīō* he struck *ō gīō* he went. The Perfect sometimes combines the past participle with the verb substantive into one word. Thus *ayē* for *de-ō-ē* I have come.

Kar-nu, to do, makes its past participle *kīō* or *kīnō*. *Kīō* is also used to mean 'sold', as in Gujarātī.

The present participle is *mārīō* striking the infinitive, *mār-nō* to strike and the conjunctive participle *mār mār-gē* or *mār-kē* having struck.

In *khaufiō* caused to feed, we have a causal verb formed by suffixing *dr* as in Rājasthānī.

The first two specimens of Labānī of the Punjab come from Lahore. They are a version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son and a folk song.

[No 14]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

LABĀNĪ OR LABĀNKĪ

(DISTRICT LAHORE.)

SPECIMEN I

Ek	bandā	gā	dō	ohhōrā	dā.	Ū-gō-mā-dī	nānā	nō	bāpū-gū
One	man-of	two	sons	were	Them-of-in	from	the-younger-by		father-to
kīō,	bāpū	jō	ghar-gō	abāb	ō	ī-gō-mā-dī	jō	mā	kbō
it-was-said	father	what	my	property	is	this-of-in	from	what	we-to
hī	rō	āvō-gū,	woh	dē-thāō.	To	un	rō	ā	khō
share	may-come	that	give-away		And	him	by	him	to
wāṭ,	dīnō	phōr-sārā	dīn	nahī	da	guj	rōyā	nana	
having-divided	was-given	Many	days	wot	were	passed,	the-younger		
ohhōrā	nō	sab-kāū	kaṭhō	kar-liyō,	to	dūr	mul	k-mā	tur-giyō.
son-by	all-everything	together	was-made	and	far	country-in	he-went-away		
Uchhō	un	rō	jā	kō	mārō	māl	luch	panā	mā
There	him	by	gone-having	the-whole	property	debauchery-in	was-wasted-away		
Tavō	un	rō	mārō	māl	kharah	kar-līnō.	Unā	mul	k-mā
If-then	him-by	the-whole	property	spent	was-made	That	country-in		

barō kāl par-gayō. Tavē ū-khō lōrh paran lagī. Woh unā
a-great famine fell Then him-to want to-fall began. He that
 mul^ak-mā ēk gaurā-ālā-karē rah-pariō, te un-rē ū-khō ghar-kī
country-in one village-man-near remained, and him-by him-as-for his-own
 paili-mā sūr charāwan wāstē tōriyō . te un-rē āp-hī ũ
field-in swine grazing for it-was-sent and him-by himself those
 chhillar-nē karē ghar-gō pēt bhar-linō, jē-rā sūr khāvē-dā,
husks-of with his-own belly filled, what the-swine eating-were,
 kōi-nē ū-khō khā-n diyō Tavē ū-khō akal āī, un-rē
any-one-by him-to anything-not was-given Then him-to senses came, him-by
 kiō, 'mhārā bāpū-gā kit^anā-hī mānas kaul khāvē, te
it-was-said, 'my father-of many-even servants loaves eat, and
 un-kē-dī kit^anō-hī wadh-rahē, te maī ihā bhūkhō
them-of-from how-much-even is-left-over-and-above, and I here hungry
 pariō marū-ō. Maī ihā-dī uthūs, te ghar-gā bāpū dhāī
fallen dying-am I here-from will-arise, and my-own father near
 jāūs, te ū-khō kahūs, "bāpū, maī Par^amēsar-gō pāp kiō,
I-will-go, and him-to I-will-say, "father, by-me God-of sin was-done,
 te thāiō vī pāp kiō, maī thārō chhōrō kahāwan jōgō nāhī
and thy even sin was-done, I thy son to-be-called worthy not
 rihō, mū-khō ghar-gā kāmā sār^akhō jān." 'Te woh uthiō,
remained, me-to your-own servant like think." 'And he arose,
 ghar-gā bāpū kōl giō, par tavē woh barī dūr dō, ū-gā bāpū-nē
his-own father near went, but still he very far was, his father-by
 ū-khō dēkh-linō, te ū-khō tars āiō ar woh dauriō, ū-khō
him-to it-was-seen, and him-to compassion came and he ran, him-to
 galā-karē lā-linō, te ū-khō chumiō Te chhōrē-nē ū-khō
neck-near it-was-applied, and him-to it-was-kissed And the-son-by him-to
 kiō, 'bāpū, maī Par^amēsar-gō pāp kinō, te thārī ākhan-mā
it-was-said, 'father, by-me God-of sin was-done, and thy eyes-in
 gunāh kinō, maī thārō chhōrō kahāwan jōgō nāhī rihō.
sin was-done, I thy son to-be-called worthy not remained'
 Par bāpū-nē ghar-gā mānas-nū kiō, 'barā changā tūk^arā
But father-by his-own servants-to it-was-said, 'very good clothes
 kādh li-ās, te ū-khō bharāō, te i-gā hāth-mā chhallō
taking-out bring, and him-to put-on, and this-one-of hand-in ring
 bharāō, te i-gā gōdan-mā palmī bharāō, te ā khājē ar
put-on, and this-one-of feet-in shoes put-on, and come let-us-eat and
 rāzī hōjē, kyō-jō yoh mhārō chhōrō mar-giyō-dō, te phēr
happy let-us-be, because-that this my son dead-gone-was, and again

reḥ j̥pariō-ē; yoh khapiō-giō-d, to mīl pariō-ē' To khushi
 he all-to-become-is he l̥l-gone-was and found-become is And happiness
 karan laḡ
 to-do they-are

To āg, m̥jō chhōru pūllī m̥ dā Tasē woh hīo to ghar-gō
 and his elder son field-to was When he came and house-of
 j̥ad hī, un rē wājīā to nēchīā suniō Te un rē ghar-gā
 here came him-by music and dancing was-heard and him by his-own
 mānā-nē-m̥-dī āk-gū l̥k mīrī to puchhīā, yoh k̥ā
 to-asked-from one to great woman-je and he-asked this what
 l̥ān rīchī? To un rē ā k̥ī hī, thārō bhāā āl-rē to
 group-came? and him-by him to it was-said thy brother come is and
 thārō l̥apā nā kaul dīnēt ky-jī chhōru āg sukhi-kap
 thy fatherly bread piece-je because that the son him of happiness with
 āg-rē To woh ghūā hī, to ghar-mā nāhī j̥wādā
 come-is And he angry become, and he sein not going was
 l̥rē wājīā l̥apā l̥ār āk, to ā k̥ī tārī-āhī. To
 thing for father outside came and him to entirely-was made And
 un rē j̥wāhī d-ā k̥ē ghar-gā l̥apā-gū hī it'nā
 him-by answer piece-taking him-own father-to it was said, so-much
 dīn-ārā l̥ār mā thārō (ah) k̥īnēt k̥ū wārī vī māī thārō
 many years by-me thy service done-is any time seen by-me thy
 hī nāhī āg; tādīhī tū mā k̥ī b̥k'rō nāhī
 again not was-discovered; nevertheless by-the me-to a goat not
 dīn j̥ō mā ghar-gā b̥l-nu rāī kārīā Par
 was-given that I my-own friends-to happy might have made But
 tārē thārō yoh chhōru ā j̥in rē thārō āru māī kanj rī pāī
 when thy this son come wholly thy whole property karats-on
 uj̥r-dīn-ārā āg tādīā tū kaul khawāp-rō
 was-wasted-away that-of in-return by thee bread was-made-to-be eaten
 To un-rē ā k̥ī hī, āī chhōru, tū rādā mīārō kapē l̥
 and him-by him to it was-said O son thou always me with art
 to j̥en-kaun māhārū chhāl thārōī (; yoh chāhī-gō dō ham rāī
 and whatever mine is thine-even is this proper was we happy
 hī to khushi kārīā, kyō-jō yoh thārō
 should have been and happiness should have made because that this thy
 l̥hā māngiō-dū, to phēr j̥l pariō-ē to woh khārīō-giō-dū,
 brother dead-gone-was and again alive-become-is and he lost-gone-was
 to mīl pariō-ē'
 and found-become-is'

[No. 15.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

WEST CENTRAL GROUP.

LABĀNĪ OR LABĀNKĪ.

(LAHORE DISTRICT.)

SPECIMEN II.

Chālō, rī chhōriyō, rukh^arī chāl^{jē}-gī.*Come, O girls, (to-)tree to-go*Rukh^arī chāl-kē te kā-hō kar^abō rī.*Tree gone-having and what-O is-to-be-done O.*Rukh^arī chāl-kē te bhāyā khēl^abō rī.*Tree gone-having and brother(-with) it-is-to-be-played O.*Rukh^arī chāl-kē te kasīdā kādh^abō rī.*Tree gone-having and needle-work is-to-be-drawn O.*Chālō, chhōriyō, bāudē chāl^{jē} rī.*Come, girls, out come O.*

Bāudē chāl-kē kā banābō rī.

*Out gone-having what is-to-be-made O.*Bāudē chāl-kē bēlā tōr^abō rī.*Out gone-having long-grass is-to-be-cut O.*Bēlā tōr-kē te sāwā^ā khēl^abō rī*Long-grass cut-having and sāvā^ā is-to-be-played O.*Nhāthō, rī chhōriyō, mug^aliā āyā^ā rī.*Run, O girls, Mughals have-come O.*

Tam mat nhāthō, rī chhōriyō, ham Labānā rī.

You not run, O girls, we Labānās O.

Jē tam Labānā hōtā, dō mōdē kalāi iē

If you Labānās were, then on-shoulder sticks O.

Jē tam Labānā hōtā dō dhilā kachhōtā rē.

If you Labānās were, then loose waist-band O

Jē tam Labānā hōtā, dō māthē pindī rē.

If you Labānās were, then on-forehead turbans O

Tam, rī chhōriyō, kē-rē tāndē giō?

You, O girls, what-in-of in-camp are (you)?

Ham-jō ohhōrī Gūjar-gē tāndē giū.

*We-veryly girls Gujar-in-of in-camp are.*Kaun vēhājē khar^awō, kaun vēhājē chhīt? Khar^awō gham-kār*Who buys red-cloth, who buys calico? Red-cloth noise*machāvē
makes.

Bātrū	vāhājō	kharwō	hauriyō	vāhājō	chhīt,	kharwō
Father-in-law	buys	red-cloth,	daughter-in-law	buys	calico,	red-cloth
gham kār	machāvō					
noise	makes					
Kit'nā k	āvō	kharwō	kit'nā k	āl	chhīt	Kharwō
How-much	came	red-cloth	how-much	came (purchased)	calico	Red-cloth
gham kār	machāvō					
noise	makes					
Kharwō	āth	gāj	hī	kharwō,	das	gāj
Red-cloth	eight	yards	is-obtained,	red-cloth	ten	yards
chhīt,	gham kār	machāvō	kharwō			
calico,	noise	makes	red-cloth			

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING

- (1) Come, girls, come to a tree¹
- (2) 'What shall we do if we go to a tree?
- (3) We shall go to the tree. There we shall sport with our brethren and do needle-work
- (4) Come girls, come out.
- (5) If we go out, what shall we do?
- (6) When we go out, we shall cut long grass.
- (7) And we shall play the sports of the month of Sāwan

Fate a troop of Mughul soldiers

- (8) Run away, girls here is a troop of Mughuls.
- (9) (The Mughuls) Do not run away girls. We are Labinās.
- (10) 'If you were Labinās, you would carry sticks on your shoulders.
- (11) If you were Labinās, your wai thanda would be loose
- (12) If you were Labinās you would have *piadi* turbans on your heads
- (13) O girls in what village do you live?
- (14) 'We girls live in a Gujar village
- (15) 'Who wants to buy red cloth and who wants to buy chintz? The red cloth makes a noise¹
- (16) 'The father in law buys red cloth and the daughter in law buys chintz. The red cloth makes a noise
- (17) 'How much red cloth was purchased and how much chintz? The red cloth makes a noise
- (18) 'Eight yards of red cloth were purchased and ten yards of chintz. The red cloth makes a noise

¹ I am not sure of the meaning of this last phrase. It may mean 'he sells out red cloth for sale.

LABĀNĪ OF KANGRA.

The Labānī of Kangra does not differ from that of Lahore. There are only a few local peculiarities. As a specimen, I give an interesting folk-tale

We may note the following few divergencies from what we have seen in Lahore

The locative of the genitive as well as the sign of the conjunctive participle is sometimes written *gar* instead of *gē*. For the dative we have *gū* (not *gū̃*) and *khū* (not *khō̃*) The sign of the locative is *maĩ*.

The datives of the first two personal pronouns are *ma-khū*, to me, *ta-khū*, to thee *Woh*, that, and *yoh*, this, have feminine forms, *wah* and *yah*, in the nominative singular Thus, *wah ant dēsī*, she will give the explanation, *wah jagah dēsī*, that place (fem) appeared, *yah (bāt, understood) mushkal chhai*, this thing is difficult. In Rājasthānī these pronouns have also such feminine forms.

The same two pronouns have *unē* and *mē* for their oblique forms singular Thus, *unē janānā-nē*, by that woman, *mē bāt-gū*, to this thing:

‘What?’ is *kah*, and ‘anything’ *kaĩ*

Among verbal forms note *thō* as well as *dō* for ‘was’; *karas*, I shall do, *dēs*, I will give, *dēsī*, she will give The past participle is spelt with *y*, not *e* Thus, *dēkhyō*, seen

[No. 16.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP.

LABĀNĪ.

(KANGRA DISTRICT)

Ēk	mānas	naukārī	dē-kai		ghar-gū	āyō-thō.		
<i>A</i>	<i>man</i>	<i>service</i>	<i>given-having (fulfilled)</i>		<i>home-to</i>	<i>come-was.</i>		
Āgē	paīdē-maī	andhērī	rāt-gū	kuchhē	rah ⁿ nā-gī	salāh		
<i>Further-on</i>	<i>the-road-in</i>	<i>dark</i>	<i>night-at</i>	<i>some-where</i>	<i>stopping-of</i>	<i>intention</i>		
hūi.	Adh ^r rātō	hōyō,	tō	ū-nē	dēkhyō	ēk	janānā-nē	ghar-kō
<i>became</i>	<i>Midnight</i>	<i>became,</i>	<i>then</i>	<i>him-by</i>	<i>was-seen</i>	<i>one</i>	<i>woman-by</i>	<i>her-own</i>
bētā	yār-gai	kahē		lag-gai	kātārālyō	Unē	mānas-nē	
<i>son</i>	<i>the-lover-at-of</i>	<i>at-the-order</i>		<i>joined-having</i>	<i>was-killed</i>	<i>That</i>	<i>man-by</i>	
mē	bāt-gū	dēkh-gai	saghālā-tāī	mhāī	rahyō	Unē	janānā-gū	
<i>this</i>	<i>occurrence-to</i>	<i>seen-having</i>	<i>morning-till</i>	<i>there</i>	<i>stayed</i>	<i>That</i>	<i>woman-to</i>	
mē	bāt-gū	bhēd	puchhyō	kī,	‘inē	bātē-gū	ant	dē, kī
<i>this</i>	<i>matter-to</i>	<i>secret</i>	<i>was-asked</i>	<i>that,</i>	<i>‘this</i>	<i>matter-of</i>	<i>meaning</i>	<i>give, that</i>
yār-gai	kahē		lag-gai	bētā-gū	kyū	mār-diō?		Kai,
<i>lover-at-of</i>	<i>at-the-saying</i>		<i>joined-having</i>	<i>the-son-to</i>	<i>why</i>	<i>was-killed?</i>		<i>What,</i>
ta-khū	bētā	pyārō	naī	dō?	Unē	janānā-nē	jawāb	diō kai,
<i>thee-to</i>	<i>the-son</i>	<i>dear</i>	<i>not</i>	<i>was?</i>	<i>That</i>	<i>woman-by</i>	<i>answer</i>	<i>was-given that,</i>

'inē bāt-gū ant laiuō, tau mhārī bah'nī jōlē jā; māī
this matter-of meaning is-to-be-taken then my sister near go I
 - chīṭhī diyī Wah ta khū ant dēL Woh mānas chīṭhī
 (a)-letter give She thee-to meaning will-give That man the-letter
 lē-gnī ā-gī bah'nī jōlē gayō. Chīṭhī dēkh-gai kahyō
 taken-having her-of sister near went The-letter seen having it-was-said
 ki jōṭhā at'war-gū ā aur jōṭhā bak'rū
 that eldest (i.e. first-of the-month) Sunday-on come and a first born kid
 kēpō lē-ā; māī ta khū ant dēL' Woh mānas jōṭhā at'war-gū
 with bring I thee-to meaning will-give That man eldest Sunday-on
 bak'rū lē-kar ayō Unō janānā nē chankō bōhīl-diyō,
 (a) goat taken having came That woman-by a-mud platform was-prepared
 bak'rū gū ūbhō kiyō, sandhūr-gō jikō la-diyō aur unō
 the-goat-to standing up was made vermilion-of mark was-applied and that
 mānas-gnī hāth māī tal'wār dī, aur kahyō ki tavē māī
 man-in-of hand-in a sword was-given and it was said that when I
 ta khū sarat larnā, tau tū bak'rū-gū khat'rāl'jā. Unō janānā nē kaū
 thee-to sign make then thou the-goat to kill That woman by some
 mantra parh-gnī sarat dī. Ū nō bak'rū khat'rāl'yō.
 incantations recited having the-sign was-given Him-by the-goat was-killed
 Woh mānas kah dēkhō ki māī ek ban māī chhiyī lōī
 That man what did he-see that I one forest-in am any
 manas najar naī āt; phirāt-phirāt najar-māī ayō ek
 man (in) sight not comes wandering-about sight-in came one
 gōl-wō ghar diyō kōī bōhō naī dōī. Ū knī alē-dwālē phirāt
 roundish house was seen any door not was It-of round-about walking
 rihyō, aur lōī bīdh nē upar chahyō. Tau ghar-māī ek
 I remained and some means-by up I-climbed Then the-house-in one
 paīrī dīst. Ghar māī utaryō, khāt bīchhanō bīchhyō thō
 ladder was-seen The-house-in I-descended bedstead bedding spread was
 upar mānas kōī naī dō. Khāt par ohup-gup sō-gayō.
 but man any not was The-bedstead-on quietly I went-to-sleep
 Inē ghar-gī mālkap ohār pari thī Vēh āī, tau kōī
 This house-of owners four fairies were They came then some
 pakhlō mānas mhl' sōyā dēkh-kar, qar-gai kahan lagī
 strange to them there sleeping seen-having they-became-afraid to say they began
 ki, Mahārāj nō ham-khū ban māī mānas balū-diyō i khū kaū
 that God-by us-to the-forest in a man has-been-summoned this-one-to anything
 mat kahū. Un janānā nē mālāh kar kō unō mānas-gū kaū
 not say Those women-by council having-made that man-to anything
 naī kahyō. Tavē woh jāg-paryā, tō ā khū kharā khara khāp gū
 not was said. When he woke-up, then him to very-good food

diyō, aur ū-khū dhiryā karā-diyō. Inē dhab-nē ū-khū
was-given, and him-to comfort was-made This manner-with him-to
 das pand^arāh din khurāk dēt-rahī, aur āpas-māī
ten fifteen days food they-continued-to-give, and themselves-in
 un-kō badō pyār hō-gayō.
them-to great affection became

Un mānas-nē ēk din parī-gū kahyō ki, 'tam tavē
That man-by one day the-fairies-to it-was-said that, 'you when
 sail karan chālī-jāō, tau māī ēk^alau darap-jāū.' Parī-nē
walking to-make go, then I alone afraid-become.' The-fairies-by
 ī-khū ghar-gī kuñjī dē-dī, aur kahyō ki, 'phalānī
this-one-to the-house-of key was-given, and it-was-said that, 'such-and-such
 kōth^arī-gū mat ughār^ajē; aur sab kōth^arī ughār-gē
room-to not open, and all-(other) the-rooms opened-having
 dēkhat-rah^ajē.' In khusī-māī ēk mahinō gujar gayō, veh
looking-remain.' This happiness-in one month having-passed went, those
 parī ū-kī janānā ban-gaī, aur woh un-kā khasam.
fairies his wives became, and he their husband

Ēk din unē mānas-gā dil-māī āī, uki 'nē kōth^arī-gū
One day that man-of the-mind-into it-came, that 'those rooms-to
 ughār-gē dēkh^anī chāh^ajē' Unē kōth^arī-gū ughār-gī
opened-having to-see it-is-proper' That room-to opening-for
 parī nāh karī-dī ū-nē kōth^arī ughārī Tau
(by)-the-fairies prohibition made-was him-by the-room was-opened Then
 unē kōth^arī-māī gadhō mandhyō disyō Pal^anā ū-kī magar-par, aur
that room-in an-ass tied-up was-seen. A-saddle its back-on, and
 jāīā samān aswārī-gō ū-kī magar thō Gadhō kēhan lagō
jewelled trapping riding-for its back(-on) was. The-ass to-say began
 ki, 'tū ā, mhārē-par charh-jā, māī ta-khu thōrī dēr-māī
that, 'thou come, me-on mount-up, I thee-to a-short while-in
 badī dūr-tāī sail karā-gē yāī pujā-dēs' Woh
a-great distance-to a-junt caused-to-make-having here will-bring.' That
 mānas aswār hō-gayō. Gadhō asmān-gū udyō, aur ēk ban-māī jā-paryō,
man rider became. The-ass the-sky-to flew, and one forest-in alighted,
 dhēri-par phuran lagō, gand^agī v khān lagō
manure-on to-walk-about began, dirt to-eat began

Unē mānas-nē sam^ajhyō, 'gadhō bhūkhō chhai, kaū khā
That man-by it-was-thought, 'the-ass hungry is, something eating
 pī lē' Āp utar-gē dānak sō-gayō.
drinking let-it-take' He-himself dismounted-having at-once went-to-sleep.
 Dānak ākh lag-gaī Ākh ugbāī tau kah dēkhyō ki
At-once eye closed. Eye opened then what was-seen that

gadho	mhā	naī	rahyō	aur	unō	jagh	bak'rū
<i>the-as</i>	<i>there</i>	<i>not</i>	<i>remained</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>place</i>	<i>the-goat</i>
kā'rō-dō,	wah	jagh	disl.	Unō	janānā-jōlō		daur-gō
<i>killed-was</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>place</i>	<i>was-seen</i>	<i>That</i>	<i>woman-near</i>		<i>run-having</i>
gayō;	kahan	lagō	ki	'ma khū	ōk	bēri	phār
<i>he-went</i>	<i>to-say</i>	<i>he-began</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>me</i>	<i>one</i>	<i>time</i>	<i>again</i>
nihl	pajā-dē.	Tau	unō	janānā nō	jawāb	diyō	ki,
<i>there</i>	<i>cause-to-reach</i>	<i>Then</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>woman-by</i>	<i>answer</i>	<i>was-given</i>	<i>that</i>
mushkal	chhal	ab	tū	ghar-kā	jēthā	bēja-gū	lē-a.
<i>difficult</i>	<i>is</i>	<i>now</i>	<i>thou</i>	<i>thine-own</i>	<i>first born</i>	<i>son</i>	<i>bring</i>
pajā-diyū.	Tiyū	knhyō	tiyū hī	jēthā	bēja-gū	lē-āyū,	aur
<i>will-concey</i>	<i>Just-as</i>	<i>it-was-said</i>	<i>so</i>	<i>the-first-born</i>	<i>son-to</i>	<i>he-brought</i>	<i>and</i>
bak'rā-gī	jagh	unō	janānā-nō	unō	bēja gū	ubō-kar-diyō	aur
<i>the-goat-of</i>	<i>instead</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>woman-by</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>son to</i>	<i>standing-was-made</i>	<i>and</i>
tal'wār	unō	mānas-gā	hāth-maī	dī,	aur	mantra	payhan
<i>the-sword</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>man-of</i>	<i>hand-in</i>	<i>was-given</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>incantations</i>	<i>to-recite</i>
Tarū	bakhat	sarat-gō	āyū,	tō	tal'wār	unō	manas-gā
<i>When</i>	<i>the-time</i>	<i>the-sign-of</i>	<i>came</i>	<i>then</i>	<i>the-sword</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>man-of</i>
lē-lī,	ki,	pasū,	ta khū	kōī	ant	naī	āyō?
<i>she-took</i>	<i>that</i>	<i>brute</i>	<i>thee-to</i>	<i>any</i>	<i>meaning</i>	<i>not</i>	<i>has-come?</i>

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING

A man was once coming home from service, and as he was benighted on the way stopped for the night in a wayside house. At midnight he saw a woman kill her son at the instigation of her lover. He stayed where he was till morning and then asked her for an explanation of her conduct. Is not said he, thine own son dear to thee? She replied. If thou want an explanation thou must go to my sister. I will give thee a letter to her and she will give thee the explanation.

So the man took the letter to the woman's sister and when the latter had read it, she said. Come to me on the first Sunday of next month with a first born goat, and I will give you the explanation. So on the first Sunday of the next month the man brought her the goat. She had prepared a sacrificial platform on which she made the goat to stand, and she put a vermilion mark on its forehead. Then she gave a sword into the man's hand and said, When I give thee the sign kill the goat. Then she recited some incantations and gave the sign. The man killed the goat and lo and behold, he immediately found himself in the middle of a forest, with not a soul near him. He wandered about till he came to a round looking house without a door. He walked round it and somehow or other managed to climb up the wall and to get down inside. There he found a bedstead and bedding but nobody was there, so he quietly lay down on the bed and went to sleep.

Now the owners of this house were four fairies. When they came home they were quite frightened to see a strange man, and they said among themselves, God has sent us

a man in the middle of this forest. Let us not say anything to him ' So they said nothing to him, and when he awoke they put nice food before him, and did all they could for his comfort. In this way they tended him for some ten or fifteen days, and they all became quite fond of him and he of them.

One day the man said to them, ' When you go out for a stroll, I am always afraid of being alone ' So they gave him the keys of the house, and told him that he might amuse himself by looking into all the rooms, except one, and into that room he was not to go. After a month had passed they got on so well together that they took him for their husband, and he took them for his wives.

One day it came into the man's head that he would look through the rooms of the house, and he opened the door of the room which the fairies had told him not to enter. In the room he saw an ass. It had a saddle on its back, and jewelled trappings. The ass said to him, ' Mount my back, and I will take thee for a ride for a great distance in a moment of time, and then I will bring thee safely back here.' So the man got on its back, and the ass flew up to heaven, and when it came down again, it alighted in a forest. It began to walk about on a dunghill and to eat the dirt. The man thought that the ass was hungry, and got off to give it something to eat and drink. No sooner had he dismounted than he fell into a deep sleep. When he awoke and opened his eyes, the ass was no longer there, and he found himself in the very place where he had killed the goat. He ran up to the woman, and asked her to send him back again to his home with the fairies. She replied, ' This is a difficult thing to do. If you will bring me your first-born son, I will be able to send you there ' As soon as she had finished, he went and fetched his eldest son, and the woman made the boy stand on the platform on which the goat had previously stood. She put a sword into the man's hand and began to recite her incantations. When the time came for her to make the sign to strike the mortal blow, she snatched the sword from his hand, and said, ' Thou brute, dost thou not yet understand why my sister killed her child to please her lover ? '

Except those received from the district of Muzaffargarh, all the remaining Labānī specimens received from the Punjab are in the same language as that of those just given. Further examples are therefore not necessary.

The specimens received from Muzaffargarh are quite different. This district is separated from Bikaner by the north of the State of Bahawalpur, and the Muzaffargarh Labānī specimens are in ordinary Bikanērī. A few lines from the commencement of a folk-tale which in itself is not of great interest, and is moreover not very decent, will show this.

Ēk	saudāgar	saudāg ^r ī-nē	gō.	Saudāgar-zādī	ēk ^r lī	rahī.
<i>A</i>	<i>merchant</i>	<i>trade-for</i>	<i>went.</i>	<i>The-merchant's-wife</i>	<i>alone</i>	<i>remained</i>
Pādshāhī-rō	wazīr	ēk	buddhī-nē	kahē	lāgō,	'saudāgar-zādī
<i>The-kingdom-of</i>	<i>the-wazīr</i>	<i>an</i>	<i>old-woman-to</i>	<i>to-say</i>	<i>began,</i>	<i>'the-merchant's-wife</i>
dhurī	jāō,	mārē-lā-rē	maḡlas	kaiā'		
<i>near</i>	<i>go,</i>	<i>me-with</i>	<i>intimacy</i>	<i>make'</i>		

It is unnecessary to give more. It will be seen that the above is ordinary Bikanērī. I may mention, however, that in this dialect the word for 'two' is *dī*, as in the Labhānī of the Central Provinces.

LABĀNĪ OF GUJARAT

As an example of the Labiānī (locally called 'Labānī') of Gujarat, I give an extract from a version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son received from the district of the Panch Mahala. It will be seen that it follows the Panjābī Labānī in changing an initial *k* to *g*. Thus *kā*, of, becomes *gā* and *kī*, that, becomes *gī*. I have not found any instances of the change of *t* to *d*, which also occurs in the Panjāb. As will be seen from the specimen the dialect is in other respects a mixture of Gujarātī and Mālvī.

Amongst special peculiarities, we may notice the change of *ś* to *a* in words like *dan* for *din* a day and *nakaḷyo* for *nikaḷyō* he went out. So, *ś* becomes *a* in *phar'āśō* for *phēr'āśō* to journey. *U* becomes *a* in *malak* for *malik* a country; *aḡāś* for *uḡāś* prodigal, and *gamāyō* for *gamāyō* wasted. All these also occur in colloquial Gujarātī.

The usual postposition of the agent case is *nē* but we have also *gā* in *ū gā gamāyō* he wasted. The demonstrative pronoun is *ū* *ī* or *e*.

[No. 17]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

LABĀNĪ.

(DISTRICT PANCH MAHALA.)

Ek manakh gē dō chhōra thā. Tī mē-gā nanā chhōra nō ū-ga
One man-to two sons were Them-in-of the-younger son-by him-of
 dādā gē kiyō gī, 'māra bhāg-gō jō māl avō ī ma-gē
father to it-was-said that my share-of what property comes that me-to
 dō. Pachhō ū-gā dādā nō māl-mō-thī ū-gī bhāg pād
give Afterwards him-of father-by property-in-from him-of share having-divided
 diyō. Thōḡā dan kējō nanā chhōrā nō sab māl
was-given A few days afterwards the-younger son-by all property
 bhēgō kar-diyō, nō dur'kā malak phar'wā nakaḷyō. Nō
collected was-made and a-distant country to-journey he-went-out And
 aḡāś hōī ū-gō ū-gō māl gamāyō Jab
prodigal having-become him-by him-of the-property was-squandered When
 ū-gā kanō sab hō-riyō, nō malak mō bhārī kñī paḡyō,
him-of near all disappeared and the-country-in a heavy famine fell
 tabō vī-gē bhīḡ paḡ'wā lagī. Tabō ūpā malak-gā lōk kanō
then him to distress to-fall began Then that country-of a-person near
 gayō, nō vī-gī sāth māl-gayō Ūpō ū-gō āp-gū khēt-mō
he-went and him-of with was-joined. By-him him for his-own field-in
 ḡak'rē chār'wā ghālyō mālyō. Duk'ryā jō khābāki khāī,
wine feeding for he-was-sent The-wine what food used-to-eat
 ū-gā thī yō ū-gī bhūkhī kōkh bhar'ō pap ū-gē
that-of from he him-of the-hungry belly he-used-to-fill but that-as-for
 ī gō diyō nī
him to it-was-given not

BAHRŪPIĀ.

The Bahrūpiās or Mahtams are a tribe who have settled in the Punjab districts of Gujrat and Sialkot. A few, also, are found in the State of Kapurthala. They have a dialect of their own, of which the following speakers have been returned for this Survey —

Sialkot	1,500
Gujrat	1,302
Kapurthala	70
TOTAL	2,872

Their own tradition is that they came from Rajputana with Rājā Mān Singh on the occasion of his expedition to Kabul (A D 1587), and that some of them settled in the neighbourhood of their present seat on his return from that country.

There is a Bahrūp sub-tribe of the Labhānīs of the Punjab, and Sir Denzil Ibbetson¹ has pointed out that the Labhānās and Mahtams closely resemble each other.

Their language is nearly the same as that of the Labhānīs of Berar, *i.e.*, it is based on the dialects spoken in Northern Gujrat (of Bombay) and in South-Western Rajputana. It hence differs somewhat from the Labhānī of the Punjab, which, as we have seen, is more nearly connected with Bāgrī.

As specimens of this dialect, I give a version of the Parable of the Prodigal Son, and an account of the origin of the tribe as narrated by a Bahrūpiā. Both come from Sialkot. It will be seen that the language differs but slightly from Berar Labhānī, except that it is freely mixed with Panjābī. The specimens received from Gujrat are similar, but have a stronger admixture of that language. No specimens have been received from Kapurthala.

The following are the principal characteristics by which we can compare the language of the specimens with the Labhānī of Berar.

There is a tendency to *metathesis*, or the interchange of consonants in the same word. Thus, *wahēlī* for *havēlī*, a mansion.

There is the usual oblique form in *ē* for nouns ending in consonants. Thus the dative of *Lāhōr*, Lahore, is *Lāhōrē-nē*, so *ghorē-thā*, from the house. Strong masculine nouns with *ā* bases end, as usual, in *ō*, with an oblique form in *ā*. Thus, *ghōrīō*, a horse, oblique singular *ghōrīā*. The postposition of the genitive is *rō* (with the usual changes), and that of the dative, *rē*, *rā*, or *nē*. The case of the agent may take *nē*, but, as often as not, drops it.

Note the form *dī*, not *dō*, for 'two'. This is characteristic of Labhānī.

As for the pronouns, there are a few peculiar forms. In the first two personal pronouns, *maĩ* is 'I' and 'by me,' and *taĩ* or *tū* is 'thou' and 'by thee'. Irregular is *mimī* for *maĩ vī*, even I. The genitives are properly *mhārō* and *thārō* (as in Berar), but they are often written *māhrō* or *māhar* and *tāhrō* or *tāhar*, respectively. The pronoun of the third person is *ū*, its oblique form, and also its agent case, is *oh*, *ū*, or *uhō*. 'This' is *ai*. *Jaĩ*, by whom.

¹ *Outlines of Panjāb Ethnography*, §§ 494, 494. Calcutta, 1888.

The present tense of the verb substantive is as usual in Labhāni Thus —

	Singular	Plural
1	chhē or chhē	chhē or chhē
2	chhē	chhē or chhē
3	chhē	chhē

Note that *chhē* can be used for any person and in both numbers. It is also used for the past tense as in the first sentence of the Parable and in many other passages in the specimens. The Gujarāṭī forms *hātō* and *tō* are also freely used.

The conjugation of the finite verb is the same as that of Berar Labhāni. We may note the Gujarāṭī form *gēō* as well as *giyō* for 'he went.'

We have a peculiar negative in *water dētō* was not giving

[No 18.]

INDO ARYAN FAMILY

CENTRAL GROUP

LABHĀNI

BAHRŪPIĀ DIALECT

(DISTRICT SIALKOT)

SPECIMEN I

Ik ād'mī rō dī bēṭā chhē. Eh-dō-māī lō nanbhō bēṭā baū nē
One man to two sons were These-of-in-from the-younger son the-father-to
 pūchhyō, rō bāū jō māhrō hissō chhē, mannē dē-dē Oh nē
asked O father whatever my share is me to give Him-by
 hissō baṇḍ dīnō.' Ō-rō bēṭā nānhō sab kāī līdō,
the share having-divided it-was-given. His son younger all anything took,
 ap'nē-pāī rākh līdō dūrō-rō mulkh chālō-giyō. Utthē jā kō bhairō
himself-with kept far-of country went-away There gone-having bad
 kāmō-rō-māī sab ap'nō māī madā ujaṛ-dīnō. Jad ū sab
acts-of-in all his-own property was-squandered-away When by-him all
 māī madā ujaṛ-dīnō, oh mulkhō-māī baṇō kal peryō ū
the-property was squandered away that country-in a-great famine fell he
 baṇō garīb hō-giyō Oh mulkhō-rō ghāhō-pāī gālō ghāhō
very poor became. That country-of a-wealthy-man-near he-went by the-wealthy-man
 ap'nē pallyō-māī sūr chugāī nē oh nē mālyō Ū kah'tō-tō jō
his-own fields-in swine feeding for him-for he was-sent. He saying-was what
 sūr khātō-tō uh ohhīllar mīmī kḥā līyē. Oh nē kḥā kāī
the-swine eating-were those hawks I also may-call Him to anyone anything
 natar dētō. Jadō oh nē hōgh āī phīr ū kīhyō, māhrē
not need-to-give When him to senses came then by-him it-was-said my

bāp-rē kināñ naukar-chākar gharē-thā bātī khāvē-*chhē*; mañ ittē
father-to how-many servants the-house-from loaves eating-are, I here
 bhūkhō marñ-*chhū* Mañ ap^{nē} bāpē-pāñ jāyñ, oh-nē jā-kē
of-hunger dying-am I my-own father-near will-go, him-to gone-having
 kahñ, "hē bāū, mañ ashmānē-rō gunāh kīdō, tāhrē hutē bhī
I-will-say, "O father, by-me heaven-of sin was-done, of-thee for also
 kīdō, abē mañ tāhrō bētā nahñ banñ, jō tāhar naukar-chākar
it-was-done, now I thy son not may-become, who thy servants
chhē, oh-rē māfak mannē rākh" Phir uth-kē ap^{nē} bāp-pāñ
are, those-of like me keep" Then arisen-having his-own father-near
 ā-giyō Ū aṇē dūr-hī hatō, oh-nē dēkh-kē bāū-nē barō darēg
he-came He yet far-even was, him-to seen-having the-father-to great pity
 āyō, daur-kē oh-nē galē lagār-lidō, ū-rō mūh māthō ohūmyō
came, run-having him-to on-the-neck he-was-applied, his face forehead was-kissed
 Ō-rē bētā kahyō, 'rē bāū, mañ tāhrō tē ashmānē-rō gunāh
Him-to the-son said, 'O father, by-me thee of and heaven-of sin
 kīdō, abē mañ lāiq nahñ, jō tāhrō bētā banñ' Oh-rē bāp
was-done, now I worthy (am)-not, that thy son I-may-become' His father
 kahyō, 'chang chang kap^{rā} liy-āō, oh-nē lag^{rā}-diyō, oh-rē hāthē-māñ *chhāp*,
said, 'good-good clothes bring, him-to put-on; his hand-in a-ring,
 tē paṣō-tē juttī ghalā-diyō, wadō bak^{rā} liy-āō, tē oh-rō jhat^{kā} kaiō, tē
and on-feet shoes put-on, big he-goat bring, and it-of killing do, and
 1al-kē khāwāñ, tē bar khushī karāñ Eh māhrō bētā mar-giyō-tō,
united-having let-us-eat, and a-great joy let-us-make This my son dead-gone-was,
 abē jī-parvō-*chhē*; gumā-giyō-tō, abē lāh-paryō-*chhē*.' Phēr oh khushī
now alive-become-is; lost-gone was, now found-become-is' Then they happiness
 karē lāg.
to-do began

Oh-rō wadō bētā pauli-māñ hatō 'Jad gharē-dē-nērē āyō, gāñō
His elder son the-field-in was When the-house-of-near he-came, singing
 nāch^{nō} sñbalyō Ū ēkī-naukar-nē bulā-ke pūchhyō, 'ai
dancing was-heard By-him one-servant-to called-having it-was-asked, 'this
 kāñ *chhē?* 'Uhō kahyō, 'tāhrō bhāñ āyō-*chhē*, tāhrē bāp bak^{rā}
what is? By-him it-was-said, 'thy brother come-is, (by-)thy father he-goat
 jhat^{kā}ū-*chhē*, ih-wāstē oh-nē bhalō-changō pāyō-*chhē* ' Ū gussē
caused-to-be-killed-is; this-for him-for safe-sound found-he-is' He angry
 hōvō, unhē *chāh* kīdō ai, 'ap^{nē} gharē-māñ na-jāwāñ'
became, to-him wish was-made this, 'my-own house-in not-we (i.e. I)-may-go'
 Oh-rō hīp bīhar ā-kē manā-lidō Oh ap^{nē} bāp-nē
His by-father out come-having it-was-remonstrated. By-him his-own father-to
 jāwāb dīnō, 'dēkh-lē rē, mañ tāhar innā *chir* khidmat kar^{tō} rah^{tō}-*chhū*,
reply was-given, 'see O, I thy so long service doing remaining-am;

kadō māī tabrē kahō-ṭhā bāhar nahī giyō; taī kadō mannō bag'rōṭā
ever I thy command-from out not went by-thee ever to-me kid
 vī dīnō nāhī tō mīmī ap'nō yārō-nālō khushī karū. Jadō
even was-given not that I-also my-own friends-with happiness may-make. When
 tāhrō ai bēṭā āyō-ohhō jāī tāhrō māl kaṣṭ'rō-rō gharō
thy this son come-is by-whom thy property harlots-in-of in-house
 ujāṭē-ohhō tū oh rō wāstō waḍō-bak'rā jhaṭ kāyō-ohhā. Oh nē
squandered was by thee him-of for big he-goat caused to-be killed-is.' Him-to
 oh kahyō, rō bēṭā, tū rōj māhar-pīl ravō-ohhā, jō
by him it-was-said O son thou every-day me-near living-art whatever
 maharō ohhā sō tāhrō ohhā. Abō khush hōtō chāhī ohhō; ai tāhrō bhāī
mine is that thine is Now glad being proper is; this thy brother
 mar-giyō-to, abō jī paṛyō-ohhō gumā-giyō-to, abō ā milyō-ohhā.
dead-was now alive-become-is lost-gone-was now found-is.

[No. 19.]

INDO-ARYAN FAMILY.

CENTRAL GROUP.

LABĀNĪ.

BAHRŪPIĀ DIALECT.

(DISTRICT SIALKOT.)

SPECIMEN II.

Jadē Rājā Mān Singh āyō-ohhē, oh rājā-rē-nālē ham-i naukar
When Rājā Mān Singh come-was, that rājā-of-with we-also servants
 chhē. Rājā Mān Singh jā-kē Kābul mār-lidō Phir jad
were. Rājā Mān Singh(-by) gone-having Kabul was-conquered. Then when
 Rājā Mān Singh Kābul mār-lidō, phir oh-nē wajirō
Rājā Mān Singh(-by) Kabul was-conquered, then him-to ministers
 musaddiyō kahyō, 'hē Rājā, taī Kābul sarkar-lidō-ohhē, abē
statesman(-by) it-was-said, 'O Rājā, by-thee Kabul conquered-is, now
 tū pāchhē Lāhōrē-nē mur-chāl ' Jadē Guj'rāt Rājā Mān Singh
thou back Lahore-to back-go.' When Gujrat Rājā Mān Singh
 ā utaryō, oh-dē-mahārē chār jātē tī, Pawār, Rathaul,
having-come alighted, him-of-in-attendance four clans were, Pawār, Rathaul,
 Ohōhān, Tūr. Tīn jātē mhārī kām-rahī, ēk jāt Tūr Gūj'rī
Ohōhān, Tūr. Three clans ours survived, one clan Tūr a-Gujrī
 pāchhē Musal'mān hō-gayō-tō Phir Rājā mur gayō Jō
for Muhammadan become-were. Then the-Rājā back-went Whosoever
 Rājā-nāl mhār bhāī mur-gaē, oh mur-gaē Phir ham-i Rām-
the-Rājā-with our brothers returned, they returned Then 'we-also Rām-
 nagar wasat-rahē, uttē ap'nē ghar wahēlī ham-i ghāl-
nagar stayed, there our-own houses big-buildings by-us-also were-
 līdī Utthā uth-kē ham-i Sōdh'rē ā-kē
constructed There-from arisen-having we-also Sōdhrā having-come
 wasat-rahē; phir Sōdh'rē-thō uth-kē ham-i gāō ghāl-lid
lived; then Sōdhra-from arisen-having by-us-also village was-founded.

FREE TRANSLATION OF THE FOREGOING.

When Rājā Mān Singh¹ came here, we were his servants 'The Rājā conquered
 Kabul, and then his ministers and courtiers advised him to return towards Lahore.
 When he halted in the Punjab District of Gujrat, four of our clans, Pawār, Rathaur,

¹ Rājā of Āmbēr (Jaipur) He was Akbar's famous lieutenant

Chōhān and Tūr were in attendance on him. Three of these have survived, but the fourth, the Tūr became Muhammadans for the sake of a Gūjar woman. Those of our brethren who went home with the Bājā went home; but we stopped at Ramnagar where we built houses and dwellings. Thence we migrated to Sōdhri and settled there. Then we again moved from Sōdhri and founded our present villages.

STANDARD WORDS AND SENTENCES IN LABHĀNĪ

English.	Labhāl (of Bazar).	Labhāl of Panjāb.
1. One	Ekā	Ek.
2. Two	Do	Do, dā
3. Three	Te	Te.
4. Four	Chār	Chār
5. Five	Pāch	Pāch.
6. Six	Chhā	Chhā, chā.
7. Seven	Sāt	Sāt.
8. Eight	Āṭ	Āṭ.
9. Nine	Naw	Naw.
10. Ten	Das	Das.
11. Twenty	Vis	Vis.
12. Fifty	Pachās	Pachās.
13. Hundred	Sā	Sā.
14. I	Mā, mā, may	Mā
15. Of me	Mārō, rahārō	Mhārō.
16. Mine	Mārō, rahārō	Mhārō.
17. We	Ham	Ham.
18. Of us	Hamārō	Hamārō.
19. Our	Hamārō	Hamārō
20. Thou	Tū, tū	Tū, thū.
21. Of thee	Tārō	Thārō.
22. Thine	Tārō	Thārō.
23. You	Tam, tamō	Tam.
24. Of you	Tamārō	Thmārō.
25. Your	Tamārō	Thmārō.

English.	Labhānī (of Berar).	Labānki of Panjab
26. He . . .	Ū, ō . . .	Ō, woh.
27 Of him . . .	Ō-rō . . .	Ū-gō, ū-kō.
28 His . . .	Ō-rō . . .	Ū-gō, ū-kō.
29 They . . .	Ō . . .	Vē, veh
30 Of them . . .	Ānō-ro, ann-rō . . .	Ū-gō, un-kō.
31. Their . . .	Ānō-rō, anu-rō . . .	Ū-gō, un-kō
32 Hand . . .	Hāt . . .	Hāth
33 Foot . . .	Pag . . .	Gōdō
34 Nose . . .	Nāk . . .	Nāk.
35 Eye . . .	Akhī . . .	Akh
36 Mouth . . .	Mupdō . . .	Mūh.
37 Tooth . . .	Dāt . . .	Dāt.
38 Ear . . .	Kān . . .	Kān
39. Hair . . .	Lattā . . .	Kēs
40 Head . . .	Māthō . . .	Māthō
41 Tongue . . .	Jibh . . .)	Jib.
42 Bolly . . .	Pēt . . .	Pēt
43 Back . . .	Putṭhō, pūṭhō . . .	Kād, magar
44 Iron . . .	Lohō . . .	Loh.
45 Gold . . .	Sōnō . . .	Sōnō
46 Silver . . .	Rupō . . .	Chāḍī.
47 Father . . .	Bāpū . . .	Bāpū.
48 Mother . . .	Yadī . . .	Bāl
49 Brother . . .	Bhāī . . .	Bhāū
50 Sister . . .	Bihēn . . .	Bhānī
51 Man . . .	Māṃas . . .	Bandō.
52 Woman . . .	Bir . . .	Buddī, buḍḍhī, ammā, ammā, lawānī

English.	Labbal (of Bora).	Labbali of Fuzak.
53. Wife	Gəjəp	Buqəti, buqəti, lawini.
54. Child	Ohborə	Jatak.
55. Son	Bəto	Ohborə.
56. Daughter	Bəti	Chborə.
57. Slave	Jəgəq	Kəmə.
58. Cultivator	Kbətəwəto	Jimədar
59. Shepherd	Dhan'gar	Chbətə, wəgi.
60. God	Dəw	Wəb-gurə.
61. Devil	Bhəti	Bhəti
62. Sun	Dən	Səraj
63. Moon	Chəti	Chəti.
64. Star	Tərə	Tərə.
65. Fire	Agər	Ag
66. Water	Pəpi	Pəpi.
67. House	Ghar	Ghar.
68. Horse	Ghəto	Ghəto.
69. Cow	Gawəti	Gawti.
70. Dog	Kwətrə	Kuthrə, kutrə.
71. Cat	Bhəti	Bhəti.
72. Cook	Kəkəto	Kəkkar kəktrə.
73. Duck	Batak	Bəttak.
74. Ass	Gadhə	Khəto.
75. Camel	Uti	Ujəto
76. Bird	Kəməq	Jəmanr
77. Go	Jo	Ja.
78. Eat	Kbə	Kbə.
79. Sit	Bəti	Bəti.

English.	Labhānī (of Berar).	Labānki of Panjab.
80 Come . . .	Ā	Ā
81. Beat . . .	Mār	Mār
82 Stand . . .	Ubhō rah . . .	Khalō-jā.
83 Die	Mar	Mar-jā
84 Give	Da	Dō
85 Run	Dhās	Nath-jā, nhāṭh-jā
86 Up	Uppar	Upar.
87 Near	Kanō	Nōrē
88. Down . . .	Hētō	Talō, thallō.
89 Far	Ghaṇ	Dūr
90 Before . . .	Aghē	Āgē
91 Behind . . .	Pāchhō, pachhō . .	Pāchhō.
92 Who	Kūn	Kaun, kōhṛō.
93. What . . .	Kāi	Kā, kāō
94 Why	Kasā-na	Kiñ
95 And	An	Aur, te
96 But	Paṇ	Par
97. If	Jō	Jō
98. Yes	Hāw	Hā.
99 No	Nah	Nahī, nā
100 Alas	Arōrē	Afsōs, amsōs.
101. A father . . .	Bāpū	Bāpū
102 Of a father . .	Bāpō-rō	Bāpū-gō, -kā
103 To a father . . .	Bāpō-nō	Bāpū-khō, -gū, -gē, -kō, -rē
104 From a father . .	Bāpō-kan-tī (or -kā-tī)	Bāpū-kolō, -dī, -san.
105 Two fathers . . .	Dī bāp	Dō bāpū.
106 Fathers	Bāpa	Dhōr sūrō bāpū.

English	Sinhala (of Burma)	Sinhala of Pagan
100. Of fathers	Pa-pa-ya	Pa-pa-ga-ka
101. To fathers	Pa-pa-ya	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ga-ya-ka-ka-ka
102. From fathers	Pa-pa-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
11. A daughter	Pa-pa	Pa-pa-ka
111. Of a daughter	Pa-pa-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka
112. To a daughter	Pa-pa-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
113. From a daughter	Pa-pa-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
114. To daughters	Pa-pa-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
115. Daughters	Pa-pa-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka
116. Of daughters	Pa-pa-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
117. To daughters	Pa-pa-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
118. From daughters	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
119. A good man	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
12. Of a good man	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
121. To a good man	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
122. From a good man	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
123. To good men	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
124. Good men	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
125. Of good men	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
126. To good men	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
127. From good men	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
128. A good woman	Pa-pa-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
129. A bad boy	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
13. Good woman	Pa-pa-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
131. A bad girl	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka-ka
132. Girl	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka
133. Better	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka	Pa-pa-ka-ka-ka-ka (better than that)

English	Labhānī (of Berar)	Labānki of Panjab
134 Best	Ghaṇḍ āchhō, sē-tī āchhō	Sabh-dī chaṅgō
135 High . .	Ūch . . .	Ūchō.
136 Higher . .	Ō-tī ūch . .	Ū-dī ūchō
137 Highest .	Sē-tī ūch . .	Sabh-dī ūchō.
138 A horse . .	Ghōḍō . . .	Ghōṛō
139. A mare .	Ghōḍī . . .	Ghōṛī
140 Horses	Ghōḍā . . .	Dhēr sārā ghōṛā
141 Mares .	Ghōḍī . . .	Dhēr sārī ghōṛī
142 A bull . .	Balad	Sāḍ, (a bullock) nariō
143 A cow .	Gāw ^a ḍī . . .	Gauṛī
144. Bulls .	Balad	Ḍhēr sāḍ, dhēr nariā
145 Cows .	Gaw ^a ḍī . . .	Ḍhēr gaurī
146. A dog	Kwatrā . . .	Kuth ^a rō
147 A bitch . .	Kwatri . . .	Kuth ^a rī
148 Dogs .	Kwatrā . . .	Ḍhēr kuth ^a rā
149 Bitches .	Kwatri . . .	Ḍhēr kuth ^a rī
150 A he goat	Bak ^a rā . . .	Bok ^a rō
151 A female goat .	Bak ^a rī, chhēlī	Bok ^a rī.
152 Goats	Bak ^a rī . . .	Bok ^a rā
153 A male deer .	Kālavīt . . .	Haran
154 A female deer	Halapī . . .	Har ^a nī
155 Deer . .	Halapī . . .	Ḍhēr haran
156 I am	Ma chhū or ohha	Maī ā, ō, āū, haigō, chhaigō
157. Thou art .	Tū chhī, ohha .	Tū ē, ī, haigō, chhaigō
158 He is .	Ū chhē, chha .	Ō ē, haigō, chhaigō
159. We are	Ham ohhā, ohha	Ham ā, haigā, ohhaigā, chaal
160 You are	Tam chhō, chha .	Tam ā, ō, haigā, ohhaigā

English	Latin (of Person)	Latin of People
161. They are	O chī ē chīa	Vā ē ē balgē chī aīgē
162. I was	Mā vīvīa	Mā dā, lāgīdā, chīlāgīdā
163. They were	Tā vīvīa	Tā dā, lāgīdā, chīlāgīdā
164. He is	Ū vīvīa	Ū dā, lāgīdā, chīlāgīdā
165. We were	Hām vīvīa	Hā dā, lāgīdā, chīlāgīdā
166. You were	Tām vīvīa	Tām dā, lāgīdā, chīlāgīdā
167. They were	Ō vīvīa	Vā dā, lāgīdā, chīlāgīdā
168. It	V y	Itā
169. I be	---	Itā
170. He be	---	Itā
171. Having been	Vīgē	Hāgē lāgē
172. I shall be	---	---
173. I should be	---	---
174. I be	Mīr	Mīr
175. To be	Māgā	Māgā
176. I be	Māgā	Māgā
177. He be	Māgā	Māgā
178. I be	Māgā	Māgā
179. I be	Māgā	Māgā
180. I be	Māgā	Māgā
181. He be	Ū mīrē	Ō mīrē
182. We be	Hām mīrē	Hām mīrē
183. You be	Tām mīrē	Tām mīrē
184. They be	Ō mīrē	Vā mīrē
185. I be (Past Tense)	Mā mīrē	Mā mīrē
186. They be (Past Tense)	Tā mīrē	Tā mīrē
187. He be (Past Tense)	Ū mīrē	Ō mīrē